projects/linux·blob assoc-array-fixes · refs

2148 lines · 66.7 KiB

1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2/*
3 * Copyright (C) 2017-2019 Linaro Ltd <[email protected]>
4 * Copyright 2026 Google LLC
5 */
6
7#include <crypto/aes-cbc-macs.h>
8#include <crypto/aes-cbc.h>
9#include <crypto/aes-ccm.h>
10#include <crypto/aes-ctr.h>
11#include <crypto/aes-ecb.h>
12#include <crypto/aes-gcm.h>
13#include <crypto/aes-xts.h>
14#include <crypto/aes.h>
15#include <crypto/gf128mul.h>
16#include <crypto/utils.h>
17#include <linux/cache.h>
18#include <linux/crypto.h>
19#include <linux/export.h>
20#include <linux/module.h>
21#include <linux/unaligned.h>
22#include "fips-aes.h"
23
24static const u8 ____cacheline_aligned aes_sbox[] = {
25 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5,
26 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76,
27 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0,
28 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0,
29 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc,
30 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
31 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a,
32 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75,
33 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0,
34 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84,
35 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b,
36 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf,
37 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
38 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8,
39 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5,
40 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2,
41 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17,
42 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73,
43 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88,
44 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb,
45 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c,
46 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
47 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9,
48 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08,
49 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6,
50 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
51 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e,
52 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e,
53 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94,
54 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf,
55 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68,
56 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16,
57};
58
59static const u8 ____cacheline_aligned aes_inv_sbox[] = {
60 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38,
61 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb,
62 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87,
63 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb,
64 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d,
65 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e,
66 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2,
67 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25,
68 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16,
69 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92,
70 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda,
71 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84,
72 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a,
73 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06,
74 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02,
75 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b,
76 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea,
77 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73,
78 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85,
79 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e,
80 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89,
81 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b,
82 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20,
83 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4,
84 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31,
85 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f,
86 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d,
87 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef,
88 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0,
89 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
90 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26,
91 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d,
92};
93
94extern const u8 crypto_aes_sbox[256] __alias(aes_sbox);
95extern const u8 crypto_aes_inv_sbox[256] __alias(aes_inv_sbox);
96
97EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_aes_sbox);
98EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_aes_inv_sbox);
99
100/* aes_enc_tab[i] contains MixColumn([SubByte(i), 0, 0, 0]). */
101const u32 ____cacheline_aligned aes_enc_tab[256] = {
102 0xa56363c6, 0x847c7cf8, 0x997777ee, 0x8d7b7bf6, 0x0df2f2ff, 0xbd6b6bd6,
103 0xb16f6fde, 0x54c5c591, 0x50303060, 0x03010102, 0xa96767ce, 0x7d2b2b56,
104 0x19fefee7, 0x62d7d7b5, 0xe6abab4d, 0x9a7676ec, 0x45caca8f, 0x9d82821f,
105 0x40c9c989, 0x877d7dfa, 0x15fafaef, 0xeb5959b2, 0xc947478e, 0x0bf0f0fb,
106 0xecadad41, 0x67d4d4b3, 0xfda2a25f, 0xeaafaf45, 0xbf9c9c23, 0xf7a4a453,
107 0x967272e4, 0x5bc0c09b, 0xc2b7b775, 0x1cfdfde1, 0xae93933d, 0x6a26264c,
108 0x5a36366c, 0x413f3f7e, 0x02f7f7f5, 0x4fcccc83, 0x5c343468, 0xf4a5a551,
109 0x34e5e5d1, 0x08f1f1f9, 0x937171e2, 0x73d8d8ab, 0x53313162, 0x3f15152a,
110 0x0c040408, 0x52c7c795, 0x65232346, 0x5ec3c39d, 0x28181830, 0xa1969637,
111 0x0f05050a, 0xb59a9a2f, 0x0907070e, 0x36121224, 0x9b80801b, 0x3de2e2df,
112 0x26ebebcd, 0x6927274e, 0xcdb2b27f, 0x9f7575ea, 0x1b090912, 0x9e83831d,
113 0x742c2c58, 0x2e1a1a34, 0x2d1b1b36, 0xb26e6edc, 0xee5a5ab4, 0xfba0a05b,
114 0xf65252a4, 0x4d3b3b76, 0x61d6d6b7, 0xceb3b37d, 0x7b292952, 0x3ee3e3dd,
115 0x712f2f5e, 0x97848413, 0xf55353a6, 0x68d1d1b9, 0x00000000, 0x2cededc1,
116 0x60202040, 0x1ffcfce3, 0xc8b1b179, 0xed5b5bb6, 0xbe6a6ad4, 0x46cbcb8d,
117 0xd9bebe67, 0x4b393972, 0xde4a4a94, 0xd44c4c98, 0xe85858b0, 0x4acfcf85,
118 0x6bd0d0bb, 0x2aefefc5, 0xe5aaaa4f, 0x16fbfbed, 0xc5434386, 0xd74d4d9a,
119 0x55333366, 0x94858511, 0xcf45458a, 0x10f9f9e9, 0x06020204, 0x817f7ffe,
120 0xf05050a0, 0x443c3c78, 0xba9f9f25, 0xe3a8a84b, 0xf35151a2, 0xfea3a35d,
121 0xc0404080, 0x8a8f8f05, 0xad92923f, 0xbc9d9d21, 0x48383870, 0x04f5f5f1,
122 0xdfbcbc63, 0xc1b6b677, 0x75dadaaf, 0x63212142, 0x30101020, 0x1affffe5,
123 0x0ef3f3fd, 0x6dd2d2bf, 0x4ccdcd81, 0x140c0c18, 0x35131326, 0x2fececc3,
124 0xe15f5fbe, 0xa2979735, 0xcc444488, 0x3917172e, 0x57c4c493, 0xf2a7a755,
125 0x827e7efc, 0x473d3d7a, 0xac6464c8, 0xe75d5dba, 0x2b191932, 0x957373e6,
126 0xa06060c0, 0x98818119, 0xd14f4f9e, 0x7fdcdca3, 0x66222244, 0x7e2a2a54,
127 0xab90903b, 0x8388880b, 0xca46468c, 0x29eeeec7, 0xd3b8b86b, 0x3c141428,
128 0x79dedea7, 0xe25e5ebc, 0x1d0b0b16, 0x76dbdbad, 0x3be0e0db, 0x56323264,
129 0x4e3a3a74, 0x1e0a0a14, 0xdb494992, 0x0a06060c, 0x6c242448, 0xe45c5cb8,
130 0x5dc2c29f, 0x6ed3d3bd, 0xefacac43, 0xa66262c4, 0xa8919139, 0xa4959531,
131 0x37e4e4d3, 0x8b7979f2, 0x32e7e7d5, 0x43c8c88b, 0x5937376e, 0xb76d6dda,
132 0x8c8d8d01, 0x64d5d5b1, 0xd24e4e9c, 0xe0a9a949, 0xb46c6cd8, 0xfa5656ac,
133 0x07f4f4f3, 0x25eaeacf, 0xaf6565ca, 0x8e7a7af4, 0xe9aeae47, 0x18080810,
134 0xd5baba6f, 0x887878f0, 0x6f25254a, 0x722e2e5c, 0x241c1c38, 0xf1a6a657,
135 0xc7b4b473, 0x51c6c697, 0x23e8e8cb, 0x7cdddda1, 0x9c7474e8, 0x211f1f3e,
136 0xdd4b4b96, 0xdcbdbd61, 0x868b8b0d, 0x858a8a0f, 0x907070e0, 0x423e3e7c,
137 0xc4b5b571, 0xaa6666cc, 0xd8484890, 0x05030306, 0x01f6f6f7, 0x120e0e1c,
138 0xa36161c2, 0x5f35356a, 0xf95757ae, 0xd0b9b969, 0x91868617, 0x58c1c199,
139 0x271d1d3a, 0xb99e9e27, 0x38e1e1d9, 0x13f8f8eb, 0xb398982b, 0x33111122,
140 0xbb6969d2, 0x70d9d9a9, 0x898e8e07, 0xa7949433, 0xb69b9b2d, 0x221e1e3c,
141 0x92878715, 0x20e9e9c9, 0x49cece87, 0xff5555aa, 0x78282850, 0x7adfdfa5,
142 0x8f8c8c03, 0xf8a1a159, 0x80898909, 0x170d0d1a, 0xdabfbf65, 0x31e6e6d7,
143 0xc6424284, 0xb86868d0, 0xc3414182, 0xb0999929, 0x772d2d5a, 0x110f0f1e,
144 0xcbb0b07b, 0xfc5454a8, 0xd6bbbb6d, 0x3a16162c,
145};
146EXPORT_SYMBOL(aes_enc_tab);
147
148/* aes_dec_tab[i] contains InvMixColumn([InvSubByte(i), 0, 0, 0]). */
149const u32 ____cacheline_aligned aes_dec_tab[256] = {
150 0x50a7f451, 0x5365417e, 0xc3a4171a, 0x965e273a, 0xcb6bab3b, 0xf1459d1f,
151 0xab58faac, 0x9303e34b, 0x55fa3020, 0xf66d76ad, 0x9176cc88, 0x254c02f5,
