| 1 | |
| 2 | * linux/kernel/sys.c
|
| 3 | *
|
| 4 | * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
|
| 5 |
|
| 6 |
|
| 7 | #include <linux/module.h>
|
| 8 | #include <linux/mm.h>
|
| 9 | #include <linux/utsname.h>
|
| 10 | #include <linux/mman.h>
|
| 11 | #include <linux/notifier.h>
|
| 12 | #include <linux/reboot.h>
|
| 13 | #include <linux/prctl.h>
|
| 14 | #include <linux/highuid.h>
|
| 15 | #include <linux/fs.h>
|
| 16 | #include <linux/perf_event.h>
|
| 17 | #include <linux/resource.h>
|
| 18 | #include <linux/kernel.h>
|
| 19 | #include <linux/kexec.h>
|
| 20 | #include <linux/workqueue.h>
|
| 21 | #include <linux/capability.h>
|
| 22 | #include <linux/device.h>
|
| 23 | #include <linux/key.h>
|
| 24 | #include <linux/times.h>
|
| 25 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
|
| 26 | #include <linux/security.h>
|
| 27 | #include <linux/dcookies.h>
|
| 28 | #include <linux/suspend.h>
|
| 29 | #include <linux/tty.h>
|
| 30 | #include <linux/signal.h>
|
| 31 | #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
|
| 32 | #include <linux/getcpu.h>
|
| 33 | #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
|
| 34 | #include <linux/seccomp.h>
|
| 35 | #include <linux/cpu.h>
|
| 36 | #include <linux/personality.h>
|
| 37 | #include <linux/ptrace.h>
|
| 38 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
|
| 39 | #include <linux/gfp.h>
|
| 40 |
|
| 41 | #include <linux/compat.h>
|
| 42 | #include <linux/syscalls.h>
|
| 43 | #include <linux/kprobes.h>
|
| 44 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
|
| 45 |
|
| 46 | #include <asm/uaccess.h>
|
| 47 | #include <asm/io.h>
|
| 48 | #include <asm/unistd.h>
|
| 49 |
|
| 50 | #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
| 51 | # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 52 | #endif
|
| 53 | #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
| 54 | # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 55 | #endif
|
| 56 | #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL
|
| 57 | # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 58 | #endif
|
| 59 | #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL
|
| 60 | # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 61 | #endif
|
| 62 | #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL
|
| 63 | # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 64 | #endif
|
| 65 | #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL
|
| 66 | # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 67 | #endif
|
| 68 | #ifndef GET_ENDIAN
|
| 69 | # define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 70 | #endif
|
| 71 | #ifndef SET_ENDIAN
|
| 72 | # define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 73 | #endif
|
| 74 | #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL
|
| 75 | # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 76 | #endif
|
| 77 | #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL
|
| 78 | # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 79 | #endif
|
| 80 |
|
| 81 | |
| 82 | * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
|
| 83 | * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
|
| 84 |
|
| 85 |
|
| 86 | int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 87 | int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
|
| 88 |
|
| 89 | #ifdef CONFIG_UID16
|
| 90 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
|
| 91 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
|
| 92 | #endif
|
| 93 |
|
| 94 | |
| 95 | * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
|
| 96 | * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
|
| 97 |
|
| 98 |
|
| 99 | int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 100 | int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 101 |
|
| 102 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
|
| 103 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
|
| 104 |
|
| 105 | |
| 106 | * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes
|
| 107 |
|
| 108 |
|
| 109 | int C_A_D = 1;
|
| 110 | struct pid *cad_pid;
|
| 111 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid);
|
| 112 |
|
| 113 | |
| 114 | * If set, this is used for preparing the system to power off.
|
| 115 |
|
| 116 |
|
| 117 | void (*pm_power_off_prepare)(void);
|
| 118 |
|
| 119 | |
| 120 | * set the priority of a task
|
| 121 | * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
|
| 122 |
|
| 123 | static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
|
| 124 | {
|
| 125 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
|
| 126 | int no_nice;
|
| 127 |
|
| 128 | if (pcred->uid != cred->euid &&
|
| 129 | pcred->euid != cred->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
|
| 130 | error = -EPERM;
|
| 131 | goto out;
|
| 132 | }
|
| 133 | if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
|
| 134 | error = -EACCES;
|
| 135 | goto out;
|
| 136 | }
|
| 137 | no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
|
| 138 | if (no_nice) {
|
| 139 | error = no_nice;
|
| 140 | goto out;
|
| 141 | }
|
| 142 | if (error == -ESRCH)
|
| 143 | error = 0;
|
| 144 | set_user_nice(p, niceval);
|
| 145 | out:
|
| 146 | return error;
|
| 147 | }
|
| 148 |
|
| 149 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval)
|
| 150 | {
|
| 151 | struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
| 152 | struct user_struct *user;
|
| 153 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 154 | int error = -EINVAL;
|
| 155 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 156 |
|
| 157 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
| 158 | goto out;
|
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
|
| 161 | error = -ESRCH;
|
| 162 | if (niceval < -20)
|
| 163 | niceval = -20;
|
| 164 | if (niceval > 19)
|
| 165 | niceval = 19;
|
| 166 |
|
| 167 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 168 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 169 | switch (which) {
|
| 170 | case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
| 171 | if (who)
|
| 172 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
|
| 173 | else
|
| 174 | p = current;
|
| 175 | if (p)
|
| 176 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 177 | break;
|
| 178 | case PRIO_PGRP:
|
| 179 | if (who)
|
| 180 | pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
| 181 | else
|
| 182 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 183 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
| 184 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 185 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
| 186 | break;
|
| 187 | case PRIO_USER:
|
| 188 | user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user;
|
| 189 | if (!who)
|
| 190 | who = cred->uid;
|
| 191 | else if ((who != cred->uid) &&
|
| 192 | !(user = find_user(who)))
|
| 193 | goto out_unlock;
|
| 194 |
|
| 195 | do_each_thread(g, p) {
|
| 196 | if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who)
|
| 197 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 198 | } while_each_thread(g, p);
|
| 199 | if (who != cred->uid)
|
| 200 | free_uid(user);
|
| 201 | break;
|
| 202 | }
|
| 203 | out_unlock:
|
| 204 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 205 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 206 | out:
|
| 207 | return error;
|
| 208 | }
|
| 209 |
|
| 210 | |
| 211 | * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
|
| 212 | * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
|
| 213 | * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
|
| 214 | * to stay compatible.
