| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | * Handle detection, reporting and mitigation of Spectre v1, v2, v3a and v4, as
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| 4 | * detailed at:
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| 5 | *
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| 6 | * https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability
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| 7 | *
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| 8 | * This code was originally written hastily under an awful lot of stress and so
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| 9 | * aspects of it are somewhat hacky. Unfortunately, changing anything in here
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| 10 | * instantly makes me feel ill. Thanks, Jann. Thann.
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| 11 | *
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| 12 | * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd, All Rights Reserved.
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| 13 | * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC
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| 14 | *
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| 15 | * "If there's something strange in your neighbourhood, who you gonna call?"
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| 16 | *
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| 17 | * Authors: Will Deacon <[email protected]> and Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
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| 18 |
|
| 19 |
|
| 20 | #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
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| 21 | #include <linux/bpf.h>
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| 22 | #include <linux/cpu.h>
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| 23 | #include <linux/device.h>
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| 24 | #include <linux/nospec.h>
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| 25 | #include <linux/prctl.h>
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| 26 | #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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| 27 | #include <linux/sysfs.h>
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| 28 |
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| 29 | #include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
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| 30 | #include <asm/insn.h>
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| 31 | #include <asm/spectre.h>
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| 32 | #include <asm/traps.h>
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| 33 | #include <asm/vectors.h>
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| 34 | #include <asm/virt.h>
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| 35 |
|
| 36 | |
| 37 | * We try to ensure that the mitigation state can never change as the result of
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| 38 | * onlining a late CPU.
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| 39 |
|
| 40 | static void update_mitigation_state(enum mitigation_state *oldp,
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| 41 | enum mitigation_state new)
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| 42 | {
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| 43 | enum mitigation_state state;
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| 44 |
|
| 45 | do {
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| 46 | state = READ_ONCE(*oldp);
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| 47 | if (new <= state)
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| 48 | break;
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| 49 |
|
| 50 |
|
| 51 | if (WARN_ON(system_capabilities_finalized()))
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| 52 | break;
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| 53 | } while (cmpxchg_relaxed(oldp, state, new) != state);
|
| 54 | }
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| 55 |
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| 56 | |
| 57 | * Spectre v1.
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| 58 | *
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| 59 | * The kernel can't protect userspace for this one: it's each person for
|
| 60 | * themselves. Advertise what we're doing and be done with it.
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| 61 |
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| 62 | ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
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| 63 | char *buf)
|
| 64 | {
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| 65 | return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
|
| 66 | }
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| 67 |
|
| 68 | |
| 69 | * Spectre v2.
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| 70 | *
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| 71 | * This one sucks. A CPU is either:
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| 72 | *
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| 73 | * - Mitigated in hardware and advertised by ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2.
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| 74 | * - Mitigated in hardware and listed in our "safe list".
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| 75 | * - Mitigated in software by firmware.
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| 76 | * - Mitigated in software by a CPU-specific dance in the kernel and a
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| 77 | * firmware call at EL2.
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| 78 | * - Vulnerable.
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| 79 | *
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| 80 | * It's not unlikely for different CPUs in a big.LITTLE system to fall into
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| 81 | * different camps.
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| 82 |
|
| 83 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_state;
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| 84 |
|
| 85 | static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_v2;
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| 86 | static int __init parse_spectre_v2_param(char *str)
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| 87 | {
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| 88 | __nospectre_v2 = true;
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| 89 | return 0;
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| 90 | }
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| 91 | early_param("nospectre_v2", parse_spectre_v2_param);
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| 92 |
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| 93 | static bool spectre_v2_mitigations_off(void)
|
| 94 | {
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| 95 | return __nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off();
|
| 96 | }
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| 97 |
|
| 98 | static const char *get_bhb_affected_string(enum mitigation_state bhb_state)
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| 99 | {
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| 100 | switch (bhb_state) {
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| 101 | case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
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| 102 | return "";
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| 103 | default:
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| 104 | case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
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| 105 | return ", but not BHB";
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| 106 | case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
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| 107 | return ", BHB";
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| 108 | }
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| 109 | }
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| 110 |
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| 111 | static bool _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
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| 112 | {
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| 113 | #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
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| 114 | return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
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| 115 | #else
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| 116 | return false;
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| 117 | #endif
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| 118 | }
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| 119 |
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| 120 | ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
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| 121 | char *buf)
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| 122 | {
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| 123 | enum mitigation_state bhb_state = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state();
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| 124 | const char *bhb_str = get_bhb_affected_string(bhb_state);
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| 125 | const char *v2_str = "Branch predictor hardening";
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| 126 |
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| 127 | switch (spectre_v2_state) {
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| 128 | case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
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| 129 | if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
|
| 130 | return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
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| 131 |
|
| 132 | |
| 133 | * Platforms affected by Spectre-BHB can't report
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| 134 | * "Not affected" for Spectre-v2.
