projects/linux·blob assoc-array-fixes · refs

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1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2#ifndef __LINUX_UACCESS_H__
3#define __LINUX_UACCESS_H__
4
5#include <linux/cleanup.h>
6#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
7#include <linux/instrumented.h>
8#include <linux/minmax.h>
9#include <linux/nospec.h>
10#include <linux/sched.h>
11#include <linux/ucopysize.h>
12
13#include <asm/uaccess.h>
14
15/*
16 * Architectures that support memory tagging (assigning tags to memory regions,
17 * embedding these tags into addresses that point to these memory regions, and
18 * checking that the memory and the pointer tags match on memory accesses)
19 * redefine this macro to strip tags from pointers.
20 *
21 * Passing down mm_struct allows to define untagging rules on per-process
22 * basis.
23 *
24 * It's defined as noop for architectures that don't support memory tagging.
25 */
26#ifndef untagged_addr
27#define untagged_addr(addr) (addr)
28#endif
29
30#ifndef untagged_addr_remote
31#define untagged_addr_remote(mm, addr) ({ \
32 mmap_assert_locked(mm); \
33 untagged_addr(addr); \
34})
35#endif
36
37#ifdef masked_user_access_begin
38 #define can_do_masked_user_access() 1
39# ifndef masked_user_write_access_begin
40# define masked_user_write_access_begin masked_user_access_begin
41# endif
42# ifndef masked_user_read_access_begin
43# define masked_user_read_access_begin masked_user_access_begin
44#endif
45#else
46 #define can_do_masked_user_access() 0
47 #define masked_user_access_begin(src) NULL
48 #define masked_user_read_access_begin(src) NULL
49 #define masked_user_write_access_begin(src) NULL
50 #define mask_user_address(src) (src)
51#endif
52
53/*
54 * Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user())
55 * and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and
56 * __copy_{to,from}_user{,_inatomic}().
57 *
58 * raw_copy_{to,from}_user(to, from, size) should copy up to size bytes and
59 * return the amount left to copy. They should assume that access_ok() has
60 * already been checked (and succeeded); they should *not* zero-pad anything.
61 * No KASAN or object size checks either - those belong here.
62 *
63 * Both of these functions should attempt to copy size bytes starting at from
64 * into the area starting at to. They must not fetch or store anything
65 * outside of those areas. Return value must be between 0 (everything
66 * copied successfully) and size (nothing copied).
67 *
68 * If raw_copy_{to,from}_user(to, from, size) returns N, size - N bytes starting
69 * at to must become equal to the bytes fetched from the corresponding area
70 * starting at from. All data past to + size - N must be left unmodified.
71 *
72 * If copying succeeds, the return value must be 0. If some data cannot be
73 * fetched, it is permitted to copy less than had been fetched; the only
74 * hard requirement is that not storing anything at all (i.e. returning size)
75 * should happen only when nothing could be copied. In other words, you don't
76 * have to squeeze as much as possible - it is allowed, but not necessary.
77 *
78 * For raw_copy_from_user() to always points to kernel memory and no faults
79 * on store should happen. Interpretation of from is affected by set_fs().
80 * For raw_copy_to_user() it's the other way round.
81 *
82 * Both can be inlined - it's up to architectures whether it wants to bother
83 * with that. They should not be used directly; they are used to implement
84 * the 6 functions (copy_{to,from}_user(), __copy_{to,from}_user_inatomic())
85 * that are used instead. Out of those, __... ones are inlined. Plain
86 * copy_{to,from}_user() might or might not be inlined. If you want them
87 * inlined, have asm/uaccess.h define INLINE_COPY_USER.
88 *
89 * NOTE: only copy_from_user() zero-pads the destination in case of short copy.
90 * Neither __copy_from_user() nor __copy_from_user_inatomic() zero anything
91 * at all; their callers absolutely must check the return value.
92 *
93 * Biarch ones should also provide raw_copy_in_user() - similar to the above,
94 * but both source and destination are __user pointers (affected by set_fs()
95 * as usual) and both source and destination can trigger faults.