|
| 215 |
|
| 216 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who)
|
| 217 | {
|
| 218 | struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
| 219 | struct user_struct *user;
|
| 220 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 221 | long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 222 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 223 |
|
| 224 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
| 225 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 226 |
|
| 227 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 228 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 229 | switch (which) {
|
| 230 | case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
| 231 | if (who)
|
| 232 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
|
| 233 | else
|
| 234 | p = current;
|
| 235 | if (p) {
|
| 236 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
|
| 237 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 238 | retval = niceval;
|
| 239 | }
|
| 240 | break;
|
| 241 | case PRIO_PGRP:
|
| 242 | if (who)
|
| 243 | pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
| 244 | else
|
| 245 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 246 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
| 247 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
|
| 248 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 249 | retval = niceval;
|
| 250 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
| 251 | break;
|
| 252 | case PRIO_USER:
|
| 253 | user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user;
|
| 254 | if (!who)
|
| 255 | who = cred->uid;
|
| 256 | else if ((who != cred->uid) &&
|
| 257 | !(user = find_user(who)))
|
| 258 | goto out_unlock;
|
| 259 |
|
| 260 | do_each_thread(g, p) {
|
| 261 | if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) {
|
| 262 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
|
| 263 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 264 | retval = niceval;
|
| 265 | }
|
| 266 | } while_each_thread(g, p);
|
| 267 | if (who != cred->uid)
|
| 268 | free_uid(user);
|
| 269 | break;
|
| 270 | }
|
| 271 | out_unlock:
|
| 272 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 273 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 274 |
|
| 275 | return retval;
|
| 276 | }
|
| 277 |
|
| 278 | |
| 279 | * emergency_restart - reboot the system
|
| 280 | *
|
| 281 | * Without shutting down any hardware or taking any locks
|
| 282 | * reboot the system. This is called when we know we are in
|
| 283 | * trouble so this is our best effort to reboot. This is
|
| 284 | * safe to call in interrupt context.
|
| 285 |
|
| 286 | void emergency_restart(void)
|
| 287 | {
|
| 288 | machine_emergency_restart();
|
| 289 | }
|
| 290 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(emergency_restart);
|
| 291 |
|
| 292 | void kernel_restart_prepare(char *cmd)
|
| 293 | {
|
| 294 | blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, cmd);
|
| 295 | system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART;
|
| 296 | device_shutdown();
|
| 297 | sysdev_shutdown();
|
| 298 | }
|
| 299 |
|
| 300 | |
| 301 | * kernel_restart - reboot the system
|
| 302 | * @cmd: pointer to buffer containing command to execute for restart
|
| 303 | * or %NULL
|
| 304 | *
|
| 305 | * Shutdown everything and perform a clean reboot.
|
| 306 | * This is not safe to call in interrupt context.
|
| 307 |
|
| 308 | void kernel_restart(char *cmd)
|
| 309 | {
|
| 310 | kernel_restart_prepare(cmd);
|
| 311 | if (!cmd)
|
| 312 | printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n");
|
| 313 | else
|
| 314 | printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", cmd);
|
| 315 | machine_restart(cmd);
|
| 316 | }
|
| 317 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_restart);
|
| 318 |
|
| 319 | static void kernel_shutdown_prepare(enum system_states state)
|
| 320 | {
|
| 321 | blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list,
|
| 322 | (state == SYSTEM_HALT)?SYS_HALT:SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL);
|
| 323 | system_state = state;
|
| 324 | device_shutdown();
|
| 325 | }
|
| 326 | |
| 327 | * kernel_halt - halt the system
|
| 328 | *
|
| 329 | * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system halt.
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 | void kernel_halt(void)
|
| 332 | {
|
| 333 | kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_HALT);
|
| 334 | sysdev_shutdown();
|
| 335 | printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n");
|
| 336 | machine_halt();
|
| 337 | }
|
| 338 |
|
| 339 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_halt);
|
| 340 |
|
| 341 | |
| 342 | * kernel_power_off - power_off the system
|
| 343 | *
|
| 344 | * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system power_off.
|
| 345 |
|
| 346 | void kernel_power_off(void)
|
| 347 | {
|
| 348 | kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_POWER_OFF);
|
| 349 | if (pm_power_off_prepare)
|
| 350 | pm_power_off_prepare();
|
| 351 | disable_nonboot_cpus();
|
| 352 | sysdev_shutdown();
|
| 353 | printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n");
|
| 354 | machine_power_off();
|
| 355 | }
|
| 356 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_power_off);
|
| 357 |
|
| 358 | static DEFINE_MUTEX(reboot_mutex);
|
| 359 |
|
| 360 | |
| 361 | * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it,
|
| 362 | * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers
|
| 363 | * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine.
|
| 364 | * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here.
|
| 365 | *
|
| 366 | * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this.
|
| 367 |
|
| 368 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(reboot, int, magic1, int, magic2, unsigned int, cmd,
|
| 369 | void __user *, arg)
|
| 370 | {
|
| 371 | char buffer[256];
|
| 372 | int ret = 0;
|
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
|
| 375 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
|
| 376 | return -EPERM;
|
| 377 |
|
| 378 |
|
| 379 | if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 ||
|
| 380 | (magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 &&
|
| 381 | magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A &&
|
| 382 | magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B &&
|
| 383 | magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C))
|
| 384 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 | |
| 387 | * halt when pm_power_off is not set do it the easy way.
|
| 388 |
|
| 389 | if ((cmd == LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF) && !pm_power_off)
|
| 390 | cmd = LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT;
|
| 391 |
|
| 392 | mutex_lock(&reboot_mutex);
|
| 393 | switch (cmd) {
|
| 394 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART:
|
| 395 | kernel_restart(NULL);
|
| 396 | break;
|
| 397 |
|
| 398 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON:
|
| 399 | C_A_D = 1;
|
| 400 | break;
|
| 401 |
|
| 402 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF:
|
| 403 | C_A_D = 0;
|
| 404 | break;
|
| 405 |
|
| 406 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT:
|
| 407 | kernel_halt();
|
| 408 | do_exit(0);
|
| 409 | panic("cannot halt");
|
| 410 |
|
| 411 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF:
|
| 412 | kernel_power_off();
|
| 413 | do_exit(0);
|
| 414 | break;
|
| 415 |
|
| 416 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2:
|
| 417 | if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) {
|
| 418 | ret = -EFAULT;
|
| 419 | break;
|
| 420 | }
|
| 421 | buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0';
|
| 422 |
|
| 423 | kernel_restart(buffer);
|
| 424 | break;
|
| 425 |
|
| 426 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
|
| 427 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC:
|
| 428 | ret = kernel_kexec();
|
| 429 | break;
|
| 430 | #endif
|
| 431 |
|
| 432 | #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
|
| 433 | case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND:
|
| 434 | ret = hibernate();
|
| 435 | break;
|
| 436 | #endif
|
| 437 |
|
| 438 | default:
|
| 439 | ret = -EINVAL;
|
| 440 | break;
|
| 441 | }
|
| 442 | mutex_unlock(&reboot_mutex);
|
| 443 | return ret;
|
| 444 | }
|
| 445 |
|
| 446 | static void deferred_cad(struct work_struct *dummy)
|
| 447 | {
|
| 448 | kernel_restart(NULL);
|
| 449 | }
|
| 450 |
|
| 451 | |
| 452 | * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt.