152 0xfcd7e54f, 0xd7cb2ac5, 0x80443526, 0x8fa362b5, 0x495ab1de, 0x671bba25,
153 0x980eea45, 0xe1c0fe5d, 0x02752fc3, 0x12f04c81, 0xa397468d, 0xc6f9d36b,
154 0xe75f8f03, 0x959c9215, 0xeb7a6dbf, 0xda595295, 0x2d83bed4, 0xd3217458,
155 0x2969e049, 0x44c8c98e, 0x6a89c275, 0x78798ef4, 0x6b3e5899, 0xdd71b927,
156 0xb64fe1be, 0x17ad88f0, 0x66ac20c9, 0xb43ace7d, 0x184adf63, 0x82311ae5,
157 0x60335197, 0x457f5362, 0xe07764b1, 0x84ae6bbb, 0x1ca081fe, 0x942b08f9,
158 0x58684870, 0x19fd458f, 0x876cde94, 0xb7f87b52, 0x23d373ab, 0xe2024b72,
159 0x578f1fe3, 0x2aab5566, 0x0728ebb2, 0x03c2b52f, 0x9a7bc586, 0xa50837d3,
160 0xf2872830, 0xb2a5bf23, 0xba6a0302, 0x5c8216ed, 0x2b1ccf8a, 0x92b479a7,
161 0xf0f207f3, 0xa1e2694e, 0xcdf4da65, 0xd5be0506, 0x1f6234d1, 0x8afea6c4,
162 0x9d532e34, 0xa055f3a2, 0x32e18a05, 0x75ebf6a4, 0x39ec830b, 0xaaef6040,
163 0x069f715e, 0x51106ebd, 0xf98a213e, 0x3d06dd96, 0xae053edd, 0x46bde64d,
164 0xb58d5491, 0x055dc471, 0x6fd40604, 0xff155060, 0x24fb9819, 0x97e9bdd6,
165 0xcc434089, 0x779ed967, 0xbd42e8b0, 0x888b8907, 0x385b19e7, 0xdbeec879,
166 0x470a7ca1, 0xe90f427c, 0xc91e84f8, 0x00000000, 0x83868009, 0x48ed2b32,
167 0xac70111e, 0x4e725a6c, 0xfbff0efd, 0x5638850f, 0x1ed5ae3d, 0x27392d36,
168 0x64d90f0a, 0x21a65c68, 0xd1545b9b, 0x3a2e3624, 0xb1670a0c, 0x0fe75793,
169 0xd296eeb4, 0x9e919b1b, 0x4fc5c080, 0xa220dc61, 0x694b775a, 0x161a121c,
170 0x0aba93e2, 0xe52aa0c0, 0x43e0223c, 0x1d171b12, 0x0b0d090e, 0xadc78bf2,
171 0xb9a8b62d, 0xc8a91e14, 0x8519f157, 0x4c0775af, 0xbbdd99ee, 0xfd607fa3,
172 0x9f2601f7, 0xbcf5725c, 0xc53b6644, 0x347efb5b, 0x7629438b, 0xdcc623cb,
173 0x68fcedb6, 0x63f1e4b8, 0xcadc31d7, 0x10856342, 0x40229713, 0x2011c684,
174 0x7d244a85, 0xf83dbbd2, 0x1132f9ae, 0x6da129c7, 0x4b2f9e1d, 0xf330b2dc,
175 0xec52860d, 0xd0e3c177, 0x6c16b32b, 0x99b970a9, 0xfa489411, 0x2264e947,
176 0xc48cfca8, 0x1a3ff0a0, 0xd82c7d56, 0xef903322, 0xc74e4987, 0xc1d138d9,
177 0xfea2ca8c, 0x360bd498, 0xcf81f5a6, 0x28de7aa5, 0x268eb7da, 0xa4bfad3f,
178 0xe49d3a2c, 0x0d927850, 0x9bcc5f6a, 0x62467e54, 0xc2138df6, 0xe8b8d890,
179 0x5ef7392e, 0xf5afc382, 0xbe805d9f, 0x7c93d069, 0xa92dd56f, 0xb31225cf,
180 0x3b99acc8, 0xa77d1810, 0x6e639ce8, 0x7bbb3bdb, 0x097826cd, 0xf418596e,
181 0x01b79aec, 0xa89a4f83, 0x656e95e6, 0x7ee6ffaa, 0x08cfbc21, 0xe6e815ef,
182 0xd99be7ba, 0xce366f4a, 0xd4099fea, 0xd67cb029, 0xafb2a431, 0x31233f2a,
183 0x3094a5c6, 0xc066a235, 0x37bc4e74, 0xa6ca82fc, 0xb0d090e0, 0x15d8a733,
184 0x4a9804f1, 0xf7daec41, 0x0e50cd7f, 0x2ff69117, 0x8dd64d76, 0x4db0ef43,
185 0x544daacc, 0xdf0496e4, 0xe3b5d19e, 0x1b886a4c, 0xb81f2cc1, 0x7f516546,
186 0x04ea5e9d, 0x5d358c01, 0x737487fa, 0x2e410bfb, 0x5a1d67b3, 0x52d2db92,
187 0x335610e9, 0x1347d66d, 0x8c61d79a, 0x7a0ca137, 0x8e14f859, 0x893c13eb,
188 0xee27a9ce, 0x35c961b7, 0xede51ce1, 0x3cb1477a, 0x59dfd29c, 0x3f73f255,
189 0x79ce1418, 0xbf37c773, 0xeacdf753, 0x5baafd5f, 0x146f3ddf, 0x86db4478,
190 0x81f3afca, 0x3ec468b9, 0x2c342438, 0x5f40a3c2, 0x72c31d16, 0x0c25e2bc,
191 0x8b493c28, 0x41950dff, 0x7101a839, 0xdeb30c08, 0x9ce4b4d8, 0x90c15664,
192 0x6184cb7b, 0x70b632d5, 0x745c6c48, 0x4257b8d0,
193};
194EXPORT_SYMBOL(aes_dec_tab);
195
196/* Prefetch data into L1 cache. @mem should be cacheline-aligned. */
197static __always_inline void aes_prefetch(const void *mem, size_t len)
198{
199 for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i += L1_CACHE_BYTES)
200 *(volatile const u8 *)(mem + i);
201 barrier();
202}
203
204static u32 mul_by_x(u32 w)
205{
206 u32 x = w & 0x7f7f7f7f;
207 u32 y = w & 0x80808080;
208
209 /* multiply by polynomial 'x' (0b10) in GF(2^8) */
210 return (x << 1) ^ (y >> 7) * 0x1b;
211}
212
213static u32 mul_by_x2(u32 w)
214{
215 u32 x = w & 0x3f3f3f3f;
216 u32 y = w & 0x80808080;
217 u32 z = w & 0x40404040;
218
219 /* multiply by polynomial 'x^2' (0b100) in GF(2^8) */
220 return (x << 2) ^ (y >> 7) * 0x36 ^ (z >> 6) * 0x1b;
221}
222
223static u32 mix_columns(u32 x)
224{
225 /*
226 * Perform the following matrix multiplication in GF(2^8)
227 *
228 * | 0x2 0x3 0x1 0x1 | | x[0] |
229 * | 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x1 | | x[1] |
230 * | 0x1 0x1 0x2 0x3 | x | x[2] |
231 * | 0x3 0x1 0x1 0x2 | | x[3] |
232 */
233 u32 y = mul_by_x(x) ^ ror32(x, 16);
234
235 return y ^ ror32(x ^ y, 8);
236}
237
238static u32 inv_mix_columns(u32 x)
239{
240 /*
241 * Perform the following matrix multiplication in GF(2^8)
242 *
243 * | 0xe 0xb 0xd 0x9 | | x[0] |
244 * | 0x9 0xe 0xb 0xd | | x[1] |
245 * | 0xd 0x9 0xe 0xb | x | x[2] |
246 * | 0xb 0xd 0x9 0xe | | x[3] |
247 *
248 * which can conveniently be reduced to
249 *
250 * | 0x2 0x3 0x1 0x1 | | 0x5 0x0 0x4 0x0 | | x[0] |
251 * | 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x1 | | 0x0 0x5 0x0 0x4 | | x[1] |
252 * | 0x1 0x1 0x2 0x3 | x | 0x4 0x0 0x5 0x0 | x | x[2] |
253 * | 0x3 0x1 0x1 0x2 | | 0x0 0x4 0x0 0x5 | | x[3] |
254 */
255 u32 y = mul_by_x2(x);
256
257 return mix_columns(x ^ y ^ ror32(y, 16));
258}
259
260static u32 subw(u32 in)
261{
262 return (aes_sbox[in & 0xff]) ^
263 (aes_sbox[(in >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
264 (aes_sbox[(in >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
265 (aes_sbox[(in >> 24) & 0xff] << 24);
266}
267
268static void aes_expandkey_generic(u32 rndkeys[], u32 *inv_rndkeys,
269 const u8 *in_key, int key_len)
270{
271 u32 kwords = key_len / sizeof(u32);
272 u32 rc, i, j;
273
274 for (i = 0; i < kwords; i++)
275 rndkeys[i] = get_unaligned_le32(&in_key[i * sizeof(u32)]);
276
277 for (i = 0, rc = 1; i < 10; i++, rc = mul_by_x(rc)) {
278 u32 *rki = &rndkeys[i * kwords];
279 u32 *rko = rki + kwords;
280
281 rko[0] = ror32(subw(rki[kwords - 1]), 8) ^ rc ^ rki[0];
282 rko[1] = rko[0] ^ rki[1];
283 rko[2] = rko[1] ^ rki[2];
284 rko[3] = rko[2] ^ rki[3];
285
286 if (key_len == AES_KEYSIZE_192) {
287 if (i >= 7)
288 break;
289 rko[4] = rko[3] ^ rki[4];
290 rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
291 } else if (key_len == AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
292 if (i >= 6)
293 break;
294 rko[4] = subw(rko[3]) ^ rki[4];
295 rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
296 rko[6] = rko[5] ^ rki[6];
297 rko[7] = rko[6] ^ rki[7];
298 }
299 }
300
301 /*
302 * Generate the decryption keys for the Equivalent Inverse Cipher.
303 * This involves reversing the order of the round keys, and applying
304 * the Inverse Mix Columns transformation to all but the first and
305 * the last one.
306 */
307 if (inv_rndkeys) {
308 inv_rndkeys[0] = rndkeys[key_len + 24];
309 inv_rndkeys[1] = rndkeys[key_len + 25];
310 inv_rndkeys[2] = rndkeys[key_len + 26];
311 inv_rndkeys[3] = rndkeys[key_len + 27];
312
313 for (i = 4, j = key_len + 20; j > 0; i += 4, j -= 4) {
314 inv_rndkeys[i] = inv_mix_columns(rndkeys[j]);
315 inv_rndkeys[i + 1] = inv_mix_columns(rndkeys[j + 1]);
316 inv_rndkeys[i + 2] = inv_mix_columns(rndkeys[j + 2]);
317 inv_rndkeys[i + 3] = inv_mix_columns(rndkeys[j + 3]);
318 }
319
320 inv_rndkeys[i] = rndkeys[0];
321 inv_rndkeys[i + 1] = rndkeys[1];
322 inv_rndkeys[i + 2] = rndkeys[2];
323 inv_rndkeys[i + 3] = rndkeys[3];
324 }
325}
326
327int aes_expandkey(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
328 unsigned int key_len)
329{
330 if (aes_check_keylen(key_len) != 0)
331 return -EINVAL;
332 ctx->key_length = key_len;
333 aes_expandkey_generic(ctx->key_enc, ctx->key_dec, in_key, key_len);
334 return 0;
335}
336EXPORT_SYMBOL(aes_expandkey);
337
338static __always_inline u32 enc_quarterround(const u32 w[4], int i, u32 rk)
339{
340 return rk ^ aes_enc_tab[(u8)w[i]] ^
341 rol32(aes_enc_tab[(u8)(w[(i + 1) % 4] >> 8)], 8) ^
342 rol32(aes_enc_tab[(u8)(w[(i + 2) % 4] >> 16)], 16) ^
343 rol32(aes_enc_tab[(u8)(w[(i + 3) % 4] >> 24)], 24);
344}
345
346static __always_inline u32 enclast_quarterround(const u32 w[4], int i, u32 rk)
347{
348 return rk ^ ((aes_enc_tab[(u8)w[i]] & 0x0000ff00) >> 8) ^
349 (aes_enc_tab[(u8)(w[(i + 1) % 4] >> 8)] & 0x0000ff00) ^
350 ((aes_enc_tab[(u8)(w[(i + 2) % 4] >> 16)] & 0x0000ff00) << 8) ^
351 ((aes_enc_tab[(u8)(w[(i + 3) % 4] >> 24)] & 0x0000ff00) << 16);
352}
353
354static void __maybe_unused aes_encrypt_generic(const u32 rndkeys[], int nrounds,
355 u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
356 const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
357{
358 const u32 *rkp = rndkeys;
359 int n = nrounds - 1;
360 u32 w[4];
361
362 w[0] = get_unaligned_le32(&in[0]) ^ *rkp++;
363 w[1] = get_unaligned_le32(&in[4]) ^ *rkp++;
364 w[2] = get_unaligned_le32(&in[8]) ^ *rkp++;
365 w[3] = get_unaligned_le32(&in[12]) ^ *rkp++;
366
367 /*
368 * Prefetch the table before doing data and key-dependent loads from it.
