| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
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| 4 |
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| 5 |
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| 6 | |
| 7 | * Refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst for detailed explanation.
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| 8 |
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| 9 |
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| 10 | #define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto-fallback: " fmt
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| 11 |
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| 12 | #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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| 13 | #include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
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| 14 | #include <linux/blk-crypto-profile.h>
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| 15 | #include <linux/blkdev.h>
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| 16 | #include <linux/crypto.h>
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| 17 | #include <linux/mempool.h>
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| 18 | #include <linux/module.h>
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| 19 | #include <linux/random.h>
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| 20 | #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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| 21 |
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| 22 | #include "blk-cgroup.h"
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| 23 | #include "blk-crypto-internal.h"
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| 24 |
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| 25 | static unsigned int num_prealloc_bounce_pg = BIO_MAX_VECS;
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| 26 | module_param(num_prealloc_bounce_pg, uint, 0);
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| 27 | MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_bounce_pg,
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| 28 | "Number of preallocated bounce pages for the blk-crypto crypto API fallback");
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| 29 |
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| 30 | static unsigned int blk_crypto_num_keyslots = 100;
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| 31 | module_param_named(num_keyslots, blk_crypto_num_keyslots, uint, 0);
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| 32 | MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_keyslots,
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| 33 | "Number of keyslots for the blk-crypto crypto API fallback");
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| 34 |
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| 35 | static unsigned int num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs = 128;
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| 36 | module_param(num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs, uint, 0);
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| 37 | MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_fallback_ctxs,
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| 38 | "Number of preallocated bio fallback crypto contexts for blk-crypto to use during crypto API fallback");
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| 39 |
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| 40 | struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx {
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| 41 | struct bio_crypt_ctx crypt_ctx;
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| 42 | |
| 43 | * Copy of the bvec_iter when this bio was submitted.
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| 44 | * We only want to en/decrypt the part of the bio as described by the
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| 45 | * bvec_iter upon submission because bio might be split before being
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| 46 | * resubmitted
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| 47 |
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| 48 | struct bvec_iter crypt_iter;
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| 49 | union {
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| 50 | struct {
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| 51 | struct work_struct work;
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| 52 | struct bio *bio;
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| 53 | };
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| 54 | struct {
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| 55 | void *bi_private_orig;
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| 56 | bio_end_io_t *bi_end_io_orig;
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| 57 | };
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| 58 | };
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| 59 | };
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| 60 |
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| 61 | static struct kmem_cache *bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache;
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| 62 | static mempool_t *bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool;
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| 63 |
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| 64 | |
| 65 | * Allocating a crypto tfm during I/O can deadlock, so we have to preallocate
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| 66 | * all of a mode's tfms when that mode starts being used. Since each mode may
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| 67 | * need all the keyslots at some point, each mode needs its own tfm for each
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| 68 | * keyslot; thus, a keyslot may contain tfms for multiple modes. However, to
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| 69 | * match the behavior of real inline encryption hardware (which only supports a
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| 70 | * single encryption context per keyslot), we only allow one tfm per keyslot to
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| 71 | * be used at a time - the rest of the unused tfms have their keys cleared.
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| 72 |
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| 73 | static DEFINE_MUTEX(tfms_init_lock);
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| 74 | static bool tfms_inited[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX];
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| 75 |
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| 76 | static struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot {
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| 77 | enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode;
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| 78 | struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfms[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX];
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| 79 | } *blk_crypto_keyslots;
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| 80 |
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| 81 | static struct blk_crypto_profile *blk_crypto_fallback_profile;
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| 82 | static struct workqueue_struct *blk_crypto_wq;
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| 83 | static mempool_t *blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool;
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| 84 | static struct bio_set enc_bio_set;
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| 85 |
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| 86 | |
| 87 | * This is the key we set when evicting a keyslot. This *should* be the all 0's
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| 88 | * key, but AES-XTS rejects that key, so we use some random bytes instead.