|
| 453 | * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice
|
| 454 | * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del.
|
| 455 |
|
| 456 | void ctrl_alt_del(void)
|
| 457 | {
|
| 458 | static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad);
|
| 459 |
|
| 460 | if (C_A_D)
|
| 461 | schedule_work(&cad_work);
|
| 462 | else
|
| 463 | kill_cad_pid(SIGINT, 1);
|
| 464 | }
|
| 465 |
|
| 466 | |
| 467 | * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
|
| 468 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
| 469 | *
|
| 470 | * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
|
| 471 | * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
|
| 472 | *
|
| 473 | * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
|
| 474 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
| 475 | * a security audit over a program.
|
| 476 | *
|
| 477 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
|
| 478 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
|
| 479 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
| 480 | *
|
| 481 | * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
|
| 482 | * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
|
| 483 |
|
| 484 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
|
| 485 | {
|
| 486 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 487 | struct cred *new;
|
| 488 | int retval;
|
| 489 |
|
| 490 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 491 | if (!new)
|
| 492 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 493 | old = current_cred();
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 496 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
| 497 | if (old->gid == rgid ||
|
| 498 | old->egid == rgid ||
|
| 499 | capable(CAP_SETGID))
|
| 500 | new->gid = rgid;
|
| 501 | else
|
| 502 | goto error;
|
| 503 | }
|
| 504 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
| 505 | if (old->gid == egid ||
|
| 506 | old->egid == egid ||
|
| 507 | old->sgid == egid ||
|
| 508 | capable(CAP_SETGID))
|
| 509 | new->egid = egid;
|
| 510 | else
|
| 511 | goto error;
|
| 512 | }
|
| 513 |
|
| 514 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
|
| 515 | (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid))
|
| 516 | new->sgid = new->egid;
|
| 517 | new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
| 518 |
|
| 519 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 520 |
|
| 521 | error:
|
| 522 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 523 | return retval;
|
| 524 | }
|
| 525 |
|
| 526 | |
| 527 | * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
|
| 528 | *
|
| 529 | * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
|
| 530 |
|
| 531 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
|
| 532 | {
|
| 533 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 534 | struct cred *new;
|
| 535 | int retval;
|
| 536 |
|
| 537 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 538 | if (!new)
|
| 539 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 540 | old = current_cred();
|
| 541 |
|
| 542 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 543 | if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
|
| 544 | new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid;
|
| 545 | else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid)
|
| 546 | new->egid = new->fsgid = gid;
|
| 547 | else
|
| 548 | goto error;
|
| 549 |
|
| 550 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 | error:
|
| 553 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 554 | return retval;
|
| 555 | }
|
| 556 |
|
| 557 | |
| 558 | * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID
|
| 559 |
|
| 560 | static int set_user(struct cred *new)
|
| 561 | {
|
| 562 | struct user_struct *new_user;
|
| 563 |
|
| 564 | new_user = alloc_uid(current_user_ns(), new->uid);
|
| 565 | if (!new_user)
|
| 566 | return -EAGAIN;
|
| 567 |
|
| 568 | if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) &&
|
| 569 | new_user != INIT_USER) {
|
| 570 | free_uid(new_user);
|
| 571 | return -EAGAIN;
|
| 572 | }
|
| 573 |
|
| 574 | free_uid(new->user);
|
| 575 | new->user = new_user;
|
| 576 | return 0;
|
| 577 | }
|
| 578 |
|
| 579 | |
| 580 | * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
|
| 581 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
| 582 | *
|
| 583 | * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
|
| 584 | * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
|
| 585 | *
|
| 586 | * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
|
| 587 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
| 588 | * a security audit over a program.
|
| 589 | *
|
| 590 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
|
| 591 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
|
| 592 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
| 593 |
|
| 594 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
|
| 595 | {
|
| 596 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 597 | struct cred *new;
|
| 598 | int retval;
|
| 599 |
|
| 600 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 601 | if (!new)
|
| 602 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 603 | old = current_cred();
|
| 604 |
|
| 605 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 606 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 607 | new->uid = ruid;
|
| 608 | if (old->uid != ruid &&
|
| 609 | old->euid != ruid &&
|
| 610 | !capable(CAP_SETUID))
|
| 611 | goto error;
|
| 612 | }
|
| 613 |
|
| 614 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 615 | new->euid = euid;
|
| 616 | if (old->uid != euid &&
|
| 617 | old->euid != euid &&
|
| 618 | old->suid != euid &&
|
| 619 | !capable(CAP_SETUID))
|
| 620 | goto error;
|
| 621 | }
|
| 622 |
|
| 623 | if (new->uid != old->uid) {
|
| 624 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 625 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 626 | goto error;
|
| 627 | }
|
| 628 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
|
| 629 | (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid))
|
| 630 | new->suid = new->euid;
|
| 631 | new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
| 632 |
|
| 633 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
| 634 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 635 | goto error;
|
| 636 |
|
| 637 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 638 |
|
| 639 | error:
|
| 640 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 641 | return retval;
|
| 642 | }
|
| 643 |
|
| 644 | |
| 645 | * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
|
| 646 | *
|
| 647 | * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
|
| 648 | * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
|
| 649 | * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
|
| 650 | * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
|
| 651 | * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
|
| 652 | * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
|
| 653 | * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
|
| 654 |
|
| 655 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
|
| 656 | {
|
| 657 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 658 | struct cred *new;
|
| 659 | int retval;
|
| 660 |
|
| 661 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 662 | if (!new)
|
| 663 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 664 | old = current_cred();
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 667 | if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 668 | new->suid = new->uid = uid;
|
| 669 | if (uid != old->uid) {
|
| 670 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 671 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 672 | goto error;
|
| 673 | }
|
| 674 | } else if (uid != old->uid && uid != new->suid) {
|
| 675 | goto error;
|
| 676 | }
|
| 677 |
|
| 678 | new->fsuid = new->euid = uid;
|
| 679 |
|
| 680 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
| 681 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 682 | goto error;
|
| 683 |
|
| 684 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 685 |
