| 1 | |
| 2 |
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| 3 | .. _deprecated:
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| 4 |
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| 5 | =====================================================================
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| 6 | Deprecated Interfaces, Language Features, Attributes, and Conventions
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| 7 | =====================================================================
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| 8 |
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| 9 | In a perfect world, it would be possible to convert all instances of
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| 10 | some deprecated API into the new API and entirely remove the old API in
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| 11 | a single development cycle. However, due to the size of the kernel, the
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| 12 | maintainership hierarchy, and timing, it's not always feasible to do these
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| 13 | kinds of conversions at once. This means that new instances may sneak into
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| 14 | the kernel while old ones are being removed, only making the amount of
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| 15 | work to remove the API grow. In order to educate developers about what
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| 16 | has been deprecated and why, this list has been created as a place to
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| 17 | point when uses of deprecated things are proposed for inclusion in the
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| 18 | kernel.
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| 19 |
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| 20 | __deprecated
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| 21 | ------------
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| 22 | While this attribute does visually mark an interface as deprecated,
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| 23 | it `does not produce warnings during builds any more
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| 24 | <https://git.kernel.org/linus/771c035372a036f83353eef46dbb829780330234>`_
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| 25 | because one of the standing goals of the kernel is to build without
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| 26 | warnings and no one was actually doing anything to remove these deprecated
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| 27 | interfaces. While using `__deprecated` is nice to note an old API in
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| 28 | a header file, it isn't the full solution. Such interfaces must either
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| 29 | be fully removed from the kernel, or added to this file to discourage
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| 30 | others from using them in the future.
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| 31 |
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| 32 | BUG() and BUG_ON()
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| 33 | ------------------
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| 34 | Use WARN() and WARN_ON() instead, and handle the "impossible"
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| 35 | error condition as gracefully as possible. While the BUG()-family
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| 36 | of APIs were originally designed to act as an "impossible situation"
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| 37 | assert and to kill a kernel thread "safely", they turn out to just be
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| 38 | too risky. (e.g. "In what order do locks need to be released? Have
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| 39 | various states been restored?") Very commonly, using BUG() will
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| 40 | destabilize a system or entirely break it, which makes it impossible
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| 41 | to debug or even get viable crash reports. Linus has `very strong
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| 42 | <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFy6jNLsywVYdGp83AMrXBo_P-pkjkphPGrO=82SPKCpLQ@mail.gmail.com/>`_
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| 43 | feelings `about this
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| 44 | <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whDHsbK3HTOpTF=ue_o04onRwTEaK_ZoJp_fjbqq4+=Jw@mail.gmail.com/>`_.
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| 45 |
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| 46 | Note that the WARN()-family should only be used for "expected to
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| 47 | be unreachable" situations. If you want to warn about "reachable
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| 48 | but undesirable" situations, please use the pr_warn()-family of
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| 49 | functions. System owners may have set the *panic_on_warn* sysctl,
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| 50 | to make sure their systems do not continue running in the face of
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| 51 | "unreachable" conditions. (For example, see commits like `this one
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| 52 | <https://git.kernel.org/linus/d4689846881d160a4d12a514e991a740bcb5d65a>`_.)
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| 53 |
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| 54 | open-coded arithmetic in allocator arguments
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| 55 | --------------------------------------------
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| 56 | Dynamic size calculations (especially multiplication) should not be
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| 57 | performed in memory allocator (or similar) function arguments due to the
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| 58 | risk of them overflowing. This could lead to values wrapping around and a
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| 59 | smaller allocation being made than the caller was expecting. Using those
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| 60 | allocations could lead to linear overflows of heap memory and other
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| 61 | misbehaviors. (One exception to this is literal values where the compiler
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| 62 | can warn if they might overflow. However, the preferred way in these
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| 63 | cases is to refactor the code as suggested below to avoid the open-coded
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| 64 | arithmetic.)
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| 65 |
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| 66 | For example, do not use ``count * size`` as an argument, as in::
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| 67 |
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| 68 | foo = kmalloc(count * size, GFP_KERNEL);
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| 69 |
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| 70 | Instead, the 2-factor form of the allocator should be used::
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| 71 |
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| 72 | foo = kmalloc_array(count, size, GFP_KERNEL);
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| 73 |
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| 74 | Specifically, kmalloc() can be replaced with kmalloc_array(), and
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| 75 | kzalloc() can be replaced with kcalloc().