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| 89 |
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| 90 | static u8 blank_key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE];
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| 91 |
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| 92 | static void blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(unsigned int slot)
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| 93 | {
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| 94 | struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot];
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| 95 | enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = slotp->crypto_mode;
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| 96 | int err;
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| 97 |
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| 98 | WARN_ON(slotp->crypto_mode == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID);
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| 99 |
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| 100 |
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| 101 | err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], blank_key,
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| 102 | blk_crypto_modes[crypto_mode].keysize);
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| 103 | WARN_ON(err);
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| 104 | slotp->crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID;
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| 105 | }
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| 106 |
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| 107 | static int
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| 108 | blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile,
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| 109 | const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
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| 110 | unsigned int slot)
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| 111 | {
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| 112 | struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot];
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| 113 | const enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode =
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| 114 | key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode;
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| 115 | int err;
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| 116 |
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| 117 | if (crypto_mode != slotp->crypto_mode &&
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| 118 | slotp->crypto_mode != BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID)
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| 119 | blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot);
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| 120 |
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| 121 | slotp->crypto_mode = crypto_mode;
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| 122 | err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], key->bytes,
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| 123 | key->size);
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| 124 | if (err) {
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| 125 | blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot);
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| 126 | return err;
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| 127 | }
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| 128 | return 0;
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| 129 | }
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| 130 |
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| 131 | static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile,
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| 132 | const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
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| 133 | unsigned int slot)
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| 134 | {
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| 135 | blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot);
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| 136 | return 0;
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| 137 | }
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| 138 |
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| 139 | static const struct blk_crypto_ll_ops blk_crypto_fallback_ll_ops = {
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| 140 | .keyslot_program = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program,
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| 141 | .keyslot_evict = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict,
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| 142 | };
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| 143 |
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| 144 | static void blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio(struct bio *enc_bio)
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| 145 | {
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| 146 | struct bio *src_bio = enc_bio->bi_private;
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| 147 | struct page **pages = (struct page **)enc_bio->bi_io_vec;
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| 148 | struct bio_vec *bv;
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| 149 | unsigned int i;
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| 150 |
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| 151 | |
| 152 | * Use the same trick as the alloc side to avoid the need for an extra
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| 153 | * pages array.
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| 154 |
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| 155 | bio_for_each_bvec_all(bv, enc_bio, i)
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| 156 | pages[i] = bv->bv_page;
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| 157 |
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| 158 | i = mempool_free_bulk(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool, (void **)pages,
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| 159 | enc_bio->bi_vcnt);
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| 160 | if (i < enc_bio->bi_vcnt)
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| 161 | release_pages(pages + i, enc_bio->bi_vcnt - i);
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| 162 |
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| 163 | if (enc_bio->bi_status)
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| 164 | cmpxchg(&src_bio->bi_status, 0, enc_bio->bi_status);
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| 165 |
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| 166 | bio_put(enc_bio);
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| 167 | bio_endio(src_bio);
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| 168 | }
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| 169 |
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| 170 | #define PAGE_PTRS_PER_BVEC (sizeof(struct bio_vec) / sizeof(struct page *))
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| 171 |
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| 172 | static struct bio *blk_crypto_alloc_enc_bio(struct bio *bio_src,
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| 173 | unsigned int nr_segs, struct page ***pages_ret)
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| 174 | {
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| 175 | unsigned int memflags = memalloc_noio_save();
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| 176 | unsigned int nr_allocated;
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| 177 | struct page **pages;
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| 178 | struct bio *bio;
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| 179 |
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| 180 | bio = bio_alloc_bioset(bio_src->bi_bdev, nr_segs, bio_src->bi_opf,
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| 181 | GFP_NOIO, &enc_bio_set);
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| 182 | if (bio_flagged(bio_src, BIO_REMAPPED))
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| 183 | bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_REMAPPED);
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| 184 | bio->bi_private = bio_src;
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| 185 | bio->bi_end_io = blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio;
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| 186 | bio->bi_ioprio = bio_src->bi_ioprio;
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| 187 | bio->bi_write_hint = bio_src->bi_write_hint;
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| 188 | bio->bi_write_stream = bio_src->bi_write_stream;
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| 189 | bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = bio_src->bi_iter.bi_sector;
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| 190 | bio_clone_blkg_association(bio, bio_src);
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| 191 |
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| 192 | |
| 193 | * Move page array up in the allocated memory for the bio vecs as far as
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| 194 | * possible so that we can start filling biovecs from the beginning
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| 195 | * without overwriting the temporary page array.
