| 1 | |
| 2 | * linux/kernel/sys.c
|
| 3 | *
|
| 4 | * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
|
| 5 |
|
| 6 |
|
| 7 | #include <linux/export.h>
|
| 8 | #include <linux/mm.h>
|
| 9 | #include <linux/utsname.h>
|
| 10 | #include <linux/mman.h>
|
| 11 | #include <linux/reboot.h>
|
| 12 | #include <linux/prctl.h>
|
| 13 | #include <linux/highuid.h>
|
| 14 | #include <linux/fs.h>
|
| 15 | #include <linux/kmod.h>
|
| 16 | #include <linux/perf_event.h>
|
| 17 | #include <linux/resource.h>
|
| 18 | #include <linux/kernel.h>
|
| 19 | #include <linux/kexec.h>
|
| 20 | #include <linux/workqueue.h>
|
| 21 | #include <linux/capability.h>
|
| 22 | #include <linux/device.h>
|
| 23 | #include <linux/key.h>
|
| 24 | #include <linux/times.h>
|
| 25 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
|
| 26 | #include <linux/security.h>
|
| 27 | #include <linux/dcookies.h>
|
| 28 | #include <linux/suspend.h>
|
| 29 | #include <linux/tty.h>
|
| 30 | #include <linux/signal.h>
|
| 31 | #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
|
| 32 | #include <linux/getcpu.h>
|
| 33 | #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
|
| 34 | #include <linux/seccomp.h>
|
| 35 | #include <linux/cpu.h>
|
| 36 | #include <linux/personality.h>
|
| 37 | #include <linux/ptrace.h>
|
| 38 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
|
| 39 | #include <linux/file.h>
|
| 40 | #include <linux/mount.h>
|
| 41 | #include <linux/gfp.h>
|
| 42 | #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
|
| 43 | #include <linux/version.h>
|
| 44 | #include <linux/ctype.h>
|
| 45 |
|
| 46 | #include <linux/compat.h>
|
| 47 | #include <linux/syscalls.h>
|
| 48 | #include <linux/kprobes.h>
|
| 49 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
|
| 50 | #include <linux/binfmts.h>
|
| 51 |
|
| 52 | #include <linux/sched.h>
|
| 53 | #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
|
| 54 | #include <linux/uidgid.h>
|
| 55 | #include <linux/cred.h>
|
| 56 |
|
| 57 | #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
|
| 58 |
|
| 59 | #include <generated/utsrelease.h>
|
| 60 |
|
| 61 | #include <asm/uaccess.h>
|
| 62 | #include <asm/io.h>
|
| 63 | #include <asm/unistd.h>
|
| 64 |
|
| 65 | #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
| 66 | # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 67 | #endif
|
| 68 | #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
| 69 | # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 70 | #endif
|
| 71 | #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL
|
| 72 | # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 73 | #endif
|
| 74 | #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL
|
| 75 | # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 76 | #endif
|
| 77 | #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL
|
| 78 | # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 79 | #endif
|
| 80 | #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL
|
| 81 | # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 82 | #endif
|
| 83 | #ifndef GET_ENDIAN
|
| 84 | # define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 85 | #endif
|
| 86 | #ifndef SET_ENDIAN
|
| 87 | # define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 88 | #endif
|
| 89 | #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL
|
| 90 | # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 91 | #endif
|
| 92 | #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL
|
| 93 | # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 94 | #endif
|
| 95 |
|
| 96 | |
| 97 | * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
|
| 98 | * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
|
| 99 |
|
| 100 |
|
| 101 | int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 102 | int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
|
| 103 |
|
| 104 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
|
| 105 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
|
| 106 |
|
| 107 | |
| 108 | * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
|
| 109 | * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
|
| 110 |
|
| 111 |
|
| 112 | int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 113 | int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 114 |
|
| 115 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
|
| 116 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
|
| 117 |
|
| 118 | |
| 119 | * Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid,
|
| 120 | * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns.
|
| 121 | *
|
| 122 | * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe
|
| 123 |
|
| 124 | static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p)
|
| 125 | {
|
| 126 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
|
| 127 |
|
| 128 | if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) ||
|
| 129 | uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid))
|
| 130 | return true;
|
| 131 | if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
|
| 132 | return true;
|
| 133 | return false;
|
| 134 | }
|
| 135 |
|
| 136 | |
| 137 | * set the priority of a task
|
| 138 | * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
|
| 139 |
|
| 140 | static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
|
| 141 | {
|
| 142 | int no_nice;
|
| 143 |
|
| 144 | if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) {
|
| 145 | error = -EPERM;
|
| 146 | goto out;
|
| 147 | }
|
| 148 | if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
|
| 149 | error = -EACCES;
|
| 150 | goto out;
|
| 151 | }
|
| 152 | no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
|
| 153 | if (no_nice) {
|
| 154 | error = no_nice;
|
| 155 | goto out;
|
| 156 | }
|
| 157 | if (error == -ESRCH)
|
| 158 | error = 0;
|
| 159 | set_user_nice(p, niceval);
|
| 160 | out:
|
| 161 | return error;
|
| 162 | }
|
| 163 |
|
| 164 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval)
|
| 165 | {
|
| 166 | struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
| 167 | struct user_struct *user;
|
| 168 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 169 | int error = -EINVAL;
|
| 170 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 171 | kuid_t uid;
|
| 172 |
|
| 173 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
| 174 | goto out;
|
| 175 |
|
| 176 |
|
| 177 | error = -ESRCH;
|
| 178 | if (niceval < -20)
|
| 179 | niceval = -20;
|
| 180 | if (niceval > 19)
|
| 181 | niceval = 19;
|
| 182 |
|
| 183 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 184 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 185 | switch (which) {
|
| 186 | case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
| 187 | if (who)
|
| 188 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
|
| 189 | else
|
| 190 | p = current;
|
| 191 | if (p)
|
| 192 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 193 | break;
|
| 194 | case PRIO_PGRP:
|
| 195 | if (who)
|
| 196 | pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
| 197 | else
|
| 198 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 199 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
| 200 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 201 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
| 202 | break;
|
| 203 | case PRIO_USER:
|
| 204 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who);
|
| 205 | user = cred->user;
|
| 206 | if (!who)
|
| 207 | uid = cred->uid;
|
| 208 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) &&
|
| 209 | !(user = find_user(uid)))
|
| 210 | goto out_unlock;
|
| 211 |
|
| 212 | do_each_thread(g, p) {
|
| 213 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid))
|
| 214 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 215 | } while_each_thread(g, p);
|
| 216 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid))
|
| 217 | free_uid(user);
|
| 218 | break;
|
| 219 | }
|
| 220 | out_unlock:
|
| 221 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 222 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 223 | out:
|
| 224 | return error;
|
| 225 | }
|
| 226 |
|
| 227 | |
| 228 | * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
|
| 229 | * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
|
| 230 | * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
|
| 231 | * to stay compatible.