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| 76 |
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| 77 | If no 2-factor form is available, the saturate-on-overflow helpers should
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| 78 | be used::
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| 79 |
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| 80 | bar = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, array_size(count, size), &dma, GFP_KERNEL);
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| 81 |
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| 82 | Another common case to avoid is calculating the size of a structure with
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| 83 | a trailing array of others structures, as in::
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| 84 |
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| 85 | header = kzalloc(sizeof(*header) + count * sizeof(*header->item),
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| 86 | GFP_KERNEL);
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| 87 |
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| 88 | Instead, use the helper::
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| 89 |
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| 90 | header = kzalloc(struct_size(header, item, count), GFP_KERNEL);
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| 91 |
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| 92 | .. note:: If you are using struct_size() on a structure containing a zero-length
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| 93 | or a one-element array as a trailing array member, please refactor such
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| 94 | array usage and switch to a `flexible array member
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| 95 | <#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays>`_ instead.
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| 96 |
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| 97 | For other calculations, please compose the use of the size_mul(),
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| 98 | size_add(), and size_sub() helpers. For example, in the case of::
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| 99 |
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| 100 | foo = krealloc(current_size + chunk_size * (count - 3), GFP_KERNEL);
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| 101 |
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| 102 | Instead, use the helpers::
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| 103 |
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| 104 | foo = krealloc(size_add(current_size,
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| 105 | size_mul(chunk_size,
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| 106 | size_sub(count, 3))), GFP_KERNEL);
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| 107 |
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| 108 | For more details, also see array3_size() and flex_array_size(),
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| 109 | as well as the related check_mul_overflow(), check_add_overflow(),
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| 110 | check_sub_overflow(), and check_shl_overflow() family of functions.
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| 111 |
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| 112 | simple_strtol(), simple_strtoll(), simple_strtoul(), simple_strtoull()
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| 113 | ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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| 114 | The simple_strtol(), simple_strtoll(),
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| 115 | simple_strtoul(), and simple_strtoull() functions
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| 116 | explicitly ignore overflows, which may lead to unexpected results
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| 117 | in callers. The respective kstrtol(), kstrtoll(),
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| 118 | kstrtoul(), and kstrtoull() functions tend to be the
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| 119 | correct replacements, though note that those require the string to be
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| 120 | NUL or newline terminated.
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| 121 |
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| 122 | strcpy()
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| 123 | --------
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| 124 | strcpy() performs no bounds checking on the destination buffer. This
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| 125 | could result in linear overflows beyond the end of the buffer, leading to
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| 126 | all kinds of misbehaviors. While `CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y` and various
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| 127 | compiler flags help reduce the risk of using this function, there is
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| 128 | no good reason to add new uses of this function. The safe replacement
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| 129 | is strscpy(), though care must be given to any cases where the return
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| 130 | value of strcpy() was used, since strscpy() does not return a pointer to
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| 131 | the destination, but rather a count of non-NUL bytes copied (or negative
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| 132 | errno when it truncates).
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| 133 |
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| 134 | strncpy()
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| 135 | ---------
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| 136 | strncpy() has been removed from the kernel. All former callers have
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| 137 | been migrated to safer alternatives.
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| 138 |
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| 139 | strncpy() did not guarantee NUL-termination of the destination buffer,
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| 140 | leading to linear read overflows and other misbehavior. It also
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| 141 | unconditionally NUL-padded the destination, which was a needless
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| 142 | performance penalty for callers using only NUL-terminated strings. Due
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| 143 | to its various behaviors, it was an ambiguous API for determining what
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| 144 | an author's true intent was for the copy.
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| 145 |
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| 146 | The replacements for strncpy() are:
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| 147 |
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| 148 | - strscpy() when the destination must be NUL-terminated.
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| 149 | - strscpy_pad() when the destination must be NUL-terminated and
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| 150 | zero-padded (e.g., structs crossing privilege boundaries).
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| 151 | - memtostr() for NUL-terminated destinations from non-NUL-terminated
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| 152 | fixed-width sources (with the `__nonstring` attribute on the source).
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| 153 | - memtostr_pad() for the same, but with zero-padding.