96 */
97
98static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
99__copy_from_user_inatomic(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
100{
101 unsigned long res;
102
103 instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
104 check_object_size(to, n, false);
105 res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
106 instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res);
107 return res;
108}
109
110static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
111__copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
112{
113 unsigned long res;
114
115 might_fault();
116 instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
117 if (should_fail_usercopy())
118 return n;
119 check_object_size(to, n, false);
120 res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
121 instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res);
122 return res;
123}
124
125/**
126 * __copy_to_user_inatomic: - Copy a block of data into user space, with less checking.
127 * @to: Destination address, in user space.
128 * @from: Source address, in kernel space.
129 * @n: Number of bytes to copy.
130 *
131 * Context: User context only.
132 *
133 * Copy data from kernel space to user space. Caller must check
134 * the specified block with access_ok() before calling this function.
135 * The caller should also make sure he pins the user space address
136 * so that we don't result in page fault and sleep.
137 */
138static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
139__copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
140{
141 if (should_fail_usercopy())
142 return n;
143 instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
144 check_object_size(from, n, true);
145 return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
146}
147
148static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
149__copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
150{
151 might_fault();
152 if (should_fail_usercopy())
153 return n;
154 instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
155 check_object_size(from, n, true);
156 return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
157}
158
159/*
160 * Architectures that #define INLINE_COPY_USER use this function
161 * directly in the normal copy_to/from_user(), the other ones go
162 * through an extern _copy_to/from_user(), which expands the same code
163 * here.
164 */
165static inline __must_check unsigned long
166_inline_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
167{
168 unsigned long res = n;
169 might_fault();
170 if (should_fail_usercopy())
171 goto fail;
172 if (can_do_masked_user_access())
173 from = mask_user_address(from);
174 else {
175 if (!access_ok(from, n))
176 goto fail;
177 /*
178 * Ensure that bad access_ok() speculation will not
179 * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
180 * finished:
181 */
182 barrier_nospec();
183 }
184 instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
185 res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
186 instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res);
187 if (likely(!res))
188 return 0;
189fail:
190 memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
191 return res;
192}
193
194static inline __must_check unsigned long
195_inline_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
196{
197 might_fault();
198 if (should_fail_usercopy())
199 return n;
200 if (access_ok(to, n)) {
201 instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
202 n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
203 }
204 return n;
205}
206#ifdef INLINE_COPY_USER
207# define _copy_to_user _inline_copy_to_user
208# define _copy_from_user _inline_copy_from_user
209#else
210extern __must_check unsigned long
211_copy_from_user(void *, const void __user *, unsigned long);
212
213extern __must_check unsigned long
214_copy_to_user(void __user *, const void *, unsigned long);
215#endif
216
217static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
218copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
219{
220 if (!check_copy_size(to, n, false))
221 return n;
222 return _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
223}
224
225static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
226copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
227{
228 if (!check_copy_size(from, n, true))
229 return n;
230 return _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
231}
232
233#ifndef copy_mc_to_kernel
234/*
235 * Without arch opt-in this generic copy_mc_to_kernel() will not handle
236 * #MC (or arch equivalent) during source read.
237 */
238static inline unsigned long __must_check
239copy_mc_to_kernel(void *dst, const void *src, size_t cnt)
240{
241 memcpy(dst, src, cnt);
242 return 0;
243}
244#endif
245
246static __always_inline void pagefault_disabled_inc(void)
247{
248 current->pagefault_disabled++;
249}
250
251static __always_inline void pagefault_disabled_dec(void)
252{
253 current->pagefault_disabled--;
254}
255
256/*
257 * These routines enable/disable the pagefault handler. If disabled, it will
258 * not take any locks and go straight to the fixup table.
259 *
260 * User access methods will not sleep when called from a pagefault_disabled()
261 * environment.
262 */
263static inline void pagefault_disable(void)
264{
265 pagefault_disabled_inc();
266 /*
267 * make sure to have issued the store before a pagefault
268 * can hit.