|
| 232 |
|
| 233 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who)
|
| 234 | {
|
| 235 | struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
| 236 | struct user_struct *user;
|
| 237 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 238 | long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 239 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 240 | kuid_t uid;
|
| 241 |
|
| 242 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
| 243 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 244 |
|
| 245 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 246 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 247 | switch (which) {
|
| 248 | case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
| 249 | if (who)
|
| 250 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
|
| 251 | else
|
| 252 | p = current;
|
| 253 | if (p) {
|
| 254 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
|
| 255 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 256 | retval = niceval;
|
| 257 | }
|
| 258 | break;
|
| 259 | case PRIO_PGRP:
|
| 260 | if (who)
|
| 261 | pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
| 262 | else
|
| 263 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 264 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
| 265 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
|
| 266 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 267 | retval = niceval;
|
| 268 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
| 269 | break;
|
| 270 | case PRIO_USER:
|
| 271 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who);
|
| 272 | user = cred->user;
|
| 273 | if (!who)
|
| 274 | uid = cred->uid;
|
| 275 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) &&
|
| 276 | !(user = find_user(uid)))
|
| 277 | goto out_unlock;
|
| 278 |
|
| 279 | do_each_thread(g, p) {
|
| 280 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid)) {
|
| 281 | niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
|
| 282 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 283 | retval = niceval;
|
| 284 | }
|
| 285 | } while_each_thread(g, p);
|
| 286 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid))
|
| 287 | free_uid(user);
|
| 288 | break;
|
| 289 | }
|
| 290 | out_unlock:
|
| 291 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 292 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 293 |
|
| 294 | return retval;
|
| 295 | }
|
| 296 |
|
| 297 | |
| 298 | * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
|
| 299 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
| 300 | *
|
| 301 | * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
|
| 302 | * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
|
| 303 | *
|
| 304 | * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
|
| 305 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
| 306 | * a security audit over a program.
|
| 307 | *
|
| 308 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
|
| 309 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
|
| 310 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
| 311 | *
|
| 312 | * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
|
| 313 | * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
|
| 314 |
|
| 315 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
|
| 316 | {
|
| 317 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 318 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 319 | struct cred *new;
|
| 320 | int retval;
|
| 321 | kgid_t krgid, kegid;
|
| 322 |
|
| 323 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
|
| 324 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
|
| 325 |
|
| 326 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
|
| 327 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 328 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
|
| 329 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 332 | if (!new)
|
| 333 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 334 | old = current_cred();
|
| 335 |
|
| 336 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 337 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
| 338 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) ||
|
| 339 | gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) ||
|
| 340 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 341 | new->gid = krgid;
|
| 342 | else
|
| 343 | goto error;
|
| 344 | }
|
| 345 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
| 346 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) ||
|
| 347 | gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) ||
|
| 348 | gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) ||
|
| 349 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 350 | new->egid = kegid;
|
| 351 | else
|
| 352 | goto error;
|
| 353 | }
|
| 354 |
|
| 355 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
|
| 356 | (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid)))
|
| 357 | new->sgid = new->egid;
|
| 358 | new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
| 359 |
|
| 360 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 361 |
|
| 362 | error:
|
| 363 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 364 | return retval;
|
| 365 | }
|
| 366 |
|
| 367 | |
| 368 | * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
|
| 369 | *
|
| 370 | * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
|
| 371 |
|
| 372 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
|
| 373 | {
|
| 374 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 375 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 376 | struct cred *new;
|
| 377 | int retval;
|
| 378 | kgid_t kgid;
|
| 379 |
|
| 380 | kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid);
|
| 381 | if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
| 382 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 383 |
|
| 384 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 385 | if (!new)
|
| 386 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 387 | old = current_cred();
|
| 388 |
|
| 389 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 390 | if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 391 | new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid;
|
| 392 | else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid))
|
| 393 | new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid;
|
| 394 | else
|
| 395 | goto error;
|
| 396 |
|
| 397 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 398 |
|
| 399 | error:
|
| 400 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 401 | return retval;
|
| 402 | }
|
| 403 |
|
| 404 | |
| 405 | * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID
|
| 406 |
|
| 407 | static int set_user(struct cred *new)
|
| 408 | {
|
| 409 | struct user_struct *new_user;
|
| 410 |
|
| 411 | new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid);
|
| 412 | if (!new_user)
|
| 413 | return -EAGAIN;
|
| 414 |
|
| 415 | |
| 416 | * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many
|
| 417 | * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming
|
| 418 | * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit
|
| 419 | * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the
|
| 420 | * failure to the execve() stage.
|
| 421 |
|
| 422 | if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) &&
|
| 423 | new_user != INIT_USER)
|
| 424 | current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
|
| 425 | else
|
| 426 | current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
|
| 427 |
|
| 428 | free_uid(new->user);
|
| 429 | new->user = new_user;
|
| 430 | return 0;
|
| 431 | }
|
| 432 |
|
| 433 | |
| 434 | * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
|
| 435 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
| 436 | *
|
| 437 | * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
|
| 438 | * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
|
| 439 | *
|
| 440 | * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
|
| 441 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
| 442 | * a security audit over a program.
|
| 443 | *
|
| 444 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
|
| 445 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
|
| 446 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
| 447 |
|
| 448 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
|
| 449 | {
|
| 450 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 451 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 452 | struct cred *new;
|
| 453 | int retval;
|
| 454 | kuid_t kruid, keuid;
|
| 455 |
|
| 456 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
|
| 457 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
|
| 458 |
|
| 459 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid))
|
| 460 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 461 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid))
|
| 462 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 463 |
|
| 464 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 465 | if (!new)
|
| 466 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 467 | old = current_cred();
|
| 468 |
|
| 469 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 470 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 471 | new->uid = kruid;
|
| 472 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) &&
|
| 473 | !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) &&
|
| 474 | !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
| 475 | goto error;
|
| 476 | }
|
| 477 |
|
| 478 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 479 | new->euid = keuid;
|
| 480 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) &&
|
| 481 | !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) &&
|
| 482 | !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) &&
|
| 483 | !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
| 484 | goto error;
|
| 485 | }
|
| 486 |
|
| 487 | if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) {
|
| 488 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 489 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 490 | goto error;
|
| 491 | }
|
| 492 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
|
| 493 | (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid)))
|
| 494 | new->suid = new->euid;
|
| 495 | new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
| 498 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 499 | goto error;
|
| 500 |
|
| 501 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 502 |
|
| 503 | error:
|
| 504 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 505 | return retval;
|
| 506 | }
|
| 507 |
|
| 508 | |
| 509 | * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
|
| 510 | *
|
| 511 | * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
|
| 512 | * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
|
| 513 | * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
|
| 514 | * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
|
| 515 | * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
|
| 516 | * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
|
| 517 | * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
|
| 518 |
|
| 519 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
|
| 520 | {
|
| 521 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 522 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 523 | struct cred *new;
|
| 524 | int retval;
|
| 525 | kuid_t kuid;
|
| 526 |
|
| 527 | kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid);
|
| 528 | if (!uid_valid(kuid))
|
| 529 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 530 |
|
| 531 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 532 | if (!new)
|
| 533 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 534 | old = current_cred();
|
| 535 |
|
| 536 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 537 | if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 538 | new->suid = new->uid = kuid;
|
| 539 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) {
|
| 540 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 541 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 542 | goto error;
|
| 543 | }
|
| 544 | } else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) {
|
| 545 | goto error;
|
| 546 | }
|
| 547 |
|
| 548 | new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid;
|
| 549 |
|
| 550 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
| 551 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 552 | goto error;
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 | error:
|
| 557 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 558 | return retval;
|
| 559 | }
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
|
| 562 | |
| 563 | * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
|
| 564 | * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
|
