| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | *
|
| 4 | * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
|
| 5 | * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <[email protected]>
|
| 6 |
|
| 7 |
|
| 8 | #include <linux/fips.h>
|
| 9 | #include <linux/module.h>
|
| 10 | #include <crypto/internal/kpp.h>
|
| 11 | #include <crypto/kpp.h>
|
| 12 | #include <crypto/dh.h>
|
| 13 | #include <crypto/rng.h>
|
| 14 | #include <linux/mpi.h>
|
| 15 |
|
| 16 | struct dh_ctx {
|
| 17 | MPI p;
|
| 18 | MPI g;
|
| 19 | MPI xa;
|
| 20 | };
|
| 21 |
|
| 22 | static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
|
| 23 | {
|
| 24 | mpi_free(ctx->p);
|
| 25 | mpi_free(ctx->g);
|
| 26 | mpi_free(ctx->xa);
|
| 27 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
| 28 | }
|
| 29 |
|
| 30 | |
| 31 | * If base is g we compute the public key
|
| 32 | * ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
|
| 33 | * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret
|
| 34 | * ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
|
| 35 |
|
| 36 | static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val)
|
| 37 | {
|
| 38 |
|
| 39 | return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p);
|
| 40 | }
|
| 41 |
|
| 42 | static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
|
| 43 | {
|
| 44 | return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
| 45 | }
|
| 46 |
|
| 47 | static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len)
|
| 48 | {
|
| 49 | if (fips_enabled)
|
| 50 | return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0;
|
| 51 |
|
| 52 | return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0;
|
| 53 | }
|
| 54 |
|
| 55 | static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)
|
| 56 | {
|
| 57 | if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3))
|
| 58 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 59 |
|
| 60 | ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size);
|
| 61 | if (!ctx->p)
|
| 62 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 63 |
|
| 64 | ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size);
|
| 65 | if (!ctx->g)
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| 66 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 67 |
|
| 68 | return 0;
|
| 69 | }
|
| 70 |
|
| 71 | static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
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| 72 | unsigned int len)
|
| 73 | {
|
| 74 | struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
|
| 75 | struct dh params;
|
| 76 |
|
| 77 |
|
| 78 | dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
|
| 79 |
|
| 80 | if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0)
|
| 81 | goto err_clear_ctx;
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| 82 |
|
| 83 | if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0)
|
| 84 | goto err_clear_ctx;
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| 85 |
|
| 86 | ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
|
| 87 | if (!ctx->xa)
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| 88 | goto err_clear_ctx;
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| 89 |
|
| 90 | return 0;
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| 91 |
|
| 92 | err_clear_ctx:
|
| 93 | dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
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| 94 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 95 | }
|
| 96 |
|
| 97 | |
| 98 | * SP800-56A public key verification:
|
| 99 | *
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| 100 | * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed
|
| 101 | * trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A
|
| 102 | * section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed.
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| 103 | *
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| 104 | * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation
|
| 105 | * according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed.
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| 106 |
|
| 107 | static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y)
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| 108 | {
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| 109 | MPI val, q;
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| 110 | int ret;
|
| 111 |
|
| 112 | if (!fips_enabled)
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| 113 | return 0;
|
| 114 |
|
| 115 | if (unlikely(!ctx->p))
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| 116 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 117 |
|
| 118 | |
| 119 | * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2.
|
| 120 | *
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| 121 | * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1
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| 122 | * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that
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| 123 | * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and
|
| 124 | * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1.
|
| 125 |
|
| 126 | if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0)
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| 127 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 128 |
|
| 129 | |
| 130 | * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p
|
| 131 | *
|
| 132 | * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2.
|
| 133 |
|
| 134 | val = mpi_alloc(0);
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| 135 | if (!val)
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| 136 | return -ENOMEM;
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| 137 |
|
| 138 | q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p));
|
| 139 | if (!q) {
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| 140 | mpi_free(val);
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| 141 | return -ENOMEM;
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| 142 | }
|
| 143 |
|
| 144 | |
| 145 | * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one
|
| 146 | * from it before shifting to the right.