|
| 686 | error:
|
| 687 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 688 | return retval;
|
| 689 | }
|
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
|
| 692 | |
| 693 | * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
|
| 694 | * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
|
| 695 |
|
| 696 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
|
| 697 | {
|
| 698 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 699 | struct cred *new;
|
| 700 | int retval;
|
| 701 |
|
| 702 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 703 | if (!new)
|
| 704 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 705 |
|
| 706 | old = current_cred();
|
| 707 |
|
| 708 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 709 | if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 710 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && ruid != old->uid &&
|
| 711 | ruid != old->euid && ruid != old->suid)
|
| 712 | goto error;
|
| 713 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid &&
|
| 714 | euid != old->euid && euid != old->suid)
|
| 715 | goto error;
|
| 716 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && suid != old->uid &&
|
| 717 | suid != old->euid && suid != old->suid)
|
| 718 | goto error;
|
| 719 | }
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 722 | new->uid = ruid;
|
| 723 | if (ruid != old->uid) {
|
| 724 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 725 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 726 | goto error;
|
| 727 | }
|
| 728 | }
|
| 729 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1)
|
| 730 | new->euid = euid;
|
| 731 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
|
| 732 | new->suid = suid;
|
| 733 | new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
| 734 |
|
| 735 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
| 736 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 737 | goto error;
|
| 738 |
|
| 739 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 740 |
|
| 741 | error:
|
| 742 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 743 | return retval;
|
| 744 | }
|
| 745 |
|
| 746 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruid, uid_t __user *, euid, uid_t __user *, suid)
|
| 747 | {
|
| 748 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 749 | int retval;
|
| 750 |
|
| 751 | if (!(retval = put_user(cred->uid, ruid)) &&
|
| 752 | !(retval = put_user(cred->euid, euid)))
|
| 753 | retval = put_user(cred->suid, suid);
|
| 754 |
|
| 755 | return retval;
|
| 756 | }
|
| 757 |
|
| 758 | |
| 759 | * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
|
| 760 |
|
| 761 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
|
| 762 | {
|
| 763 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 764 | struct cred *new;
|
| 765 | int retval;
|
| 766 |
|
| 767 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 768 | if (!new)
|
| 769 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 770 | old = current_cred();
|
| 771 |
|
| 772 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 773 | if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
|
| 774 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid &&
|
| 775 | rgid != old->egid && rgid != old->sgid)
|
| 776 | goto error;
|
| 777 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid &&
|
| 778 | egid != old->egid && egid != old->sgid)
|
| 779 | goto error;
|
| 780 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && sgid != old->gid &&
|
| 781 | sgid != old->egid && sgid != old->sgid)
|
| 782 | goto error;
|
| 783 | }
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 786 | new->gid = rgid;
|
| 787 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 788 | new->egid = egid;
|
| 789 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 790 | new->sgid = sgid;
|
| 791 | new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
| 792 |
|
| 793 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 794 |
|
| 795 | error:
|
| 796 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 797 | return retval;
|
| 798 | }
|
| 799 |
|
| 800 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgid, gid_t __user *, egid, gid_t __user *, sgid)
|
| 801 | {
|
| 802 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 803 | int retval;
|
| 804 |
|
| 805 | if (!(retval = put_user(cred->gid, rgid)) &&
|
| 806 | !(retval = put_user(cred->egid, egid)))
|
| 807 | retval = put_user(cred->sgid, sgid);
|
| 808 |
|
| 809 | return retval;
|
| 810 | }
|
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
|
| 813 | |
| 814 | * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
|
| 815 | * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
|
| 816 | * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
|
| 817 | * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
|
| 818 |
|
| 819 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
|
| 820 | {
|
| 821 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 822 | struct cred *new;
|
| 823 | uid_t old_fsuid;
|
| 824 |
|
| 825 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 826 | if (!new)
|
| 827 | return current_fsuid();
|
| 828 | old = current_cred();
|
| 829 | old_fsuid = old->fsuid;
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 | if (uid == old->uid || uid == old->euid ||
|
| 832 | uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid ||
|
| 833 | capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 834 | if (uid != old_fsuid) {
|
| 835 | new->fsuid = uid;
|
| 836 | if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
|
| 837 | goto change_okay;
|
| 838 | }
|
| 839 | }
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 842 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 843 |
|
| 844 | change_okay:
|
| 845 | commit_creds(new);
|
| 846 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 847 | }
|
| 848 |
|
| 849 | |
| 850 | * Samma på svenska..
|
| 851 |
|
| 852 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
|
| 853 | {
|
| 854 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 855 | struct cred *new;
|
| 856 | gid_t old_fsgid;
|
| 857 |
|
| 858 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 859 | if (!new)
|
| 860 | return current_fsgid();
|
| 861 | old = current_cred();
|
| 862 | old_fsgid = old->fsgid;
|
| 863 |
|
| 864 | if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->egid ||
|
| 865 | gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid ||
|
| 866 | capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
|
| 867 | if (gid != old_fsgid) {
|
| 868 | new->fsgid = gid;
|
| 869 | goto change_okay;
|
| 870 | }
|
| 871 | }
|
| 872 |
|
| 873 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 874 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 875 |
|
| 876 | change_okay:
|
| 877 | commit_creds(new);
|
| 878 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 879 | }
|
| 880 |
|
| 881 | void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms)
|
| 882 | {
|
| 883 | cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime;
|
| 884 |
|
| 885 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
|
| 886 | thread_group_times(current, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
| 887 | cutime = current->signal->cutime;
|
| 888 | cstime = current->signal->cstime;
|
| 889 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
|
| 890 | tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgutime);
|
| 891 | tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgstime);
|
| 892 | tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime);
|
| 893 | tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime);
|
| 894 | }
|
| 895 |
|
| 896 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf)
|
| 897 | {
|
| 898 | if (tbuf) {
|
| 899 | struct tms tmp;
|
| 900 |
|
| 901 | do_sys_times(&tmp);
|
| 902 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
|
| 903 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 904 | }
|
| 905 | force_successful_syscall_return();
|
| 906 | return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
|
| 907 | }
|
| 908 |
|
| 909 | |
| 910 | * This needs some heavy checking ...