| 565 |
|
| 566 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
|
| 567 | {
|
| 568 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 569 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 570 | struct cred *new;
|
| 571 | int retval;
|
| 572 | kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid;
|
| 573 |
|
| 574 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
|
| 575 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
|
| 576 | ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid);
|
| 577 |
|
| 578 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid))
|
| 579 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 580 |
|
| 581 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid))
|
| 582 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 583 |
|
| 584 | if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid))
|
| 585 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 586 |
|
| 587 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 588 | if (!new)
|
| 589 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 590 |
|
| 591 | old = current_cred();
|
| 592 |
|
| 593 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 594 | if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 595 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
|
| 596 | !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid))
|
| 597 | goto error;
|
| 598 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) &&
|
| 599 | !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid))
|
| 600 | goto error;
|
| 601 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) &&
|
| 602 | !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid))
|
| 603 | goto error;
|
| 604 | }
|
| 605 |
|
| 606 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 607 | new->uid = kruid;
|
| 608 | if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) {
|
| 609 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 610 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 611 | goto error;
|
| 612 | }
|
| 613 | }
|
| 614 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1)
|
| 615 | new->euid = keuid;
|
| 616 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
|
| 617 | new->suid = ksuid;
|
| 618 | new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
| 619 |
|
| 620 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
| 621 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 622 | goto error;
|
| 623 |
|
| 624 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 625 |
|
| 626 | error:
|
| 627 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 628 | return retval;
|
| 629 | }
|
| 630 |
|
| 631 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp)
|
| 632 | {
|
| 633 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 634 | int retval;
|
| 635 | uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
|
| 636 |
|
| 637 | ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid);
|
| 638 | euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid);
|
| 639 | suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid);
|
| 640 |
|
| 641 | if (!(retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp)) &&
|
| 642 | !(retval = put_user(euid, euidp)))
|
| 643 | retval = put_user(suid, suidp);
|
| 644 |
|
| 645 | return retval;
|
| 646 | }
|
| 647 |
|
| 648 | |
| 649 | * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
|
| 650 |
|
| 651 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
|
| 652 | {
|
| 653 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 654 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 655 | struct cred *new;
|
| 656 | int retval;
|
| 657 | kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid;
|
| 658 |
|
| 659 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
|
| 660 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
|
| 661 | ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid);
|
| 662 |
|
| 663 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
|
| 664 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 665 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
|
| 666 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 667 | if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid))
|
| 668 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 669 |
|
| 670 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 671 | if (!new)
|
| 672 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 673 | old = current_cred();
|
| 674 |
|
| 675 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 676 | if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
|
| 677 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
|
| 678 | !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid))
|
| 679 | goto error;
|
| 680 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
|
| 681 | !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid))
|
| 682 | goto error;
|
| 683 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
|
| 684 | !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid))
|
| 685 | goto error;
|
| 686 | }
|
| 687 |
|
| 688 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 689 | new->gid = krgid;
|
| 690 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 691 | new->egid = kegid;
|
| 692 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 693 | new->sgid = ksgid;
|
| 694 | new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
| 695 |
|
| 696 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 697 |
|
| 698 | error:
|
| 699 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 700 | return retval;
|
| 701 | }
|
| 702 |
|
| 703 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp)
|
| 704 | {
|
| 705 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 706 | int retval;
|
| 707 | gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
|
| 708 |
|
| 709 | rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid);
|
| 710 | egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid);
|
| 711 | sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid);
|
| 712 |
|
| 713 | if (!(retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp)) &&
|
| 714 | !(retval = put_user(egid, egidp)))
|
| 715 | retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp);
|
| 716 |
|
| 717 | return retval;
|
| 718 | }
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 | |
| 722 | * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
|
| 723 | * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
|
| 724 | * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
|
| 725 | * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
|
| 726 |
|
| 727 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
|
| 728 | {
|
| 729 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 730 | struct cred *new;
|
| 731 | uid_t old_fsuid;
|
| 732 | kuid_t kuid;
|
| 733 |
|
| 734 | old = current_cred();
|
| 735 | old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid);
|
| 736 |
|
| 737 | kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid);
|
| 738 | if (!uid_valid(kuid))
|
| 739 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 740 |
|
| 741 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 742 | if (!new)
|
| 743 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 744 |
|
| 745 | if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
|
| 746 | uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
|
| 747 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 748 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
|
| 749 | new->fsuid = kuid;
|
| 750 | if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
|
| 751 | goto change_okay;
|
| 752 | }
|
| 753 | }
|
| 754 |
|
| 755 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 756 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 757 |
|
| 758 | change_okay:
|
| 759 | commit_creds(new);
|
| 760 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 761 | }
|
| 762 |
|
| 763 | |
| 764 | * Samma på svenska..
|
| 765 |
|
| 766 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
|
| 767 | {
|
| 768 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 769 | struct cred *new;
|
| 770 | gid_t old_fsgid;
|
| 771 | kgid_t kgid;
|
| 772 |
|
| 773 | old = current_cred();
|
| 774 | old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid);
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 | kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid);
|
| 777 | if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
| 778 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 781 | if (!new)
|
| 782 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 783 |
|
| 784 | if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) ||
|
| 785 | gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) ||
|
| 786 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
|
| 787 | if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) {
|
| 788 | new->fsgid = kgid;
|
| 789 | goto change_okay;
|
| 790 | }
|
| 791 | }
|
| 792 |
|
| 793 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 794 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 795 |
|
| 796 | change_okay:
|
| 797 | commit_creds(new);
|
| 798 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 799 | }
|
| 800 |
|
| 801 | |
| 802 | * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process
|
| 803 | *
|
| 804 | * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and
|
| 805 | * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in
|
| 806 | * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group.
|
| 807 | *
|
| 808 | * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change.
|
| 809 |
|
| 810 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid)
|
| 811 | {
|
| 812 | return task_tgid_vnr(current);
|
| 813 | }
|
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
|
| 816 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid)
|
| 817 | {
|
| 818 | return task_pid_vnr(current);
|
| 819 | }
|
| 820 |
|
| 821 | |
| 822 | * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could
|
| 823 | * change from under us. However, we can use a stale
|
| 824 | * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see
|
| 825 | * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct).
|
| 826 |
|
| 827 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid)
|
| 828 | {
|
| 829 | int pid;
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 832 | pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent));
|
| 833 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 | return pid;
|
| 836 | }
|
| 837 |
|
| 838 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid)
|
| 839 | {
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
|
| 842 | }
|
| 843 |
|
| 844 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid)
|
| 845 | {
|
| 846 |
|
| 847 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid());
|
| 848 | }
|
| 849 |
|
| 850 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid)
|
| 851 | {
|
| 852 |
|
| 853 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid());
|
| 854 | }
|
| 855 |
|
| 856 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid)
|
| 857 | {
|
| 858 |
|
| 859 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid());
|
| 860 | }
|
| 861 |
|
| 862 | void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms)
|
| 863 | {
|
| 864 | cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime;
|
| 865 |
|
| 866 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
|
| 867 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
| 868 | cutime = current->signal->cutime;
|
| 869 | cstime = current->signal->cstime;
|
| 870 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
|
| 871 | tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgutime);
|
| 872 | tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgstime);
|
| 873 | tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime);
|
| 874 | tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime);
|
| 875 | }
|
| 876 |
|
| 877 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf)
|
| 878 | {
|
| 879 | if (tbuf) {
|
| 880 | struct tms tmp;
|
| 881 |
|
| 882 | do_sys_times(&tmp);
|
| 883 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
|
| 884 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 885 | }
|
| 886 | force_successful_syscall_return();
|
| 887 | return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
|
| 888 | }
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 | |
| 891 | * This needs some heavy checking ...
|
| 892 | * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
|
| 893 | * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
|
| 894 | *
|
| 895 | * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
|
| 896 | * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
|
| 897 | * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
|
| 898 | *
|
| 899 | * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX.