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| 147 |
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| 148 | ret = mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1) ?:
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| 149 | mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p);
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| 150 |
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| 151 | mpi_free(q);
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| 152 | if (ret) {
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| 153 | mpi_free(val);
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| 154 | return ret;
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| 155 | }
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| 156 |
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| 157 | ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1);
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| 158 |
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| 159 | mpi_free(val);
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| 160 |
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| 161 | if (ret != 0)
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| 162 | return -EINVAL;
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| 163 |
|
| 164 | return 0;
|
| 165 | }
|
| 166 |
|
| 167 | static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
|
| 168 | {
|
| 169 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
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| 170 | struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
|
| 171 | MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0);
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| 172 | int ret = 0;
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| 173 | int sign;
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| 174 |
|
| 175 | if (!val)
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| 176 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 177 |
|
| 178 | if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) {
|
| 179 | ret = -EINVAL;
|
| 180 | goto err_free_val;
|
| 181 | }
|
| 182 |
|
| 183 | if (req->src) {
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| 184 | base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len);
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| 185 | if (!base) {
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| 186 | ret = -EINVAL;
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| 187 | goto err_free_val;
|
| 188 | }
|
| 189 | ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base);
|
| 190 | if (ret)
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| 191 | goto err_free_base;
|
| 192 | } else {
|
| 193 | base = ctx->g;
|
| 194 | }
|
| 195 |
|
| 196 | ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val);
|
| 197 | if (ret)
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| 198 | goto err_free_base;
|
| 199 |
|
| 200 | if (fips_enabled) {
|
| 201 |
|
| 202 | if (req->src) {
|
| 203 | MPI pone;
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| 204 |
|
| 205 |
|
| 206 | if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) {
|
| 207 | ret = -EBADMSG;
|
| 208 | goto err_free_base;
|
| 209 | }
|
| 210 |
|
| 211 |
|
| 212 | pone = mpi_alloc(0);
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| 213 |
|
| 214 | if (!pone) {
|
| 215 | ret = -ENOMEM;
|
| 216 | goto err_free_base;
|
| 217 | }
|
| 218 |
|
| 219 | ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1);
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| 220 | if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val))
|
| 221 | ret = -EBADMSG;
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| 222 |
|
| 223 | mpi_free(pone);
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| 224 |
|
| 225 | if (ret)
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| 226 | goto err_free_base;
|
| 227 |
|
| 228 |
|
| 229 | } else {
|
| 230 | if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) {
|
| 231 | ret = -EAGAIN;
|
| 232 | goto err_free_val;
|
| 233 | }
|
| 234 | }
|
| 235 | }
|
| 236 |
|
| 237 | ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign);
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| 238 | if (ret)
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| 239 | goto err_free_base;
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| 240 |
|
| 241 | if (sign < 0)
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| 242 | ret = -EBADMSG;
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| 243 | err_free_base:
|
| 244 | if (req->src)
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| 245 | mpi_free(base);
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| 246 | err_free_val:
|
| 247 | mpi_free(val);
|
| 248 | return ret;
|
| 249 | }
|
| 250 |
|
| 251 | static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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| 252 | {
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| 253 | struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
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| 254 |
|
| 255 | return mpi_get_size(ctx->p);
|
| 256 | }
|
| 257 |
|
| 258 | static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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| 259 | {
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| 260 | struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
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| 261 |
|
| 262 | dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
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| 263 | }
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| 264 |
|
| 265 | static struct kpp_alg dh = {
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| 266 | .set_secret = dh_set_secret,
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| 267 | .generate_public_key = dh_compute_value,
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| 268 | .compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value,
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| 269 | .max_size = dh_max_size,
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| 270 | .exit = dh_exit_tfm,
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| 271 | .base = {
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| 272 | .cra_name = "dh",
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| 273 | .cra_driver_name = "dh-generic",
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| 274 | .cra_priority = 100,
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| 275 | .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
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| 276 | .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx),
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| 277 | },
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| 278 | };
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| 279 |
|
| 280 |
|
| 281 | struct dh_safe_prime {
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| 282 | unsigned int max_strength;
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| 283 | unsigned int p_size;
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| 284 | const char *p;
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| 285 | };
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| 286 |
|
| 287 | static const char safe_prime_g[] = { 2 };