|
| 911 | * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
|
| 912 | * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
|
| 913 | *
|
| 914 | * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
|
| 915 | * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
|
| 916 | * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
|
| 917 | *
|
| 918 | * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX.
|
| 919 | * LBT 04.03.94
|
| 920 |
|
| 921 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid)
|
| 922 | {
|
| 923 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 924 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
| 925 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 926 | int err;
|
| 927 |
|
| 928 | if (!pid)
|
| 929 | pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader);
|
| 930 | if (!pgid)
|
| 931 | pgid = pid;
|
| 932 | if (pgid < 0)
|
| 933 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 934 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 935 |
|
| 936 | |
| 937 | * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
|
| 938 |
|
| 939 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 940 |
|
| 941 | err = -ESRCH;
|
| 942 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 943 | if (!p)
|
| 944 | goto out;
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 | err = -EINVAL;
|
| 947 | if (!thread_group_leader(p))
|
| 948 | goto out;
|
| 949 |
|
| 950 | if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) {
|
| 951 | err = -EPERM;
|
| 952 | if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader))
|
| 953 | goto out;
|
| 954 | err = -EACCES;
|
| 955 | if (p->did_exec)
|
| 956 | goto out;
|
| 957 | } else {
|
| 958 | err = -ESRCH;
|
| 959 | if (p != group_leader)
|
| 960 | goto out;
|
| 961 | }
|
| 962 |
|
| 963 | err = -EPERM;
|
| 964 | if (p->signal->leader)
|
| 965 | goto out;
|
| 966 |
|
| 967 | pgrp = task_pid(p);
|
| 968 | if (pgid != pid) {
|
| 969 | struct task_struct *g;
|
| 970 |
|
| 971 | pgrp = find_vpid(pgid);
|
| 972 | g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID);
|
| 973 | if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader))
|
| 974 | goto out;
|
| 975 | }
|
| 976 |
|
| 977 | err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
|
| 978 | if (err)
|
| 979 | goto out;
|
| 980 |
|
| 981 | if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp)
|
| 982 | change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp);
|
| 983 |
|
| 984 | err = 0;
|
| 985 | out:
|
| 986 |
|
| 987 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 988 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 989 | return err;
|
| 990 | }
|
| 991 |
|
| 992 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid)
|
| 993 | {
|
| 994 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 995 | struct pid *grp;
|
| 996 | int retval;
|
| 997 |
|
| 998 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 999 | if (!pid)
|
| 1000 | grp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 1001 | else {
|
| 1002 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 1003 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 1004 | if (!p)
|
| 1005 | goto out;
|
| 1006 | grp = task_pgrp(p);
|
| 1007 | if (!grp)
|
| 1008 | goto out;
|
| 1009 |
|
| 1010 | retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
|
| 1011 | if (retval)
|
| 1012 | goto out;
|
| 1013 | }
|
| 1014 | retval = pid_vnr(grp);
|
| 1015 | out:
|
| 1016 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1017 | return retval;
|
| 1018 | }
|
| 1019 |
|
| 1020 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
|
| 1021 |
|
| 1022 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp)
|
| 1023 | {
|
| 1024 | return sys_getpgid(0);
|
| 1025 | }
|
| 1026 |
|
| 1027 | #endif
|
| 1028 |
|
| 1029 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid)
|
| 1030 | {
|
| 1031 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 1032 | struct pid *sid;
|
| 1033 | int retval;
|
| 1034 |
|
| 1035 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1036 | if (!pid)
|
| 1037 | sid = task_session(current);
|
| 1038 | else {
|
| 1039 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 1040 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 1041 | if (!p)
|
| 1042 | goto out;
|
| 1043 | sid = task_session(p);
|
| 1044 | if (!sid)
|
| 1045 | goto out;
|
| 1046 |
|
| 1047 | retval = security_task_getsid(p);
|
| 1048 | if (retval)
|
| 1049 | goto out;
|
| 1050 | }
|
| 1051 | retval = pid_vnr(sid);
|
| 1052 | out:
|
| 1053 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1054 | return retval;
|
| 1055 | }
|
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid)
|
| 1058 | {
|
| 1059 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
| 1060 | struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader);
|
| 1061 | pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid);
|
| 1062 | int err = -EPERM;
|
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1065 |
|
| 1066 | if (group_leader->signal->leader)
|
| 1067 | goto out;
|
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 | |
| 1070 | * proposed session id.
|
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 | if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID))
|
| 1073 | goto out;
|
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 | group_leader->signal->leader = 1;
|
| 1076 | __set_special_pids(sid);
|
| 1077 |
|
| 1078 | proc_clear_tty(group_leader);
|
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 | err = session;
|
| 1081 | out:
|
| 1082 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1083 | if (err > 0)
|
| 1084 | proc_sid_connector(group_leader);
|
| 1085 | return err;
|
| 1086 | }
|
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 | DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);
|
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 | #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE
|
| 1091 | #define override_architecture(name) \
|
| 1092 | (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \
|
| 1093 | copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \
|
| 1094 | sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE)))
|
| 1095 | #else
|
| 1096 | #define override_architecture(name) 0
|
| 1097 | #endif
|
| 1098 |
|
| 1099 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1100 | {
|
| 1101 | int errno = 0;
|
| 1102 |
|
| 1103 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1104 | if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name))
|
| 1105 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1106 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 | if (!errno && override_architecture(name))
|
| 1109 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1110 | return errno;
|
| 1111 | }
|
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME
|
| 1114 | |
| 1115 | * Old cruft
|
| 1116 |
|
| 1117 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1118 | {
|
| 1119 | int error = 0;
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 | if (!name)
|
| 1122 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1123 |
|
| 1124 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1125 | if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof(*name)))
|
| 1126 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 1127 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 | if (!error && override_architecture(name))
|
| 1130 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 1131 | return error;
|
| 1132 | }
|
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1135 | {
|
| 1136 | int error;
|
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 | if (!name)
|
| 1139 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1140 | if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, sizeof(struct oldold_utsname)))
|
| 1141 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1144 | error = __copy_to_user(&name->sysname, &utsname()->sysname,
|
| 1145 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1146 | error |= __put_user(0, name->sysname + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1147 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->nodename, &utsname()->nodename,
|
| 1148 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1149 | error |= __put_user(0, name->nodename + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1150 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->release, &utsname()->release,
|
| 1151 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1152 | error |= __put_user(0, name->release + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1153 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->version, &utsname()->version,
|
| 1154 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1155 | error |= __put_user(0, name->version + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1156 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->machine, &utsname()->machine,
|
| 1157 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1158 | error |= __put_user(0, name->machine + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1159 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1160 |
|
| 1161 | if (!error && override_architecture(name))
|
| 1162 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 1163 | return error ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1164 | }
|
| 1165 | #endif
|
| 1166 |
|
| 1167 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1168 | {
|
| 1169 | int errno;
|
| 1170 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
| 1173 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1174 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
| 1175 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1176 | down_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1177 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1178 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
| 1179 | struct new_utsname *u = utsname();
|
| 1180 |
|
| 1181 | memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len);
|
| 1182 | memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len);
|
| 1183 | errno = 0;
|
| 1184 | }
|
| 1185 | up_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1186 | return errno;
|
| 1187 | }
|
| 1188 |