269 */
270 barrier();
271}
272
273static inline void pagefault_enable(void)
274{
275 /*
276 * make sure to issue those last loads/stores before enabling
277 * the pagefault handler again.
278 */
279 barrier();
280 pagefault_disabled_dec();
281}
282
283/*
284 * Is the pagefault handler disabled? If so, user access methods will not sleep.
285 */
286static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void)
287{
288 return current->pagefault_disabled != 0;
289}
290
291/*
292 * The pagefault handler is in general disabled by pagefault_disable() or
293 * when in irq context (via in_atomic()).
294 *
295 * This function should only be used by the fault handlers. Other users should
296 * stick to pagefault_disabled().
297 * Please NEVER use preempt_disable() to disable the fault handler. With
298 * !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT, this is like a NOP. So the handler won't be disabled.
299 * in_atomic() will report different values based on !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT.
300 */
301#define faulthandler_disabled() (pagefault_disabled() || in_atomic())
302
303DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_0(pagefault, pagefault_disable(), pagefault_enable())
304
305#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUBPAGE_FAULTS
306
307/**
308 * probe_subpage_writeable: probe the user range for write faults at sub-page
309 * granularity (e.g. arm64 MTE)
310 * @uaddr: start of address range
311 * @size: size of address range
312 *
313 * Returns 0 on success, the number of bytes not probed on fault.
314 *
315 * It is expected that the caller checked for the write permission of each
316 * page in the range either by put_user() or GUP. The architecture port can
317 * implement a more efficient get_user() probing if the same sub-page faults
318 * are triggered by either a read or a write.
319 */
320static inline size_t probe_subpage_writeable(char __user *uaddr, size_t size)
321{
322 return 0;
323}
324
325#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUBPAGE_FAULTS */
326
327#ifndef ARCH_HAS_NONTEMPORAL_UACCESS
328
329static inline __must_check unsigned long
330copy_from_user_inatomic_nontemporal(void *to, const void __user *from,
331 unsigned long n)
332{
333 if (can_do_masked_user_access())
334 from = mask_user_address(from);
335 else
336 if (!access_ok(from, n))
337 return n;
338 return __copy_from_user_inatomic(to, from, n);
339}
340
341#endif /* ARCH_HAS_NONTEMPORAL_UACCESS */
342
343extern __must_check int check_zeroed_user(const void __user *from, size_t size);
344
345/**
346 * copy_struct_from_user: copy a struct from userspace
347 * @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be @ksize
348 * bytes long.
349 * @ksize: Size of @dst struct.
350 * @src: Source address, in userspace.
351 * @usize: (Alleged) size of @src struct.
352 *
353 * Copies a struct from userspace to kernel space, in a way that guarantees
354 * backwards-compatibility for struct syscall arguments (as long as future
355 * struct extensions are made such that all new fields are *appended* to the
356 * old struct, and zeroed-out new fields have the same meaning as the old
357 * struct).
358 *
359 * @ksize is just sizeof(*dst), and @usize should've been passed by userspace.
360 * The recommended usage is something like the following:
361 *
362 * SYSCALL_DEFINE2(foobar, const struct foo __user *, uarg, size_t, usize)
363 * {
364 * int err;
365 * struct foo karg = {};
366 *
367 * if (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
368 * return -E2BIG;
369 * if (usize < FOO_SIZE_VER0)
370 * return -EINVAL;
371 *
372 * err = copy_struct_from_user(&karg, sizeof(karg), uarg, usize);
373 * if (err)
374 * return err;
375 *
376 * // ...
377 * }
378 *
379 * There are three cases to consider:
380 * * If @usize == @ksize, then it's copied verbatim.
381 * * If @usize < @ksize, then the userspace has passed an old struct to a
382 * newer kernel. The rest of the trailing bytes in @dst (@ksize - @usize)
383 * are to be zero-filled.
