| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | * This implements the various checks for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY*,
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| 4 | * which are designed to protect kernel memory from needless exposure
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| 5 | * and overwrite under many unintended conditions. This code is based
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| 6 | * on PAX_USERCOPY, which is:
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| 7 | *
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| 8 | * Copyright (C) 2001-2016 PaX Team, Bradley Spengler, Open Source
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| 9 | * Security Inc.
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| 10 |
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| 11 | #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
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| 12 |
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| 13 | #include <linux/mm.h>
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| 14 | #include <linux/highmem.h>
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| 15 | #include <linux/kstrtox.h>
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| 16 | #include <linux/slab.h>
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| 17 | #include <linux/sched.h>
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| 18 | #include <linux/sched/task.h>
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| 19 | #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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| 20 | #include <linux/ucopysize.h>
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| 21 | #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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| 22 | #include <linux/atomic.h>
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| 23 | #include <linux/jump_label.h>
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| 24 | #include <asm/sections.h>
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| 25 | #include "slab.h"
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| 26 |
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| 27 | |
| 28 | * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
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| 29 | * stack frame (if possible).
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| 30 | *
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| 31 | * Returns:
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| 32 | * NOT_STACK: not at all on the stack
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| 33 | * GOOD_FRAME: fully within a valid stack frame
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| 34 | * GOOD_STACK: within the current stack (when can't frame-check exactly)
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| 35 | * BAD_STACK: error condition (invalid stack position or bad stack frame)
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| 36 |
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| 37 | static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
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| 38 | {
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| 39 | const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current);
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| 40 | const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
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| 41 | int ret;
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| 42 |
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| 43 |
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| 44 | if (obj + len <= stack || stackend <= obj)
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| 45 | return NOT_STACK;
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| 46 |
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| 47 | |
| 48 | * Reject: object partially overlaps the stack (passing the
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| 49 | * check above means at least one end is within the stack,
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| 50 | * so if this check fails, the other end is outside the stack).
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| 51 |
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| 52 | if (obj < stack || stackend < obj + len)
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| 53 | return BAD_STACK;
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| 54 |
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| 55 |
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| 56 | ret = arch_within_stack_frames(stack, stackend, obj, len);
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| 57 | if (ret)
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| 58 | return ret;
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| 59 |
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| 60 |
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| 61 | #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
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| 62 | if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP)) {
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| 63 | if ((void *)current_stack_pointer < obj + len)
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| 64 | return BAD_STACK;
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| 65 | } else {
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| 66 | if (obj < (void *)current_stack_pointer)
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| 67 | return BAD_STACK;
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| 68 | }
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| 69 | #endif
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| 70 |
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| 71 | return GOOD_STACK;
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| 72 | }
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| 73 |
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| 74 | |
| 75 | * If these functions are reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found
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| 76 | * an unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
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| 77 | * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
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| 78 | * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
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| 79 | * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
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| 80 | * For cache objects, it is checking that only the whitelisted range of
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| 81 | * bytes for a given cache is being accessed (via the cache's usersize and
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| 82 | * useroffset fields). To adjust a cache whitelist, use the usercopy-aware
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| 83 | * kmem_cache_create_usercopy() function to create the cache (and
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| 84 | * carefully audit the whitelist range).
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| 85 |
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| 86 | void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
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| 87 | bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
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| 88 | unsigned long len)
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| 89 | {
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| 90 | pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
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| 91 | to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
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| 92 | to_user ? "from" : "to",
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| 93 | name ? : "unknown?!",
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| 94 | detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
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| 95 | offset, len);
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| 96 |
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| 97 | |
| 98 | * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
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| 99 | * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
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| 100 | * Oops code, so that is used here instead.