|
| 900 | * LBT 04.03.94
|
| 901 |
|
| 902 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid)
|
| 903 | {
|
| 904 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 905 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
| 906 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 907 | int err;
|
| 908 |
|
| 909 | if (!pid)
|
| 910 | pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader);
|
| 911 | if (!pgid)
|
| 912 | pgid = pid;
|
| 913 | if (pgid < 0)
|
| 914 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 915 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 916 |
|
| 917 | |
| 918 | * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
|
| 919 |
|
| 920 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 921 |
|
| 922 | err = -ESRCH;
|
| 923 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 924 | if (!p)
|
| 925 | goto out;
|
| 926 |
|
| 927 | err = -EINVAL;
|
| 928 | if (!thread_group_leader(p))
|
| 929 | goto out;
|
| 930 |
|
| 931 | if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) {
|
| 932 | err = -EPERM;
|
| 933 | if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader))
|
| 934 | goto out;
|
| 935 | err = -EACCES;
|
| 936 | if (p->did_exec)
|
| 937 | goto out;
|
| 938 | } else {
|
| 939 | err = -ESRCH;
|
| 940 | if (p != group_leader)
|
| 941 | goto out;
|
| 942 | }
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 | err = -EPERM;
|
| 945 | if (p->signal->leader)
|
| 946 | goto out;
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 | pgrp = task_pid(p);
|
| 949 | if (pgid != pid) {
|
| 950 | struct task_struct *g;
|
| 951 |
|
| 952 | pgrp = find_vpid(pgid);
|
| 953 | g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID);
|
| 954 | if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader))
|
| 955 | goto out;
|
| 956 | }
|
| 957 |
|
| 958 | err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
|
| 959 | if (err)
|
| 960 | goto out;
|
| 961 |
|
| 962 | if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp)
|
| 963 | change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp);
|
| 964 |
|
| 965 | err = 0;
|
| 966 | out:
|
| 967 |
|
| 968 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 969 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 970 | return err;
|
| 971 | }
|
| 972 |
|
| 973 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid)
|
| 974 | {
|
| 975 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 976 | struct pid *grp;
|
| 977 | int retval;
|
| 978 |
|
| 979 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 980 | if (!pid)
|
| 981 | grp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 982 | else {
|
| 983 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 984 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 985 | if (!p)
|
| 986 | goto out;
|
| 987 | grp = task_pgrp(p);
|
| 988 | if (!grp)
|
| 989 | goto out;
|
| 990 |
|
| 991 | retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
|
| 992 | if (retval)
|
| 993 | goto out;
|
| 994 | }
|
| 995 | retval = pid_vnr(grp);
|
| 996 | out:
|
| 997 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 998 | return retval;
|
| 999 | }
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp)
|
| 1004 | {
|
| 1005 | return sys_getpgid(0);
|
| 1006 | }
|
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 | #endif
|
| 1009 |
|
| 1010 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid)
|
| 1011 | {
|
| 1012 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 1013 | struct pid *sid;
|
| 1014 | int retval;
|
| 1015 |
|
| 1016 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1017 | if (!pid)
|
| 1018 | sid = task_session(current);
|
| 1019 | else {
|
| 1020 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 1021 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 1022 | if (!p)
|
| 1023 | goto out;
|
| 1024 | sid = task_session(p);
|
| 1025 | if (!sid)
|
| 1026 | goto out;
|
| 1027 |
|
| 1028 | retval = security_task_getsid(p);
|
| 1029 | if (retval)
|
| 1030 | goto out;
|
| 1031 | }
|
| 1032 | retval = pid_vnr(sid);
|
| 1033 | out:
|
| 1034 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1035 | return retval;
|
| 1036 | }
|
| 1037 |
|
| 1038 | static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid)
|
| 1039 | {
|
| 1040 | struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader;
|
| 1041 |
|
| 1042 | if (task_session(curr) != pid)
|
| 1043 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid);
|
| 1044 |
|
| 1045 | if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid)
|
| 1046 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid);
|
| 1047 | }
|
| 1048 |
|
| 1049 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid)
|
| 1050 | {
|
| 1051 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
| 1052 | struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader);
|
| 1053 | pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid);
|
| 1054 | int err = -EPERM;
|
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 | if (group_leader->signal->leader)
|
| 1059 | goto out;
|
| 1060 |
|
| 1061 | |
| 1062 | * proposed session id.
|
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 | if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID))
|
| 1065 | goto out;
|
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 | group_leader->signal->leader = 1;
|
| 1068 | set_special_pids(sid);
|
| 1069 |
|
| 1070 | proc_clear_tty(group_leader);
|
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 | err = session;
|
| 1073 | out:
|
| 1074 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1075 | if (err > 0) {
|
| 1076 | proc_sid_connector(group_leader);
|
| 1077 | sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader);
|
| 1078 | }
|
| 1079 | return err;
|
| 1080 | }
|
| 1081 |
|
| 1082 | DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);
|
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 | #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE
|
| 1085 | #define override_architecture(name) \
|
| 1086 | (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \
|
| 1087 | copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \
|
| 1088 | sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE)))
|
| 1089 | #else
|
| 1090 | #define override_architecture(name) 0
|
| 1091 | #endif
|
| 1092 |
|
| 1093 | |
| 1094 | * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0".
|
| 1095 | * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40
|
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 | static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len)
|
| 1098 | {
|
| 1099 | int ret = 0;
|
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 | if (current->personality & UNAME26) {
|
| 1102 | const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE;
|
| 1103 | char buf[65] = { 0 };
|
| 1104 | int ndots = 0;
|
| 1105 | unsigned v;
|
| 1106 | size_t copy;
|
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 | while (*rest) {
|
| 1109 | if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3)
|
| 1110 | break;
|
| 1111 | if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.')