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| 154 | - strtomem() for non-NUL-terminated fixed-width destinations, with
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| 155 | the `__nonstring` attribute on the destination.
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| 156 | - strtomem_pad() for non-NUL-terminated destinations that also need
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| 157 | zero-padding.
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| 158 | - memcpy_and_pad() for bounded copies from potentially unterminated
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| 159 | sources where the destination size is a runtime value.
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| 160 |
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| 161 | strlcpy()
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| 162 | ---------
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| 163 | strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first (since the return value
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| 164 | is meant to match that of strlen()). This read may exceed the destination
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| 165 | size limit. This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read overflows
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| 166 | if a source string is not NUL-terminated. The safe replacement is strscpy(),
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| 167 | though care must be given to any cases where the return value of strlcpy()
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| 168 | is used, since strscpy() will return negative errno values when it truncates.
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| 169 |
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| 170 | %p format specifier
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| 171 | -------------------
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| 172 | Traditionally, using "%p" in format strings would lead to regular address
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| 173 | exposure flaws in dmesg, proc, sysfs, etc. Instead of leaving these to
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| 174 | be exploitable, all "%p" uses in the kernel are being printed as a hashed
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| 175 | value, rendering them unusable for addressing. New uses of "%p" should not
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| 176 | be added to the kernel. For text addresses, using "%pS" is likely better,
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| 177 | as it produces the more useful symbol name instead. For nearly everything
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| 178 | else, just do not add "%p" at all.
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| 179 |
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| 180 | Paraphrasing Linus's current `guidance <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwQEd_d40g4mUCSsVRZzrFPUJt74vc6PPpb675hYNXcKw@mail.gmail.com/>`_:
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| 181 |
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| 182 | - If the hashed "%p" value is pointless, ask yourself whether the pointer
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| 183 | itself is important. Maybe it should be removed entirely?
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| 184 | - If you really think the true pointer value is important, why is some
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| 185 | system state or user privilege level considered "special"? If you think
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| 186 | you can justify it (in comments and commit log) well enough to stand
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| 187 | up to Linus's scrutiny, maybe you can use "%px", along with making sure
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| 188 | you have sensible permissions.
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| 189 |
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| 190 | If you are debugging something where "%p" hashing is causing problems,
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| 191 | you can temporarily boot with the debug flag "`no_hash_pointers
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| 192 | <https://git.kernel.org/linus/5ead723a20e0447bc7db33dc3070b420e5f80aa6>`_".
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| 193 |
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| 194 | Variable Length Arrays (VLAs)
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| 195 | -----------------------------
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| 196 | Using stack VLAs produces much worse machine code than statically
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| 197 | sized stack arrays. While these non-trivial `performance issues
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| 198 | <https://git.kernel.org/linus/02361bc77888>`_ are reason enough to
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| 199 | eliminate VLAs, they are also a security risk. Dynamic growth of a stack
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| 200 | array may exceed the remaining memory in the stack segment. This could
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| 201 | lead to a crash, possible overwriting sensitive contents at the end of the
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| 202 | stack (when built without `CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK=y`), or overwriting
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| 203 | memory adjacent to the stack (when built without `CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y`)
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| 204 |
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| 205 | Implicit switch case fall-through
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| 206 | ---------------------------------
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| 207 | The C language allows switch cases to fall through to the next case
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| 208 | when a "break" statement is missing at the end of a case. This, however,
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| 209 | introduces ambiguity in the code, as it's not always clear if the missing
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| 210 | break is intentional or a bug. For example, it's not obvious just from
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| 211 | looking at the code if `STATE_ONE` is intentionally designed to fall
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| 212 | through into `STATE_TWO`::
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| 213 |
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| 214 | switch (value) {
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| 215 | case STATE_ONE:
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| 216 | do_something();
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| 217 | case STATE_TWO:
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| 218 | do_other();
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| 219 | break;
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| 220 | default:
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| 221 | WARN("unknown state");
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| 222 | }
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| 223 |
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| 224 | As there have been a long list of flaws `due to missing "break" statements
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| 225 | <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/484.html>`_, we no longer allow
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| 226 | implicit fall-through. In order to identify intentional fall-through
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| 227 | cases, we have adopted a pseudo-keyword macro "fallthrough" which
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| 228 | expands to gcc's extension `__attribute__((__fallthrough__))
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| 229 | <https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Statement-Attributes.html>`_.