369 *
370 * This is intended only as a basic constant-time hardening measure that
371 * avoids interfering with performance too much. Its effectiveness is
372 * not guaranteed. For proper constant-time AES, a CPU that supports
373 * AES instructions should be used instead.
374 */
375 aes_prefetch(aes_enc_tab, sizeof(aes_enc_tab));
376
377 do {
378 u32 w0 = enc_quarterround(w, 0, *rkp++);
379 u32 w1 = enc_quarterround(w, 1, *rkp++);
380 u32 w2 = enc_quarterround(w, 2, *rkp++);
381 u32 w3 = enc_quarterround(w, 3, *rkp++);
382
383 w[0] = w0;
384 w[1] = w1;
385 w[2] = w2;
386 w[3] = w3;
387 } while (--n);
388
389 put_unaligned_le32(enclast_quarterround(w, 0, *rkp++), &out[0]);
390 put_unaligned_le32(enclast_quarterround(w, 1, *rkp++), &out[4]);
391 put_unaligned_le32(enclast_quarterround(w, 2, *rkp++), &out[8]);
392 put_unaligned_le32(enclast_quarterround(w, 3, *rkp++), &out[12]);
393}
394
395static __always_inline u32 dec_quarterround(const u32 w[4], int i, u32 rk)
396{
397 return rk ^ aes_dec_tab[(u8)w[i]] ^
398 rol32(aes_dec_tab[(u8)(w[(i + 3) % 4] >> 8)], 8) ^
399 rol32(aes_dec_tab[(u8)(w[(i + 2) % 4] >> 16)], 16) ^
400 rol32(aes_dec_tab[(u8)(w[(i + 1) % 4] >> 24)], 24);
401}
402
403static __always_inline u32 declast_quarterround(const u32 w[4], int i, u32 rk)
404{
405 return rk ^ aes_inv_sbox[(u8)w[i]] ^
406 ((u32)aes_inv_sbox[(u8)(w[(i + 3) % 4] >> 8)] << 8) ^
407 ((u32)aes_inv_sbox[(u8)(w[(i + 2) % 4] >> 16)] << 16) ^
408 ((u32)aes_inv_sbox[(u8)(w[(i + 1) % 4] >> 24)] << 24);
409}
410
411static void __maybe_unused aes_decrypt_generic(const u32 inv_rndkeys[],
412 int nrounds,
413 u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
414 const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
415{
416 const u32 *rkp = inv_rndkeys;
417 int n = nrounds - 1;
418 u32 w[4];
419
420 w[0] = get_unaligned_le32(&in[0]) ^ *rkp++;
421 w[1] = get_unaligned_le32(&in[4]) ^ *rkp++;
422 w[2] = get_unaligned_le32(&in[8]) ^ *rkp++;
423 w[3] = get_unaligned_le32(&in[12]) ^ *rkp++;
424
425 aes_prefetch(aes_dec_tab, sizeof(aes_dec_tab));
426
427 do {
428 u32 w0 = dec_quarterround(w, 0, *rkp++);
429 u32 w1 = dec_quarterround(w, 1, *rkp++);
430 u32 w2 = dec_quarterround(w, 2, *rkp++);
431 u32 w3 = dec_quarterround(w, 3, *rkp++);
432
433 w[0] = w0;
434 w[1] = w1;
435 w[2] = w2;
436 w[3] = w3;
437 } while (--n);
438
439 aes_prefetch(aes_inv_sbox, sizeof(aes_inv_sbox));
440 put_unaligned_le32(declast_quarterround(w, 0, *rkp++), &out[0]);
441 put_unaligned_le32(declast_quarterround(w, 1, *rkp++), &out[4]);
442 put_unaligned_le32(declast_quarterround(w, 2, *rkp++), &out[8]);
443 put_unaligned_le32(declast_quarterround(w, 3, *rkp++), &out[12]);
444}
445
446/*
447 * Note: the aes_prepare*key_* names reflect the fact that the implementation
448 * might not actually expand the key. (The s390 code for example doesn't.)
449 * Where the key is expanded we use the more specific names aes_expandkey_*.
450 *
451 * aes_preparekey_arch() is passed an optional pointer 'inv_k' which points to
452 * the area to store the prepared decryption key. It will be NULL if the user
453 * is requesting encryption-only. aes_preparekey_arch() is also passed a valid
454 * 'key_len' and 'nrounds', corresponding to AES-128, AES-192, or AES-256.
455 */
456#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_ARCH
457/* An arch-specific implementation of AES is available. Include it. */
458#include "aes.h" /* $(SRCARCH)/aes.h */
459#else
460/* No arch-specific implementation of AES is available. Use generic code. */
461
462static void aes_preparekey_arch(union aes_enckey_arch *k,
463 union aes_invkey_arch *inv_k,
464 const u8 *in_key, int key_len, int nrounds)
465{
466 aes_expandkey_generic(k->rndkeys, inv_k ? inv_k->inv_rndkeys : NULL,
467 in_key, key_len);
468}
469
470static void aes_encrypt_arch(const struct aes_enckey *key,
471 u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
472 const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
473{
474 aes_encrypt_generic(key->k.rndkeys, key->nrounds, out, in);
475}
476
477static void aes_decrypt_arch(const struct aes_key *key,
478 u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
479 const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
480{
481 aes_decrypt_generic(key->inv_k.inv_rndkeys, key->nrounds, out, in);
482}
483#endif
484
485static int __aes_preparekey(struct aes_enckey *enc_key,
486 union aes_invkey_arch *inv_k,
487 const u8 *in_key, size_t key_len)
488{
489 if (aes_check_keylen(key_len) != 0)
490 return -EINVAL;
491 enc_key->len = key_len;
492 enc_key->nrounds = 6 + key_len / 4;
493 aes_preparekey_arch(&enc_key->k, inv_k, in_key, key_len,
494 enc_key->nrounds);
495 return 0;
496}
497
498int aes_preparekey(struct aes_key *key, const u8 *in_key, size_t key_len)
499{
500 return __aes_preparekey((struct aes_enckey *)key, &key->inv_k,
501 in_key, key_len);
502}
503EXPORT_SYMBOL(aes_preparekey);
504
505int aes_prepareenckey(struct aes_enckey *key, const u8 *in_key, size_t key_len)
506{
507 return __aes_preparekey(key, NULL, in_key, key_len);
508}
509EXPORT_SYMBOL(aes_prepareenckey);
510
511void aes_encrypt(aes_encrypt_arg key, u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
512 const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
513{
514 aes_encrypt_arch(key.enc_key, out, in);
515}
516EXPORT_SYMBOL(aes_encrypt);
517
518void aes_decrypt(const struct aes_key *key, u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
519 const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
520{
521 aes_decrypt_arch(key, out, in);
522}
523EXPORT_SYMBOL(aes_decrypt);
524
525/* FIPS cryptographic algorithm self-test for "bare" AES */
526static void __init aes_fips_test(void)
527{
528 struct aes_key key;
529 u8 data[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
530
531 if (aes_preparekey(&key, fips_test_key, sizeof(fips_test_key)) != 0)
532 panic("aes: FIPS self-test failed (preparekey)\n");
533
534 aes_encrypt(&key, data, fips_test_data);
535 if (memcmp(fips_test_aes_ecb_ctext, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
536 panic("aes: FIPS self-test failed (wrong ciphertext)\n");
537
538 aes_decrypt(&key, data, data);
539 if (memcmp(fips_test_data, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
540 panic("aes: FIPS self-test failed (wrong plaintext)\n");
541
542 memzero_explicit(&key, sizeof(key));
543}
544
545#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CBC_MACS)
546
547#ifndef aes_cbcmac_blocks_arch
548static bool aes_cbcmac_blocks_arch(u8 h[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
549 const struct aes_enckey *key, const u8 *data,
550 size_t nblocks, bool enc_before,
551 bool enc_after)
552{
553 return false;
554}
555#endif
556
557/* This assumes nblocks >= 1. */
558static void aes_cbcmac_blocks(u8 h[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
559 const struct aes_enckey *key, const u8 *data,
560 size_t nblocks, bool enc_before, bool enc_after)
561{
562 if (aes_cbcmac_blocks_arch(h, key, data, nblocks, enc_before,
563 enc_after))
564 return;
565
566 if (enc_before)
567 aes_encrypt(key, h, h);
568 for (; nblocks > 1; nblocks--) {
569 crypto_xor(h, data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
570 data += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
571 aes_encrypt(key, h, h);
572 }
573 crypto_xor(h, data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
574 if (enc_after)
575 aes_encrypt(key, h, h);
576}
577
578int aes_cmac_preparekey(struct aes_cmac_key *key, const u8 *in_key,
579 size_t key_len)
580{
581 u64 hi, lo, mask;
582 int err;
583
584 /* Prepare the AES key. */
585 err = aes_prepareenckey(&key->aes, in_key, key_len);
586 if (err)
587 return err;
588
589 /*
590 * Prepare the subkeys K1 and K2 by encrypting the all-zeroes block,
591 * then multiplying by 'x' and 'x^2' (respectively) in GF(2^128).
592 * Reference: NIST SP 800-38B, Section 6.1 "Subkey Generation".
593 */
594 memset(key->k_final[0].b, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
595 aes_encrypt(&key->aes, key->k_final[0].b, key->k_final[0].b);
596 hi = be64_to_cpu(key->k_final[0].w[0]);
597 lo = be64_to_cpu(key->k_final[0].w[1]);
598 for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
599 mask = ((s64)hi >> 63) & 0x87;
600 hi = (hi << 1) ^ (lo >> 63);
601 lo = (lo << 1) ^ mask;
602 key->k_final[i].w[0] = cpu_to_be64(hi);
603 key->k_final[i].w[1] = cpu_to_be64(lo);
604 }
605 return 0;
606}
607EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_cmac_preparekey);
608
609void aes_xcbcmac_preparekey(struct aes_cmac_key *key,
610 const u8 in_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128])
611{
612 static const u8 constants[3][AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {
613 { [0 ... AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x1 },
614 { [0 ... AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x2 },
615 { [0 ... AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x3 },
616 };
617 u8 new_aes_key[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
618
619 static_assert(AES_BLOCK_SIZE == AES_KEYSIZE_128);
620 aes_prepareenckey(&key->aes, in_key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
621 aes_encrypt(&key->aes, new_aes_key, constants[0]);
622 aes_encrypt(&key->aes, key->k_final[0].b, constants[1]);
623 aes_encrypt(&key->aes, key->k_final[1].b, constants[2]);
624 aes_prepareenckey(&key->aes, new_aes_key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
625 memzero_explicit(new_aes_key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
626}
627EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_xcbcmac_preparekey);
628
629void aes_cmac_update(struct aes_cmac_ctx *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t data_len)
630{
631 bool enc_before = false;
632 size_t nblocks;
633
634 if (ctx->partial_len) {
635 /* XOR data into a pending block. */
636 size_t l = min(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - ctx->partial_len);
637
638 crypto_xor(&ctx->h[ctx->partial_len], data, l);
639 data += l;
640 data_len -= l;
641 ctx->partial_len += l;
642 if (data_len == 0) {
643 /*
644 * Either the pending block hasn't been filled yet, or
645 * no more data was given so it's not yet known whether
646 * the block is the final block.