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| 288 |
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| 289 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx {
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| 290 | struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn;
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| 291 | const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime;
|
| 292 | };
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| 293 |
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| 294 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx {
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| 295 | struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm;
|
| 296 | };
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| 297 |
|
| 298 | static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst)
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| 299 | {
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| 300 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
|
| 301 |
|
| 302 | crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn);
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| 303 | kfree(inst);
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| 304 | }
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| 305 |
|
| 306 | static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(
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| 307 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
|
| 308 | {
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| 309 | return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm));
|
| 310 | }
|
| 311 |
|
| 312 | static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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| 313 | {
|
| 314 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
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| 315 | dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
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| 316 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
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| 317 |
|
| 318 | tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn);
|
| 319 | if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm))
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| 320 | return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
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| 321 |
|
| 322 | kpp_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct kpp_request) +
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| 323 | crypto_kpp_reqsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm));
|
| 324 |
|
| 325 | return 0;
|
| 326 | }
|
| 327 |
|
| 328 | static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
|
| 329 | {
|
| 330 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
| 331 |
|
| 332 | crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
|
| 333 | }
|
| 334 |
|
| 335 | static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val)
|
| 336 | {
|
| 337 | unsigned int i;
|
| 338 |
|
| 339 | for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) {
|
| 340 | u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]);
|
| 341 |
|
| 342 | tmp += val;
|
| 343 | val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1;
|
| 344 | dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp);
|
| 345 | }
|
| 346 |
|
| 347 | return val;
|
| 348 | }
|
| 349 |
|
| 350 | static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime,
|
| 351 | unsigned int *key_size)
|
| 352 | {
|
| 353 | unsigned int n, oversampling_size;
|
| 354 | __be64 *key;
|
| 355 | int err;
|
| 356 | u64 h, o;
|
| 357 |
|
| 358 | |
| 359 | * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3,
|
| 360 | * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp..
|
| 361 | *
|
| 362 | * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that
|
| 363 | * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1
|
| 364 | * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups.
|
| 365 | * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to
|
| 366 | * avoid excessively large private keys while still
|
| 367 | * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in
|
| 368 | * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[],
|
| 369 | * the following holds for such N:
|
| 370 | * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64
|
| 371 | * bits and
|
| 372 | * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound.
|
| 373 |
|
| 374 | n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength);
|
| 375 | WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1));
|
| 376 | n >>= 6;
|
| 377 |
|
| 378 | |
| 379 | * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits
|
| 380 | * required as per 5.6.1.1.3.
|
| 381 |
|
| 382 | oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64);
|
| 383 | key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL);
|
| 384 | if (!key)
|
| 385 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 | |
| 388 | * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64
|
| 389 | * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer.
|
| 390 |
|
| 391 | err = crypto_stdrng_get_bytes(key, oversampling_size);
|
| 392 | if (err)
|
| 393 | goto out_err;
|
| 394 |
|
| 395 | |
| 396 | * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus,
|
| 397 | * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N.
|
| 398 | *
|
| 399 | * For step 6, calculate
|
| 400 | * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1.
|
| 401 | *
|
| 402 | * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that
|
| 403 | * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h,
|
| 404 | * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds.
|
| 405 | * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words
|
| 406 | * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0]
|
| 407 | * representing the 64 most significant bits and l
|
| 408 | * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark
|
| 409 | * from above,
|
| 410 | * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1).
|
| 411 | * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after
|
| 412 | * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2.
|
| 413 | * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as
|
| 414 | * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one,
|
| 415 | * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will
|
| 416 | * be zero after a second reduction:
|
| 417 | * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1).
|
| 418 | * At this point, it is still possible that
|
| 419 | * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1)
|
| 420 | * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of
|
| 421 | * the final increment overflowing in this case.
|
| 422 |
|
| 423 | h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]);
|
| 424 | h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
|
| 425 | h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
|
| 426 | WARN_ON_ONCE(h);
|
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
|
| 429 | o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1);
|
| 430 | |
| 431 | * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or
|
| 432 | * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian
|
| 433 | * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to
|
| 434 | * one, c.f. above.