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| 135 |
|
| 136 | v2_str = "CSV2";
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| 137 | fallthrough;
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| 138 | case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
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| 139 | if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED && _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
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| 140 | return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n");
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| 141 |
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| 142 | return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: %s%s\n", v2_str, bhb_str);
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| 143 | case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
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| 144 | fallthrough;
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| 145 | default:
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| 146 | return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
|
| 147 | }
|
| 148 | }
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| 149 |
|
| 150 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(void)
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| 151 | {
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| 152 | u64 pfr0;
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| 153 | static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = {
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| 154 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
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| 155 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
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| 156 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
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| 157 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53),
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| 158 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110),
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| 159 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_2XX_SILVER),
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| 160 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER),
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| 161 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER),
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| 162 | { }
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| 163 | };
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| 164 |
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| 165 |
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| 166 | pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
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| 167 | if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_CSV2_SHIFT))
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| 168 | return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
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| 169 |
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| 170 |
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| 171 | if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_v2_safe_list))
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| 172 | return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
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| 173 |
|
| 174 | return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
|
| 175 | }
|
| 176 |
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| 177 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
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| 178 | {
|
| 179 | int ret;
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| 180 | struct arm_smccc_res res;
|
| 181 |
|
| 182 | arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
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| 183 | ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
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| 184 |
|
| 185 | ret = res.a0;
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| 186 | switch (ret) {
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| 187 | case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
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| 188 | return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
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| 189 | case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED:
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| 190 | return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
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| 191 | default:
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| 192 | fallthrough;
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| 193 | case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
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| 194 | return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
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| 195 | }
|
| 196 | }
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| 197 |
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| 198 | bool has_spectre_v2(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
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| 199 | {
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| 200 | WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
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| 201 |
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| 202 | if (spectre_v2_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state() == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
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| 203 | return false;
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| 204 |
|
| 205 | if (spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state() == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
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| 206 | return false;
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| 207 |
|
| 208 | return true;
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| 209 | }
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| 210 |
|
| 211 | enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v2_state(void)
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| 212 | {
|
| 213 | return spectre_v2_state;
|
| 214 | }
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| 215 |
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| 216 | DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
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| 217 |
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| 218 | static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn)
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| 219 | {
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| 220 | __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
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| 221 |
|
| 222 | |
| 223 | * Vinz Clortho takes the hyp_vecs start/end "keys" at
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| 224 | * the door when we're a guest. Skip the hyp-vectors work.
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| 225 |
|
| 226 | if (!is_hyp_mode_available())
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| 227 | return;
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| 228 |
|
| 229 | __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.slot, HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_DIRECT);
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| 230 | }
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| 231 |
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| 232 |
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| 233 | static noinstr void call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void)
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| 234 | {
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| 235 | arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
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| 236 | }
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| 237 |
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| 238 |
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| 239 | static noinstr void call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
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| 240 | {
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| 241 | arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
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| 242 | }
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| 243 |
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| 244 |
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| 245 | static noinstr void qcom_link_stack_sanitisation(void)
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| 246 | {
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| 247 | u64 tmp;
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| 248 |
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| 249 | asm volatile("mov %0, x30 \n"
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| 250 | ".rept 16 \n"
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| 251 | "bl . + 4 \n"
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| 252 | ".endr \n"
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| 253 | "mov x30, %0 \n"
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| 254 | : "=&r" (tmp));
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| 255 | }
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| 256 |
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| 257 | static bp_hardening_cb_t spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb(void)
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| 258 | {
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| 259 | u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();
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| 260 | if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) &&
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| 261 | ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
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| 262 | return NULL;
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| 263 |
|
| 264 | return qcom_link_stack_sanitisation;
|
| 265 | }
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| 266 |
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| 267 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation(void)
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| 268 | {
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| 269 | bp_hardening_cb_t cb;
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| 270 | enum mitigation_state state;
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| 271 |
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| 272 | state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
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| 273 | if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
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| 274 | return state;
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| 275 |
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| 276 | if (spectre_v2_mitigations_off())
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| 277 | return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
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| 278 |
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| 279 | switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) {
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| 280 | case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC:
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| 281 | cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
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| 282 | break;
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| 283 |
|
| 284 | case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC:
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| 285 | cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
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| 286 | break;
|
| 287 |
|
| 288 | default:
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| 289 | return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
|
| 290 | }
|
| 291 |
|
| 292 | |
| 293 | * Prefer a CPU-specific workaround if it exists. Note that we
|
| 294 | * still rely on firmware for the mitigation at EL2.
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| 295 |
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| 296 | cb = spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb() ?: cb;
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| 297 | install_bp_hardening_cb(cb);
|
| 298 | return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 299 | }
|
| 300 |
|
| 301 | void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
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| 302 | {
|
| 303 | enum mitigation_state state;
|
| 304 |
|
| 305 | WARN_ON(preemptible());
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| 306 |
|
| 307 | state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state();
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| 308 | if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
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| 309 | state = spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation();
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| 310 |
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| 311 | update_mitigation_state(&spectre_v2_state, state);
|
| 312 | }
|
| 313 |
|
| 314 | |
| 315 | * Spectre-v3a.
|
| 316 | *
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| 317 | * Phew, there's not an awful lot to do here! We just instruct EL2 to use
|
| 318 | * an indirect trampoline for the hyp vectors so that guests can't read
|
| 319 | * VBAR_EL2 to defeat randomisation of the hypervisor VA layout.
