| 1 | |
| 2 | * linux/kernel/capability.c
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| 3 | *
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| 4 | * Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <[email protected]>
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| 5 | *
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| 6 | * Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
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| 7 | * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <[email protected]>
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| 8 |
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| 9 |
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| 10 | #include <linux/capability.h>
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| 11 | #include <linux/mm.h>
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| 12 | #include <linux/module.h>
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| 13 | #include <linux/security.h>
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| 14 | #include <linux/syscalls.h>
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| 15 | #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
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| 16 | #include <asm/uaccess.h>
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| 17 |
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| 18 | |
| 19 | * This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current.
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| 20 | * Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock.
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| 21 |
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| 22 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock);
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| 23 |
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| 24 | |
| 25 | * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
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| 26 |
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| 27 |
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| 28 | const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
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| 29 | const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET;
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| 30 | const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
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| 31 |
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| 32 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
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| 33 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
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| 34 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
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| 35 |
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| 36 | |
| 37 | * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
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| 38 | *
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| 39 | * http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
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| 40 |
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| 41 |
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| 42 | static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
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| 43 | {
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| 44 | static int warned;
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| 45 | if (!warned) {
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| 46 | char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
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| 47 |
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| 48 | printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities"
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| 49 | " (legacy support in use)\n",
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| 50 | get_task_comm(name, current));
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| 51 | warned = 1;
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| 52 | }
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| 53 | }
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| 54 |
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| 55 | |
| 56 | * For sys_getproccap() and sys_setproccap(), any of the three
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| 57 | * capability set pointers may be NULL -- indicating that that set is
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| 58 | * uninteresting and/or not to be changed.
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| 59 |
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| 60 |
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| 61 | |
| 62 | * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
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| 63 | * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
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| 64 | * target pid data
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| 65 | * @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
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| 66 | * and inheritable capabilities that are returned
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| 67 | *
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| 68 | * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
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| 69 |
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| 70 | asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
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| 71 | {
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| 72 | int ret = 0;
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| 73 | pid_t pid;
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| 74 | __u32 version;
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| 75 | struct task_struct *target;
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| 76 | unsigned tocopy;
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| 77 | kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
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| 78 |
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| 79 | if (get_user(version, &header->version))
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| 80 | return -EFAULT;
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| 81 |
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| 82 | switch (version) {
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| 83 | case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
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| 84 | warn_legacy_capability_use();
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| 85 | tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
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| 86 | break;
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| 87 | case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
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| 88 | tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
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| 89 | break;
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| 90 | default:
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| 91 | if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
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| 92 | return -EFAULT;
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| 93 | return -EINVAL;
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| 94 | }
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| 95 |
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| 96 | if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
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| 97 | return -EFAULT;
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| 98 |
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| 99 | if (pid < 0)
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| 100 | return -EINVAL;
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| 101 |
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| 102 | spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
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| 103 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
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| 104 |
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| 105 | if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) {
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| 106 | target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
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| 107 | if (!target) {
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| 108 | ret = -ESRCH;
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| 109 | goto out;
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| 110 | }
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| 111 | } else
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| 112 | target = current;
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| 113 |
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| 114 | ret = security_capget(target, &pE, &pI, &pP);
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| 115 |
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| 116 | out:
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| 117 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
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| 118 | spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
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| 119 |
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| 120 | if (!ret) {
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| 121 | struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
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| 122 | unsigned i;
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| 123 |
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| 124 | for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
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| 125 | kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i];
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| 126 | kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i];
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| 127 | kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i];
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| 128 | }
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| 129 |
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| 130 | |
| 131 | * Note, in the case, tocopy < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S,
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| 132 | * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This
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| 133 | * has the effect of making older libcap
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| 134 | * implementations implicitly drop upper capability
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| 135 | * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset
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| 136 | * sequence.
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| 137 | *
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| 138 | * This behavior is considered fail-safe
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| 139 | * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer
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| 140 | * version of libcap will enable access to the newer
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| 141 | * capabilities.
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| 142 | *
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| 143 | * An alternative would be to return an error here
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| 144 | * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to
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| 145 | * unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts
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| 146 | * before modification is attempted and the application
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| 147 | * fails.