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| 230 | (When the C17/C18 `[[fallthrough]]` syntax is more commonly supported by
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| 231 | C compilers, static analyzers, and IDEs, we can switch to using that syntax
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| 232 | for the macro pseudo-keyword.)
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| 233 |
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| 234 | All switch/case blocks must end in one of:
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| 235 |
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| 236 | * break;
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| 237 | * fallthrough;
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| 238 | * continue;
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| 239 | * goto <label>;
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| 240 | * return [expression];
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| 241 |
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| 242 | Zero-length and one-element arrays
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| 243 | ----------------------------------
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| 244 | There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having
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| 245 | a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code
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| 246 | should always use `"flexible array members" <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member>`_
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| 247 | for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should
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| 248 | no longer be used.
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| 249 |
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| 250 | In older C code, dynamically sized trailing elements were done by specifying
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| 251 | a one-element array at the end of a structure::
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| 252 |
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| 253 | struct something {
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| 254 | size_t count;
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| 255 | struct foo items[1];
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| 256 | };
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| 257 |
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| 258 | This led to fragile size calculations via sizeof() (which would need to
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| 259 | remove the size of the single trailing element to get a correct size of
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| 260 | the "header"). A `GNU C extension <https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html>`_
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| 261 | was introduced to allow for zero-length arrays, to avoid these kinds of
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| 262 | size problems::
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| 263 |
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| 264 | struct something {
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| 265 | size_t count;
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| 266 | struct foo items[0];
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| 267 | };
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| 268 |
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| 269 | But this led to other problems, and didn't solve some problems shared by
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| 270 | both styles, like not being able to detect when such an array is accidentally
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| 271 | being used _not_ at the end of a structure (which could happen directly, or
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| 272 | when such a struct was in unions, structs of structs, etc).
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| 273 |
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| 274 | C99 introduced "flexible array members", which lacks a numeric size for
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| 275 | the array declaration entirely::
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| 276 |
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| 277 | struct something {
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| 278 | size_t count;
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| 279 | struct foo items[];
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| 280 | };
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| 281 |
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| 282 | This is the way the kernel expects dynamically sized trailing elements
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| 283 | to be declared. It allows the compiler to generate errors when the
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| 284 | flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which helps to prevent
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| 285 | some kind of `undefined behavior
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| 286 | <https://git.kernel.org/linus/76497732932f15e7323dc805e8ea8dc11bb587cf>`_
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| 287 | bugs from being inadvertently introduced to the codebase. It also allows
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| 288 | the compiler to correctly analyze array sizes (via sizeof(),
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| 289 | `CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE`, and `CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS`). For instance,
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| 290 | there is no mechanism that warns us that the following application of the
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| 291 | sizeof() operator to a zero-length array always results in zero::
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| 292 |
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| 293 | struct something {
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| 294 | size_t count;
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| 295 | struct foo items[0];
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| 296 | };
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| 297 |
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| 298 | struct something *instance;
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| 299 |
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| 300 | instance = kmalloc(struct_size(instance, items, count), GFP_KERNEL);
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| 301 | instance->count = count;
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| 302 |
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| 303 | size = sizeof(instance->items) * instance->count;
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| 304 | memcpy(instance->items, source, size);
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| 305 |
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| 306 | At the last line of code above, ``size`` turns out to be ``zero``, when one might
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| 307 | have thought it represents the total size in bytes of the dynamic memory recently
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| 308 | allocated for the trailing array ``items``. Here are a couple examples of this
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| 309 | issue: `link 1
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| 310 | <https://git.kernel.org/linus/f2cd32a443da694ac4e28fbf4ac6f9d5cc63a539>`_,
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| 311 | `link 2
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| 312 | <https://git.kernel.org/linus/ab91c2a89f86be2898cee208d492816ec238b2cf>`_.
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| 313 | Instead, `flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof()
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| 314 | operator may not be applied <https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html>`_,
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| 315 | so any misuse of such operators will be immediately noticed at build time.