384 * * If @usize > @ksize, then the userspace has passed a new struct to an
385 * older kernel. The trailing bytes unknown to the kernel (@usize - @ksize)
386 * are checked to ensure they are zeroed, otherwise -E2BIG is returned.
387 *
388 * Returns (in all cases, some data may have been copied):
389 * * -E2BIG: (@usize > @ksize) and there are non-zero trailing bytes in @src.
390 * * -EFAULT: access to userspace failed.
391 */
392static __always_inline __must_check int
393copy_struct_from_user(void *dst, size_t ksize, const void __user *src,
394 size_t usize)
395{
396 size_t size = min(ksize, usize);
397 size_t rest = max(ksize, usize) - size;
398
399 /* Double check if ksize is larger than a known object size. */
400 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ksize > __builtin_object_size(dst, 1)))
401 return -E2BIG;
402
403 /* Deal with trailing bytes. */
404 if (usize < ksize) {
405 memset(dst + size, 0, rest);
406 } else if (usize > ksize) {
407 int ret = check_zeroed_user(src + size, rest);
408 if (ret <= 0)
409 return ret ?: -E2BIG;
410 }
411 /* Copy the interoperable parts of the struct. */
412 if (copy_from_user(dst, src, size))
413 return -EFAULT;
414 return 0;
415}
416
417/**
418 * copy_struct_to_user: copy a struct to userspace
419 * @dst: Destination address, in userspace. This buffer must be @ksize
420 * bytes long.
421 * @usize: (Alleged) size of @dst struct.
422 * @src: Source address, in kernel space.
423 * @ksize: Size of @src struct.
424 * @ignored_trailing: Set to %true if there was a non-zero byte in @src that
425 * userspace cannot see because they are using an smaller struct.
426 *
427 * Copies a struct from kernel space to userspace, in a way that guarantees
428 * backwards-compatibility for struct syscall arguments (as long as future
429 * struct extensions are made such that all new fields are *appended* to the
430 * old struct, and zeroed-out new fields have the same meaning as the old
431 * struct).
432 *
433 * Some syscalls may wish to make sure that userspace knows about everything in
434 * the struct, and if there is a non-zero value that userspce doesn't know
435 * about, they want to return an error (such as -EMSGSIZE) or have some other
436 * fallback (such as adding a "you're missing some information" flag). If
437 * @ignored_trailing is non-%NULL, it will be set to %true if there was a
438 * non-zero byte that could not be copied to userspace (ie. was past @usize).
439 *
440 * While unconditionally returning an error in this case is the simplest
441 * solution, for maximum backward compatibility you should try to only return
442 * -EMSGSIZE if the user explicitly requested the data that couldn't be copied.
443 * Note that structure sizes can change due to header changes and simple
444 * recompilations without code changes(!), so if you care about
445 * @ignored_trailing you probably want to make sure that any new field data is
446 * associated with a flag. Otherwise you might assume that a program knows
447 * about data it does not.
448 *
449 * @ksize is just sizeof(*src), and @usize should've been passed by userspace.
450 * The recommended usage is something like the following:
451 *
452 * SYSCALL_DEFINE2(foobar, struct foo __user *, uarg, size_t, usize)
453 * {
454 * int err;
455 * bool ignored_trailing;
456 * struct foo karg = {};
457 *
458 * if (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
459 * return -E2BIG;
460 * if (usize < FOO_SIZE_VER0)
461 * return -EINVAL;
462 *
463 * // ... modify karg somehow ...
464 *
465 * err = copy_struct_to_user(uarg, usize, &karg, sizeof(karg),
466 * &ignored_trailing);
467 * if (err)
468 * return err;
469 * if (ignored_trailing)
470 * return -EMSGSIZE:
471 *
472 * // ...
473 * }
474 *
475 * There are three cases to consider:
476 * * If @usize == @ksize, then it's copied verbatim.
477 * * If @usize < @ksize, then the kernel is trying to pass userspace a newer
478 * struct than it supports. Thus we only copy the interoperable portions
479 * (@usize) and ignore the rest (but @ignored_trailing is set to %true if
480 * any of the trailing (@ksize - @usize) bytes are non-zero).