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| 101 |
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| 102 | BUG();
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| 103 | }
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| 104 |
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| 105 |
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| 106 | static bool overlaps(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
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| 107 | unsigned long low, unsigned long high)
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| 108 | {
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| 109 | const unsigned long check_low = ptr;
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| 110 | unsigned long check_high = check_low + n;
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| 111 |
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| 112 |
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| 113 | if (check_low >= high || check_high <= low)
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| 114 | return false;
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| 115 |
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| 116 | return true;
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| 117 | }
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| 118 |
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| 119 |
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| 120 | static inline void check_kernel_text_object(const unsigned long ptr,
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| 121 | unsigned long n, bool to_user)
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| 122 | {
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| 123 | unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
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| 124 | unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
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| 125 | unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear;
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| 126 |
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| 127 | if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
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| 128 | usercopy_abort("kernel text", NULL, to_user, ptr - textlow, n);
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| 129 |
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| 130 | |
| 131 | * Some architectures have virtual memory mappings with a secondary
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| 132 | * mapping of the kernel text, i.e. there is more than one virtual
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| 133 | * kernel address that points to the kernel image. It is usually
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| 134 | * when there is a separate linear physical memory mapping, in that
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| 135 | * __pa() is not just the reverse of __va(). This can be detected
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| 136 | * and checked:
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| 137 |
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| 138 | textlow_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(textlow);
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| 139 |
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| 140 | if (textlow_linear == textlow)
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| 141 | return;
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| 142 |
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| 143 |
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| 144 | texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(texthigh);
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| 145 | if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
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| 146 | usercopy_abort("linear kernel text", NULL, to_user,
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| 147 | ptr - textlow_linear, n);
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| 148 | }
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| 149 |
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| 150 | static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
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| 151 | bool to_user)
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| 152 | {
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| 153 |
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| 154 | if (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr)
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| 155 | usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n);
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| 156 |
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| 157 |
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| 158 | if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(ptr))
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| 159 | usercopy_abort("null address", NULL, to_user, ptr, n);
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| 160 | }
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| 161 |
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| 162 | static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
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| 163 | bool to_user)
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| 164 | {
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| 165 | unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
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| 166 | unsigned long offset;
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| 167 | struct page *page;
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| 168 | struct slab *slab;
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| 169 |
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| 170 | if (is_kmap_addr(ptr)) {
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| 171 | offset = offset_in_page(ptr);
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| 172 | if (n > PAGE_SIZE - offset)
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| 173 | usercopy_abort("kmap", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
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| 174 | return;
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| 175 | }
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| 176 |
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| 177 | if (is_vmalloc_addr(ptr) && !pagefault_disabled()) {
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| 178 | struct vmap_area *area = find_vmap_area(addr);
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| 179 |
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| 180 | if (!area)
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| 181 | usercopy_abort("vmalloc", "no area", to_user, 0, n);
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| 182 |
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| 183 | if (n > area->va_end - addr) {
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| 184 | offset = addr - area->va_start;
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| 185 | usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
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| 186 | }
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| 187 | return;
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| 188 | }
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| 189 |
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| 190 | if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
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| 191 | return;
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| 192 |
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| 193 | page = virt_to_page(ptr);
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| 194 | slab = page_slab(page);
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| 195 | if (slab) {
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| 196 |
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| 197 | __check_heap_object(ptr, n, slab, to_user);
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| 198 | } else if (PageCompound(page)) {
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| 199 | page = compound_head(page);
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| 200 | offset = ptr - page_address(page);
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| 201 | if (n > page_size(page) - offset)
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| 202 | usercopy_abort("page alloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
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| 203 | }
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| 204 |
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| 205 | |
| 206 | * We cannot check non-compound pages. They might be part of
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| 207 | * a large allocation, in which case crossing a page boundary
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| 208 | * is fine.
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| 209 |
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| 210 | }
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| 211 |
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| 212 | DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE_RO(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON,
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| 213 | validate_usercopy_range);
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| 214 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(validate_usercopy_range);
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| 215 |
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| 216 | |
| 217 | * Validates that the given object is:
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| 218 | * - not bogus address
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| 219 | * - fully contained by stack (or stack frame, when available)
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| 220 | * - fully within SLAB object (or object whitelist area, when available)
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| 221 | * - not in kernel text
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| 222 |
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| 223 | void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
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| 224 | {
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| 225 |
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| 226 | if (!n)
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| 227 | return;
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| 228 |
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| 229 |
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| 230 | check_bogus_address((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
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| 231 |
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| 232 |
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| 233 | switch (check_stack_object(ptr, n)) {
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| 234 | case NOT_STACK:
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| 235 |
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| 236 | break;
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| 237 | case GOOD_FRAME:
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| 238 | case GOOD_STACK:
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| 239 | |
| 240 | * Object is either in the correct frame (when it
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| 241 | * is possible to check) or just generally on the
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| 242 | * process stack (when frame checking not available).
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| 243 |
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| 244 | return;
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| 245 | default:
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| 246 | usercopy_abort("process stack", NULL, to_user,
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| 247 | #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
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| 248 | IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP) ?
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| 249 | ptr - (void *)current_stack_pointer :
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| 250 | (void *)current_stack_pointer - ptr,
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| 251 | #else
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| 252 | 0,
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| 253 | #endif
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| 254 | n);
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| 255 | }
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| 256 |
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| 257 |
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| 258 | check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user);
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| 259 |
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| 260 |
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| 261 | check_kernel_text_object((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
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| 262 | }
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| 263 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
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| 264 |
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| 265 | static bool enable_checks __initdata =
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| 266 | IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON);
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| 267 |
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| 268 | static int __init parse_hardened_usercopy(char *str)
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| 269 | {
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| 270 | if (kstrtobool(str, &enable_checks))
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| 271 | pr_warn("Invalid option string for hardened_usercopy: '%s'\n",
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| 272 | str);
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| 273 | return 1;
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| 274 | }
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| 275 |
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| 276 | __setup("hardened_usercopy=", parse_hardened_usercopy);
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| 277 |
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| 278 | static int __init set_hardened_usercopy(void)
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| 279 | {
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| 280 | if (enable_checks)
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| 281 | static_branch_enable(&validate_usercopy_range);
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| 282 | else
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| 283 | static_branch_disable(&validate_usercopy_range);
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| 284 | return 1;
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| 285 | }
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| 286 |
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| 287 | late_initcall(set_hardened_usercopy);
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