|
| 435 |
|
| 436 | if (o)
|
| 437 | key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1);
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 | *key_size = n << 3;
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 | memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size);
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 | return key;
|
| 445 |
|
| 446 | out_err:
|
| 447 | kfree_sensitive(key);
|
| 448 | return ERR_PTR(err);
|
| 449 | }
|
| 450 |
|
| 451 | static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer,
|
| 452 | unsigned int len)
|
| 453 | {
|
| 454 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
|
| 455 | dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
|
| 456 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
| 457 | struct dh params = {};
|
| 458 | void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL;
|
| 459 | unsigned int buf_size;
|
| 460 | int err;
|
| 461 |
|
| 462 | if (buffer) {
|
| 463 | err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, ¶ms);
|
| 464 | if (err)
|
| 465 | return err;
|
| 466 | if (params.p_size || params.g_size)
|
| 467 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 468 | }
|
| 469 |
|
| 470 | params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p;
|
| 471 | params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size;
|
| 472 | params.g = safe_prime_g;
|
| 473 | params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g);
|
| 474 |
|
| 475 | if (!params.key_size) {
|
| 476 | key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime,
|
| 477 | ¶ms.key_size);
|
| 478 | if (IS_ERR(key))
|
| 479 | return PTR_ERR(key);
|
| 480 | params.key = key;
|
| 481 | }
|
| 482 |
|
| 483 | buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(¶ms);
|
| 484 | buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
|
| 485 | if (!buf) {
|
| 486 | err = -ENOMEM;
|
| 487 | goto out;
|
| 488 | }
|
| 489 |
|
| 490 | err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, ¶ms);
|
| 491 | if (err)
|
| 492 | goto out;
|
| 493 |
|
| 494 | err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size);
|
| 495 | out:
|
| 496 | kfree_sensitive(buf);
|
| 497 | kfree_sensitive(key);
|
| 498 | return err;
|
| 499 | }
|
| 500 |
|
| 501 | static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(void *data, int err)
|
| 502 | {
|
| 503 | struct kpp_request *req = data;
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 | kpp_request_complete(req, err);
|
| 506 | }
|
| 507 |
|
| 508 | static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req)
|
| 509 | {
|
| 510 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx =
|
| 511 | kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req));
|
| 512 | struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req);
|
| 513 |
|
| 514 | kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
|
| 515 | kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags,
|
| 516 | dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req);
|
| 517 |
|
| 518 | kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len);
|
| 519 | kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len);
|
| 520 |
|
| 521 | return dh_req;
|
| 522 | }
|
| 523 |
|
| 524 | static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req)
|
| 525 | {
|
| 526 | struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
|
| 527 |
|
| 528 | return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req);
|
| 529 | }
|
| 530 |
|
| 531 | static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req)
|
| 532 | {
|
| 533 | struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
|
| 534 |
|
| 535 | return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req);
|
| 536 | }
|
| 537 |
|
| 538 | static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
|
| 539 | {
|
| 540 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
|
| 541 |
|
| 542 | return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
|
| 543 | }
|
| 544 |
|
| 545 | static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create(
|
| 546 | struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
|
| 547 | const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime)
|
| 548 | {
|
| 549 | struct kpp_instance *inst;
|
| 550 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx;
|
| 551 | const char *dh_name;
|
| 552 | struct kpp_alg *dh_alg;
|
| 553 | u32 mask;
|
| 554 | int err;
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 | err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask);
|
| 557 | if (err)
|
| 558 | return err;
|
| 559 |
|
| 560 | dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
|
| 561 | if (IS_ERR(dh_name))
|
| 562 | return PTR_ERR(dh_name);
|
| 563 |
|
| 564 | inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
|
| 565 | if (!inst)
|
| 566 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 567 |
|
| 568 | ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
|
| 569 |
|
| 570 | err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
|
| 571 | dh_name, 0, mask);
|
| 572 | if (err)
|
| 573 | goto err_free_inst;
|
| 574 |
|
| 575 | err = -EINVAL;
|
| 576 | dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn);
|
| 577 | if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh"))
|
| 578 | goto err_free_inst;
|
| 579 |
|
| 580 | ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime;
|
| 581 |
|
| 582 | err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
|
| 583 | tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base);
|
| 584 | if (err)
|
| 585 | goto err_free_inst;
|
| 586 |
|
| 587 | inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret;
|
| 588 | inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key;
|
| 589 | inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret;
|
| 590 | inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size;
|
| 591 | inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm;
|
| 592 | inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm;
|
| 593 | inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority;
|
| 594 | inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
|
| 595 | inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx);
|
| 596 |
|
| 597 | inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance;
|
| 598 |
|
| 599 | err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
|
| 600 | if (err)
|
| 601 | goto err_free_inst;
|
| 602 |
|
| 603 | return 0;
|
| 604 |
|
| 605 | err_free_inst:
|
| 606 | dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst);
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 | return err;
|
| 609 | }
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 | #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS
|
| 612 |
|
| 613 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = {
|
| 614 | .max_strength = 112,
|
| 615 | .p_size = 256,
|
| 616 | .p =
|
| 617 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
| 618 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
| 619 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
| 620 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
| 621 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
| 622 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
| 623 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
| 624 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