481 * * If @usize > @ksize, then the kernel is trying to pass userspace an older
482 * struct than userspace supports. In order to make sure the
483 * unknown-to-the-kernel fields don't contain garbage values, we zero the
484 * trailing (@usize - @ksize) bytes.
485 *
486 * Returns (in all cases, some data may have been copied):
487 * * -EFAULT: access to userspace failed.
488 */
489static __always_inline __must_check int
490copy_struct_to_user(void __user *dst, size_t usize, const void *src,
491 size_t ksize, bool *ignored_trailing)
492{
493 size_t size = min(ksize, usize);
494 size_t rest = max(ksize, usize) - size;
495
496 /* Double check if ksize is larger than a known object size. */
497 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ksize > __builtin_object_size(src, 1)))
498 return -E2BIG;
499
500 /* Deal with trailing bytes. */
501 if (usize > ksize) {
502 if (clear_user(dst + size, rest))
503 return -EFAULT;
504 }
505 if (ignored_trailing)
506 *ignored_trailing = usize < ksize &&
507 memchr_inv(src + size, 0, rest) != NULL;
508 /* Copy the interoperable parts of the struct. */
509 if (copy_to_user(dst, src, size))
510 return -EFAULT;
511 return 0;
512}
513
514static __always_inline void
515__copy_struct_generic_bounce_buffer(void *dst, size_t dstsize,
516 const void *src, size_t srcsize,
517 bool *ignored_trailing)
518{
519 size_t size = min(dstsize, srcsize);
520 size_t rest = max(dstsize, srcsize) - size;
521
522 /* Deal with trailing bytes. */
523 if (dstsize > srcsize)
524 memset(dst + size, 0, rest);
525 if (ignored_trailing)
526 *ignored_trailing = dstsize < srcsize &&
527 memchr_inv(src + size, 0, rest) != NULL;
528 /* Copy the interoperable parts of the struct. */
529 memcpy(dst, src, size);
530}
531
532/**
533 * This is like copy_struct_from_user(), but the
534 * src buffer was already copied into a kernel
535 * bounce buffer, so it will never return -EFAULT.
536 */
537static __always_inline __must_check int
538copy_struct_from_bounce_buffer(void *dst, size_t dstsize,
539 const void *src, size_t srcsize)
540{
541 bool ignored_trailing;
542
543 /* Double check if ksize is larger than a known object size. */
544 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dstsize > __builtin_object_size(dst, 1)))
545 return -E2BIG;
546
547 __copy_struct_generic_bounce_buffer(dst, dstsize,
548 src, srcsize,
549 &ignored_trailing);
550 if (unlikely(ignored_trailing))
551 return -E2BIG;
552
553 return 0;
554}
555
556/**
557 * This is like copy_struct_to_user(), but the
558 * dst buffer is a kernel bounce buffer instead
559 * of a direct userspace buffer, so it will never return -EFAULT.
560 */
561static __always_inline __must_check int
562copy_struct_to_bounce_buffer(void *dst, size_t dstsize,
563 const void *src,
564 size_t srcsize,
565 bool *ignored_trailing)
566{
567 /* Double check if srcsize is larger than a known object size. */
568 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(srcsize > __builtin_object_size(src, 1)))
569 return -E2BIG;
570
571 __copy_struct_generic_bounce_buffer(dst, dstsize,
572 src, srcsize,
573 ignored_trailing);
574 return 0;
575}
576
577bool copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size);
578
579long copy_from_kernel_nofault(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
580long notrace copy_to_kernel_nofault(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
581
582long copy_from_user_nofault(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size);
583long notrace copy_to_user_nofault(void __user *dst, const void *src,
584 size_t size);
585
586long strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr,
587 long count);
588
589long strncpy_from_user_nofault(char *dst, const void __user *unsafe_addr,
590 long count);
591long strnlen_user_nofault(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count);
592
593#ifdef arch_get_kernel_nofault
594/*
595 * Wrap the architecture implementation so that @label can be outside of a
596 * cleanup() scope. A regular C goto works correctly, but ASM goto does
597 * not. Clang rejects such an attempt, but GCC silently emits buggy code.