647 */
648 return;
649 }
650 /* Pending block has been filled and isn't the final block. */
651 enc_before = true;
652 }
653
654 nblocks = data_len / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
655 data_len %= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
656 if (nblocks == 0) {
657 /* 0 additional full blocks, then optionally a partial block */
658 if (enc_before)
659 aes_encrypt(&ctx->key->aes, ctx->h, ctx->h);
660 crypto_xor(ctx->h, data, data_len);
661 ctx->partial_len = data_len;
662 } else if (data_len != 0) {
663 /* 1 or more additional full blocks, then a partial block */
664 aes_cbcmac_blocks(ctx->h, &ctx->key->aes, data, nblocks,
665 enc_before, /* enc_after= */ true);
666 data += nblocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
667 crypto_xor(ctx->h, data, data_len);
668 ctx->partial_len = data_len;
669 } else {
670 /*
671 * 1 or more additional full blocks only. Encryption of the
672 * last block is delayed until it's known whether it's the final
673 * block in the message or not.
674 */
675 aes_cbcmac_blocks(ctx->h, &ctx->key->aes, data, nblocks,
676 enc_before, /* enc_after= */ false);
677 ctx->partial_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
678 }
679}
680EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_cmac_update);
681
682void aes_cmac_final(struct aes_cmac_ctx *ctx, u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
683{
684 if (ctx->partial_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
685 /* Final block is a full block. Use k_final[0]. */
686 crypto_xor(ctx->h, ctx->key->k_final[0].b, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
687 } else {
688 /* Final block is a partial block. Pad, and use k_final[1]. */
689 ctx->h[ctx->partial_len] ^= 0x80;
690 crypto_xor(ctx->h, ctx->key->k_final[1].b, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
691 }
692 aes_encrypt(&ctx->key->aes, out, ctx->h);
693 memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
694}
695EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_cmac_final);
696
697void aes_cbcmac_update(struct aes_cbcmac_ctx *ctx, const u8 *data,
698 size_t data_len)
699{
700 bool enc_before = false;
701 size_t nblocks;
702
703 if (ctx->partial_len) {
704 size_t l = min(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - ctx->partial_len);
705
706 crypto_xor(&ctx->h[ctx->partial_len], data, l);
707 data += l;
708 data_len -= l;
709 ctx->partial_len += l;
710 if (ctx->partial_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
711 return;
712 enc_before = true;
713 }
714
715 nblocks = data_len / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
716 data_len %= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
717 if (nblocks == 0) {
718 if (enc_before)
719 aes_encrypt(ctx->key, ctx->h, ctx->h);
720 } else {
721 aes_cbcmac_blocks(ctx->h, ctx->key, data, nblocks, enc_before,
722 /* enc_after= */ true);
723 data += nblocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
724 }
725 crypto_xor(ctx->h, data, data_len);
726 ctx->partial_len = data_len;
727}
728EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(aes_cbcmac_update, "CRYPTO_INTERNAL");
729
730void aes_cbcmac_final(struct aes_cbcmac_ctx *ctx, u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
731{
732 if (ctx->partial_len)
733 aes_encrypt(ctx->key, out, ctx->h);
734 else
735 memcpy(out, ctx->h, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
736 memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
737}
738EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(aes_cbcmac_final, "CRYPTO_INTERNAL");
739
740/* FIPS cryptographic algorithm self-test for AES-CMAC */
741static void __init aes_cmac_fips_test(void)
742{
743 struct aes_cmac_key key __cleanup(aes_cmac_zeroize_key);
744 u8 mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
745
746 if (aes_cmac_preparekey(&key, fips_test_key, sizeof(fips_test_key)) !=
747 0)
748 panic("aes: CMAC FIPS self-test failed (preparekey)\n");
749 aes_cmac(&key, fips_test_data, sizeof(fips_test_data), mac);
750 if (memcmp(fips_test_aes_cmac_value, mac, sizeof(mac)) != 0)
751 panic("aes: CMAC FIPS self-test failed (wrong MAC)\n");
752}
753#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CBC_MACS */
754static inline void aes_cmac_fips_test(void)
755{
756}
757#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CBC_MACS */
758
759#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_ECB)
760/*
761 * Hooks for optimized AES-ECB implementations, overridable by the architecture.
762 * They are called with len > 0 && len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0. Returning false
763 * causes the fallback implementation to be used instead.
764 */
765#ifndef aes_ecb_encrypt_arch
766static bool aes_ecb_encrypt_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
767 const struct aes_enckey *key)
768{
769 return false;
770}
771#endif
772#ifndef aes_ecb_decrypt_arch
773static bool aes_ecb_decrypt_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
774 const struct aes_key *key)
775{
776 return false;
777}
778#endif
779
780void aes_ecb_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len, aes_encrypt_arg key)
781{
782 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
783 len = round_down(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
784
785 if (unlikely(len == 0))
786 return;
787
788 if (likely(aes_ecb_encrypt_arch(dst, src, len, key.enc_key)))
789 return;
790
791 for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
792 aes_encrypt(key, &dst[i], &src[i]);
793}
794EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ecb_encrypt);
795
796void aes_ecb_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
797 const struct aes_key *key)
798{
799 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
800 len = round_down(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
801
802 if (unlikely(len == 0))
803 return;
804
805 if (likely(aes_ecb_decrypt_arch(dst, src, len, key)))
806 return;
807
808 for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
809 aes_decrypt(key, &dst[i], &src[i]);
810}
811EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ecb_decrypt);
812
813/* FIPS cryptographic algorithm self-test for AES-ECB */
814static void __init aes_ecb_fips_test(void)
815{
816 struct aes_key key;
817 u8 data[sizeof(fips_test_data)];
818
819 if (aes_preparekey(&key, fips_test_key, sizeof(fips_test_key)) != 0)
820 panic("aes: ECB FIPS self-test failed (preparekey)\n");
821
822 aes_ecb_encrypt(data, fips_test_data, sizeof(data), &key);
823 if (memcmp(fips_test_aes_ecb_ctext, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
824 panic("aes: ECB FIPS self-test failed (wrong ciphertext)\n");
825
826 aes_ecb_decrypt(data, data, sizeof(data), &key);
827 if (memcmp(fips_test_data, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
828 panic("aes: ECB FIPS self-test failed (wrong plaintext)\n");
829
830 memzero_explicit(&key, sizeof(key));
831}
832#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_ECB */
833static inline void aes_ecb_fips_test(void)
834{
835}
836#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_ECB */
837
838#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CBC)
839/*
840 * Hooks for optimized AES-CBC implementations, overridable by the architecture.
841 * They are called with len > 0 && len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0. Returning false
842 * causes the fallback implementation to be used instead.
843 */
844#ifndef aes_cbc_encrypt_arch
845static bool aes_cbc_encrypt_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
846 u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
847 const struct aes_enckey *key)
848{
849 return false;
850}
851#endif
852#ifndef aes_cbc_decrypt_arch
853static bool aes_cbc_decrypt_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
854 u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
855 const struct aes_key *key)
856{
857 return false;
858}
859#endif
860
861void aes_cbc_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len, u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
862 aes_encrypt_arg key)
863{
864 const u8 *prev = iv;
865
866 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
867 len = round_down(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
868
869 if (unlikely(len == 0))
870 return;
871
872 if (likely(aes_cbc_encrypt_arch(dst, src, len, iv, key.enc_key)))
873 return;
874
875 do {
876 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, prev, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
877 aes_encrypt(key, dst, dst);
878 prev = dst;
879 dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
880 src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
881 len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
882 } while (len);
883 memcpy(iv, prev, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
884}
885EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_cbc_encrypt);
886
887void aes_cbc_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len, u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
888 const struct aes_key *key)
889{
890 u8 next_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
891
892 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
893 len = round_down(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
894
895 if (unlikely(len == 0))
896 return;
897
898 if (likely(aes_cbc_decrypt_arch(dst, src, len, iv, key)))
899 return;
900
901 len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
902 dst += len;
903 src += len;
904 memcpy(next_iv, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
905 for (;;) {
906 aes_decrypt(key, dst, src);
907 if (len == 0)
908 break;
909 src -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
910 crypto_xor(dst, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
911 dst -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
912 len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
913 }
914 crypto_xor(dst, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
915 memcpy(iv, next_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
916}
917EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_cbc_decrypt);
918
919/*
920 * Hooks for optimized AES-CBC-CTS implementations, overridable by the
921 * architecture. They are called with len > AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Returning false
922 * causes the fallback implementation to be used instead. The fallback
923 * implementation still uses the arch-optimized AES-CBC code if available, but
924 * direct implementation of AES-CBC-CTS is helpful on short messages.
925 */
926#ifndef aes_cbc_cts_encrypt_arch
927static bool aes_cbc_cts_encrypt_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
928 u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
929 const struct aes_enckey *key)
930{
931 return false;
932}
933#endif
934#ifndef aes_cbc_cts_decrypt_arch
935static bool aes_cbc_cts_decrypt_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
936 u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
937 const struct aes_key *key)
938{
939 return false;
940}
941#endif
942
943void aes_cbc_cts_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
944 u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], aes_encrypt_arg key)
945{
946 /* Offset to P[n] and C[n] (last plaintext and ciphertext block) */
947 size_t pn_offset = round_down(len - 1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
948 /* Length of P[n] and C[n], 1 <= pn_len <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE */
949 size_t pn_len = len - pn_offset;
950 u8 tmp[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
951 u8 *pad;
952
953 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
954 return;
955
956 if (len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
957 aes_cbc_encrypt(dst, src, len, iv, key);
958 return;
959 }
960 if (likely(aes_cbc_cts_encrypt_arch(dst, src, len, iv, key.enc_key)))
961 return;
962
963 /* CBC-encrypt all blocks except the last. */
964 aes_cbc_encrypt(dst, src, pn_offset, iv, key);
965
966 /*
967 * Compute C[n] and C[n - 1].
968 *
969 * Careful: src may equal dst (i.e., the encryption can be in-place), so
970 * src[pn_offset..] can't be read after dst[pn_offset..] is written.