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| 196 |
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| 197 | static_assert(PAGE_PTRS_PER_BVEC > 1);
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| 198 | pages = (struct page **)bio->bi_io_vec;
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| 199 | pages += nr_segs * (PAGE_PTRS_PER_BVEC - 1);
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| 200 |
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| 201 | |
| 202 | * Try a bulk allocation first. This might not fill all allocated
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| 203 | * pages, but we'll fix that up later in mempool_alloc_bulk.
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| 204 | *
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| 205 | * Note: alloc_pages_bulk needs the array to be zeroed, as it assumes
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| 206 | * any non-zero slot already contains a valid allocation.
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| 207 |
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| 208 | memset(pages, 0, sizeof(struct page *) * nr_segs);
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| 209 | nr_allocated = alloc_pages_bulk(GFP_KERNEL, nr_segs, pages);
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| 210 | if (nr_allocated < nr_segs)
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| 211 | mempool_alloc_bulk(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool,
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| 212 | (void **)pages + nr_allocated,
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| 213 | nr_segs - nr_allocated);
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| 214 | memalloc_noio_restore(memflags);
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| 215 | *pages_ret = pages;
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| 216 | return bio;
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| 217 | }
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| 218 |
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| 219 | static struct crypto_sync_skcipher *
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| 220 | blk_crypto_fallback_tfm(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot)
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| 221 | {
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| 222 | const struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp =
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| 223 | &blk_crypto_keyslots[blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)];
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| 224 |
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| 225 | return slotp->tfms[slotp->crypto_mode];
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| 226 | }
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| 227 |
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| 228 | union blk_crypto_iv {
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| 229 | __le64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
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| 230 | u8 bytes[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE];
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| 231 | };
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| 232 |
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| 233 | static void blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(const u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
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| 234 | union blk_crypto_iv *iv)
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| 235 | {
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| 236 | int i;
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| 237 |
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| 238 | for (i = 0; i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
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| 239 | iv->dun[i] = cpu_to_le64(dun[i]);
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| 240 | }
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| 241 |
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| 242 | static void __blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio *src_bio,
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| 243 | struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm)
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| 244 | {
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| 245 | struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = src_bio->bi_crypt_context;
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| 246 | int data_unit_size = bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size;
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| 247 | SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ciph_req, tfm);
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| 248 | u64 curr_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
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| 249 | struct scatterlist src, dst;
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| 250 | union blk_crypto_iv iv;
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| 251 | unsigned int nr_enc_pages, enc_idx;
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| 252 | struct page **enc_pages;
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| 253 | struct bio *enc_bio;
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| 254 | unsigned int i;
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| 255 |
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| 256 | skcipher_request_set_callback(ciph_req,
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| 257 | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
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| 258 | NULL, NULL);
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| 259 |
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| 260 | memcpy(curr_dun, bc->bc_dun, sizeof(curr_dun));
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| 261 | sg_init_table(&src, 1);
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| 262 | sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
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| 263 |
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| 264 | skcipher_request_set_crypt(ciph_req, &src, &dst, data_unit_size,
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| 265 | iv.bytes);
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| 266 |
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| 267 | |
| 268 | * Encrypt each page in the source bio. Because the source bio could
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| 269 | * have bio_vecs that span more than a single page, but the encrypted
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| 270 | * bios are limited to a single page per bio_vec, this can generate
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| 271 | * more than a single encrypted bio per source bio.
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| 272 |
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| 273 | new_bio:
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| 274 | nr_enc_pages = min(bio_segments(src_bio), BIO_MAX_VECS);
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| 275 | enc_bio = blk_crypto_alloc_enc_bio(src_bio, nr_enc_pages, &enc_pages);
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| 276 | enc_idx = 0;
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| 277 | for (;;) {
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| 278 | struct bio_vec src_bv =
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| 279 | bio_iter_iovec(src_bio, src_bio->bi_iter);
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| 280 | struct page *enc_page = enc_pages[enc_idx];
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| 281 |
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| 282 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(src_bv.bv_len | src_bv.bv_offset,
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| 283 | data_unit_size)) {
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| 284 | enc_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_INVAL;
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| 285 | goto out_free_enc_bio;
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| 286 | }
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| 287 |
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| 288 | __bio_add_page(enc_bio, enc_page, src_bv.bv_len,
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| 289 | src_bv.bv_offset);
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| 290 |
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| 291 | sg_set_page(&src, src_bv.bv_page, data_unit_size,
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| 292 | src_bv.bv_offset);
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| 293 | sg_set_page(&dst, enc_page, data_unit_size, src_bv.bv_offset);
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| 294 |
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| 295 | |
| 296 | * Increment the index now that the encrypted page is added to
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| 297 | * the bio. This is important for the error unwind path.