598 */
599#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label) \
600do { \
601 __label__ local_label; \
602 arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, local_label); \
603 if (0) { \
604 local_label: \
605 goto label; \
606 } \
607} while (0)
608
609#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label) \
610do { \
611 __label__ local_label; \
612 arch_put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, local_label); \
613 if (0) { \
614 local_label: \
615 goto label; \
616 } \
617} while (0)
618
619#elif !defined(__get_kernel_nofault) /* arch_get_kernel_nofault */
620
621#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label) \
622do { \
623 type __user *p = (type __force __user *)(src); \
624 type data; \
625 if (__get_user(data, p)) \
626 goto label; \
627 *(type *)dst = data; \
628} while (0)
629
630#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label) \
631do { \
632 type __user *p = (type __force __user *)(dst); \
633 type data = *(type *)src; \
634 if (__put_user(data, p)) \
635 goto label; \
636} while (0)
637
638#endif /* !__get_kernel_nofault */
639
640/**
641 * get_kernel_nofault(): safely attempt to read from a location
642 * @val: read into this variable
643 * @ptr: address to read from
644 *
645 * Returns 0 on success, or -EFAULT.
646 */
647#define get_kernel_nofault(val, ptr) ({ \
648 const typeof(val) *__gk_ptr = (ptr); \
649 copy_from_kernel_nofault(&(val), __gk_ptr, sizeof(val));\
650})
651
652#ifdef user_access_begin
653
654#ifdef arch_unsafe_get_user
655/*
656 * Wrap the architecture implementation so that @label can be outside of a
657 * cleanup() scope. A regular C goto works correctly, but ASM goto does
658 * not. Clang rejects such an attempt, but GCC silently emits buggy code.
659 *
660 * Some architectures use internal local labels already, but this extra
661 * indirection here is harmless because the compiler optimizes it out
662 * completely in any case. This construct just ensures that the ASM GOTO
663 * target is always in the local scope. The C goto 'label' works correctly
664 * when leaving a cleanup() scope.
665 */
666#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label) \
667do { \
668 __label__ local_label; \
669 arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, local_label); \
670 if (0) { \
671 local_label: \
672 goto label; \
673 } \
674} while (0)
675
676#define unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \
677do { \
678 __label__ local_label; \
679 arch_unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, local_label); \
680 if (0) { \
681 local_label: \
682 goto label; \
683 } \
684} while (0)
685#endif /* arch_unsafe_get_user */
686
687#else /* user_access_begin */
688#define user_access_begin(ptr,len) access_ok(ptr, len)
689#define user_access_end() do { } while (0)
690#define unsafe_op_wrap(op, err) do { if (unlikely(op)) goto err; } while (0)
691#define unsafe_get_user(x,p,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__get_user(x,p),e)
692#define unsafe_put_user(x,p,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__put_user(x,p),e)
693#define unsafe_copy_to_user(d,s,l,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__copy_to_user(d,s,l),e)
694#define unsafe_copy_from_user(d,s,l,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__copy_from_user(d,s,l),e)
695static inline unsigned long user_access_save(void) { return 0UL; }
696static inline void user_access_restore(unsigned long flags) { }
697#endif /* !user_access_begin */
698
699#ifndef user_write_access_begin
700#define user_write_access_begin user_access_begin
701#define user_write_access_end user_access_end
702#endif
703#ifndef user_read_access_begin
704#define user_read_access_begin user_access_begin
705#define user_read_access_end user_access_end
706#endif
707
708#ifndef unsafe_atomic_store_release_user
709# define unsafe_atomic_store_release_user(val, uptr, elbl) \
710 do { \
711 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_MEMORY_ORDER_TSO)) \
712 smp_mb(); \
713 else \
714 barrier(); \
715 unsafe_put_user(val, uptr, elbl); \
716 } while (0)
717#endif
718
719/* Define RW variant so the below _mode macro expansion works */
720#define masked_user_rw_access_begin(u) masked_user_access_begin(u)
721#define user_rw_access_begin(u, s) user_access_begin(u, s)
722
723/* Scoped user access */
724
725/* Cleanup wrapper functions */
726static __always_inline void __scoped_user_read_access_end(const void *p)
727{
728 user_read_access_end();
729};
730static __always_inline void __scoped_user_write_access_end(const void *p)
731{
732 user_write_access_end();
733};
734static __always_inline void __scoped_user_rw_access_end(const void *p)
735{
736 user_access_end();
737};
738
739/**
740 * __scoped_user_access_begin - Start a scoped user access
741 * @mode: The mode of the access class (read, write, rw)
742 * @uptr: The pointer to access user space memory
743 * @size: Size of the access
744 * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected
745 *
746 * Internal helper for __scoped_user_access(). Don't use directly.
