| 1 | #include <linux/kernel.h>
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| 2 | #include <linux/syscalls.h>
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| 3 | #include <linux/fdtable.h>
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| 4 | #include <linux/string.h>
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| 5 | #include <linux/random.h>
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| 6 | #include <linux/module.h>
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| 7 | #include <linux/ptrace.h>
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| 8 | #include <linux/init.h>
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| 9 | #include <linux/errno.h>
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| 10 | #include <linux/cache.h>
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| 11 | #include <linux/bug.h>
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| 12 | #include <linux/err.h>
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| 13 | #include <linux/kcmp.h>
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| 14 |
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| 15 | #include <asm/unistd.h>
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| 16 |
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| 17 | |
| 18 | * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
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| 19 | * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
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| 20 | * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
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| 21 | *
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| 22 | * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
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| 23 | * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
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| 24 | * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
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| 25 | * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
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| 26 | * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
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| 27 | * relative prime to 2^n).
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| 28 | *
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| 29 | * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
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| 30 | * it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
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| 31 |
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| 32 | static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
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| 33 |
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| 34 | static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
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| 35 | {
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| 36 | return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
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| 37 | }
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| 38 |
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| 39 | |
| 40 | * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
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| 41 | * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
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| 42 | * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
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| 43 | * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
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| 44 |
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| 45 | static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
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| 46 | {
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| 47 | long ret;
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| 48 |
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| 49 | ret = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type) - kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);
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| 50 |
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| 51 | return (ret < 0) | ((ret > 0) << 1);
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| 52 | }
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| 53 |
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| 54 |
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| 55 | static struct file *
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| 56 | get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
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| 57 | {
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| 58 | struct file *file = NULL;
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| 59 |
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| 60 | task_lock(task);
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| 61 | rcu_read_lock();
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| 62 |
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| 63 | if (task->files)
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| 64 | file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx);
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| 65 |
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| 66 | rcu_read_unlock();
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| 67 | task_unlock(task);
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| 68 |
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| 69 | return file;
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| 70 | }
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| 71 |
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| 72 | static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
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| 73 | {
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| 74 | if (likely(m2 != m1))
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| 75 | mutex_unlock(m2);
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| 76 | mutex_unlock(m1);
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| 77 | }
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| 78 |
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| 79 | static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
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| 80 | {
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| 81 | int err;
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| 82 |
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| 83 | if (m2 > m1)
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| 84 | swap(m1, m2);
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| 85 |
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| 86 | err = mutex_lock_killable(m1);
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| 87 | if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) {
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| 88 | err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
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| 89 | if (err)
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| 90 | mutex_unlock(m1);
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| 91 | }
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| 92 |
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| 93 | return err;
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| 94 | }
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| 95 |
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| 96 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
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| 97 | unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
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| 98 | {
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| 99 | struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
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| 100 | int ret;
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| 101 |
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| 102 | rcu_read_lock();
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| 103 |
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| 104 | |
| 105 | * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
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| 106 |
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| 107 | task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
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| 108 | task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
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| 109 | if (!task1 || !task2)
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| 110 | goto err_no_task;
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| 111 |
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| 112 | get_task_struct(task1);
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| 113 | get_task_struct(task2);
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| 114 |
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| 115 | rcu_read_unlock();
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| 116 |
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| 117 | |
| 118 | * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
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| 119 |
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| 120 | ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
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| 121 | &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
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| 122 | if (ret)
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| 123 | goto err;
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| 124 | if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) ||
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| 125 | !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
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| 126 | ret = -EPERM;
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| 127 | goto err_unlock;
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| 128 | }
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| 129 |
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| 130 | switch (type) {
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| 131 | case KCMP_FILE: {
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| 132 | struct file *filp1, *filp2;
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| 133 |
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| 134 | filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
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| 135 | filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);
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| 136 |
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| 137 | if (filp1 && filp2)
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| 138 | ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
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| 139 | else
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| 140 | ret = -EBADF;
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| 141 | break;
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| 142 | }
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| 143 | case KCMP_VM:
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| 144 | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
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| 145 | break;
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| 146 | case KCMP_FILES:
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| 147 | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
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| 148 | break;
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| 149 | case KCMP_FS:
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| 150 | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
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| 151 | break;
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| 152 | case KCMP_SIGHAND:
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| 153 | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
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| 154 | break;
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| 155 | case KCMP_IO:
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| 156 | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
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| 157 | break;
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| 158 | case KCMP_SYSVSEM:
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| 159 | #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
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| 160 | ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
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| 161 | task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
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| 162 | KCMP_SYSVSEM);
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| 163 | #else
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| 164 | ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
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| 165 | #endif
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| 166 | break;
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| 167 | default:
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| 168 | ret = -EINVAL;
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| 169 | break;
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| 170 | }
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| 171 |
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| 172 | err_unlock:
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| 173 | kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
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| 174 | &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
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| 175 | err:
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| 176 | put_task_struct(task1);
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| 177 | put_task_struct(task2);
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| 178 |
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| 179 | return ret;
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| 180 |
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| 181 | err_no_task:
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| 182 | rcu_read_unlock();
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| 183 | return -ESRCH;
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| 184 | }
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| 185 |
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| 186 | static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
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| 187 | {
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| 188 | int i;
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| 189 |
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| 190 | get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));
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| 191 |
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| 192 | for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
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| 193 | cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1);
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| 194 |
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| 195 | return 0;
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| 196 | }
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| 197 | arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);
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