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| 298 |
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| 299 | enc_idx++;
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| 300 |
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| 301 | |
| 302 | * Encrypt each data unit in this page.
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| 303 |
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| 304 | for (i = 0; i < src_bv.bv_len; i += data_unit_size) {
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| 305 | blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(curr_dun, &iv);
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| 306 | if (crypto_skcipher_encrypt(ciph_req)) {
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| 307 | enc_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
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| 308 | goto out_free_enc_bio;
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| 309 | }
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| 310 | bio_crypt_dun_increment(curr_dun, 1);
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| 311 | src.offset += data_unit_size;
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| 312 | dst.offset += data_unit_size;
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| 313 | }
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| 314 |
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| 315 | bio_advance_iter_single(src_bio, &src_bio->bi_iter,
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| 316 | src_bv.bv_len);
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| 317 | if (!src_bio->bi_iter.bi_size)
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| 318 | break;
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| 319 |
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| 320 | if (enc_idx == nr_enc_pages) {
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| 321 | |
| 322 | * For each additional encrypted bio submitted,
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| 323 | * increment the source bio's remaining count. Each
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| 324 | * encrypted bio's completion handler calls bio_endio on
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| 325 | * the source bio, so this keeps the source bio from
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| 326 | * completing until the last encrypted bio does.
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| 327 |
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| 328 | bio_inc_remaining(src_bio);
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| 329 | submit_bio(enc_bio);
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| 330 | goto new_bio;
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| 331 | }
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| 332 | }
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| 333 |
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| 334 | submit_bio(enc_bio);
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| 335 | return;
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| 336 |
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| 337 | out_free_enc_bio:
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| 338 | |
| 339 | * Add the remaining pages to the bio so that the normal completion path
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| 340 | * in blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio frees them. The exact data
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| 341 | * layout does not matter for that, so don't bother iterating the source
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| 342 | * bio.
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| 343 |
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| 344 | for (; enc_idx < nr_enc_pages; enc_idx++)
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| 345 | __bio_add_page(enc_bio, enc_pages[enc_idx], PAGE_SIZE, 0);
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| 346 | bio_endio(enc_bio);
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| 347 | }
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| 348 |
|
| 349 | |
| 350 | * The crypto API fallback's encryption routine.
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| 351 | *
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| 352 | * Allocate one or more bios for encryption, encrypt the input bio using the
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| 353 | * crypto API, and submit the encrypted bios. Sets bio->bi_status and
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| 354 | * completes the source bio on error
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| 355 |
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| 356 | static void blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio *src_bio)
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| 357 | {
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| 358 | struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = src_bio->bi_crypt_context;
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| 359 | struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot;
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| 360 | blk_status_t status;
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| 361 |
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| 362 | status = blk_crypto_get_keyslot(blk_crypto_fallback_profile,
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| 363 | bc->bc_key, &slot);
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| 364 | if (status != BLK_STS_OK) {
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| 365 | bio_endio_status(src_bio, status);
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| 366 | return;
|
| 367 | }
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| 368 | __blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(src_bio,
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| 369 | blk_crypto_fallback_tfm(slot));
|
| 370 | blk_crypto_put_keyslot(slot);
|
| 371 | }
|
| 372 |
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| 373 | static blk_status_t __blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct bio *bio,
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| 374 | struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc, struct bvec_iter iter,
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| 375 | struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm)
|
| 376 | {
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| 377 | SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ciph_req, tfm);
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| 378 | u64 curr_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
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| 379 | union blk_crypto_iv iv;
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| 380 | struct scatterlist sg;
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| 381 | struct bio_vec bv;
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| 382 | const int data_unit_size = bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size;
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| 383 | unsigned int i;
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| 384 |
|
| 385 | skcipher_request_set_callback(ciph_req,
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| 386 | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
|
| 387 | NULL, NULL);
|
| 388 |
|
| 389 | memcpy(curr_dun, bc->bc_dun, sizeof(curr_dun));
|
| 390 | sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
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| 391 | skcipher_request_set_crypt(ciph_req, &sg, &sg, data_unit_size,
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| 392 | iv.bytes);
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| 393 |
|
| 394 |
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| 395 | __bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio, iter, iter) {
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| 396 | struct page *page = bv.bv_page;
|
| 397 |
|
| 398 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(bv.bv_len | bv.bv_offset, data_unit_size))
|
| 399 | return BLK_STS_INVAL;
|
| 400 |
|
| 401 | sg_set_page(&sg, page, data_unit_size, bv.bv_offset);
|
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
|
| 404 | for (i = 0; i < bv.bv_len; i += data_unit_size) {
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| 405 | blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(curr_dun, &iv);
|
| 406 | if (crypto_skcipher_decrypt(ciph_req))
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| 407 | return BLK_STS_IOERR;
|
| 408 | bio_crypt_dun_increment(curr_dun, 1);
|
| 409 | sg.offset += data_unit_size;
|
| 410 | }
|
| 411 | }
|
| 412 |
|
| 413 | return BLK_STS_OK;
|
| 414 | }
|
| 415 |
|
| 416 | |
| 417 | * The crypto API fallback's main decryption routine.