971 */
972 pad = &dst[pn_offset - AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
973 memcpy(tmp, pad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
974 crypto_xor(tmp, &src[pn_offset], pn_len);
975 memcpy(&dst[pn_offset], pad, pn_len); /* C[n] */
976 aes_encrypt(key, pad, tmp); /* C[n - 1] */
977
978 memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
979}
980EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_cbc_cts_encrypt);
981
982void aes_cbc_cts_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
983 u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const struct aes_key *key)
984{
985 /* Offset to P[n] and C[n] (last plaintext and ciphertext block) */
986 size_t pn_offset = round_down(len - 1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
987 /* Length of P[n] and C[n], 1 <= pn_len <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE */
988 size_t pn_len = len - pn_offset;
989 u8 *pad;
990
991 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
992 return;
993
994 if (len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
995 aes_cbc_decrypt(dst, src, len, iv, key);
996 return;
997 }
998 if (likely(aes_cbc_cts_decrypt_arch(dst, src, len, iv, key)))
999 return;
1000
1001 /* Compute P[0]..P[n - 2]. */
1002 aes_cbc_decrypt(dst, src, pn_offset - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, iv, key);
1003
1004 /*
1005 * Compute P[n] and P[n - 1].
1006 *
1007 * Careful: src may equal dst (i.e., the decryption can be in-place), so
1008 * src[pn_offset..] can't be read after dst[pn_offset..] is written.
1009 *
1010 * To avoid needing a temporary buffer, do a "redundant" XOR to recover
1011 * src[pn_offset..] from dst[pn_offset..] after the latter is written.
1012 */
1013 pad = &dst[pn_offset - AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1014 aes_decrypt(key, pad, &src[pn_offset - AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
1015 crypto_xor_cpy(&dst[pn_offset], &src[pn_offset], pad,
1016 pn_len); /* P[n] */
1017 crypto_xor(pad, &dst[pn_offset], pn_len);
1018 aes_decrypt(key, pad, pad);
1019 crypto_xor(pad, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* P[n - 1] */
1020}
1021EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_cbc_cts_decrypt);
1022
1023/* FIPS cryptographic algorithm self-test for AES-CBC */
1024static void __init aes_cbc_fips_test(void)
1025{
1026 struct aes_key key;
1027 u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1028 u8 data[sizeof(fips_test_data)];
1029
1030 if (aes_preparekey(&key, fips_test_key, sizeof(fips_test_key)) != 0)
1031 panic("aes: CBC FIPS self-test failed (preparekey)\n");
1032
1033 memcpy(iv, fips_test_iv, sizeof(iv));
1034 aes_cbc_encrypt(data, fips_test_data, sizeof(data), iv, &key);
1035 if (memcmp(fips_test_aes_cbc_ctext, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
1036 panic("aes: CBC FIPS self-test failed (wrong ciphertext)\n");
1037
1038 memcpy(iv, fips_test_iv, sizeof(iv));
1039 aes_cbc_decrypt(data, data, sizeof(data), iv, &key);
1040 if (memcmp(fips_test_data, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
1041 panic("aes: CBC FIPS self-test failed (wrong plaintext)\n");
1042
1043 memzero_explicit(&key, sizeof(key));
1044}
1045
1046/* FIPS cryptographic algorithm self-test for AES-CBC-CTS */
1047static void __init aes_cbc_cts_fips_test(void)
1048{
1049 struct aes_key key;
1050 u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1051 const size_t data_len = 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1052 u8 ptext[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1053 u8 data[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1054
1055 /* ptext = fips_test_data || fips_test_data */
1056 memcpy(ptext, fips_test_data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1057 memcpy(&ptext[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], ptext, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1058
1059 if (aes_preparekey(&key, fips_test_key, sizeof(fips_test_key)) != 0)
1060 panic("aes: CBC-CTS FIPS self-test failed (preparekey)\n");
1061
1062 memcpy(iv, fips_test_iv, sizeof(iv));
1063 aes_cbc_cts_encrypt(data, ptext, data_len, iv, &key);
1064 if (memcmp(fips_test_aes_cbc_cts_ctext, data, data_len) != 0)
1065 panic("aes: CBC-CTS FIPS self-test failed (wrong ciphertext)\n");
1066
1067 memcpy(iv, fips_test_iv, sizeof(iv));
1068 aes_cbc_cts_decrypt(data, data, data_len, iv, &key);
1069 if (memcmp(ptext, data, data_len) != 0)
1070 panic("aes: CBC-CTS FIPS self-test failed (wrong plaintext)\n");
1071
1072 memzero_explicit(&key, sizeof(key));
1073}
1074#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CBC */
1075static inline void aes_cbc_fips_test(void)
1076{
1077}
1078static inline void aes_cbc_cts_fips_test(void)
1079{
1080}
1081#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CBC */
1082
1083#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CTR)
1084/*
1085 * Hooks for optimized AES-CTR and AES-XCTR implementations, overridable by the
1086 * architecture. They are called with any len >= 0. Returning false causes the
1087 * fallback implementation to be used instead.
1088 */
1089#ifndef aes_ctr_arch
1090static bool aes_ctr_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
1091 u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const struct aes_enckey *key)
1092{
1093 return false;
1094}
1095#endif
1096#ifndef aes_xctr_arch
1097static bool aes_xctr_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len, u64 *ctr,
1098 const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
1099 const struct aes_enckey *key)
1100{
1101 return false;
1102}
1103#endif
1104
1105static __always_inline void inc_be128_ctr(u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE])
1106{
1107 /*
1108 * 255 times out of 256 the first iteration is enough, so unroll the
1109 * first iteration as a micro-optimization.
1110 */
1111 if ((++ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1]) != 0)
1112 return;
1113 for (int i = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
1114 if (++ctr[i] != 0)
1115 break;
1116 }
1117}
1118
1119void aes_ctr(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len, u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
1120 aes_encrypt_arg key)
1121{
1122 u8 keystream[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
1123
1124 if (likely(aes_ctr_arch(dst, src, len, ctr, key.enc_key)))
1125 return;
1126
1127 /* Handle the full blocks. */
1128 for (; len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
1129 aes_encrypt(key, keystream, ctr);
1130 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, keystream, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1131 inc_be128_ctr(ctr);
1132 dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1133 src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1134 }
1135 /* Handle any partial block at the end. */
1136 if (len) {
1137 aes_encrypt(key, keystream, ctr);
1138 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, keystream, len);
1139 /* Counter is incremented even with just a partial block. */
1140 inc_be128_ctr(ctr);
1141 }
1142 memzero_explicit(keystream, sizeof(keystream));
1143}
1144EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ctr);
1145
1146void aes_xctr(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len, u64 *ctr,
1147 const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], aes_encrypt_arg key)
1148{
1149 const __le64 iv0 = get_unaligned((const __le64 *)&iv[0]);
1150 __le64 aes_input[2];
1151 u8 keystream[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
1152
1153 if (likely(aes_xctr_arch(dst, src, len, ctr, iv, key.enc_key)))
1154 return;
1155
1156 aes_input[1] = get_unaligned((const __le64 *)&iv[8]);
1157 /* Handle the full blocks. */
1158 for (; len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
1159 aes_input[0] = iv0 ^ cpu_to_le64((*ctr)++);
1160 aes_encrypt(key, keystream, (const u8 *)aes_input);
1161 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, keystream, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1162 dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1163 src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1164 }
1165 /* Handle any partial block at the end. */
1166 if (len) {
1167 /* Counter is incremented even with just a partial block. */
1168 aes_input[0] = iv0 ^ cpu_to_le64((*ctr)++);
1169 aes_encrypt(key, keystream, (const u8 *)aes_input);
1170 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, keystream, len);
1171 }
1172 memzero_explicit(keystream, sizeof(keystream));
1173 memzero_explicit(aes_input, sizeof(aes_input));
1174}
1175EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_xctr);
1176
1177/* FIPS cryptographic algorithm self-test for AES-CTR */
1178static void __init aes_ctr_fips_test(void)
1179{
1180 struct aes_enckey key;
1181 u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1182 u8 data[sizeof(fips_test_data)];
1183
1184 if (aes_prepareenckey(&key, fips_test_key, sizeof(fips_test_key)) != 0)
1185 panic("aes: CTR FIPS self-test failed (preparekey)\n");
1186
1187 memcpy(ctr, fips_test_iv, sizeof(ctr));
1188 aes_ctr(data, fips_test_data, sizeof(data), ctr, &key);
1189 if (memcmp(fips_test_aes_ctr_ctext, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
1190 panic("aes: CTR FIPS self-test failed (wrong ciphertext)\n");
1191
1192 memcpy(ctr, fips_test_iv, sizeof(ctr));
1193 aes_ctr(data, data, sizeof(data), ctr, &key);
1194 if (memcmp(fips_test_data, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
1195 panic("aes: CTR FIPS self-test failed (wrong plaintext)\n");
1196
1197 memzero_explicit(&key, sizeof(key));
1198}
1199#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CTR */
1200static inline void aes_ctr_fips_test(void)
1201{
1202}
1203#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CTR */
1204
1205#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_XTS)
1206int aes_xts_preparekey(struct aes_xts_key *key, const u8 *in_key,
1207 size_t key_len, int flags)
1208{
1209 int err;
1210
1211 err = __xts_verify_key(in_key, key_len, flags);
1212 if (unlikely(err))
1213 goto out_zeroize;
1214 /* First half of XTS key is the main key */
1215 err = aes_preparekey(&key->main_key, in_key, key_len / 2);
1216 if (unlikely(err))
1217 goto out_zeroize;
1218 /* Second half of XTS key is the tweak key */
1219 err = aes_prepareenckey(&key->tweak_key, &in_key[key_len / 2],
1220 key_len / 2);
1221 if (unlikely(err))
1222 goto out_zeroize;
1223 return 0;
1224
1225out_zeroize:
1226 memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(*key));
1227 return err;
1228}
1229EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_xts_preparekey);
1230
1231/*
1232 * Hooks for optimized AES-XTS implementations, overridable by the architecture.
1233 * They are called with len > 0 && len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0. In other words,
1234 * they aren't expected to handle ciphertext stealing or empty inputs.
1235 * Returning false causes the fallback implementation to be used instead.
1236 *
1237 * (Currently, all users of AES-XTS in the kernel seem to en/decrypt whole
1238 * numbers of blocks anyway, with len >= 512. So there's no need to heavily
1239 * optimize ciphertext stealing for short messages.)