|
| 1189 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
|
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1192 | {
|
| 1193 | int i, errno;
|
| 1194 | struct new_utsname *u;
|
| 1195 |
|
| 1196 | if (len < 0)
|
| 1197 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1198 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1199 | u = utsname();
|
| 1200 | i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename);
|
| 1201 | if (i > len)
|
| 1202 | i = len;
|
| 1203 | errno = 0;
|
| 1204 | if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i))
|
| 1205 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1206 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1207 | return errno;
|
| 1208 | }
|
| 1209 |
|
| 1210 | #endif
|
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 | |
| 1213 | * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
|
| 1214 | * uname()
|
| 1215 |
|
| 1216 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1217 | {
|
| 1218 | int errno;
|
| 1219 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
| 1220 |
|
| 1221 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
| 1222 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1223 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
| 1224 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 | down_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1227 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1228 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
| 1229 | struct new_utsname *u = utsname();
|
| 1230 |
|
| 1231 | memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len);
|
| 1232 | memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len);
|
| 1233 | errno = 0;
|
| 1234 | }
|
| 1235 | up_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1236 | return errno;
|
| 1237 | }
|
| 1238 |
|
| 1239 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1240 | {
|
| 1241 | struct rlimit value;
|
| 1242 | int ret;
|
| 1243 |
|
| 1244 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value);
|
| 1245 | if (!ret)
|
| 1246 | ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1247 |
|
| 1248 | return ret;
|
| 1249 | }
|
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
|
| 1252 |
|
| 1253 | |
| 1254 | * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
|
| 1255 |
|
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1258 | struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1259 | {
|
| 1260 | struct rlimit x;
|
| 1261 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1262 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1263 |
|
| 1264 | task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1265 | x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
| 1266 | task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1267 | if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1268 | x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1269 | if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1270 | x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1271 | return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0;
|
| 1272 | }
|
| 1273 |
|
| 1274 | #endif
|
| 1275 |
|
| 1276 | static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64)
|
| 1277 | {
|
| 1278 | #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64
|
| 1279 | return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX;
|
| 1280 | #else
|
| 1281 | return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1282 | #endif
|
| 1283 | }
|
| 1284 |
|
| 1285 | static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64)
|
| 1286 | {
|
| 1287 | if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1288 | rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1289 | else
|
| 1290 | rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur;
|
| 1291 | if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1292 | rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1293 | else
|
| 1294 | rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max;
|
| 1295 | }
|
| 1296 |
|
| 1297 | static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim)
|
| 1298 | {
|
| 1299 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur))
|
| 1300 | rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1301 | else
|
| 1302 | rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur;
|
| 1303 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max))
|
| 1304 | rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1305 | else
|
| 1306 | rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max;
|
| 1307 | }
|
| 1308 |
|
| 1309 |
|
| 1310 | int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
|
| 1311 | struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim)
|
| 1312 | {
|
| 1313 | struct rlimit *rlim;
|
| 1314 | int retval = 0;
|
| 1315 |
|
| 1316 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1317 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1318 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1319 | if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
|
| 1320 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1321 | if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE &&
|
| 1322 | new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open)
|
| 1323 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1324 | }
|
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
|
| 1327 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1328 | if (!tsk->sighand) {
|
| 1329 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 1330 | goto out;
|
| 1331 | }
|
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 | rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
|
| 1334 | task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
|
| 1335 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1336 | if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max &&
|
| 1337 | !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 1338 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 1339 | if (!retval)
|
| 1340 | retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk->group_leader,
|
| 1341 | resource, new_rlim);
|
| 1342 | if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur == 0) {
|
| 1343 | |
| 1344 | * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU
|
| 1345 | * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was
|
| 1346 | * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second
|
| 1347 | * instead
|
| 1348 |
|
| 1349 | new_rlim->rlim_cur = 1;
|
| 1350 | }
|
| 1351 | }
|
| 1352 | if (!retval) {
|
| 1353 | if (old_rlim)
|
| 1354 | *old_rlim = *rlim;
|
| 1355 | if (new_rlim)
|
| 1356 | *rlim = *new_rlim;
|
| 1357 | }
|
| 1358 | task_unlock(tsk->group_leader);
|
| 1359 |
|
| 1360 | |
| 1361 | * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error
|
| 1362 | * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a
|
| 1363 | * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of
|
| 1364 | * applications, so we live with it
|
| 1365 |
|
| 1366 | if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU &&
|
| 1367 | new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1368 | update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur);
|
| 1369 | out:
|
| 1370 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1371 | return retval;
|
| 1372 | }
|
| 1373 |
|
| 1374 |
|
| 1375 | static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task)
|
| 1376 | {
|
| 1377 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
|
| 1378 |
|
| 1379 | tcred = __task_cred(task);
|
| 1380 | if ((cred->uid != tcred->euid ||
|
| 1381 | cred->uid != tcred->suid ||
|
| 1382 | cred->uid != tcred->uid ||
|
| 1383 | cred->gid != tcred->egid ||
|
| 1384 | cred->gid != tcred->sgid ||
|
| 1385 | cred->gid != tcred->gid) &&
|
| 1386 | !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
|
| 1387 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1388 | }
|
| 1389 |
|
| 1390 | return 0;
|
| 1391 | }
|
| 1392 |
|
| 1393 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1394 | const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim,
|
| 1395 | struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim)
|
| 1396 | {
|
| 1397 | struct rlimit64 old64, new64;
|
| 1398 | struct rlimit old, new;
|
| 1399 | struct task_struct *tsk;
|
| 1400 | int ret;
|
| 1401 |
|
| 1402 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1403 | if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64)))
|
| 1404 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1405 | rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new);
|
| 1406 | }
|
| 1407 |
|
| 1408 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1409 | tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current;
|
| 1410 | if (!tsk) {
|
| 1411 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1412 | return -ESRCH;
|
| 1413 | }
|
| 1414 | ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk);
|
| 1415 | if (ret) {
|
| 1416 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1417 | return ret;
|
| 1418 | }
|
| 1419 | get_task_struct(tsk);
|
| 1420 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1421 |
|
| 1422 | ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL,
|
| 1423 | old_rlim ? &old : NULL);
|
| 1424 |
|
| 1425 | if (!ret && old_rlim) {
|
| 1426 | rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64);
|
| 1427 | if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64)))
|
| 1428 | ret = -EFAULT;
|
| 1429 | }
|
| 1430 |
|
| 1431 | put_task_struct(tsk);
|
| 1432 | return ret;
|
| 1433 | }
|
| 1434 |
|
| 1435 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1436 | {
|
| 1437 | struct rlimit new_rlim;
|
| 1438 |
|
| 1439 | if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
|
| 1440 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1441 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL);
|
| 1442 | }
|
| 1443 |
|
| 1444 | |
| 1445 | * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
|
| 1446 | * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
|
| 1447 | * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
|
| 1448 | * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
|
| 1449 | * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
|
| 1450 | * measuring them yet).