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| 320 |
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| 321 | bool has_spectre_v3a(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
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| 322 | {
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| 323 | static const struct midr_range spectre_v3a_unsafe_list[] = {
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| 324 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
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| 325 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
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| 326 | {},
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| 327 | };
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| 328 |
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| 329 | WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
|
| 330 | return is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_v3a_unsafe_list);
|
| 331 | }
|
| 332 |
|
| 333 | void spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
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| 334 | {
|
| 335 | struct bp_hardening_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data);
|
| 336 |
|
| 337 | if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A))
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| 338 | data->slot += HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT;
|
| 339 | }
|
| 340 |
|
| 341 | |
| 342 | * Spectre v4.
|
| 343 | *
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| 344 | * If you thought Spectre v2 was nasty, wait until you see this mess. A CPU is
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| 345 | * either:
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| 346 | *
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| 347 | * - Mitigated in hardware and listed in our "safe list".
|
| 348 | * - Mitigated in hardware via PSTATE.SSBS.
|
| 349 | * - Mitigated in software by firmware (sometimes referred to as SSBD).
|
| 350 | *
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| 351 | * Wait, that doesn't sound so bad, does it? Keep reading...
|
| 352 | *
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| 353 | * A major source of headaches is that the software mitigation is enabled both
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| 354 | * on a per-task basis, but can also be forced on for the kernel, necessitating
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| 355 | * both context-switch *and* entry/exit hooks. To make it even worse, some CPUs
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| 356 | * allow EL0 to toggle SSBS directly, which can end up with the prctl() state
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| 357 | * being stale when re-entering the kernel. The usual big.LITTLE caveats apply,
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| 358 | * so you can have systems that have both firmware and SSBS mitigations. This
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| 359 | * means we actually have to reject late onlining of CPUs with mitigations if
|
| 360 | * all of the currently onlined CPUs are safelisted, as the mitigation tends to
|
| 361 | * be opt-in for userspace. Yes, really, the cure is worse than the disease.
|
| 362 | *
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| 363 | * The only good part is that if the firmware mitigation is present, then it is
|
| 364 | * present for all CPUs, meaning we don't have to worry about late onlining of a
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| 365 | * vulnerable CPU if one of the boot CPUs is using the firmware mitigation.
|
| 366 | *
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| 367 | * Give me a VAX-11/780 any day of the week...
|
| 368 |
|
| 369 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_state;
|
| 370 |
|
| 371 |
|
| 372 | DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
|
| 373 |
|
| 374 | enum spectre_v4_policy {
|
| 375 | SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DYNAMIC,
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| 376 | SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_ENABLED,
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| 377 | SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DISABLED,
|
| 378 | };
|
| 379 |
|
| 380 | static enum spectre_v4_policy __read_mostly __spectre_v4_policy;
|
| 381 |
|
| 382 | static const struct spectre_v4_param {
|
| 383 | const char *str;
|
| 384 | enum spectre_v4_policy policy;
|
| 385 | } spectre_v4_params[] = {
|
| 386 | { "force-on", SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_ENABLED, },
|
| 387 | { "force-off", SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DISABLED, },
|
| 388 | { "kernel", SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DYNAMIC, },
|
| 389 | };
|
| 390 | static int __init parse_spectre_v4_param(char *str)
|
| 391 | {
|
| 392 | int i;
|
| 393 |
|
| 394 | if (!str || !str[0])
|
| 395 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 396 |
|
| 397 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_v4_params); i++) {
|
| 398 | const struct spectre_v4_param *param = &spectre_v4_params[i];
|
| 399 |
|
| 400 | if (strncmp(str, param->str, strlen(param->str)))
|
| 401 | continue;
|
| 402 |
|
| 403 | __spectre_v4_policy = param->policy;
|
| 404 | return 0;
|
| 405 | }
|
| 406 |
|
| 407 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 408 | }
|
| 409 | early_param("ssbd", parse_spectre_v4_param);
|
| 410 |
|
| 411 | |
| 412 | * Because this was all written in a rush by people working in different silos,
|
| 413 | * we've ended up with multiple command line options to control the same thing.
|
| 414 | * Wrap these up in some helpers, which prefer disabling the mitigation if faced
|
| 415 | * with contradictory parameters. The mitigation is always either "off",
|
| 416 | * "dynamic" or "on".