1240 */
1241#ifndef aes_xts_encrypt_arch
1242static bool aes_xts_encrypt_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
1243 u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
1244 const struct aes_xts_key *key, bool cont)
1245{
1246 return false;
1247}
1248#endif
1249#ifndef aes_xts_decrypt_arch
1250static bool aes_xts_decrypt_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
1251 u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
1252 const struct aes_xts_key *key, bool cont)
1253{
1254 return false;
1255}
1256#endif
1257
1258static noinline void aes_xts_crypt_nocts_blockbyblock(
1259 u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len, u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
1260 const struct aes_xts_key *key, bool cont, bool enc)
1261{
1262 le128 t;
1263
1264 if (cont)
1265 memcpy(&t, tweak, sizeof(t));
1266 else
1267 aes_encrypt(&key->tweak_key, (u8 *)&t, tweak);
1268 do {
1269 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, (const u8 *)&t, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1270 if (enc)
1271 aes_encrypt(&key->main_key, dst, dst);
1272 else
1273 aes_decrypt(&key->main_key, dst, dst);
1274 crypto_xor(dst, (const u8 *)&t, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1275 gf128mul_x_ble(&t, &t);
1276 dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1277 src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1278 len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1279 } while (len);
1280 memcpy(tweak, &t, sizeof(t));
1281 memzero_explicit(&t, sizeof(t));
1282}
1283
1284/* Requires len > 0 && len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0 */
1285static __always_inline void aes_xts_encrypt_nocts(u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
1286 size_t len,
1287 u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
1288 const struct aes_xts_key *key,
1289 bool cont)
1290{
1291 if (likely(aes_xts_encrypt_arch(dst, src, len, tweak, key, cont)))
1292 return;
1293
1294 /*
1295 * For the fallback, just go block-by-block. It could be implemented on
1296 * top of AES-ECB, which could be significantly faster than this if the
1297 * arch has optimized AES-ECB code but not AES-XTS. However, AES-XTS
1298 * performance is important enough that it needs to be (and has been)
1299 * implemented directly by every non-obsolete arch anyway.
1300 */
1301 aes_xts_crypt_nocts_blockbyblock(dst, src, len, tweak, key, cont,
1302 /* enc= */ true);
1303}
1304
1305/* Requires len > 0 && len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0 */
1306static __always_inline void aes_xts_decrypt_nocts(u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
1307 size_t len,
1308 u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
1309 const struct aes_xts_key *key,
1310 bool cont)
1311{
1312 if (likely(aes_xts_decrypt_arch(dst, src, len, tweak, key, cont)))
1313 return;
1314
1315 /* Just go block-by-block. See comment in aes_xts_encrypt_nocts(). */
1316 aes_xts_crypt_nocts_blockbyblock(dst, src, len, tweak, key, cont,
1317 /* enc= */ false);
1318}
1319
1320static noinline void aes_xts_encrypt_cts(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
1321 u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
1322 const struct aes_xts_key *key,
1323 bool cont)
1324{
1325 size_t partial_len = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* Length of partial block */
1326 size_t nocts_len = round_down(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1327 u8 tmp_block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
1328
1329 /* Encrypt all full blocks. */
1330 aes_xts_encrypt_nocts(dst, src, nocts_len, tweak, key, cont);
1331 dst += nocts_len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1332 src += nocts_len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1333
1334 /*
1335 * Swap the partial block with the first 'partial_len' bytes of the
1336 * encrypted last full block. Note that a temporary buffer is needed to
1337 * support in-place encryption.
1338 */
1339 memcpy(tmp_block, src + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, partial_len);
1340 memcpy(dst + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dst, partial_len);
1341 memcpy(dst, tmp_block, partial_len);
1342
1343 /* Encrypt the last full block again. */
1344 crypto_xor(dst, tweak, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1345 aes_encrypt(&key->main_key, dst, dst);
1346 crypto_xor(dst, tweak, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1347 memzero_explicit(tmp_block, sizeof(tmp_block));
1348}
1349
1350static noinline void aes_xts_decrypt_cts(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
1351 u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
1352 const struct aes_xts_key *key,
1353 bool cont)
1354{
1355 size_t partial_len = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* Length of partial block */
1356 size_t nocts_len = round_down(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1357 union {
1358 u8 block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1359 le128 tweak;
1360 } tmp __aligned(__alignof__(long));
1361
1362 /*
1363 * Decrypt all blocks except the last full block and the partial block.
1364 * The last full block has to be handled specially because decryption
1365 * ciphertext stealing uses the last two tweaks in reverse order.
1366 *
1367 * nocts_len == 0 is possible here, which aes_xts_decrypt_nocts()
1368 * doesn't handle (so that the length doesn't get checked redundantly in
1369 * the fast path). So handle that case specially as well.
1370 */
1371 if (nocts_len)
1372 aes_xts_decrypt_nocts(dst, src, nocts_len, tweak, key, cont);
1373 else if (!cont)
1374 aes_encrypt(&key->tweak_key, tweak, tweak);
1375 dst += nocts_len;
1376 src += nocts_len;
1377
1378 /* Copy the tweak, advance it again, then decrypt last full block. */
1379 memcpy(&tmp.tweak, tweak, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1380 gf128mul_x_ble(&tmp.tweak, &tmp.tweak);
1381 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, tmp.block, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1382 aes_decrypt(&key->main_key, dst, dst);
1383 crypto_xor(dst, tmp.block, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1384
1385 /*
1386 * Swap the partial block with the first 'partial_len' bytes of the
1387 * decrypted last full block. Note that a temporary buffer is needed to
1388 * support in-place decryption.
1389 */
1390 memcpy(tmp.block, src + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, partial_len);
1391 memcpy(dst + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dst, partial_len);
1392 memcpy(dst, tmp.block, partial_len);
1393
1394 /* Decrypt the last full block again. */
1395 crypto_xor(dst, tweak, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1396 aes_decrypt(&key->main_key, dst, dst);
1397 crypto_xor(dst, tweak, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1398 memzero_explicit(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
1399}
1400
1401void aes_xts_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
1402 u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const struct aes_xts_key *key,
1403 bool cont)
1404{
1405 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
1406 return;
1407
1408 if (unlikely(len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
1409 aes_xts_encrypt_cts(dst, src, len, tweak, key, cont);
1410 return;
1411 }
1412
1413 aes_xts_encrypt_nocts(dst, src, len, tweak, key, cont);
1414}
1415EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_xts_encrypt);
1416
1417void aes_xts_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
1418 u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], const struct aes_xts_key *key,
1419 bool cont)
1420{
1421 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
1422 return;
1423
1424 if (unlikely(len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
1425 aes_xts_decrypt_cts(dst, src, len, tweak, key, cont);
1426 return;
1427 }
1428
1429 aes_xts_decrypt_nocts(dst, src, len, tweak, key, cont);
1430}
1431EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_xts_decrypt);
1432
1433/* FIPS cryptographic algorithm self-test for AES-XTS */
1434static void __init aes_xts_fips_test(void)
1435{
1436 struct aes_xts_key *key __free(kfree_sensitive) = kmalloc_obj(*key);
1437 u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1438 u8 data[sizeof(fips_test_data)];
1439
1440 if (key == NULL)
1441 panic("aes: XTS FIPS self-test failed (kmalloc)\n");
1442
1443 if (aes_xts_preparekey(key, fips_test_xts_key,
1444 sizeof(fips_test_xts_key), 0) != 0)
1445 panic("aes: XTS FIPS self-test failed (preparekey)\n");
1446
1447 memcpy(tweak, fips_test_iv, sizeof(tweak));
1448 aes_xts_encrypt(data, fips_test_data, sizeof(data), tweak, key, false);
1449 if (memcmp(fips_test_aes_xts_ctext, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
1450 panic("aes: XTS FIPS self-test failed (wrong ciphertext)\n");
1451
1452 memcpy(tweak, fips_test_iv, sizeof(tweak));
1453 aes_xts_decrypt(data, data, sizeof(data), tweak, key, false);
1454 if (memcmp(fips_test_data, data, sizeof(data)) != 0)
1455 panic("aes: XTS FIPS self-test failed (wrong plaintext)\n");
1456}
1457#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_XTS */
1458static inline void aes_xts_fips_test(void)
1459{
1460}
1461#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_XTS */
1462
1463#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_GCM)
1464/*
1465 * Hooks for optimized AES-GCM implementations, overridable by the architecture.
1466 * They are called with len > 0 && len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0. I.e. they aren't
1467 * expected to handle empty inputs or partial blocks, as those cases are handled
1468 * by non-arch-specific code instead.
1469 *
1470 * The GHASH accumulator is provided in POLYVAL format. The counter is provided
1471 * in big endian format, and it's read-only, as the caller handles updating it.
1472 *
1473 * Returning false causes the fallback implementation to be used instead.
1474 *
1475 * These hooks are used only for en/decrypted data. For the associated data the
1476 * GHASH functions are called instead, so those should be implemented too.
1477 */
1478#ifndef aes_gcm_encrypt_update_arch
1479static bool aes_gcm_encrypt_update_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
1480 struct polyval_elem *ghash_acc,
1481 const __be32 ctr32[4],
1482 const struct aes_enckey *aes_key,
1483 const struct ghash_key *ghash_key)
1484{
1485 return false;
1486}
1487#endif
1488#ifndef aes_gcm_decrypt_update_arch
1489static bool aes_gcm_decrypt_update_arch(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t len,
1490 struct polyval_elem *ghash_acc,
1491 const __be32 ctr32[4],
1492 const struct aes_enckey *aes_key,
1493 const struct ghash_key *ghash_key)
1494{
1495 return false;
1496}
1497#endif
1498
1499int aes_gcm_preparekey(struct aes_gcm_key *key, const u8 *in_key,
1500 size_t key_len, size_t authtag_len)
1501{
1502 u8 h[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 };
1503 int err;
1504
1505 err = crypto_gcm_check_authsize(authtag_len);
1506 if (unlikely(err))
1507 return err;
1508
1509 err = aes_prepareenckey(&key->aes, in_key, key_len);
1510 if (unlikely(err))
1511 return err;
1512
1513 aes_encrypt(&key->aes, h, h);
1514 ghash_preparekey(&key->ghash, h);
1515
1516 key->authtag_len = authtag_len;
1517
1518 memzero_explicit(h, sizeof(h));
1519 return 0;
1520}
1521EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_gcm_preparekey);
1522
1523void aes_gcm_init(struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 nonce[12],
1524 const struct aes_gcm_key *key)
1525{
1526 ctx->key = key;
1527 ctx->ad_len = 0;
1528 ctx->data_len = 0;
1529 ghash_init(&ctx->ghash, &key->ghash);
1530 memset(ctx->keystream, 0, sizeof(ctx->keystream));
1531
1532 memcpy(ctx->ctr32, nonce, 12);
1533 ctx->ctr32[3] = cpu_to_be32(1);
1534
1535 aes_encrypt(&key->aes, ctx->j0_enc, ctx->ctr);
1536 ctx->ctr32[3] = cpu_to_be32(2);
1537}
1538EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_gcm_init);
1539
1540void aes_gcm_auth_update(struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *ad, size_t len)
1541{
1542 WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->data_len != 0);
1543 if (len) {
1544 ghash_update(&ctx->ghash, ad, len);
1545 ctx->ad_len += len;
1546 }
1547}
1548EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_gcm_auth_update);
1549
1550static const u8 gcm_zeroes[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1551
1552static __always_inline void ghash_pad(struct ghash_ctx *ghash, u64 len)
1553{
1554 if (len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
1555 ghash_update(ghash, gcm_zeroes, -len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1556}
1557
1558static __always_inline void aes_gcm_crypt_update(struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx,
1559 u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
1560 size_t len, bool enc)
1561{
1562 size_t partial_len, n;
1563
1564 if (unlikely(len == 0))
1565 return;
1566
1567 partial_len = ctx->data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1568 if (ctx->data_len == 0)
1569 ghash_pad(&ctx->ghash, ctx->ad_len);
1570 ctx->data_len += len;
1571
1572 if (unlikely(partial_len != 0)) {
1573 /*
1574 * The previous call ended on a non-block-aligned data_len, so
1575 * continue using a previously-generated keystream block.