|
| 418 | *
|
| 419 | * Decrypts input bio in place, and calls bio_endio on the bio.
|
| 420 |
|
| 421 | static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct work_struct *work)
|
| 422 | {
|
| 423 | struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx =
|
| 424 | container_of(work, struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, work);
|
| 425 | struct bio *bio = f_ctx->bio;
|
| 426 | struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = &f_ctx->crypt_ctx;
|
| 427 | struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot;
|
| 428 | blk_status_t status;
|
| 429 |
|
| 430 | status = blk_crypto_get_keyslot(blk_crypto_fallback_profile,
|
| 431 | bc->bc_key, &slot);
|
| 432 | if (status == BLK_STS_OK) {
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| 433 | status = __blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(bio, bc,
|
| 434 | f_ctx->crypt_iter,
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| 435 | blk_crypto_fallback_tfm(slot));
|
| 436 | blk_crypto_put_keyslot(slot);
|
| 437 | }
|
| 438 | mempool_free(f_ctx, bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool);
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 | bio_endio_status(bio, status);
|
| 441 | }
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 | |
| 444 | * blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio - queue bio for fallback decryption
|
| 445 | *
|
| 446 | * @bio: the bio to queue
|
| 447 | *
|
| 448 | * Restore bi_private and bi_end_io, and queue the bio for decryption into a
|
| 449 | * workqueue, since this function will be called from an atomic context.
|
| 450 |
|
| 451 | static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio(struct bio *bio)
|
| 452 | {
|
| 453 | struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx = bio->bi_private;
|
| 454 |
|
| 455 | bio->bi_private = f_ctx->bi_private_orig;
|
| 456 | bio->bi_end_io = f_ctx->bi_end_io_orig;
|
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
|
| 459 | if (bio->bi_status) {
|
| 460 | mempool_free(f_ctx, bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool);
|
| 461 | bio_endio(bio);
|
| 462 | return;
|
| 463 | }
|
| 464 |
|
| 465 | INIT_WORK(&f_ctx->work, blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio);
|
| 466 | f_ctx->bio = bio;
|
| 467 | queue_work(blk_crypto_wq, &f_ctx->work);
|
| 468 | }
|
| 469 |
|
| 470 | |
| 471 | * blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep - Prepare a bio to use fallback en/decryption
|
| 472 | * @bio: bio to prepare
|
| 473 | *
|
| 474 | * If bio is doing a WRITE operation, allocate one or more bios to contain the
|
| 475 | * encrypted payload and submit them.
|
| 476 | *
|
| 477 | * For a READ operation, mark the bio for decryption by using bi_private and
|
| 478 | * bi_end_io.
|
| 479 | *
|
| 480 | * In either case, this function will make the submitted bio(s) look like
|
| 481 | * regular bios (i.e. as if no encryption context was ever specified) for the
|
| 482 | * purposes of the rest of the stack except for blk-integrity (blk-integrity and
|
| 483 | * blk-crypto are not currently supported together).