|
| 1112 | break;
|
| 1113 | rest++;
|
| 1114 | }
|
| 1115 | v = ((LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff) + 40;
|
| 1116 | copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf));
|
| 1117 | copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest);
|
| 1118 | ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1);
|
| 1119 | }
|
| 1120 | return ret;
|
| 1121 | }
|
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1124 | {
|
| 1125 | int errno = 0;
|
| 1126 |
|
| 1127 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1128 | if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name))
|
| 1129 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1130 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 | if (!errno && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
| 1133 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1134 | if (!errno && override_architecture(name))
|
| 1135 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1136 | return errno;
|
| 1137 | }
|
| 1138 |
|
| 1139 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME
|
| 1140 | |
| 1141 | * Old cruft
|
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1144 | {
|
| 1145 | int error = 0;
|
| 1146 |
|
| 1147 | if (!name)
|
| 1148 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1149 |
|
| 1150 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1151 | if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof(*name)))
|
| 1152 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 1153 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1154 |
|
| 1155 | if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
| 1156 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 1157 | if (!error && override_architecture(name))
|
| 1158 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 1159 | return error;
|
| 1160 | }
|
| 1161 |
|
| 1162 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1163 | {
|
| 1164 | int error;
|
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 | if (!name)
|
| 1167 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1168 | if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, sizeof(struct oldold_utsname)))
|
| 1169 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1172 | error = __copy_to_user(&name->sysname, &utsname()->sysname,
|
| 1173 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1174 | error |= __put_user(0, name->sysname + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1175 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->nodename, &utsname()->nodename,
|
| 1176 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1177 | error |= __put_user(0, name->nodename + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1178 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->release, &utsname()->release,
|
| 1179 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1180 | error |= __put_user(0, name->release + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1181 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->version, &utsname()->version,
|
| 1182 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1183 | error |= __put_user(0, name->version + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1184 | error |= __copy_to_user(&name->machine, &utsname()->machine,
|
| 1185 | __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1186 | error |= __put_user(0, name->machine + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1187 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1188 |
|
| 1189 | if (!error && override_architecture(name))
|
| 1190 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 1191 | if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
| 1192 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 1193 | return error ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1194 | }
|
| 1195 | #endif
|
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1198 | {
|
| 1199 | int errno;
|
| 1200 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
| 1201 |
|
| 1202 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
| 1203 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1204 |
|
| 1205 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
| 1206 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1207 | down_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1208 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1209 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
| 1210 | struct new_utsname *u = utsname();
|
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 | memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len);
|
| 1213 | memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len);
|
| 1214 | errno = 0;
|
| 1215 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME);
|
| 1216 | }
|
| 1217 | up_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1218 | return errno;
|
| 1219 | }
|
| 1220 |
|
| 1221 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
|
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1224 | {
|
| 1225 | int i, errno;
|
| 1226 | struct new_utsname *u;
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 | if (len < 0)
|
| 1229 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1230 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1231 | u = utsname();
|
| 1232 | i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename);
|
| 1233 | if (i > len)
|
| 1234 | i = len;
|
| 1235 | errno = 0;
|
| 1236 | if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i))
|
| 1237 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1238 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1239 | return errno;
|
| 1240 | }
|
| 1241 |
|
| 1242 | #endif
|
| 1243 |
|
| 1244 | |
| 1245 | * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
|
| 1246 | * uname()
|
| 1247 |
|
| 1248 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1249 | {
|
| 1250 | int errno;
|
| 1251 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
| 1252 |
|
| 1253 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
| 1254 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1255 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
| 1256 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1257 |
|
| 1258 | down_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1259 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1260 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
| 1261 | struct new_utsname *u = utsname();
|
| 1262 |
|
| 1263 | memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len);
|
| 1264 | memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len);
|
| 1265 | errno = 0;
|
| 1266 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME);
|
| 1267 | }
|
| 1268 | up_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1269 | return errno;
|
| 1270 | }
|
| 1271 |
|
| 1272 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1273 | {
|
| 1274 | struct rlimit value;
|
| 1275 | int ret;
|
| 1276 |
|
| 1277 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value);
|
| 1278 | if (!ret)
|
| 1279 | ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 | return ret;
|
| 1282 | }
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
|
| 1285 |
|
| 1286 | |
| 1287 | * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
|
| 1290 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1291 | struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1292 | {
|
| 1293 | struct rlimit x;
|
| 1294 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1295 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1296 |
|
| 1297 | task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1298 | x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
| 1299 | task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1300 | if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1301 | x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1302 | if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1303 | x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1304 | return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0;
|
| 1305 | }
|
| 1306 |
|
| 1307 | #endif
|
| 1308 |
|
| 1309 | static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64)
|
| 1310 | {
|
| 1311 | #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64
|
| 1312 | return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX;
|
| 1313 | #else
|
| 1314 | return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1315 | #endif
|
| 1316 | }
|
| 1317 |
|
| 1318 | static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64)
|
| 1319 | {
|
| 1320 | if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1321 | rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1322 | else
|
| 1323 | rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur;
|
| 1324 | if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1325 | rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1326 | else
|
| 1327 | rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max;
|
| 1328 | }
|
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 | static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim)
|
| 1331 | {
|
| 1332 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur))
|
| 1333 | rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1334 | else
|
| 1335 | rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur;
|
| 1336 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max))
|
| 1337 | rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1338 | else
|
| 1339 | rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max;
|
| 1340 | }
|
| 1341 |
|
| 1342 |
|
| 1343 | int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
|
| 1344 | struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim)
|
| 1345 | {
|
| 1346 | struct rlimit *rlim;
|
| 1347 | int retval = 0;
|
| 1348 |
|
| 1349 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1350 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1351 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1352 | if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
|
| 1353 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1354 | if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE &&
|
| 1355 | new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open)
|
| 1356 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1357 | }
|
| 1358 |
|
| 1359 |
|
| 1360 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1361 | if (!tsk->sighand) {
|
| 1362 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 1363 | goto out;
|
| 1364 | }
|
| 1365 |
|
| 1366 | rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
|
| 1367 | task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
|
| 1368 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1369 | |
| 1370 | cgroups can contain all limits
|
| 1371 | if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max &&
|
| 1372 | !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 1373 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 1374 | if (!retval)
|
| 1375 | retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk->group_leader,
|
| 1376 | resource, new_rlim);
|
| 1377 | if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur == 0) {
|
| 1378 | |
| 1379 | * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU
|
| 1380 | * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was
|
| 1381 | * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second
|
| 1382 | * instead
|
| 1383 |
|
| 1384 | new_rlim->rlim_cur = 1;
|
| 1385 | }
|
| 1386 | }
|
| 1387 | if (!retval) {
|
| 1388 | if (old_rlim)
|
| 1389 | *old_rlim = *rlim;
|
| 1390 | if (new_rlim)
|
| 1391 | *rlim = *new_rlim;
|
| 1392 | }
|
| 1393 | task_unlock(tsk->group_leader);
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 | |
| 1396 | * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error
|
| 1397 | * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a
|
| 1398 | * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of
|
| 1399 | * applications, so we live with it
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 | if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU &&
|
| 1402 | new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1403 | update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur);
|
| 1404 | out:
|
| 1405 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1406 | return retval;
|
| 1407 | }
|
| 1408 |
|
| 1409 |
|
| 1410 | static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task)
|
| 1411 | {
|
| 1412 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
|
| 1413 |
|
| 1414 | if (current == task)
|
| 1415 | return 0;
|
| 1416 |
|
| 1417 | tcred = __task_cred(task);
|
| 1418 | if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
|
| 1419 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
|
| 1420 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
|
| 1421 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
|
| 1422 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
|
| 1423 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
|
| 1424 | return 0;
|
| 1425 | if (ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 1426 | return 0;
|
| 1427 |
|
| 1428 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1429 | }
|
| 1430 |
|
| 1431 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1432 | const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim,
|
| 1433 | struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim)
|
| 1434 | {
|
| 1435 | struct rlimit64 old64, new64;
|
| 1436 | struct rlimit old, new;
|
| 1437 | struct task_struct *tsk;
|
| 1438 | int ret;
|
| 1439 |
|
| 1440 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1441 | if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64)))
|
| 1442 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1443 | rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new);
|
| 1444 | }
|
| 1445 |
|
| 1446 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1447 | tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current;
|
| 1448 | if (!tsk) {
|
| 1449 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1450 | return -ESRCH;
|
| 1451 | }
|
| 1452 | ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk);
|
| 1453 | if (ret) {
|
| 1454 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1455 | return ret;
|
| 1456 | }
|
| 1457 | get_task_struct(tsk);
|
| 1458 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1459 |
|
| 1460 | ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL,
|
| 1461 | old_rlim ? &old : NULL);
|
| 1462 |
|
| 1463 | if (!ret && old_rlim) {
|
| 1464 | rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64);
|
| 1465 | if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64)))
|
| 1466 | ret = -EFAULT;
|
| 1467 | }
|
| 1468 |
|
| 1469 | put_task_struct(tsk);
|
| 1470 | return ret;
|
| 1471 | }
|
| 1472 |
|
| 1473 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1474 | {
|
| 1475 | struct rlimit new_rlim;
|
| 1476 |
|
| 1477 | if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
|
| 1478 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1479 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL);
|
| 1480 | }
|
| 1481 |
|
| 1482 | |
| 1483 | * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
|
| 1484 | * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
|
| 1485 | * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
|
| 1486 | * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
|
| 1487 | * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
|
| 1488 | * measuring them yet).