|
| 417 |
|
| 418 | static bool spectre_v4_mitigations_off(void)
|
| 419 | {
|
| 420 | return cpu_mitigations_off() ||
|
| 421 | __spectre_v4_policy == SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DISABLED;
|
| 422 | }
|
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
|
| 425 | static bool spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic(void)
|
| 426 | {
|
| 427 | return !spectre_v4_mitigations_off() &&
|
| 428 | __spectre_v4_policy == SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_DYNAMIC;
|
| 429 | }
|
| 430 |
|
| 431 | static bool spectre_v4_mitigations_on(void)
|
| 432 | {
|
| 433 | return !spectre_v4_mitigations_off() &&
|
| 434 | __spectre_v4_policy == SPECTRE_V4_POLICY_MITIGATION_ENABLED;
|
| 435 | }
|
| 436 |
|
| 437 | ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
|
| 438 | struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
|
| 439 | {
|
| 440 | switch (spectre_v4_state) {
|
| 441 | case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
|
| 442 | return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
|
| 443 | case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
|
| 444 | return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl\n");
|
| 445 | case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
|
| 446 | fallthrough;
|
| 447 | default:
|
| 448 | return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
|
| 449 | }
|
| 450 | }
|
| 451 |
|
| 452 | enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v4_state(void)
|
| 453 | {
|
| 454 | return spectre_v4_state;
|
| 455 | }
|
| 456 |
|
| 457 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(void)
|
| 458 | {
|
| 459 | static const struct midr_range spectre_v4_safe_list[] = {
|
| 460 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
|
| 461 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
|
| 462 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
|
| 463 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53),
|
| 464 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER),
|
| 465 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER),
|
| 466 | { },
|
| 467 | };
|
| 468 |
|
| 469 | if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_v4_safe_list))
|
| 470 | return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
|
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
|
| 473 | if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
|
| 474 | return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 475 |
|
| 476 | return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
|
| 477 | }
|
| 478 |
|
| 479 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
|
| 480 | {
|
| 481 | int ret;
|
| 482 | struct arm_smccc_res res;
|
| 483 |
|
| 484 | arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
|
| 485 | ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
|
| 486 |
|
| 487 | ret = res.a0;
|
| 488 | switch (ret) {
|
| 489 | case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
|
| 490 | return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 491 | case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED:
|
| 492 | fallthrough;
|
| 493 | case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
|
| 494 | return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
|
| 495 | default:
|
| 496 | fallthrough;
|
| 497 | case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
|
| 498 | return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
|
| 499 | }
|
| 500 | }
|
| 501 |
|
| 502 | bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope)
|
| 503 | {
|
| 504 | enum mitigation_state state;
|
| 505 |
|
| 506 | WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
|
| 507 |
|
| 508 | state = spectre_v4_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state();
|
| 509 | if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
|
| 510 | state = spectre_v4_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
|
| 511 |
|
| 512 | return state != SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
|
| 513 | }
|
| 514 |
|
| 515 | bool try_emulate_el1_ssbs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr)
|
| 516 | {
|
| 517 | const u32 instr_mask = ~(1U << PSTATE_Imm_shift);
|
| 518 | const u32 instr_val = 0xd500401f | PSTATE_SSBS;
|
| 519 |
|
| 520 | if ((instr & instr_mask) != instr_val)
|
| 521 | return false;
|
| 522 |
|
| 523 | if (instr & BIT(PSTATE_Imm_shift))
|
| 524 | regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
|
| 525 | else
|
| 526 | regs->pstate &= ~PSR_SSBS_BIT;
|
| 527 |
|
| 528 | arm64_skip_faulting_instruction(regs, 4);
|
| 529 | return true;
|
| 530 | }
|
| 531 |
|
| 532 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(void)
|
| 533 | {
|
| 534 | enum mitigation_state state;
|
| 535 |
|
| 536 | |
| 537 | * If the system is mitigated but this CPU doesn't have SSBS, then
|
| 538 | * we must be on the safelist and there's nothing more to do.
|
| 539 |
|
| 540 | state = spectre_v4_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state();
|
| 541 | if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED || !this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
|
| 542 | return state;
|
| 543 |
|
| 544 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off()) {
|
| 545 | sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, 0, SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS);
|
| 546 | set_pstate_ssbs(1);
|
| 547 | return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
|
| 548 | }
|
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 | set_pstate_ssbs(0);
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 | |
| 554 | * SSBS is self-synchronizing and is intended to affect subsequent
|
| 555 | * speculative instructions, but some CPUs can speculate with a stale
|
| 556 | * value of SSBS.
|
| 557 | *
|
| 558 | * Mitigate this with an unconditional speculation barrier, as CPUs
|
| 559 | * could mis-speculate branches and bypass a conditional barrier.
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 | if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386))
|
| 562 | spec_bar();
|
| 563 |
|
| 564 | return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 565 | }
|
| 566 |
|
| 567 | |
| 568 | * Patch a branch over the Spectre-v4 mitigation code with a NOP so that
|
| 569 | * we fallthrough and check whether firmware needs to be called on this CPU.
|
| 570 |
|
| 571 | void __init spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt,
|
| 572 | __le32 *origptr,
|
| 573 | __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
|
| 574 | {
|
| 575 | BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
|
| 576 |
|
| 577 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off())
|
| 578 | return;
|
| 579 |
|
| 580 | if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
|
| 581 | return;
|
| 582 |
|
| 583 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic())
|
| 584 | *updptr = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
|
| 585 | }
|
| 586 |
|
| 587 | |
| 588 | * Patch a NOP in the Spectre-v4 mitigation code with an SMC/HVC instruction
|
| 589 | * to call into firmware to adjust the mitigation state.