1576 */
1577 n = min(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - partial_len);
1578 if (enc) {
1579 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, &ctx->keystream[partial_len],
1580 n);
1581 ghash_update(&ctx->ghash, dst, n);
1582 } else {
1583 ghash_update(&ctx->ghash, src, n);
1584 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, &ctx->keystream[partial_len],
1585 n);
1586 }
1587 dst += n;
1588 src += n;
1589 len -= n;
1590 }
1591
1592 if (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
1593 n = round_down(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1594 if (enc) {
1595 if (likely(aes_gcm_encrypt_update_arch(
1596 dst, src, n, &ctx->ghash.acc, ctx->ctr32,
1597 &ctx->key->aes, &ctx->key->ghash))) {
1598 be32_add_cpu(&ctx->ctr32[3],
1599 n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1600 } else {
1601 aes_ctr(dst, src, n, ctx->ctr, &ctx->key->aes);
1602 ghash_update(&ctx->ghash, dst, n);
1603 }
1604 } else {
1605 if (likely(aes_gcm_decrypt_update_arch(
1606 dst, src, n, &ctx->ghash.acc, ctx->ctr32,
1607 &ctx->key->aes, &ctx->key->ghash))) {
1608 be32_add_cpu(&ctx->ctr32[3],
1609 n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1610 } else {
1611 ghash_update(&ctx->ghash, src, n);
1612 aes_ctr(dst, src, n, ctx->ctr, &ctx->key->aes);
1613 }
1614 }
1615 dst += n;
1616 src += n;
1617 len -= n;
1618 }
1619
1620 if (len != 0) {
1621 /*
1622 * Ending on a non-block aligned data_len. Generate the next
1623 * keystream block, use the needed portion of it, and leave it
1624 * cached in ctx->keystream in case this isn't the final call.
1625 */
1626 aes_encrypt(&ctx->key->aes, ctx->keystream, ctx->ctr);
1627 be32_add_cpu(&ctx->ctr32[3], 1);
1628 if (enc) {
1629 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, ctx->keystream, len);
1630 ghash_update(&ctx->ghash, dst, len);
1631 } else {
1632 ghash_update(&ctx->ghash, src, len);
1633 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, ctx->keystream, len);
1634 }
1635 }
1636}
1637
1638void aes_gcm_encrypt_update(struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
1639 size_t len)
1640{
1641 aes_gcm_crypt_update(ctx, dst, src, len, /* enc= */ true);
1642}
1643EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_gcm_encrypt_update);
1644
1645void aes_gcm_decrypt_update(struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
1646 size_t len)
1647{
1648 aes_gcm_crypt_update(ctx, dst, src, len, /* enc= */ false);
1649}
1650EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_gcm_decrypt_update);
1651
1652/* Maximum AES-GCM associated data length in bytes */
1653#define AES_GCM_MAX_AD_LEN ((1ULL << 61) - 1)
1654/* Maximum AES-GCM en/decrypted data length in bytes */
1655#define AES_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN ((1ULL << 36) - 32)
1656
1657void aes_gcm_encrypt_final(struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *authtag)
1658{
1659 __be64 tail[2];
1660
1661 WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->ad_len > AES_GCM_MAX_AD_LEN);
1662 WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->data_len > AES_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN);
1663
1664 ghash_pad(&ctx->ghash,
1665 ctx->data_len == 0 ? ctx->ad_len : ctx->data_len);
1666
1667 tail[0] = cpu_to_be64(ctx->ad_len * 8);
1668 tail[1] = cpu_to_be64(ctx->data_len * 8);
1669 ghash_update(&ctx->ghash, (const u8 *)tail, 16);
1670 ghash_final(&ctx->ghash, ctx->ctr); /* Use ctr as temp buffer */
1671
1672 crypto_xor_cpy(authtag, ctx->ctr, ctx->j0_enc, ctx->key->authtag_len);
1673 memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
1674}
1675EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_gcm_encrypt_final);
1676
1677int aes_gcm_decrypt_final(struct aes_gcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *authtag)
1678{
1679 __be64 tail[2];
1680 int err;
1681
1682 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->ad_len > AES_GCM_MAX_AD_LEN) ||
1683 WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->data_len > AES_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN)) {
1684 err = -EBADMSG;
1685 goto out;
1686 }
1687
1688 ghash_pad(&ctx->ghash,
1689 ctx->data_len == 0 ? ctx->ad_len : ctx->data_len);
1690
1691 tail[0] = cpu_to_be64(ctx->ad_len * 8);
1692 tail[1] = cpu_to_be64(ctx->data_len * 8);
1693 ghash_update(&ctx->ghash, (const u8 *)tail, 16);
1694 ghash_final(&ctx->ghash, ctx->ctr); /* Use ctr as temp buffer */
1695 crypto_xor(ctx->ctr, ctx->j0_enc, ctx->key->authtag_len);
1696 err = crypto_memneq(ctx->ctr, authtag, ctx->key->authtag_len) ?
1697 -EBADMSG :
1698 0;
1699out:
1700 memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
1701 return err;
1702}
1703EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_gcm_decrypt_final);
1704
1705void aes_gcm_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, u8 *authtag,
1706 const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len, const u8 nonce[12],
1707 const struct aes_gcm_key *key)
1708{
1709 struct aes_gcm_ctx ctx;
1710
1711 aes_gcm_init(&ctx, nonce, key);
1712 aes_gcm_auth_update(&ctx, ad, ad_len);
1713 aes_gcm_encrypt_update(&ctx, dst, src, data_len);
1714 aes_gcm_encrypt_final(&ctx, authtag);
1715}
1716EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_gcm_encrypt);
1717
1718int aes_gcm_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, const u8 *authtag,
1719 const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len, const u8 nonce[12],
1720 const struct aes_gcm_key *key)
1721{
1722 struct aes_gcm_ctx ctx;
1723 int err;
1724
1725 aes_gcm_init(&ctx, nonce, key);
1726 aes_gcm_auth_update(&ctx, ad, ad_len);
1727 aes_gcm_decrypt_update(&ctx, dst, src, data_len);
1728 err = aes_gcm_decrypt_final(&ctx, authtag);
1729 if (unlikely(err) && data_len) {
1730 /*
1731 * Clear the inauthentic decrypted data so that callers won't
1732 * receive it even if they fail to correctly handle errors.
1733 */
1734 memset(dst, 0, data_len);
1735 }
1736 return err;
1737}
1738EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_gcm_decrypt);
1739
1740/* FIPS cryptographic algorithm self-test for AES-GCM */
1741static void __init aes_gcm_fips_test(void)
1742{
1743 const size_t data_len = sizeof(fips_test_data);
1744 u8 buf[sizeof(fips_test_data) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1745 struct aes_gcm_key key;
1746 int err;
1747
1748 if (aes_gcm_preparekey(&key, fips_test_key, sizeof(fips_test_key),
1749 AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0)
1750 panic("aes: GCM FIPS self-test failed (preparekey)\n");
1751
1752 aes_gcm_encrypt(buf, fips_test_data, data_len, &buf[data_len],
1753 fips_test_ad, sizeof(fips_test_ad), fips_test_iv, &key);
1754 if (memcmp(fips_test_aes_gcm_ctext_and_tag, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0)
1755 panic("aes: GCM FIPS self-test failed (wrong ciphertext and/or tag)\n");
1756
1757 err = aes_gcm_decrypt(buf, buf, data_len, &buf[data_len], fips_test_ad,
1758 sizeof(fips_test_ad), fips_test_iv, &key);
1759 if (err != 0)
1760 panic("aes: GCM FIPS self-test failed (decryption failed)\n");
1761 if (memcmp(fips_test_data, buf, data_len) != 0)
1762 panic("aes: GCM FIPS self-test failed (wrong plaintext)\n");
1763
1764 memzero_explicit(&key, sizeof(key));
1765}
1766#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_GCM */
1767static inline void aes_gcm_fips_test(void)
1768{
1769}
1770#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_GCM */
1771
1772#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CCM)
1773int aes_ccm_preparekey(struct aes_ccm_key *key, const u8 *in_key,
1774 size_t key_len, size_t authtag_len)
1775{
1776 int err;
1777
1778 if (unlikely(authtag_len < 4 || authtag_len > 16 || authtag_len % 2))
1779 return -EINVAL;
1780
1781 err = aes_prepareenckey(&key->aes, in_key, key_len);
1782 if (unlikely(err))
1783 return err;
1784
1785 key->authtag_len = authtag_len;
1786 return 0;
1787}
1788EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ccm_preparekey);
1789
1790int aes_ccm_init(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u64 data_len, u64 ad_len,
1791 const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
1792 const struct aes_ccm_key *key)
1793{
1794 /*
1795 * This is the value L defined in the CCM specification. It determines
1796 * the maximum allowed message length, and it is itself determined by
1797 * the nonce length. They are inversely related, i.e. the longer the
1798 * nonce the smaller the maximum message length is.
1799 */
1800 unsigned int l = 15 - nonce_len;
1801
1802 if (unlikely(nonce_len < 7 || nonce_len > 13))
1803 return -EINVAL;
1804 /* Thus 2 <= l <= 8. */
1805
1806 /* Check whether data_len can be represented in 'l' bytes. */
1807 if (unlikely(data_len > U64_MAX >> (64 - 8 * l)))
1808 return -EOVERFLOW;
1809
1810 ctx->key = key;
1811 ctx->ad_remaining = ad_len;
1812 ctx->data_remaining = data_len;
1813 ctx->ad_padded = false;
1814
1815 /*
1816 * Initialize the zero-th counter block to:
1817 *
1818 * L - 1 || nonce || 0
1819 *
1820 * ... and the zero-th CBC-MAC block to:
1821 *
1822 * Flags || nonce || data_len
1823 */
1824 *(__be64 *)&ctx->ctr[8] = 0;
1825 *(__be64 *)&ctx->mac[8] = cpu_to_be64(data_len);
1826 ctx->ctr[0] = l - 1;
1827 ctx->mac[0] = (ad_len ? 0x40 : 0) |
1828 (((key->authtag_len - 2) / 2) << 3) | (l - 1);
1829 memcpy(&ctx->ctr[1], nonce, nonce_len); /* Overlapping store */
1830 memcpy(&ctx->mac[1], nonce, nonce_len); /* Overlapping store */
1831
1832 /*
1833 * Generate S_0 by encrypting the counter (this is used to encrypt the
1834 * auth tag later), and encrypt the zero-th CBC-MAC block.
1835 */
1836 aes_encrypt(&key->aes, ctx->s0, ctx->ctr);
1837 aes_encrypt(&key->aes, ctx->mac, ctx->mac);
1838
1839 /* Increment the counter from 0 to 1. */
1840 ctx->ctr[15] = 1;
1841
1842 if (ad_len) {
1843 /*
1844 * Update CBC-MAC with the associated data length, represented
1845 * using either 2, 6, or 10 bytes depending on the length.