|
| 1489 | *
|
| 1490 | * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
|
| 1491 | * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
|
| 1492 | * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
|
| 1493 | * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
|
| 1494 | * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
|
| 1495 | * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
|
| 1496 | * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
|
| 1497 | *
|
| 1498 | * Locking:
|
| 1499 | * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH
|
| 1500 | * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded
|
| 1501 | * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with
|
| 1502 | * the siglock held.
|
| 1503 | * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and
|
| 1504 | * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one
|
| 1505 | * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else
|
| 1506 | * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the
|
| 1507 | * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just
|
| 1508 | * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock.
|
| 1509 | * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal
|
| 1510 | * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal->
|
| 1511 | * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple.
|
| 1512 | *
|
| 1513 |
|
| 1514 |
|
| 1515 | static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r)
|
| 1516 | {
|
| 1517 | r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw;
|
| 1518 | r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw;
|
| 1519 | r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt;
|
| 1520 | r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt;
|
| 1521 | r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t);
|
| 1522 | r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t);
|
| 1523 | }
|
| 1524 |
|
| 1525 | static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
|
| 1526 | {
|
| 1527 | struct task_struct *t;
|
| 1528 | unsigned long flags;
|
| 1529 | cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime;
|
| 1530 | unsigned long maxrss = 0;
|
| 1531 |
|
| 1532 | memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r);
|
| 1533 | utime = stime = 0;
|
| 1534 |
|
| 1535 | if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) {
|
| 1536 | task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime);
|
| 1537 | accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r);
|
| 1538 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
|
| 1539 | goto out;
|
| 1540 | }
|
| 1541 |
|
| 1542 | if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags))
|
| 1543 | return;
|
| 1544 |
|
| 1545 | switch (who) {
|
| 1546 | case RUSAGE_BOTH:
|
| 1547 | case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
|
| 1548 | utime = p->signal->cutime;
|
| 1549 | stime = p->signal->cstime;
|
| 1550 | r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw;
|
| 1551 | r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw;
|
| 1552 | r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt;
|
| 1553 | r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt;
|
| 1554 | r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock;
|
| 1555 | r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock;
|
| 1556 | maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss;
|
| 1557 |
|
| 1558 | if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
|
| 1559 | break;
|
| 1560 |
|
| 1561 | case RUSAGE_SELF:
|
| 1562 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
| 1563 | utime += tgutime;
|
| 1564 | stime += tgstime;
|
| 1565 | r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw;
|
| 1566 | r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw;
|
| 1567 | r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt;
|
| 1568 | r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt;
|
| 1569 | r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock;
|
| 1570 | r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock;
|
| 1571 | if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss)
|
| 1572 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
|
| 1573 | t = p;
|
| 1574 | do {
|
| 1575 | accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r);
|
| 1576 | t = next_thread(t);
|
| 1577 | } while (t != p);
|
| 1578 | break;
|
| 1579 |
|
| 1580 | default:
|
| 1581 | BUG();
|
| 1582 | }
|
| 1583 | unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
|
| 1584 |
|
| 1585 | out:
|
| 1586 | cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime);
|
| 1587 | cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime);
|
| 1588 |
|
| 1589 | if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) {
|
| 1590 | struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p);
|
| 1591 | if (mm) {
|
| 1592 | setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm);
|
| 1593 | mmput(mm);
|
| 1594 | }
|
| 1595 | }
|
| 1596 | r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024);
|
| 1597 | }
|
| 1598 |
|
| 1599 | int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru)
|
| 1600 | {
|
| 1601 | struct rusage r;
|
| 1602 | k_getrusage(p, who, &r);
|
| 1603 | return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1604 | }
|
| 1605 |
|
| 1606 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru)
|
| 1607 | {
|
| 1608 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
|
| 1609 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
|
| 1610 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1611 | return getrusage(current, who, ru);
|
| 1612 | }
|
| 1613 |
|
| 1614 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 1615 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru)
|
| 1616 | {
|
| 1617 | struct rusage r;
|
| 1618 |
|
| 1619 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
|
| 1620 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
|
| 1621 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1622 |
|
| 1623 | k_getrusage(current, who, &r);
|
| 1624 | return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru);
|
| 1625 | }
|
| 1626 | #endif
|
| 1627 |
|
| 1628 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask)
|
| 1629 | {
|
| 1630 | mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
|
| 1631 | return mask;
|
| 1632 | }
|
| 1633 |
|
| 1634 | static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
|
| 1635 | {
|
| 1636 | struct fd exe;
|
| 1637 | struct inode *inode;
|
| 1638 | int err;
|
| 1639 |
|
| 1640 | exe = fdget(fd);
|
| 1641 | if (!exe.file)
|
| 1642 | return -EBADF;
|
| 1643 |
|
| 1644 | inode = file_inode(exe.file);
|
| 1645 |
|
| 1646 | |
| 1647 | * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make
|
| 1648 | * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an
|
| 1649 | * overall picture.
|
| 1650 |
|
| 1651 | err = -EACCES;
|
| 1652 | if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) ||
|
| 1653 | exe.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
|
| 1654 | goto exit;
|
| 1655 |
|
| 1656 | err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
|
| 1657 | if (err)
|
| 1658 | goto exit;
|
| 1659 |
|
| 1660 | down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
| 1661 |
|
| 1662 | |
| 1663 | * Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped.
|
| 1664 |
|
| 1665 | err = -EBUSY;
|
| 1666 | if (mm->exe_file) {
|
| 1667 | struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
| 1668 |
|
| 1669 | for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next)
|
| 1670 | if (vma->vm_file &&
|
| 1671 | path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path,
|
| 1672 | &mm->exe_file->f_path))
|
| 1673 | goto exit_unlock;
|
| 1674 | }
|
| 1675 |
|
| 1676 | |
| 1677 | * The symlink can be changed only once, just to disallow arbitrary
|
| 1678 | * transitions malicious software might bring in. This means one
|
| 1679 | * could make a snapshot over all processes running and monitor
|
| 1680 | * /proc/pid/exe changes to notice unusual activity if needed.