|
| 590 |
|
| 591 | void __init smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt,
|
| 592 | __le32 *origptr,
|
| 593 | __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
|
| 594 | {
|
| 595 | u32 insn;
|
| 596 |
|
| 597 | BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
|
| 598 |
|
| 599 | switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) {
|
| 600 | case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC:
|
| 601 | insn = aarch64_insn_get_hvc_value();
|
| 602 | break;
|
| 603 | case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC:
|
| 604 | insn = aarch64_insn_get_smc_value();
|
| 605 | break;
|
| 606 | default:
|
| 607 | return;
|
| 608 | }
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 | *updptr = cpu_to_le32(insn);
|
| 611 | }
|
| 612 |
|
| 613 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_fw_mitigation(void)
|
| 614 | {
|
| 615 | enum mitigation_state state;
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 | state = spectre_v4_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
|
| 618 | if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
|
| 619 | return state;
|
| 620 |
|
| 621 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off()) {
|
| 622 | arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, false, NULL);
|
| 623 | return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
|
| 624 | }
|
| 625 |
|
| 626 | arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, true, NULL);
|
| 627 |
|
| 628 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic())
|
| 629 | __this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
|
| 630 |
|
| 631 | return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 632 | }
|
| 633 |
|
| 634 | void spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
|
| 635 | {
|
| 636 | enum mitigation_state state;
|
| 637 |
|
| 638 | WARN_ON(preemptible());
|
| 639 |
|
| 640 | state = spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation();
|
| 641 | if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
|
| 642 | state = spectre_v4_enable_fw_mitigation();
|
| 643 |
|
| 644 | update_mitigation_state(&spectre_v4_state, state);
|
| 645 | }
|
| 646 |
|
| 647 | static void __update_pstate_ssbs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool state)
|
| 648 | {
|
| 649 | u64 bit = compat_user_mode(regs) ? PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT : PSR_SSBS_BIT;
|
| 650 |
|
| 651 | if (state)
|
| 652 | regs->pstate |= bit;
|
| 653 | else
|
| 654 | regs->pstate &= ~bit;
|
| 655 | }
|
| 656 |
|
| 657 | void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
| 658 | {
|
| 659 | struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(tsk);
|
| 660 | bool ssbs = false, kthread = tsk->flags & PF_KTHREAD;
|
| 661 |
|
| 662 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off())
|
| 663 | ssbs = true;
|
| 664 | else if (spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic() && !kthread)
|
| 665 | ssbs = !test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD);
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 | __update_pstate_ssbs(regs, ssbs);
|
| 668 | }
|
| 669 |
|
| 670 | |
| 671 | * The Spectre-v4 mitigation can be controlled via a prctl() from userspace.
|
| 672 | * This is interesting because the "speculation disabled" behaviour can be
|
| 673 | * configured so that it is preserved across exec(), which means that the
|
| 674 | * prctl() may be necessary even when PSTATE.SSBS can be toggled directly
|
| 675 | * from userspace.
|
| 676 |
|
| 677 | static void ssbd_prctl_enable_mitigation(struct task_struct *task)
|
| 678 | {
|
| 679 | task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
|
| 680 | task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
|
| 681 | set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
|
| 682 | }
|
| 683 |
|
| 684 | static void ssbd_prctl_disable_mitigation(struct task_struct *task)
|
| 685 | {
|
| 686 | task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
|
| 687 | task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
|
| 688 | clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
|
| 689 | }
|
| 690 |
|
| 691 | static int ssbd_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
|
| 692 | {
|
| 693 | switch (ctrl) {
|
| 694 | case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
|
| 695 |
|
| 696 | |
| 697 | * Force disabled speculation prevents it from being
|
| 698 | * re-enabled.
|
| 699 |
|
| 700 | if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
|
| 701 | return -EPERM;
|
| 702 |
|
| 703 | |
| 704 | * If the mitigation is forced on, then speculation is forced
|
| 705 | * off and we again prevent it from being re-enabled.
|
| 706 |
|
| 707 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_on())
|
| 708 | return -EPERM;
|
| 709 |
|
| 710 | ssbd_prctl_disable_mitigation(task);
|
| 711 | break;
|
| 712 | case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
|
| 713 |
|
| 714 | |
| 715 | * If the mitigation is forced off, then speculation is forced
|
| 716 | * on and we prevent it from being disabled.
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off())
|
| 719 | return -EPERM;
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 | task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
|
| 722 | fallthrough;
|
| 723 | case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
|
| 724 |
|
| 725 |
|
| 726 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off())
|
| 727 | return -EPERM;
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 | ssbd_prctl_enable_mitigation(task);
|
| 730 | break;
|
| 731 | case PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC:
|
| 732 |
|
| 733 | |
| 734 | * If the mitigation state is forced one way or the other, then
|
| 735 | * we must fail now before we try to toggle it on execve().