| 625 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
| 626 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
| 627 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
| 628 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
| 629 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
| 630 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
| 631 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
| 632 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
| 633 | };
|
| 634 |
|
| 635 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = {
|
| 636 | .max_strength = 128,
|
| 637 | .p_size = 384,
|
| 638 | .p =
|
| 639 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
| 640 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
| 641 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
| 642 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
| 643 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
| 644 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
| 645 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
| 646 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
| 647 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
| 648 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
| 649 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
| 650 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
| 651 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
| 652 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
| 653 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
| 654 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
|
| 655 | "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
|
| 656 | "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
|
| 657 | "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
|
| 658 | "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
|
| 659 | "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
|
| 660 | "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
|
| 661 | "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
|
| 662 | "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
| 663 | };
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = {
|
| 666 | .max_strength = 152,
|
| 667 | .p_size = 512,
|
| 668 | .p =
|
| 669 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
| 670 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
| 671 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
| 672 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
| 673 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
| 674 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
| 675 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
| 676 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
| 677 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
| 678 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
| 679 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
| 680 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
| 681 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
| 682 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
| 683 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
| 684 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
|
| 685 | "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
|
| 686 | "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
|
| 687 | "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
|
| 688 | "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
|
| 689 | "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
|
| 690 | "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
|
| 691 | "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
|
| 692 | "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
|
| 693 | "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
|
| 694 | "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
|
| 695 | "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
|
| 696 | "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
|
| 697 | "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
|
| 698 | "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
|
| 699 | "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
|
| 700 | "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
| 701 | };
|
| 702 |
|
| 703 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = {
|
| 704 | .max_strength = 176,
|
| 705 | .p_size = 768,
|
| 706 | .p =
|
| 707 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
| 708 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
| 709 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
| 710 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
| 711 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
| 712 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
| 713 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
| 714 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
| 715 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
| 716 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
| 717 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
| 718 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
| 719 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
| 720 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
| 721 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
| 722 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
|
| 723 | "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
|
| 724 | "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
|
| 725 | "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
|
| 726 | "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
|
| 727 | "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
|
| 728 | "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
|
| 729 | "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
|
| 730 | "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
|
| 731 | "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
|
| 732 | "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
|
| 733 | "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
|
| 734 | "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
|
| 735 | "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
|
| 736 | "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
|
| 737 | "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
|
| 738 | "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
|
| 739 | "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
|
| 740 | "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
|
| 741 | "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
|
| 742 | "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
|
| 743 | "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
|
| 744 | "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
|
| 745 | "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
|
| 746 | "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
|
| 747 | "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
|
| 748 | "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
|
| 749 | "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
|
| 750 | "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
|
| 751 | "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
|
| 752 | "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
|
| 753 | "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
|
| 754 | "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
