| 1 | |
| 2 | * This is <linux/capability.h>
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| 3 | *
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| 4 | * Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
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| 5 | * Alexander Kjeldaas <[email protected]>
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| 6 | * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
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| 7 | *
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| 8 | * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
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| 9 | *
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| 10 | * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
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| 11 |
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| 12 | #ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
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| 13 | #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
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| 14 |
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| 15 | #include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
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| 16 |
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| 17 |
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| 18 | #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
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| 19 | #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
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| 20 |
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| 21 | extern int file_caps_enabled;
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| 22 |
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| 23 | typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
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| 24 | __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
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| 25 | } kernel_cap_t;
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| 26 |
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| 27 |
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| 28 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
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| 29 | __u32 magic_etc;
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| 30 | kernel_cap_t permitted;
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| 31 | kernel_cap_t inheritable;
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| 32 | };
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| 33 |
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| 34 | #define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
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| 35 | #define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
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| 36 |
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| 37 |
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| 38 | struct file;
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| 39 | struct inode;
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| 40 | struct dentry;
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| 41 | struct user_namespace;
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| 42 |
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| 43 | struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
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| 44 |
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| 45 | extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
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| 46 | extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
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| 47 |
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| 48 | |
| 49 | * Internal kernel functions only
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| 50 |
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| 51 |
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| 52 | #define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
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| 53 | for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
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| 54 |
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| 55 | |
| 56 | * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
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| 57 | *
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| 58 | * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
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| 59 | * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
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| 60 | *
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| 61 | * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
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| 62 | *
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| 63 | * We could also define fsmask as follows:
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| 64 | * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
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| 65 | * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
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| 66 |
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| 67 |
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| 68 | # define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
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| 69 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
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| 70 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
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| 71 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
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| 72 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
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| 73 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
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| 74 |
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| 75 | # define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
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| 76 |
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| 77 | #if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
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| 78 | # error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
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| 79 | #else
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| 80 |
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| 81 | # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
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| 82 | # define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
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| 83 | # define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
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| 84 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
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| 85 | CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
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| 86 | # define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
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| 87 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
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| 88 | CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
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| 89 |
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| 90 | #endif
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| 91 |
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| 92 | # define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
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| 93 |
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| 94 | #define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
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| 95 | #define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
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| 96 | #define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
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| 97 |
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| 98 | #define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
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| 99 | do { \
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| 100 | unsigned __capi; \
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| 101 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
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| 102 | c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
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| 103 | } \
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| 104 | } while (0)
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| 105 |
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| 106 | #define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
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| 107 | do { \
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| 108 | unsigned __capi; \
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| 109 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
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| 110 | c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
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| 111 | } \
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| 112 | } while (0)
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| 113 |
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| 114 | static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
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| 115 | const kernel_cap_t b)
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| 116 | {
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| 117 | kernel_cap_t dest;
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| 118 | CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
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| 119 | return dest;
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| 120 | }
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| 121 |
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| 122 | static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
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| 123 | const kernel_cap_t b)
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| 124 | {
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| 125 | kernel_cap_t dest;
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| 126 | CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
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| 127 | return dest;
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| 128 | }
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| 129 |
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| 130 | static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
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| 131 | const kernel_cap_t drop)
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| 132 | {
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| 133 | kernel_cap_t dest;
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| 134 | CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
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| 135 | return dest;
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| 136 | }
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| 137 |
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| 138 | static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
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| 139 | {
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| 140 | kernel_cap_t dest;
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| 141 | CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
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| 142 | return dest;
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| 143 | }
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| 144 |
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| 145 | static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
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| 146 | {
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| 147 | unsigned __capi;
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| 148 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
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| 149 | if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
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| 150 | return 0;
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| 151 | }
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| 152 | return 1;
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| 153 | }
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| 154 |
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| 155 | |
| 156 | * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
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| 157 | * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
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| 158 | * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
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| 159 | * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
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| 160 | * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
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| 161 |
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| 162 | static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
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| 163 | {
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| 164 | kernel_cap_t dest;
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| 165 | dest = cap_drop(a, set);
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| 166 | return cap_isclear(dest);
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| 167 | }
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| 168 |
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| 169 |
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| 170 |
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| 171 | static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
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| 172 | {
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| 173 | const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
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| 174 | return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
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| 175 | }
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| 176 |
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| 177 | static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
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| 178 | {
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| 179 | const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
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| 180 | return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
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| 181 | }
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| 182 |
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| 183 | static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
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| 184 | const kernel_cap_t permitted)
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| 185 | {
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| 186 | const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
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| 187 | return cap_combine(a,
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| 188 | cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
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| 189 | }
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| 190 |
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| 191 | static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
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| 192 | {
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| 193 | const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
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| 194 | return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
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| 195 | }
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| 196 |
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| 197 | static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
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| 198 | const kernel_cap_t permitted)
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| 199 | {
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| 200 | const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
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| 201 | return cap_combine(a,
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| 202 | cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
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| 203 | }
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| 204 |
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| 205 | extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
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| 206 | extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
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| 207 | struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
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| 208 | extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
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| 209 | extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
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| 210 | struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
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| 211 | extern bool capable(int cap);
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| 212 | extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
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| 213 | extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
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| 214 | extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
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| 215 |
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| 216 |
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| 217 | extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
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| 218 |
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| 219 | #endif
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