|
| 736 |
|
| 737 | if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task) ||
|
| 738 | spectre_v4_mitigations_off() ||
|
| 739 | spectre_v4_mitigations_on()) {
|
| 740 | return -EPERM;
|
| 741 | }
|
| 742 |
|
| 743 | ssbd_prctl_enable_mitigation(task);
|
| 744 | task_set_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
|
| 745 | break;
|
| 746 | default:
|
| 747 | return -ERANGE;
|
| 748 | }
|
| 749 |
|
| 750 | spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(task);
|
| 751 | return 0;
|
| 752 | }
|
| 753 |
|
| 754 | int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
|
| 755 | unsigned long ctrl)
|
| 756 | {
|
| 757 | switch (which) {
|
| 758 | case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
|
| 759 | return ssbd_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
|
| 760 | default:
|
| 761 | return -ENODEV;
|
| 762 | }
|
| 763 | }
|
| 764 |
|
| 765 | static int ssbd_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
|
| 766 | {
|
| 767 | switch (spectre_v4_state) {
|
| 768 | case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
|
| 769 | return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
|
| 770 | case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
|
| 771 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_on())
|
| 772 | return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
|
| 773 |
|
| 774 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_dynamic())
|
| 775 | break;
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 | fallthrough;
|
| 779 | case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
|
| 780 | fallthrough;
|
| 781 | default:
|
| 782 | return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
|
| 783 | }
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
|
| 786 | if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
|
| 787 | return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
|
| 788 |
|
| 789 | if (task_spec_ssb_noexec(task))
|
| 790 | return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC;
|
| 791 |
|
| 792 | if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
|
| 793 | return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
|
| 794 |
|
| 795 | return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
|
| 796 | }
|
| 797 |
|
| 798 | int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
|
| 799 | {
|
| 800 | switch (which) {
|
| 801 | case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
|
| 802 | return ssbd_prctl_get(task);
|
| 803 | default:
|
| 804 | return -ENODEV;
|
| 805 | }
|
| 806 | }
|
| 807 |
|
| 808 | |
| 809 | * Spectre BHB.
|
| 810 | *
|
| 811 | * A CPU is either:
|
| 812 | * - Mitigated by a branchy loop a CPU specific number of times, and listed
|
| 813 | * in our "loop mitigated list".
|
| 814 | * - Mitigated in software by the firmware Spectre v2 call.
|
| 815 | * - Has the ClearBHB instruction to perform the mitigation.
|
| 816 | * - Has the 'Exception Clears Branch History Buffer' (ECBHB) feature, so no
|
| 817 | * software mitigation in the vectors is needed.
|
| 818 | * - Has CSV2.3, so is unaffected.
|
| 819 |
|
| 820 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state;
|
| 821 |
|
| 822 | enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void)
|
| 823 | {
|
| 824 | return spectre_bhb_state;
|
| 825 | }
|
| 826 |
|
| 827 | enum bhb_mitigation_bits {
|
| 828 | BHB_LOOP,
|
| 829 | BHB_FW,
|
| 830 | BHB_HW,
|
| 831 | BHB_INSN,
|
| 832 | };
|
| 833 | static unsigned long system_bhb_mitigations;
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 | |
| 836 | * This must be called with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU for each type of CPU, before any
|
| 837 | * SCOPE_SYSTEM call will give the right answer.
|
| 838 |
|
| 839 | static bool is_spectre_bhb_safe(int scope)
|
| 840 | {
|
| 841 | static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_safe_list[] = {
|
| 842 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
|
| 843 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
|
| 844 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
|
| 845 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A510),
|
| 846 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A520),
|
| 847 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53),
|
| 848 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_2XX_SILVER),
|
| 849 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER),
|
| 850 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER),
|
| 851 | {},
|
| 852 | };
|
| 853 | static bool all_safe = true;
|
| 854 |
|
| 855 | if (scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
|
| 856 | return all_safe;
|
| 857 |
|
| 858 | if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_safe_list))
|
| 859 | return true;
|
| 860 |
|
| 861 | all_safe = false;
|
| 862 |
|
| 863 | return false;
|
| 864 | }
|
| 865 |
|
| 866 | static u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(void)
|
| 867 | {
|
| 868 | u8 k = 0;
|
| 869 |
|
| 870 | static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k132_list[] = {
|
| 871 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X3),
|
| 872 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V2),
|
| 873 | {},
|
| 874 | };
|
| 875 | static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k38_list[] = {
|
| 876 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A715),
|
| 877 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A720),
|
| 878 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A720AE),
|
| 879 | {},
|
| 880 | };
|
| 881 | static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k32_list[] = {
|
| 882 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78),
|
| 883 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE),
|
| 884 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78C),
|
| 885 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1),
|
| 886 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1C),
|
| 887 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A710),
|
| 888 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X2),
|
| 889 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2),
|
| 890 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1),
|
| 891 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110),
|
| 892 | {},
|
| 893 | };
|
| 894 | static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k24_list[] = {
|
| 895 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
|
| 896 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76AE),
|
| 897 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A77),
|
| 898 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1),
|
| 899 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_GOLD),
|
| 900 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_HIP09),
|
| 901 | {},
|
| 902 | };
|
| 903 | static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k11_list[] = {
|
| 904 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_AMPERE1),
|
| 905 | {},
|
| 906 | };
|
| 907 | static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k8_list[] = {
|