|
| 1681 |
|
| 1682 | err = -EPERM;
|
| 1683 | if (test_and_set_bit(MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED, &mm->flags))
|
| 1684 | goto exit_unlock;
|
| 1685 |
|
| 1686 | err = 0;
|
| 1687 | set_mm_exe_file(mm, exe.file);
|
| 1688 | exit_unlock:
|
| 1689 | up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
| 1690 |
|
| 1691 | exit:
|
| 1692 | fdput(exe);
|
| 1693 | return err;
|
| 1694 | }
|
| 1695 |
|
| 1696 | static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
|
| 1697 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
| 1698 | {
|
| 1699 | unsigned long rlim = rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA);
|
| 1700 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
| 1701 | struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
| 1702 | int error;
|
| 1703 |
|
| 1704 | if (arg5 || (arg4 && opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV))
|
| 1705 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1706 |
|
| 1707 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 1708 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1709 |
|
| 1710 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE)
|
| 1711 | return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr);
|
| 1712 |
|
| 1713 | if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr)
|
| 1714 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1715 |
|
| 1716 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1717 |
|
| 1718 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
| 1719 | vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
|
| 1720 |
|
| 1721 | switch (opt) {
|
| 1722 | case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE:
|
| 1723 | mm->start_code = addr;
|
| 1724 | break;
|
| 1725 | case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE:
|
| 1726 | mm->end_code = addr;
|
| 1727 | break;
|
| 1728 | case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA:
|
| 1729 | mm->start_data = addr;
|
| 1730 | break;
|
| 1731 | case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA:
|
| 1732 | mm->end_data = addr;
|
| 1733 | break;
|
| 1734 |
|
| 1735 | case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK:
|
| 1736 | if (addr <= mm->end_data)
|
| 1737 | goto out;
|
| 1738 |
|
| 1739 | if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY &&
|
| 1740 | (mm->brk - addr) +
|
| 1741 | (mm->end_data - mm->start_data) > rlim)
|
| 1742 | goto out;
|
| 1743 |
|
| 1744 | mm->start_brk = addr;
|
| 1745 | break;
|
| 1746 |
|
| 1747 | case PR_SET_MM_BRK:
|
| 1748 | if (addr <= mm->end_data)
|
| 1749 | goto out;
|
| 1750 |
|
| 1751 | if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY &&
|
| 1752 | (addr - mm->start_brk) +
|
| 1753 | (mm->end_data - mm->start_data) > rlim)
|
| 1754 | goto out;
|
| 1755 |
|
| 1756 | mm->brk = addr;
|
| 1757 | break;
|
| 1758 |
|
| 1759 | |
| 1760 | * If command line arguments and environment
|
| 1761 | * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can
|
| 1762 | * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup
|
| 1763 | * command line argumets and ENV_START/END
|
| 1764 | * for environment.
|
| 1765 |
|
| 1766 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK:
|
| 1767 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START:
|
| 1768 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END:
|
| 1769 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START:
|
| 1770 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END:
|
| 1771 | if (!vma) {
|
| 1772 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 1773 | goto out;
|
| 1774 | }
|
| 1775 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_START_STACK)
|
| 1776 | mm->start_stack = addr;
|
| 1777 | else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_START)
|
| 1778 | mm->arg_start = addr;
|
| 1779 | else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_END)
|
| 1780 | mm->arg_end = addr;
|
| 1781 | else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_START)
|
| 1782 | mm->env_start = addr;
|
| 1783 | else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_END)
|
| 1784 | mm->env_end = addr;
|
| 1785 | break;
|
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 | |
| 1788 | * This doesn't move auxiliary vector itself
|
| 1789 | * since it's pinned to mm_struct, but allow
|
| 1790 | * to fill vector with new values. It's up
|
| 1791 | * to a caller to provide sane values here
|
| 1792 | * otherwise user space tools which use this
|
| 1793 | * vector might be unhappy.
|
| 1794 |
|
| 1795 | case PR_SET_MM_AUXV: {
|
| 1796 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE];
|
| 1797 |
|
| 1798 | if (arg4 > sizeof(user_auxv))
|
| 1799 | goto out;
|
| 1800 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
| 1801 |
|
| 1802 | if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, arg4))
|
| 1803 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1804 |
|
| 1805 |
|
| 1806 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0;
|
| 1807 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0;
|
| 1808 |
|
| 1809 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv));
|
| 1810 |
|
| 1811 | task_lock(current);
|
| 1812 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, arg4);
|
| 1813 | task_unlock(current);
|
| 1814 |
|
| 1815 | return 0;
|
| 1816 | }
|
| 1817 | default:
|
| 1818 | goto out;
|
| 1819 | }
|
| 1820 |
|
| 1821 | error = 0;
|
| 1822 | out:
|
| 1823 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
| 1824 | return error;
|
| 1825 | }
|
| 1826 |
|
| 1827 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
| 1828 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr)
|
| 1829 | {
|
| 1830 | return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr);
|
| 1831 | }
|
| 1832 | #else
|
| 1833 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr)
|
| 1834 | {
|
| 1835 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1836 | }
|
| 1837 | #endif
|
| 1838 |
|
| 1839 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
|
| 1840 | unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
|
| 1841 | {
|
| 1842 | struct task_struct *me = current;
|
| 1843 | unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
|
| 1844 | long error;
|
| 1845 |
|
| 1846 | error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 1847 | if (error != -ENOSYS)
|
| 1848 | return error;
|
| 1849 |
|
| 1850 | error = 0;
|
| 1851 | switch (option) {
|
| 1852 | case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
|
| 1853 | if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
|
| 1854 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1855 | break;
|
| 1856 | }
|
| 1857 | me->pdeath_signal = arg2;
|
| 1858 | break;
|
| 1859 | case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
|
| 1860 | error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
|
| 1861 | break;
|
| 1862 | case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
|
| 1863 | error = get_dumpable(me->mm);
|
| 1864 | break;
|
| 1865 | case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
|
| 1866 | if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) {
|
| 1867 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1868 | break;
|
| 1869 | }
|
| 1870 | set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
|
| 1871 | break;
|
| 1872 |
|
| 1873 | case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
|
| 1874 | error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1875 | break;
|
| 1876 | case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
|
| 1877 | error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1878 | break;
|
| 1879 | case PR_SET_FPEMU:
|
| 1880 | error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1881 | break;
|
| 1882 | case PR_GET_FPEMU:
|
| 1883 | error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1884 | break;
|
| 1885 | case PR_SET_FPEXC:
|
| 1886 | error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1887 | break;
|
| 1888 | case PR_GET_FPEXC:
|
| 1889 | error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 1890 | break;
|
| 1891 | case PR_GET_TIMING:
|
| 1892 | error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
|
| 1893 | break;
|
| 1894 | case PR_SET_TIMING:
|
| 1895 | if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
|
| 1896 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1897 | break;
|
| 1898 | case PR_SET_NAME:
|
| 1899 | comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0;
|
| 1900 | if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2,
|
| 1901 | sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0)
|
| 1902 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1903 | set_task_comm(me, comm);
|
| 1904 | proc_comm_connector(me);
|
| 1905 | break;
|
| 1906 | case PR_GET_NAME:
|
| 1907 | get_task_comm(comm, me);
|
| 1908 | if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm)))
|
| 1909 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1910 | break;
|
| 1911 | case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
|
| 1912 | error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
| 1913 | break;
|
| 1914 | case PR_SET_ENDIAN:
|
| 1915 | error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
| 1916 | break;
|
| 1917 | case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
|
| 1918 | error = prctl_get_seccomp();
|
| 1919 | break;
|
| 1920 | case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
|
| 1921 | error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3);
|
| 1922 | break;
|
| 1923 | case PR_GET_TSC:
|
| 1924 | error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
| 1925 | break;
|
| 1926 | case PR_SET_TSC:
|
| 1927 | error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
| 1928 | break;
|
| 1929 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE:
|
| 1930 | error = perf_event_task_disable();
|
| 1931 | break;
|
| 1932 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE:
|
| 1933 | error = perf_event_task_enable();
|
| 1934 | break;
|
| 1935 | case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK:
|
| 1936 | error = current->timer_slack_ns;
|
| 1937 | break;
|
| 1938 | case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK:
|
| 1939 | if (arg2 <= 0)
|
| 1940 | current->timer_slack_ns =
|
| 1941 | current->default_timer_slack_ns;
|
| 1942 | else
|
| 1943 | current->timer_slack_ns = arg2;
|
| 1944 | break;
|
| 1945 | case PR_MCE_KILL:
|
| 1946 | if (arg4 | arg5)
|
| 1947 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1948 | switch (arg2) {
|
| 1949 | case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR:
|
| 1950 | if (arg3 != 0)
|
| 1951 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1952 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
| 1953 | break;
|
| 1954 | case PR_MCE_KILL_SET:
|
| 1955 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
| 1956 | if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY)
|
| 1957 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
| 1958 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE)
|
| 1959 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
| 1960 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT)
|
| 1961 | current->flags &=
|
| 1962 | ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS);
|
| 1963 | else
|
| 1964 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1965 | break;
|
| 1966 | default:
|
| 1967 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1968 | }
|
| 1969 | break;
|
| 1970 | case PR_MCE_KILL_GET:
|
| 1971 | if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
|
| 1972 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1973 | if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS)
|
| 1974 | error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ?