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| 316 |
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| 317 | With respect to one-element arrays, one has to be acutely aware that `such arrays
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| 318 | occupy at least as much space as a single object of the type
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| 319 | <https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html>`_,
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| 320 | hence they contribute to the size of the enclosing structure. This is prone
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| 321 | to error every time people want to calculate the total size of dynamic memory
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| 322 | to allocate for a structure containing an array of this kind as a member::
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| 323 |
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| 324 | struct something {
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| 325 | size_t count;
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| 326 | struct foo items[1];
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| 327 | };
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| 328 |
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| 329 | struct something *instance;
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| 330 |
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| 331 | instance = kmalloc(struct_size(instance, items, count - 1), GFP_KERNEL);
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| 332 | instance->count = count;
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| 333 |
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| 334 | size = sizeof(instance->items) * instance->count;
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| 335 | memcpy(instance->items, source, size);
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| 336 |
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| 337 | In the example above, we had to remember to calculate ``count - 1`` when using
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| 338 | the struct_size() helper, otherwise we would have --unintentionally-- allocated
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| 339 | memory for one too many ``items`` objects. The cleanest and least error-prone way
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| 340 | to implement this is through the use of a `flexible array member`, together with
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| 341 | struct_size() and flex_array_size() helpers::
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| 342 |
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| 343 | struct something {
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| 344 | size_t count;
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| 345 | struct foo items[];
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| 346 | };
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| 347 |
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| 348 | struct something *instance;
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| 349 |
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| 350 | instance = kmalloc(struct_size(instance, items, count), GFP_KERNEL);
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| 351 | instance->count = count;
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| 352 |
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| 353 | memcpy(instance->items, source, flex_array_size(instance, items, instance->count));
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| 354 |
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| 355 | There are two special cases of replacement where the DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY()
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| 356 | helper needs to be used. (Note that it is named __DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY() for
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| 357 | use in UAPI headers.) Those cases are when the flexible array is either
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| 358 | alone in a struct or is part of a union. These are disallowed by the C99
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| 359 | specification, but for no technical reason (as can be seen by both the
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| 360 | existing use of such arrays in those places and the work-around that
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| 361 | DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY() uses). For example, to convert this::
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| 362 |
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| 363 | struct something {
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| 364 | ...
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| 365 | union {
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| 366 | struct type1 one[0];
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| 367 | struct type2 two[0];
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| 368 | };
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| 369 | };
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| 370 |
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| 371 | The helper must be used::
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| 372 |
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| 373 | struct something {
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| 374 | ...
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| 375 | union {
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| 376 | DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct type1, one);
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| 377 | DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct type2, two);
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| 378 | };
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| 379 | };
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| 380 |
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| 381 | Open-coded kmalloc assignments for struct objects
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| 382 | -------------------------------------------------
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| 383 | Performing open-coded kmalloc()-family allocation assignments prevents
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| 384 | the kernel (and compiler) from being able to examine the type of the
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| 385 | variable being assigned, which limits any related introspection that
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| 386 | may help with alignment, wrap-around, or additional hardening. The
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| 387 | kmalloc_obj()-family of macros provide this introspection, which can be
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| 388 | used for the common code patterns for single, array, and flexible object
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| 389 | allocations. For example, these open coded assignments::
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| 390 |
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| 391 | ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr), gfp);
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| 392 | ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr), gfp);
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| 393 | ptr = kmalloc_array(count, sizeof(*ptr), gfp);
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| 394 | ptr = kcalloc(count, sizeof(*ptr), gfp);
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| 395 | ptr = kmalloc(struct_size(ptr, flex_member, count), gfp);
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| 396 | ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct foo), gfp);
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| 397 |
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| 398 | become, respectively::
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| 399 |
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| 400 | ptr = kmalloc_obj(*ptr [, gfp] );
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| 401 | ptr = kzalloc_obj(*ptr [, gfp] );
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| 402 | ptr = kmalloc_objs(*ptr, count [, gfp] );
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| 403 | ptr = kzalloc_objs(*ptr, count [, gfp] );
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| 404 | ptr = kmalloc_flex(*ptr, flex_member, count [, gfp] );
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| 405 | __auto_type ptr = kmalloc_obj(struct foo [, gfp] );
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| 406 |
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| 407 | The argument gfp is optional, the default value is GFP_KERNEL.
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| 408 | If `ptr->flex_member` is annotated with __counted_by(), the allocation
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| 409 | will automatically fail if `count` is larger than the maximum
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| 410 | representable value that can be stored in the counter member associated
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| 411 | with `flex_member`.
|