| 908 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
|
| 909 | MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
|
| 910 | {},
|
| 911 | };
|
| 912 |
|
| 913 | if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k132_list))
|
| 914 | k = 132;
|
| 915 | else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k38_list))
|
| 916 | k = 38;
|
| 917 | else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k32_list))
|
| 918 | k = 32;
|
| 919 | else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k24_list))
|
| 920 | k = 24;
|
| 921 | else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k11_list))
|
| 922 | k = 11;
|
| 923 | else if (is_midr_in_range_list(spectre_bhb_k8_list))
|
| 924 | k = 8;
|
| 925 |
|
| 926 | return k;
|
| 927 | }
|
| 928 |
|
| 929 | static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
|
| 930 | {
|
| 931 | int ret;
|
| 932 | struct arm_smccc_res res;
|
| 933 |
|
| 934 | arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
|
| 935 | ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3, &res);
|
| 936 |
|
| 937 | ret = res.a0;
|
| 938 | switch (ret) {
|
| 939 | case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
|
| 940 | return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 941 | case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED:
|
| 942 | return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
|
| 943 | default:
|
| 944 | fallthrough;
|
| 945 | case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
|
| 946 | return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
|
| 947 | }
|
| 948 | }
|
| 949 |
|
| 950 | static bool has_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigation(void)
|
| 951 | {
|
| 952 | enum mitigation_state fw_state;
|
| 953 | bool has_smccc = arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() != SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE;
|
| 954 |
|
| 955 | fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
|
| 956 | return has_smccc && fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 957 | }
|
| 958 |
|
| 959 | static bool supports_ecbhb(int scope)
|
| 960 | {
|
| 961 | u64 mmfr1;
|
| 962 |
|
| 963 | if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
|
| 964 | mmfr1 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1);
|
| 965 | else
|
| 966 | mmfr1 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1);
|
| 967 |
|
| 968 | return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(mmfr1,
|
| 969 | ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_ECBHB_SHIFT);
|
| 970 | }
|
| 971 |
|
| 972 | static u8 max_bhb_k;
|
| 973 |
|
| 974 | bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
|
| 975 | int scope)
|
| 976 | {
|
| 977 | WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
|
| 978 |
|
| 979 | if (supports_csv2p3(scope))
|
| 980 | return false;
|
| 981 |
|
| 982 | if (is_spectre_bhb_safe(scope))
|
| 983 | return false;
|
| 984 |
|
| 985 | |
| 986 | * At this point the core isn't known to be "safe" so we're going to
|
| 987 | * assume it's vulnerable. We still need to update `max_bhb_k` though,
|
| 988 | * but only if we aren't mitigating with clearbhb though.
|
| 989 |
|
| 990 | if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU && !supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
|
| 991 | max_bhb_k = max(max_bhb_k, spectre_bhb_loop_affected());
|
| 992 |
|
| 993 | return true;
|
| 994 | }
|
| 995 |
|
| 996 | u8 get_spectre_bhb_loop_value(void)
|
| 997 | {
|
| 998 | return max_bhb_k;
|
| 999 | }
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 | static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
|
| 1002 | {
|
| 1003 | const char *v = arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(slot);
|
| 1004 |
|
| 1005 | __this_cpu_write(this_cpu_vector, v);
|
| 1006 |
|
| 1007 | |
| 1008 | * When KPTI is in use, the vectors are switched when exiting to
|
| 1009 | * user-space.
|
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 | if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0))
|
| 1012 | return;
|
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 | write_sysreg(v, vbar_el1);
|
| 1015 | isb();
|
| 1016 | }
|
| 1017 |
|
| 1018 | bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
|
| 1019 | static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
|
| 1020 | {
|
| 1021 | __nospectre_bhb = true;
|
| 1022 | return 0;
|
| 1023 | }
|
| 1024 | early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
|
| 1025 |
|
| 1026 | static bool spectre_bhb_mitigations_off(void)
|
| 1027 | {
|
| 1028 | return __nospectre_bhb || cpu_mitigations_off();
|
| 1029 | }
|
| 1030 |
|
| 1031 | void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
|
| 1032 | {
|
| 1033 | bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
|
| 1034 | enum mitigation_state state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
|
| 1035 | struct bp_hardening_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data);
|
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 | if (!is_spectre_bhb_affected(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
|
| 1038 | return;
|
| 1039 |
|
| 1040 | if (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) {
|
| 1041 |
|
| 1042 | } else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
|
| 1043 |
|
| 1044 | } else if (spectre_bhb_mitigations_off()) {
|
| 1045 |
|
| 1046 | } else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
|
| 1047 | state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 1048 | set_bit(BHB_HW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
|
| 1049 | } else if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
|
| 1050 | |
| 1051 | * Ensure KVM uses the indirect vector which will have ClearBHB
|
| 1052 | * added.
|
| 1053 |
|
| 1054 | if (!data->slot)
|
| 1055 | data->slot = HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT;
|
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 | this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN);
|
| 1058 | state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 1059 | set_bit(BHB_INSN, &system_bhb_mitigations);
|
| 1060 | } else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected()) {
|
| 1061 | |
| 1062 | * Ensure KVM uses the indirect vector which will have the
|
| 1063 | * branchy-loop added. A57/A72-r0 will already have selected
|
| 1064 | * the spectre-indirect vector, which is sufficient for BHB
|
| 1065 | * too.
|
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 | if (!data->slot)
|
| 1068 | data->slot = HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT;
|
| 1069 |
|
| 1070 | this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP);
|
| 1071 | state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 1072 | set_bit(BHB_LOOP, &system_bhb_mitigations);
|
| 1073 | } else if (has_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigation()) {
|
| 1074 | |
| 1075 | * Ensure KVM uses one of the spectre bp_hardening
|
| 1076 | * vectors. The indirect vector doesn't include the EL3
|
| 1077 | * call, so needs upgrading to
|
| 1078 | * HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_INDIRECT.