|
| 484 | *
|
| 485 | * Return: true if @bio should be submitted to the driver by the caller, else
|
| 486 | * false. Sets bio->bi_status, calls bio_endio and returns false on error.
|
| 487 |
|
| 488 | bool blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep(struct bio *bio)
|
| 489 | {
|
| 490 | struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
|
| 491 | struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx;
|
| 492 |
|
| 493 | if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tfms_inited[bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode])) {
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 | bio_io_error(bio);
|
| 496 | return false;
|
| 497 | }
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 | if (bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.key_type != BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW) {
|
| 500 | bio_endio_status(bio, BLK_STS_NOTSUPP);
|
| 501 | return false;
|
| 502 | }
|
| 503 |
|
| 504 | if (bio_data_dir(bio) == WRITE) {
|
| 505 | blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(bio);
|
| 506 | return false;
|
| 507 | }
|
| 508 |
|
| 509 | |
| 510 | * bio READ case: Set up a f_ctx in the bio's bi_private and set the
|
| 511 | * bi_end_io appropriately to trigger decryption when the bio is ended.
|
| 512 |
|
| 513 | f_ctx = mempool_alloc(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool, GFP_NOIO);
|
| 514 | f_ctx->crypt_ctx = *bc;
|
| 515 | f_ctx->crypt_iter = bio->bi_iter;
|
| 516 | f_ctx->bi_private_orig = bio->bi_private;
|
| 517 | f_ctx->bi_end_io_orig = bio->bi_end_io;
|
| 518 | bio->bi_private = (void *)f_ctx;
|
| 519 | bio->bi_end_io = blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio;
|
| 520 | bio_crypt_free_ctx(bio);
|
| 521 |
|
| 522 | return true;
|
| 523 | }
|
| 524 |
|
| 525 | int blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key)
|
| 526 | {
|
| 527 | return __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile, key);
|
| 528 | }
|
| 529 |
|
| 530 | static bool blk_crypto_fallback_inited;
|
| 531 | static int blk_crypto_fallback_init(void)
|
| 532 | {
|
| 533 | int i;
|
| 534 | int err;
|
| 535 |
|
| 536 | if (blk_crypto_fallback_inited)
|
| 537 | return 0;
|
| 538 |
|
| 539 | get_random_bytes(blank_key, sizeof(blank_key));
|
| 540 |
|
| 541 | err = bioset_init(&enc_bio_set, 64, 0, BIOSET_NEED_BVECS);
|
| 542 | if (err)
|
| 543 | goto out;
|
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
|
| 546 | blk_crypto_fallback_profile = kzalloc_obj(*blk_crypto_fallback_profile);
|
| 547 | if (!blk_crypto_fallback_profile) {
|
| 548 | err = -ENOMEM;
|
| 549 | goto fail_free_bioset;
|
| 550 | }
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 | err = blk_crypto_profile_init(blk_crypto_fallback_profile,
|
| 553 | blk_crypto_num_keyslots);
|
| 554 | if (err)
|
| 555 | goto fail_free_profile;
|
| 556 | err = -ENOMEM;
|
| 557 |
|
| 558 | blk_crypto_fallback_profile->ll_ops = blk_crypto_fallback_ll_ops;
|
| 559 | blk_crypto_fallback_profile->max_dun_bytes_supported = BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE;
|
| 560 | blk_crypto_fallback_profile->key_types_supported = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
|
| 561 |
|
| 562 |
|
| 563 | for (i = 0; i < BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX; i++)
|
| 564 | blk_crypto_fallback_profile->modes_supported[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
|
| 565 | blk_crypto_fallback_profile->modes_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID] = 0;
|
| 566 |
|
| 567 | blk_crypto_wq = alloc_workqueue("blk_crypto_wq",
|
| 568 | WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI |
|
| 569 | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, num_online_cpus());
|
| 570 | if (!blk_crypto_wq)
|
| 571 | goto fail_destroy_profile;
|
| 572 |
|
| 573 | blk_crypto_keyslots = kzalloc_objs(blk_crypto_keyslots[0],
|
| 574 | blk_crypto_num_keyslots);
|
| 575 | if (!blk_crypto_keyslots)
|
| 576 | goto fail_free_wq;