1846 */
1847 if (likely(ad_len < 0xff00)) {
1848 *(__be16 *)&ctx->mac[0] ^= cpu_to_be16(ad_len);
1849 ctx->partial_len = 2;
1850 } else if (ad_len <= U32_MAX) {
1851 __be32 *p = (__be32 *)&ctx->mac[2];
1852
1853 *(__be16 *)&ctx->mac[0] ^= cpu_to_be16(0xfffe);
1854 put_unaligned(get_unaligned(p) ^ cpu_to_be32(ad_len),
1855 p);
1856 ctx->partial_len = 6;
1857 } else {
1858 __be64 *p = (__be64 *)&ctx->mac[2];
1859
1860 *(__be16 *)&ctx->mac[0] ^= cpu_to_be16(0xffff);
1861 put_unaligned(get_unaligned(p) ^ cpu_to_be64(ad_len),
1862 p);
1863 ctx->partial_len = 10;
1864 }
1865 } else {
1866 ctx->partial_len = 0;
1867 }
1868 return 0;
1869}
1870EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ccm_init);
1871
1872void aes_ccm_auth_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *ad, size_t len)
1873{
1874 size_t partial_len = ctx->partial_len;
1875 bool enc_before = false;
1876 size_t nblocks;
1877
1878 WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->ad_padded);
1879
1880 /*
1881 * We could warn on len > ad_remaining here, but underflow will be
1882 * caught by the != 0 check at the end anyway. (It's a u64, so it isn't
1883 * going to underflow all the way back to 0.)
1884 */
1885 ctx->ad_remaining -= len;
1886
1887 if (partial_len) {
1888 size_t n = min(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - partial_len);
1889
1890 crypto_xor(&ctx->mac[partial_len], ad, n);
1891 ad += n;
1892 len -= n;
1893 partial_len += n;
1894 if (partial_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
1895 ctx->partial_len = partial_len;
1896 return;
1897 }
1898 enc_before = true;
1899 }
1900
1901 nblocks = len / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1902 len %= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1903 if (nblocks == 0) {
1904 if (enc_before)
1905 aes_encrypt(&ctx->key->aes, ctx->mac, ctx->mac);
1906 } else {
1907 aes_cbcmac_blocks(ctx->mac, &ctx->key->aes, ad, nblocks,
1908 enc_before, /* enc_after= */ true);
1909 ad += nblocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1910 }
1911 crypto_xor(ctx->mac, ad, len);
1912 ctx->partial_len = len;
1913}
1914EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ccm_auth_update);
1915
1916static __always_inline void aes_ccm_crypt_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx,
1917 u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
1918 size_t len, bool enc)
1919{
1920 size_t partial_len = ctx->partial_len;
1921 size_t n, nblocks;
1922
1923 if (unlikely(len == 0))
1924 return;
1925
1926 WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->ad_remaining != 0);
1927
1928 /*
1929 * We could warn on len > data_remaining here, but underflow will be
1930 * caught by the != 0 check at the end anyway. (It's a u64, so it isn't
1931 * going to underflow all the way back to 0.)
1932 */
1933 ctx->data_remaining -= len;
1934
1935 if (!ctx->ad_padded) {
1936 ctx->ad_padded = true;
1937 if (partial_len)
1938 aes_encrypt(&ctx->key->aes, ctx->mac, ctx->mac);
1939 } else if (partial_len) {
1940 /*
1941 * The previous call ended on a non-block-aligned data_len, so
1942 * continue using a previously-generated keystream block.
1943 */
1944 n = min(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - partial_len);
1945 if (enc)
1946 crypto_xor(&ctx->mac[partial_len], src, n);
1947 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, &ctx->keystream[partial_len], n);
1948 if (!enc)
1949 crypto_xor(&ctx->mac[partial_len], dst, n);
1950 dst += n;
1951 src += n;
1952 len -= n;
1953 partial_len += n;
1954 if (partial_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
1955 ctx->partial_len = partial_len;
1956 return;
1957 }
1958 aes_encrypt(&ctx->key->aes, ctx->mac, ctx->mac);
1959 }
1960
1961 if (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
1962 n = round_down(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1963 nblocks = len / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1964 if (enc)
1965 aes_cbcmac_blocks(ctx->mac, &ctx->key->aes, src,
1966 nblocks, /* enc_before= */ false,
1967 /* enc_after= */ true);
1968 aes_ctr(dst, src, n, ctx->ctr, &ctx->key->aes);
1969 if (!enc)
1970 aes_cbcmac_blocks(ctx->mac, &ctx->key->aes, dst,
1971 nblocks, /* enc_before= */ false,
1972 /* enc_after= */ true);
1973 dst += n;
1974 src += n;
1975 len -= n;
1976 }
1977
1978 if (len) {
1979 /*
1980 * Ending on a non-block aligned data_len. Generate the next
1981 * keystream block, use the needed portion of it, and leave it
1982 * cached in ctx->keystream in case this isn't the final call.
1983 */
1984 aes_encrypt(&ctx->key->aes, ctx->keystream, ctx->ctr);
1985 inc_be128_ctr(ctx->ctr);
1986 if (enc)
1987 crypto_xor(ctx->mac, src, len);
1988 crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, ctx->keystream, len);
1989 if (!enc)
1990 crypto_xor(ctx->mac, dst, len);
1991 }
1992 ctx->partial_len = len;
1993}
1994
1995void aes_ccm_encrypt_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
1996 size_t len)
1997{
1998 aes_ccm_crypt_update(ctx, dst, src, len, /* enc= */ true);
1999}
2000EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ccm_encrypt_update);
2001
2002void aes_ccm_decrypt_update(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
2003 size_t len)
2004{
2005 aes_ccm_crypt_update(ctx, dst, src, len, /* enc= */ false);
2006}
2007EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ccm_decrypt_update);
2008
2009void aes_ccm_encrypt_final(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, u8 *authtag)
2010{
2011 WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->ad_remaining != 0);
2012 WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->data_remaining != 0);
2013 if (ctx->partial_len)
2014 aes_encrypt(&ctx->key->aes, ctx->mac, ctx->mac);
2015 crypto_xor_cpy(authtag, ctx->mac, ctx->s0, ctx->key->authtag_len);
2016 memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
2017}
2018EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ccm_encrypt_final);
2019
2020int aes_ccm_decrypt_final(struct aes_ccm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *authtag)
2021{
2022 int err;
2023
2024 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->ad_remaining != 0) ||
2025 WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->data_remaining != 0)) {
2026 err = -EBADMSG;
2027 goto out;
2028 }
2029
2030 if (ctx->partial_len)
2031 aes_encrypt(&ctx->key->aes, ctx->mac, ctx->mac);
2032 crypto_xor(ctx->mac, ctx->s0, ctx->key->authtag_len);
2033 err = crypto_memneq(ctx->mac, authtag, ctx->key->authtag_len) ?
2034 -EBADMSG :
2035 0;
2036out:
2037 memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
2038 return err;
2039}
2040EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ccm_decrypt_final);
2041
2042int aes_ccm_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, u8 *authtag,
2043 const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len, const u8 *nonce,
2044 size_t nonce_len, const struct aes_ccm_key *key)
2045{
2046 struct aes_ccm_ctx ctx;
2047 int err;
2048
2049 err = aes_ccm_init(&ctx, data_len, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key);
2050 if (unlikely(err))
2051 return err;
2052 aes_ccm_auth_update(&ctx, ad, ad_len);
2053 aes_ccm_encrypt_update(&ctx, dst, src, data_len);
2054 aes_ccm_encrypt_final(&ctx, authtag);
2055 return 0;
2056}
2057EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ccm_encrypt);
2058
2059int aes_ccm_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, const u8 *authtag,
2060 const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len, const u8 *nonce,
2061 size_t nonce_len, const struct aes_ccm_key *key)
2062{
2063 struct aes_ccm_ctx ctx;
2064 int err;
2065
2066 err = aes_ccm_init(&ctx, data_len, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key);
2067 if (unlikely(err))
2068 return err;
2069 aes_ccm_auth_update(&ctx, ad, ad_len);
2070 aes_ccm_decrypt_update(&ctx, dst, src, data_len);
2071 err = aes_ccm_decrypt_final(&ctx, authtag);
2072 if (unlikely(err) && data_len) {
2073 /*
2074 * Clear the inauthentic decrypted data so that callers won't
2075 * receive it even if they fail to correctly handle errors.
2076 */
2077 memset(dst, 0, data_len);
2078 }
2079 return err;
2080}
2081EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aes_ccm_decrypt);
2082
2083/* FIPS cryptographic algorithm self-test for AES-CCM */
2084static void __init aes_ccm_fips_test(void)
2085{
2086 const size_t data_len = sizeof(fips_test_data);
2087 const size_t nonce_len = 13;
2088 u8 buf[sizeof(fips_test_data) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
2089 struct aes_ccm_key key;
2090 int err;
2091
2092 if (aes_ccm_preparekey(&key, fips_test_key, sizeof(fips_test_key),
2093 AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0)
2094 panic("aes: CCM FIPS self-test failed (preparekey)\n");
2095
2096 err = aes_ccm_encrypt(buf, fips_test_data, data_len, &buf[data_len],
2097 fips_test_ad, sizeof(fips_test_ad), fips_test_iv,
2098 nonce_len, &key);
2099 if (err != 0)
2100 panic("aes: CCM FIPS self-test failed (encryption failed)\n");
2101 if (memcmp(fips_test_aes_ccm_ctext_and_tag, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0)
2102 panic("aes: CCM FIPS self-test failed (wrong ciphertext and/or tag)\n");
2103
2104 err = aes_ccm_decrypt(buf, buf, data_len, &buf[data_len], fips_test_ad,
2105 sizeof(fips_test_ad), fips_test_iv, nonce_len,
2106 &key);
2107 if (err != 0)
2108 panic("aes: CCM FIPS self-test failed (decryption failed)\n");
2109 if (memcmp(fips_test_data, buf, data_len) != 0)
2110 panic("aes: CCM FIPS self-test failed (wrong plaintext)\n");
2111
2112 memzero_explicit(&key, sizeof(key));
2113}
2114#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CCM */
2115static inline void aes_ccm_fips_test(void)
2116{
2117}
2118#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CCM */
2119
2120static int __init aes_mod_init(void)
2121{
2122#ifdef aes_mod_init_arch
2123 aes_mod_init_arch();
2124#endif
2125 if (fips_enabled) {
2126 aes_fips_test();
2127 aes_cmac_fips_test();
2128 aes_ecb_fips_test();
2129 aes_cbc_fips_test();
2130 aes_cbc_cts_fips_test();
2131 aes_ctr_fips_test();
2132 aes_xts_fips_test();
2133 aes_gcm_fips_test();
2134 aes_ccm_fips_test();
2135 }
2136 return 0;
2137}
2138subsys_initcall(aes_mod_init);
2139
2140static void __exit aes_mod_exit(void)
2141{
2142}
2143module_exit(aes_mod_exit);
2144
2145MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES block cipher");
2146MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>");
2147MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <[email protected]>");
2148MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");