|
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 | if (!data->slot || data->slot == HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT)
|
| 1081 | data->slot += 1;
|
| 1082 |
|
| 1083 | this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW);
|
| 1084 |
|
| 1085 | |
| 1086 | * The WA3 call in the vectors supersedes the WA1 call
|
| 1087 | * made during context-switch. Uninstall any firmware
|
| 1088 | * bp_hardening callback.
|
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 | cpu_cb = spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb();
|
| 1091 | if (__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn) != cpu_cb)
|
| 1092 | __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, NULL);
|
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 | state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
|
| 1095 | set_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
|
| 1096 | }
|
| 1097 |
|
| 1098 | update_mitigation_state(&spectre_bhb_state, state);
|
| 1099 | }
|
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 | bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_mitigated(void)
|
| 1102 | {
|
| 1103 | return test_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations);
|
| 1104 | }
|
| 1105 |
|
| 1106 |
|
| 1107 | void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt,
|
| 1108 | __le32 *origptr,
|
| 1109 | __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
|
| 1110 | {
|
| 1111 | BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
|
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 | if (test_bit(BHB_LOOP, &system_bhb_mitigations))
|
| 1114 | *updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
|
| 1115 | }
|
| 1116 |
|
| 1117 |
|
| 1118 | void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_fw_mitigation_enabled(struct alt_instr *alt,
|
| 1119 | __le32 *origptr,
|
| 1120 | __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
|
| 1121 | {
|
| 1122 | BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
|
| 1123 |
|
| 1124 | if (test_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations))
|
| 1125 | *updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
|
| 1126 | }
|
| 1127 |
|
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 | void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter(struct alt_instr *alt,
|
| 1130 | __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
|
| 1131 | {
|
| 1132 | u8 rd;
|
| 1133 | u32 insn;
|
| 1134 |
|
| 1135 | BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
|
| 1136 |
|
| 1137 | if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY))
|
| 1138 | return;
|
| 1139 |
|
| 1140 | insn = le32_to_cpu(*origptr);
|
| 1141 | rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD, insn);
|
| 1142 | insn = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, max_bhb_k, 0,
|
| 1143 | AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT,
|
| 1144 | AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_ZERO);
|
| 1145 | *updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(insn);
|
| 1146 | }
|
| 1147 |
|
| 1148 |
|
| 1149 | void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_wa3(struct alt_instr *alt,
|
| 1150 | __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
|
| 1151 | {
|
| 1152 | u8 rd;
|
| 1153 | u32 insn;
|
| 1154 |
|
| 1155 | BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
|
| 1156 |
|
| 1157 | if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY) ||
|
| 1158 | !test_bit(BHB_FW, &system_bhb_mitigations))
|
| 1159 | return;
|
| 1160 |
|
| 1161 | insn = le32_to_cpu(*origptr);
|
| 1162 | rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD, insn);
|
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 | insn = aarch64_insn_gen_logical_immediate(AARCH64_INSN_LOGIC_ORR,
|
| 1165 | AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_32BIT,
|
| 1166 | AARCH64_INSN_REG_ZR, rd,
|
| 1167 | ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3);
|
| 1168 | if (WARN_ON_ONCE(insn == AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT))
|
| 1169 | return;
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 | *updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(insn);
|
| 1172 | }
|
| 1173 |
|
| 1174 |
|
| 1175 | void __init spectre_bhb_patch_clearbhb(struct alt_instr *alt,
|
| 1176 | __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst)
|
| 1177 | {
|
| 1178 | BUG_ON(nr_inst != 2);
|
| 1179 |
|
| 1180 | if (test_bit(BHB_INSN, &system_bhb_mitigations))
|
| 1181 | return;
|
| 1182 |
|
| 1183 | *updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
|
| 1184 | *updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
|
| 1185 | }
|
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 | #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
|
| 1188 | #define EBPF_WARN "Unprivileged eBPF is enabled, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
|
| 1189 | void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
|
| 1190 | {
|
| 1191 | if (spectre_v2_state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE ||
|
| 1192 | spectre_bhb_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
|
| 1193 | return;
|
| 1194 |
|
| 1195 | if (!new_state)
|
| 1196 | pr_err("WARNING: %s", EBPF_WARN);
|
| 1197 | }
|
| 1198 | #endif
|
| 1199 |
|
| 1200 | void spectre_print_disabled_mitigations(void)
|
| 1201 | {
|
| 1202 |
|
| 1203 | const char *spectre_disabled_suffix = "mitigation disabled by command-line option\n";
|
| 1204 |
|
| 1205 | if (spectre_v2_mitigations_off())
|
| 1206 | pr_info("spectre-v2 %s", spectre_disabled_suffix);
|
| 1207 |
|
| 1208 | if (spectre_v4_mitigations_off())
|
| 1209 | pr_info("spectre-v4 %s", spectre_disabled_suffix);
|
| 1210 |
|
| 1211 | if (spectre_bhb_mitigations_off())
|
| 1212 | pr_info("spectre-bhb %s", spectre_disabled_suffix);
|
| 1213 | }
|