|
| 577 |
|
| 578 | blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool =
|
| 579 | mempool_create_page_pool(num_prealloc_bounce_pg, 0);
|
| 580 | if (!blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool)
|
| 581 | goto fail_free_keyslots;
|
| 582 |
|
| 583 | bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, 0);
|
| 584 | if (!bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache)
|
| 585 | goto fail_free_bounce_page_pool;
|
| 586 |
|
| 587 | bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool =
|
| 588 | mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs,
|
| 589 | bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache);
|
| 590 | if (!bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool)
|
| 591 | goto fail_free_crypt_ctx_cache;
|
| 592 |
|
| 593 | blk_crypto_fallback_inited = true;
|
| 594 |
|
| 595 | return 0;
|
| 596 | fail_free_crypt_ctx_cache:
|
| 597 | kmem_cache_destroy(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache);
|
| 598 | fail_free_bounce_page_pool:
|
| 599 | mempool_destroy(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool);
|
| 600 | fail_free_keyslots:
|
| 601 | kfree(blk_crypto_keyslots);
|
| 602 | fail_free_wq:
|
| 603 | destroy_workqueue(blk_crypto_wq);
|
| 604 | fail_destroy_profile:
|
| 605 | blk_crypto_profile_destroy(blk_crypto_fallback_profile);
|
| 606 | fail_free_profile:
|
| 607 | kfree(blk_crypto_fallback_profile);
|
| 608 | fail_free_bioset:
|
| 609 | bioset_exit(&enc_bio_set);
|
| 610 | out:
|
| 611 | return err;
|
| 612 | }
|
| 613 |
|
| 614 | |
| 615 | * Prepare blk-crypto-fallback for the specified crypto mode.
|
| 616 | * Returns -ENOPKG if the needed crypto API support is missing.
|
| 617 |
|
| 618 | int blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(enum blk_crypto_mode_num mode_num)
|
| 619 | {
|
| 620 | const char *cipher_str = blk_crypto_modes[mode_num].cipher_str;
|
| 621 | struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp;
|
| 622 | unsigned int i;
|
| 623 | int err = 0;
|
| 624 |
|
| 625 | |
| 626 | * Fast path
|
| 627 | * Ensure that updates to blk_crypto_keyslots[i].tfms[mode_num]
|
| 628 | * for each i are visible before we try to access them.
|
| 629 |
|
| 630 | if (likely(smp_load_acquire(&tfms_inited[mode_num])))
|
| 631 | return 0;
|
| 632 |
|
| 633 | mutex_lock(&tfms_init_lock);
|
| 634 | if (tfms_inited[mode_num])
|
| 635 | goto out;
|
| 636 |
|
| 637 | err = blk_crypto_fallback_init();
|
| 638 | if (err)
|
| 639 | goto out;
|
| 640 |
|
| 641 | for (i = 0; i < blk_crypto_num_keyslots; i++) {
|
| 642 | slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[i];
|
| 643 | slotp->tfms[mode_num] = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(cipher_str,
|
| 644 | 0, 0);
|
| 645 | if (IS_ERR(slotp->tfms[mode_num])) {
|
| 646 | err = PTR_ERR(slotp->tfms[mode_num]);
|
| 647 | if (err == -ENOENT) {
|
| 648 | pr_warn_once("Missing crypto API support for \"%s\"\n",
|
| 649 | cipher_str);
|
| 650 | err = -ENOPKG;
|
| 651 | }
|
| 652 | slotp->tfms[mode_num] = NULL;
|
| 653 | goto out_free_tfms;
|
| 654 | }
|
| 655 |
|
| 656 | crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(slotp->tfms[mode_num],
|
| 657 | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
|
| 658 | }
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 | |
| 661 | * Ensure that updates to blk_crypto_keyslots[i].tfms[mode_num]
|
| 662 | * for each i are visible before we set tfms_inited[mode_num].
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 | smp_store_release(&tfms_inited[mode_num], true);
|
| 665 | goto out;
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 | out_free_tfms:
|
| 668 | for (i = 0; i < blk_crypto_num_keyslots; i++) {
|
| 669 | slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[i];
|
| 670 | crypto_free_sync_skcipher(slotp->tfms[mode_num]);
|
| 671 | slotp->tfms[mode_num] = NULL;
|
| 672 | }
|
| 673 | out:
|
| 674 | mutex_unlock(&tfms_init_lock);
|
| 675 | return err;
|
| 676 | }
|