|
| 1975 | PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE;
|
| 1976 | else
|
| 1977 | error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT;
|
| 1978 | break;
|
| 1979 | case PR_SET_MM:
|
| 1980 | error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 1981 | break;
|
| 1982 | case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS:
|
| 1983 | error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user **)arg2);
|
| 1984 | break;
|
| 1985 | case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
|
| 1986 | me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2;
|
| 1987 | break;
|
| 1988 | case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
|
| 1989 | error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper,
|
| 1990 | (int __user *)arg2);
|
| 1991 | break;
|
| 1992 | case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
|
| 1993 | if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 1994 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1995 |
|
| 1996 | current->no_new_privs = 1;
|
| 1997 | break;
|
| 1998 | case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
|
| 1999 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2000 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2001 | return current->no_new_privs ? 1 : 0;
|
| 2002 | default:
|
| 2003 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2004 | break;
|
| 2005 | }
|
| 2006 | return error;
|
| 2007 | }
|
| 2008 |
|
| 2009 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep,
|
| 2010 | struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused)
|
| 2011 | {
|
| 2012 | int err = 0;
|
| 2013 | int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
|
| 2014 | if (cpup)
|
| 2015 | err |= put_user(cpu, cpup);
|
| 2016 | if (nodep)
|
| 2017 | err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep);
|
| 2018 | return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 2019 | }
|
| 2020 |
|
| 2021 | |
| 2022 | * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct
|
| 2023 | * @info: pointer to buffer to fill
|
| 2024 |
|
| 2025 | static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info)
|
| 2026 | {
|
| 2027 | unsigned long mem_total, sav_total;
|
| 2028 | unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount;
|
| 2029 | struct timespec tp;
|
| 2030 |
|
| 2031 | memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo));
|
| 2032 |
|
| 2033 | get_monotonic_boottime(&tp);
|
| 2034 | info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0);
|
| 2035 |
|
| 2036 | get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT);
|
| 2037 |
|
| 2038 | info->procs = nr_threads;
|
| 2039 |
|
| 2040 | si_meminfo(info);
|
| 2041 | si_swapinfo(info);
|
| 2042 |
|
| 2043 | |
| 2044 | * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap)
|
| 2045 | * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then
|
| 2046 | * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not,
|
| 2047 | * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways...
|
| 2048 | *
|
| 2049 | * -Erik Andersen <[email protected]>
|
| 2050 |
|
| 2051 |
|
| 2052 | mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap;
|
| 2053 | if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap)
|
| 2054 | goto out;
|
| 2055 | bitcount = 0;
|
| 2056 | mem_unit = info->mem_unit;
|
| 2057 | while (mem_unit > 1) {
|
| 2058 | bitcount++;
|
| 2059 | mem_unit >>= 1;
|
| 2060 | sav_total = mem_total;
|
| 2061 | mem_total <<= 1;
|
| 2062 | if (mem_total < sav_total)
|
| 2063 | goto out;
|
| 2064 | }
|
| 2065 |
|
| 2066 | |
| 2067 | * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by
|
| 2068 | * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible
|
| 2069 | * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x
|
| 2070 | * kernels...
|
| 2071 |
|
| 2072 |
|
| 2073 | info->mem_unit = 1;
|
| 2074 | info->totalram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2075 | info->freeram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2076 | info->sharedram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2077 | info->bufferram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2078 | info->totalswap <<= bitcount;
|
| 2079 | info->freeswap <<= bitcount;
|
| 2080 | info->totalhigh <<= bitcount;
|
| 2081 | info->freehigh <<= bitcount;
|
| 2082 |
|
| 2083 | out:
|
| 2084 | return 0;
|
| 2085 | }
|
| 2086 |
|
| 2087 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info)
|
| 2088 | {
|
| 2089 | struct sysinfo val;
|
| 2090 |
|
| 2091 | do_sysinfo(&val);
|
| 2092 |
|
| 2093 | if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo)))
|
| 2094 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2095 |
|
| 2096 | return 0;
|
| 2097 | }
|
| 2098 |
|
| 2099 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 2100 | struct compat_sysinfo {
|
| 2101 | s32 uptime;
|
| 2102 | u32 loads[3];
|
| 2103 | u32 totalram;
|
| 2104 | u32 freeram;
|
| 2105 | u32 sharedram;
|
| 2106 | u32 bufferram;
|
| 2107 | u32 totalswap;
|
| 2108 | u32 freeswap;
|
| 2109 | u16 procs;
|
| 2110 | u16 pad;
|
| 2111 | u32 totalhigh;
|
| 2112 | u32 freehigh;
|
| 2113 | u32 mem_unit;
|
| 2114 | char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)];
|
| 2115 | };
|
| 2116 |
|
| 2117 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
|
| 2118 | {
|
| 2119 | struct sysinfo s;
|
| 2120 |
|
| 2121 | do_sysinfo(&s);
|
| 2122 |
|
| 2123 | |
| 2124 | * down if needed
|
| 2125 |
|
| 2126 | if ((s.totalram >> 32) || (s.totalswap >> 32)) {
|
| 2127 | int bitcount = 0;
|
| 2128 |
|
| 2129 | while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) {
|
| 2130 | s.mem_unit <<= 1;
|
| 2131 | bitcount++;
|
| 2132 | }
|
| 2133 |
|
| 2134 | s.totalram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2135 | s.freeram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2136 | s.sharedram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2137 | s.bufferram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2138 | s.totalswap >>= bitcount;
|
| 2139 | s.freeswap >>= bitcount;
|
| 2140 | s.totalhigh >>= bitcount;
|
| 2141 | s.freehigh >>= bitcount;
|
| 2142 | }
|
| 2143 |
|
| 2144 | if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, info, sizeof(struct compat_sysinfo)) ||
|
| 2145 | __put_user(s.uptime, &info->uptime) ||
|
| 2146 | __put_user(s.loads[0], &info->loads[0]) ||
|
| 2147 | __put_user(s.loads[1], &info->loads[1]) ||
|
| 2148 | __put_user(s.loads[2], &info->loads[2]) ||
|
| 2149 | __put_user(s.totalram, &info->totalram) ||
|
| 2150 | __put_user(s.freeram, &info->freeram) ||
|
| 2151 | __put_user(s.sharedram, &info->sharedram) ||
|
| 2152 | __put_user(s.bufferram, &info->bufferram) ||
|
| 2153 | __put_user(s.totalswap, &info->totalswap) ||
|
| 2154 | __put_user(s.freeswap, &info->freeswap) ||
|
| 2155 | __put_user(s.procs, &info->procs) ||
|
| 2156 | __put_user(s.totalhigh, &info->totalhigh) ||
|
| 2157 | __put_user(s.freehigh, &info->freehigh) ||
|
| 2158 | __put_user(s.mem_unit, &info->mem_unit))
|
| 2159 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2160 |
|
| 2161 | return 0;
|
| 2162 | }
|
| 2163 | #endif
|