747 */
748#define __scoped_user_access_begin(mode, uptr, size, elbl) \
749({ \
750 typeof(uptr) __retptr; \
751 \
752 if (can_do_masked_user_access()) { \
753 __retptr = masked_user_##mode##_access_begin(uptr); \
754 } else { \
755 __retptr = uptr; \
756 if (!user_##mode##_access_begin(uptr, size)) \
757 goto elbl; \
758 } \
759 __retptr; \
760})
761
762/**
763 * __scoped_user_access - Open a scope for user access
764 * @mode: The mode of the access class (read, write, rw)
765 * @uptr: The pointer to access user space memory
766 * @size: Size of the access
767 * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected. It
768 * must be placed outside the scope
769 *
770 * If the user access function inside the scope requires a fault label, it
771 * can use @elbl or a different label outside the scope, which requires
772 * that user access which is implemented with ASM GOTO has been properly
773 * wrapped. See unsafe_get_user() for reference.
774 *
775 * scoped_user_rw_access(ptr, efault) {
776 * unsafe_get_user(rval, &ptr->rval, efault);
777 * unsafe_put_user(wval, &ptr->wval, efault);
778 * }
779 * return 0;
780 * efault:
781 * return -EFAULT;
782 *
783 * The scope is internally implemented as a autoterminating nested for()
784 * loop, which can be left with 'return', 'break' and 'goto' at any
785 * point.
786 *
787 * When the scope is left user_##@_mode##_access_end() is automatically
788 * invoked.
789 *
790 * When the architecture supports masked user access and the access region
791 * which is determined by @uptr and @size is not a valid user space
792 * address, i.e. < TASK_SIZE, the scope sets the pointer to a faulting user
793 * space address and does not terminate early. This optimizes for the good
794 * case and lets the performance uncritical bad case go through the fault.
795 *
796 * The eventual modification of the pointer is limited to the scope.
797 * Outside of the scope the original pointer value is unmodified, so that
798 * the original pointer value is available for diagnostic purposes in an
799 * out of scope fault path.
800 *
801 * Nesting scoped user access into a user access scope is invalid and fails
802 * the build. Nesting into other guards, e.g. pagefault is safe.
803 *
804 * The masked variant does not check the size of the access and relies on a
805 * mapping hole (e.g. guard page) to catch an out of range pointer, the
806 * first access to user memory inside the scope has to be within
807 * @uptr ... @uptr + PAGE_SIZE - 1
808 *
809 * Don't use directly. Use scoped_masked_user_$MODE_access() instead.
810 */
811#define __scoped_user_access(mode, uptr, size, elbl) \
812for (bool done = false; !done; done = true) \
813 for (auto _tmpptr = __scoped_user_access_begin(mode, uptr, size, elbl); \
814 !done; done = true) \
815 /* Force modified pointer usage within the scope */ \
816 for (const auto uptr __cleanup(__scoped_user_##mode##_access_end) = \
817 _tmpptr; !done; done = true)
818
819/**
820 * scoped_user_read_access_size - Start a scoped user read access with given size
821 * @usrc: Pointer to the user space address to read from
822 * @size: Size of the access starting from @usrc
823 * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected
824 *
825 * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above.