|
| 1451 | *
|
| 1452 | * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
|
| 1453 | * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
|
| 1454 | * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
|
| 1455 | * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
|
| 1456 | * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
|
| 1457 | * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
|
| 1458 | * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
|
| 1459 | *
|
| 1460 | * Locking:
|
| 1461 | * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH
|
| 1462 | * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded
|
| 1463 | * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with
|
| 1464 | * the siglock held.
|
| 1465 | * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and
|
| 1466 | * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one
|
| 1467 | * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else
|
| 1468 | * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the
|
| 1469 | * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just
|
| 1470 | * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock.
|
| 1471 | * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal
|
| 1472 | * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal->
|
| 1473 | * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple.
|
| 1474 | *
|
| 1475 |
|
| 1476 |
|
| 1477 | static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r)
|
| 1478 | {
|
| 1479 | r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw;
|
| 1480 | r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw;
|
| 1481 | r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt;
|
| 1482 | r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt;
|
| 1483 | r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t);
|
| 1484 | r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t);
|
| 1485 | }
|
| 1486 |
|
| 1487 | static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
|
| 1488 | {
|
| 1489 | struct task_struct *t;
|
| 1490 | unsigned long flags;
|
| 1491 | cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime;
|
| 1492 | unsigned long maxrss = 0;
|
| 1493 |
|
| 1494 | memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r);
|
| 1495 | utime = stime = cputime_zero;
|
| 1496 |
|
| 1497 | if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) {
|
| 1498 | task_times(current, &utime, &stime);
|
| 1499 | accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r);
|
| 1500 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
|
| 1501 | goto out;
|
| 1502 | }
|
| 1503 |
|
| 1504 | if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags))
|
| 1505 | return;
|
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 | switch (who) {
|
| 1508 | case RUSAGE_BOTH:
|
| 1509 | case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
|
| 1510 | utime = p->signal->cutime;
|
| 1511 | stime = p->signal->cstime;
|
| 1512 | r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw;
|
| 1513 | r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw;
|
| 1514 | r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt;
|
| 1515 | r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt;
|
| 1516 | r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock;
|
| 1517 | r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock;
|
| 1518 | maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss;
|
| 1519 |
|
| 1520 | if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
|
| 1521 | break;
|
| 1522 |
|
| 1523 | case RUSAGE_SELF:
|
| 1524 | thread_group_times(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
| 1525 | utime = cputime_add(utime, tgutime);
|
| 1526 | stime = cputime_add(stime, tgstime);
|
| 1527 | r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw;
|
| 1528 | r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw;
|
| 1529 | r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt;
|
| 1530 | r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt;
|
| 1531 | r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock;
|
| 1532 | r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock;
|
| 1533 | if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss)
|
| 1534 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
|
| 1535 | t = p;
|
| 1536 | do {
|
| 1537 | accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r);
|
| 1538 | t = next_thread(t);
|
| 1539 | } while (t != p);
|
| 1540 | break;
|
| 1541 |
|
| 1542 | default:
|
| 1543 | BUG();
|
| 1544 | }
|
| 1545 | unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
|
| 1546 |
|
| 1547 | out:
|
| 1548 | cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime);
|
| 1549 | cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime);
|
| 1550 |
|
| 1551 | if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) {
|
| 1552 | struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p);
|
| 1553 | if (mm) {
|
| 1554 | setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm);
|
| 1555 | mmput(mm);
|
| 1556 | }
|
| 1557 | }
|
| 1558 | r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024);
|
| 1559 | }
|
| 1560 |
|
| 1561 | int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru)
|
| 1562 | {
|
| 1563 | struct rusage r;
|
| 1564 | k_getrusage(p, who, &r);
|
| 1565 | return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1566 | }
|
| 1567 |
|
| 1568 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru)
|
| 1569 | {
|
| 1570 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
|
| 1571 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
|
| 1572 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1573 | return getrusage(current, who, ru);
|
| 1574 | }
|
| 1575 |
|
| 1576 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask)
|
| 1577 | {
|
| 1578 | mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
|
| 1579 | return mask;
|
| 1580 | }
|
| 1581 |
|
| 1582 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
|
| 1583 | unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
|
| 1584 | {
|
| 1585 | struct task_struct *me = current;
|
| 1586 | unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
|
| 1587 | long error;
|
| 1588 |
|
| 1589 | error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 1590 | if (error != -ENOSYS)
|
| 1591 | return error;
|
| 1592 |
|
| 1593 | error = 0;
|
| 1594 | switch (option) {
|
| 1595 | case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
|
| 1596 | if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
|
| 1597 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1598 | break;
|
| 1599 | }
|
| 1600 | me->pdeath_signal = arg2;
|
| 1601 | error = 0;
|
| 1602 | break;
|
| 1603 | case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
|
| 1604 | error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
|
| 1605 | break;
|
| 1606 | case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
|
| 1607 | error = get_dumpable(me->mm);
|
| 1608 | break;
|
| 1609 | case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
|
| 1610 | if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) {
|
| 1611 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1612 | break;
|
| 1613 | }
|
| 1614 | set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
|
| 1615 | error = 0;
|
| 1616 | break;
|
| 1617 |
|
| 1618 | case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