| 755 | };
|
| 756 |
|
| 757 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = {
|
| 758 | .max_strength = 200,
|
| 759 | .p_size = 1024,
|
| 760 | .p =
|
| 761 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
|
| 762 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
|
| 763 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
|
| 764 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
|
| 765 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
|
| 766 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
|
| 767 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
|
| 768 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
|
| 769 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
|
| 770 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
|
| 771 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
|
| 772 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
|
| 773 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
|
| 774 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
|
| 775 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
|
| 776 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
|
| 777 | "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
|
| 778 | "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
|
| 779 | "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
|
| 780 | "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
|
| 781 | "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
|
| 782 | "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
|
| 783 | "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
|
| 784 | "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
|
| 785 | "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
|
| 786 | "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
|
| 787 | "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
|
| 788 | "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
|
| 789 | "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
|
| 790 | "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
|
| 791 | "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
|
| 792 | "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
|
| 793 | "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
|
| 794 | "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
|
| 795 | "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
|
| 796 | "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
|
| 797 | "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
|
| 798 | "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
|
| 799 | "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
|
| 800 | "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
|
| 801 | "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
|
| 802 | "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
|
| 803 | "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
|
| 804 | "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
|
| 805 | "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
|
| 806 | "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
|
| 807 | "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
|
| 808 | "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38"
|
| 809 | "\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43"
|
| 810 | "\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef"
|
| 811 | "\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65"
|
| 812 | "\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4"
|
| 813 | "\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c"
|
| 814 | "\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22"
|
| 815 | "\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee"
|
| 816 | "\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc"
|
| 817 | "\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9"
|
| 818 | "\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31"
|
| 819 | "\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8"
|
| 820 | "\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30"
|
| 821 | "\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe"
|
| 822 | "\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d"
|
| 823 | "\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c"
|
| 824 | "\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
|
| 825 | };
|
| 826 |
|
| 827 | static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
| 828 | struct rtattr **tb)
|
| 829 | {
|
| 830 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime);
|
| 831 | }
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 | static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
| 834 | struct rtattr **tb)
|
| 835 | {
|
| 836 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime);
|
| 837 | }
|
| 838 |
|
| 839 | static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
| 840 | struct rtattr **tb)
|
| 841 | {
|
| 842 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime);
|
| 843 | }
|
| 844 |
|
| 845 | static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
| 846 | struct rtattr **tb)
|
| 847 | {
|
| 848 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime);
|
| 849 | }
|
| 850 |
|
| 851 | static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
|
| 852 | struct rtattr **tb)
|
| 853 | {
|
| 854 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime);
|
| 855 | }
|
| 856 |
|
| 857 | static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {
|
| 858 | {
|
| 859 | .name = "ffdhe2048",
|
| 860 | .create = dh_ffdhe2048_create,
|
| 861 | .module = THIS_MODULE,
|
| 862 | },
|
| 863 | {
|
| 864 | .name = "ffdhe3072",
|
| 865 | .create = dh_ffdhe3072_create,
|
| 866 | .module = THIS_MODULE,
|
| 867 | },
|
| 868 | {
|
| 869 | .name = "ffdhe4096",
|
| 870 | .create = dh_ffdhe4096_create,
|
| 871 | .module = THIS_MODULE,
|
| 872 | },
|
| 873 | {
|
| 874 | .name = "ffdhe6144",
|
| 875 | .create = dh_ffdhe6144_create,
|
| 876 | .module = THIS_MODULE,
|
| 877 | },
|
| 878 | {
|
| 879 | .name = "ffdhe8192",
|
| 880 | .create = dh_ffdhe8192_create,
|
| 881 | .module = THIS_MODULE,
|
| 882 | },
|
| 883 | };
|
| 884 |
|
| 885 | #else
|
| 886 |
|
| 887 | static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {};
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 | #endif
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 | static int __init dh_init(void)
|
| 893 | {
|
| 894 | int err;
|
| 895 |
|
| 896 | err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh);
|
| 897 | if (err)
|
| 898 | return err;
|
| 899 |
|
| 900 | err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
|
| 901 | ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
|
| 902 | if (err) {
|
| 903 | crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
|
| 904 | return err;
|
| 905 | }
|
| 906 |
|
| 907 | return 0;
|
| 908 | }
|
| 909 |
|
| 910 | static void __exit dh_exit(void)
|
| 911 | {
|
| 912 | crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
|
| 913 | ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
|
| 914 | crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
|
| 915 | }
|
| 916 |
|
| 917 | module_init(dh_init);
|
| 918 | module_exit(dh_exit);
|
| 919 | MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh");
|
| 920 | MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|
| 921 | MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm");
|