826 */
827#define scoped_user_read_access_size(usrc, size, elbl) \
828 __scoped_user_access(read, usrc, size, elbl)
829
830/**
831 * scoped_user_read_access - Start a scoped user read access
832 * @usrc: Pointer to the user space address to read from
833 * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected
834 *
835 * The size of the access starting from @usrc is determined via sizeof(*@usrc)).
836 *
837 * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above.
838 */
839#define scoped_user_read_access(usrc, elbl) \
840 scoped_user_read_access_size(usrc, sizeof(*(usrc)), elbl)
841
842/**
843 * scoped_user_write_access_size - Start a scoped user write access with given size
844 * @udst: Pointer to the user space address to write to
845 * @size: Size of the access starting from @udst
846 * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected
847 *
848 * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above.
849 */
850#define scoped_user_write_access_size(udst, size, elbl) \
851 __scoped_user_access(write, udst, size, elbl)
852
853/**
854 * scoped_user_write_access - Start a scoped user write access
855 * @udst: Pointer to the user space address to write to
856 * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected
857 *
858 * The size of the access starting from @udst is determined via sizeof(*@udst)).
859 *
860 * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above.
861 */
862#define scoped_user_write_access(udst, elbl) \
863 scoped_user_write_access_size(udst, sizeof(*(udst)), elbl)
864
865/**
866 * scoped_user_rw_access_size - Start a scoped user read/write access with given size
867 * @uptr: Pointer to the user space address to read from and write to
868 * @size: Size of the access starting from @uptr
869 * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected
870 *
871 * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above.
872 */
873#define scoped_user_rw_access_size(uptr, size, elbl) \
874 __scoped_user_access(rw, uptr, size, elbl)
875
876/**
877 * scoped_user_rw_access - Start a scoped user read/write access
878 * @uptr: Pointer to the user space address to read from and write to
879 * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected
880 *
881 * The size of the access starting from @uptr is determined via sizeof(*@uptr)).
882 *
883 * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above.
884 */
885#define scoped_user_rw_access(uptr, elbl) \
886 scoped_user_rw_access_size(uptr, sizeof(*(uptr)), elbl)
887
888/**
889 * get_user_inline - Read user data inlined
890 * @val: The variable to store the value read from user memory
891 * @usrc: Pointer to the user space memory to read from
892 *
893 * Return: 0 if successful, -EFAULT when faulted
894 *
895 * Inlined variant of get_user(). Only use when there is a demonstrable
896 * performance reason.
897 */
898#define get_user_inline(val, usrc) \
899({ \
900 __label__ efault; \
901 typeof(usrc) _tmpsrc = usrc; \
902 int _ret = 0; \
903 \
904 scoped_user_read_access(_tmpsrc, efault) \
905 unsafe_get_user(val, _tmpsrc, efault); \
906 if (0) { \
907 efault: \
908 _ret = -EFAULT; \
909 } \
910 _ret; \
911})
912
913/**
914 * put_user_inline - Write to user memory inlined
915 * @val: The value to write
916 * @udst: Pointer to the user space memory to write to
917 *
918 * Return: 0 if successful, -EFAULT when faulted
919 *
920 * Inlined variant of put_user(). Only use when there is a demonstrable
921 * performance reason.
922 */
923#define put_user_inline(val, udst) \
924({ \
925 __label__ efault; \
926 typeof(udst) _tmpdst = udst; \
927 int _ret = 0; \
928 \
929 scoped_user_write_access(_tmpdst, efault) \
930 unsafe_put_user(val, _tmpdst, efault); \
931 if (0) { \
932 efault: \
933 _ret = -EFAULT; \
934 } \
935 _ret; \
936})
937
938#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
939void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
940 bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
941 unsigned long len);
942#endif
943
944#endif /* __LINUX_UACCESS_H__ */