|
| 1619 | error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1620 | break;
|
| 1621 | case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
|
| 1622 | error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1623 | break;
|
| 1624 | case PR_SET_FPEMU:
|
| 1625 | error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1626 | break;
|
| 1627 | case PR_GET_FPEMU:
|
| 1628 | error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1629 | break;
|
| 1630 | case PR_SET_FPEXC:
|
| 1631 | error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1632 | break;
|
| 1633 | case PR_GET_FPEXC:
|
| 1634 | error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1635 | break;
|
| 1636 | case PR_GET_TIMING:
|
| 1637 | error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
|
| 1638 | break;
|
| 1639 | case PR_SET_TIMING:
|
| 1640 | if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
|
| 1641 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1642 | else
|
| 1643 | error = 0;
|
| 1644 | break;
|
| 1645 |
|
| 1646 | case PR_SET_NAME:
|
| 1647 | comm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0;
|
| 1648 | if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2,
|
| 1649 | sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0)
|
| 1650 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1651 | set_task_comm(me, comm);
|
| 1652 | return 0;
|
| 1653 | case PR_GET_NAME:
|
| 1654 | get_task_comm(comm, me);
|
| 1655 | if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm,
|
| 1656 | sizeof(comm)))
|
| 1657 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1658 | return 0;
|
| 1659 | case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
|
| 1660 | error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
| 1661 | break;
|
| 1662 | case PR_SET_ENDIAN:
|
| 1663 | error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
| 1664 | break;
|
| 1665 |
|
| 1666 | case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
|
| 1667 | error = prctl_get_seccomp();
|
| 1668 | break;
|
| 1669 | case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
|
| 1670 | error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
|
| 1671 | break;
|
| 1672 | case PR_GET_TSC:
|
| 1673 | error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
| 1674 | break;
|
| 1675 | case PR_SET_TSC:
|
| 1676 | error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
| 1677 | break;
|
| 1678 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE:
|
| 1679 | error = perf_event_task_disable();
|
| 1680 | break;
|
| 1681 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE:
|
| 1682 | error = perf_event_task_enable();
|
| 1683 | break;
|
| 1684 | case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK:
|
| 1685 | error = current->timer_slack_ns;
|
| 1686 | break;
|
| 1687 | case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK:
|
| 1688 | if (arg2 <= 0)
|
| 1689 | current->timer_slack_ns =
|
| 1690 | current->default_timer_slack_ns;
|
| 1691 | else
|
| 1692 | current->timer_slack_ns = arg2;
|
| 1693 | error = 0;
|
| 1694 | break;
|
| 1695 | case PR_MCE_KILL:
|
| 1696 | if (arg4 | arg5)
|
| 1697 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1698 | switch (arg2) {
|
| 1699 | case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR:
|
| 1700 | if (arg3 != 0)
|
| 1701 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1702 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
| 1703 | break;
|
| 1704 | case PR_MCE_KILL_SET:
|
| 1705 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
| 1706 | if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY)
|
| 1707 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
| 1708 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE)
|
| 1709 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
| 1710 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT)
|
| 1711 | current->flags &=
|
| 1712 | ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS);
|
| 1713 | else
|
| 1714 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1715 | break;
|
| 1716 | default:
|
| 1717 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1718 | }
|
| 1719 | error = 0;
|
| 1720 | break;
|
| 1721 | case PR_MCE_KILL_GET:
|
| 1722 | if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
|
| 1723 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1724 | if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS)
|
| 1725 | error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ?
|
| 1726 | PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE;
|
| 1727 | else
|
| 1728 | error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT;
|
| 1729 | break;
|
| 1730 | default:
|
| 1731 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1732 | break;
|
| 1733 | }
|
| 1734 | return error;
|
| 1735 | }
|
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep,
|
| 1738 | struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused)
|
| 1739 | {
|
| 1740 | int err = 0;
|
| 1741 | int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
|
| 1742 | if (cpup)
|
| 1743 | err |= put_user(cpu, cpup);
|
| 1744 | if (nodep)
|
| 1745 | err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep);
|
| 1746 | return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1747 | }
|
| 1748 |
|
| 1749 | char poweroff_cmd[POWEROFF_CMD_PATH_LEN] = "/sbin/poweroff";
|
| 1750 |
|
| 1751 | static void argv_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)
|
| 1752 | {
|
| 1753 | argv_free(info->argv);
|
| 1754 | }
|
| 1755 |
|
| 1756 | |
| 1757 | * orderly_poweroff - Trigger an orderly system poweroff
|
| 1758 | * @force: force poweroff if command execution fails
|
| 1759 | *
|
| 1760 | * This may be called from any context to trigger a system shutdown.
|
| 1761 | * If the orderly shutdown fails, it will force an immediate shutdown.
|
| 1762 |
|
| 1763 | int orderly_poweroff(bool force)
|
| 1764 | {
|
| 1765 | int argc;
|
| 1766 | char **argv = argv_split(GFP_ATOMIC, poweroff_cmd, &argc);
|
| 1767 | static char *envp[] = {
|
| 1768 | "HOME=/",
|
| 1769 | "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin",
|
| 1770 | NULL
|
| 1771 | };
|
| 1772 | int ret = -ENOMEM;
|
| 1773 | struct subprocess_info *info;
|
| 1774 |
|
| 1775 | if (argv == NULL) {
|
| 1776 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s failed to allocate memory for \"%s\"\n",
|
| 1777 | __func__, poweroff_cmd);
|
| 1778 | goto out;
|
| 1779 | }
|
| 1780 |
|
| 1781 | info = call_usermodehelper_setup(argv[0], argv, envp, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
| 1782 | if (info == NULL) {
|
| 1783 | argv_free(argv);
|
| 1784 | goto out;
|
| 1785 | }
|
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 | call_usermodehelper_setfns(info, NULL, argv_cleanup, NULL);
|
| 1788 |
|
| 1789 | ret = call_usermodehelper_exec(info, UMH_NO_WAIT);
|
| 1790 |
|
| 1791 | out:
|
| 1792 | if (ret && force) {
|
| 1793 | printk(KERN_WARNING "Failed to start orderly shutdown: "
|
| 1794 | "forcing the issue\n");
|
| 1795 |
|
| 1796 | |
| 1797 | sync and poweroff asap. Or not even bother syncing
|
| 1798 | if we're doing an emergency shutdown?
|
| 1799 | emergency_sync();
|
| 1800 | kernel_power_off();
|
| 1801 | }
|
| 1802 |
|
| 1803 | return ret;
|
| 1804 | }
|
| 1805 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(orderly_poweroff);
|