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| 148 |
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| 149 |
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| 150 | if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy
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| 151 | * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
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| 152 | return -EFAULT;
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| 153 | }
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| 154 | }
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| 155 |
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| 156 | return ret;
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| 157 | }
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| 158 |
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| 159 | |
| 160 | * cap_set_pg - set capabilities for all processes in a given process
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| 161 | * group. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
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| 162 |
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| 163 | static inline int cap_set_pg(int pgrp_nr, kernel_cap_t *effective,
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| 164 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
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| 165 | kernel_cap_t *permitted)
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| 166 | {
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| 167 | struct task_struct *g, *target;
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| 168 | int ret = -EPERM;
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| 169 | int found = 0;
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| 170 | struct pid *pgrp;
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| 171 |
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| 172 | pgrp = find_vpid(pgrp_nr);
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| 173 | do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g) {
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| 174 | target = g;
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| 175 | while_each_thread(g, target) {
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| 176 | if (!security_capset_check(target, effective,
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| 177 | inheritable,
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| 178 | permitted)) {
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| 179 | security_capset_set(target, effective,
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| 180 | inheritable,
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| 181 | permitted);
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| 182 | ret = 0;
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| 183 | }
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| 184 | found = 1;
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| 185 | }
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| 186 | } while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g);
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| 187 |
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| 188 | if (!found)
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| 189 | ret = 0;
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| 190 | return ret;
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| 191 | }
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| 192 |
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| 193 | |
| 194 | * cap_set_all - set capabilities for all processes other than init
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| 195 | * and self. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
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| 196 |
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| 197 | static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
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| 198 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
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| 199 | kernel_cap_t *permitted)
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| 200 | {
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| 201 | struct task_struct *g, *target;
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| 202 | int ret = -EPERM;
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| 203 | int found = 0;
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| 204 |
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| 205 | do_each_thread(g, target) {
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| 206 | if (target == current || is_container_init(target->group_leader))
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| 207 | continue;
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| 208 | found = 1;
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| 209 | if (security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable,
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| 210 | permitted))
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| 211 | continue;
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| 212 | ret = 0;
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| 213 | security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
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| 214 | } while_each_thread(g, target);
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| 215 |
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| 216 | if (!found)
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| 217 | ret = 0;
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| 218 | return ret;
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| 219 | }
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| 220 |
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| 221 | |
| 222 | * sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or a group of processes
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| 223 | * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
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| 224 | * target pid data
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| 225 | * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
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| 226 | * and inheritable capabilities
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| 227 | *
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| 228 | * Set capabilities for a given process, all processes, or all
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| 229 | * processes in a given process group.
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| 230 | *
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| 231 | * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
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| 232 | *
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| 233 | * [pid is for the 'target' task. 'current' is the calling task.]
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| 234 | *
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| 235 | * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
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| 236 | * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
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| 237 | * E: must be set to a subset of (new target) permitted
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| 238 | *
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| 239 | * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
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| 240 |
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| 241 | asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
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| 242 | {
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| 243 | struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
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| 244 | unsigned i, tocopy;
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| 245 | kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
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| 246 | __u32 version;
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| 247 | struct task_struct *target;
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| 248 | int ret;
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| 249 | pid_t pid;
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| 250 |
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| 251 | if (get_user(version, &header->version))
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| 252 | return -EFAULT;
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| 253 |
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| 254 | switch (version) {
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| 255 | case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
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| 256 | warn_legacy_capability_use();
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| 257 | tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
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| 258 | break;
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| 259 | case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
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| 260 | tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
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| 261 | break;
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| 262 | default:
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| 263 | if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
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| 264 | return -EFAULT;
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| 265 | return -EINVAL;
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| 266 | }
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| 267 |
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| 268 | if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
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| 269 | return -EFAULT;
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| 270 |
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| 271 | if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current) && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
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| 272 | return -EPERM;
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| 273 |
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| 274 | if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy
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| 275 | * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
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| 276 | return -EFAULT;
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| 277 | }
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| 278 |
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| 279 | for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
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| 280 | effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
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| 281 | permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted;
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| 282 | inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable;
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| 283 | }
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| 284 | while (i < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S) {
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| 285 | effective.cap[i] = 0;
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| 286 | permitted.cap[i] = 0;
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| 287 | inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
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| 288 | i++;
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| 289 | }
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| 290 |
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| 291 | spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
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| 292 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
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| 293 |
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| 294 | if (pid > 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) {
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| 295 | target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
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| 296 | if (!target) {
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| 297 | ret = -ESRCH;
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| 298 | goto out;
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| 299 | }
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| 300 | } else
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| 301 | target = current;
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| 302 |
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| 303 | ret = 0;
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| 304 |
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| 305 | |
| 306 | we now put them into effect.
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| 307 | if (pid < 0) {
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| 308 | if (pid == -1)
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| 309 | ret = cap_set_all(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
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| 310 |
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| 311 | else
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| 312 | ret = cap_set_pg(-pid, &effective, &inheritable,
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| 313 | &permitted);
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| 314 | } else {
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| 315 | ret = security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable,
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| 316 | &permitted);
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| 317 | if (!ret)
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| 318 | security_capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable,
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| 319 | &permitted);
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| 320 | }
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| 321 |
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| 322 | out:
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| 323 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
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| 324 | spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
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| 325 |
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| 326 | return ret;
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| 327 | }
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| 328 |
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| 329 | int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
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| 330 | {
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| 331 | if (security_capable(t, cap) == 0) {
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| 332 | t->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
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| 333 | return 1;
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| 334 | }
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| 335 | return 0;
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| 336 | }
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| 337 |
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| 338 | int capable(int cap)
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| 339 | {
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| 340 | return __capable(current, cap);
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| 341 | }
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| 342 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
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