| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | * linux/kernel/sys.c
|
| 4 | *
|
| 5 | * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
|
| 6 |
|
| 7 |
|
| 8 | #include <linux/export.h>
|
| 9 | #include <linux/mm.h>
|
| 10 | #include <linux/mm_inline.h>
|
| 11 | #include <linux/utsname.h>
|
| 12 | #include <linux/mman.h>
|
| 13 | #include <linux/reboot.h>
|
| 14 | #include <linux/prctl.h>
|
| 15 | #include <linux/highuid.h>
|
| 16 | #include <linux/fs.h>
|
| 17 | #include <linux/kmod.h>
|
| 18 | #include <linux/perf_event.h>
|
| 19 | #include <linux/resource.h>
|
| 20 | #include <linux/kernel.h>
|
| 21 | #include <linux/workqueue.h>
|
| 22 | #include <linux/capability.h>
|
| 23 | #include <linux/device.h>
|
| 24 | #include <linux/key.h>
|
| 25 | #include <linux/times.h>
|
| 26 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
|
| 27 | #include <linux/security.h>
|
| 28 | #include <linux/random.h>
|
| 29 | #include <linux/suspend.h>
|
| 30 | #include <linux/tty.h>
|
| 31 | #include <linux/signal.h>
|
| 32 | #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
|
| 33 | #include <linux/getcpu.h>
|
| 34 | #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
|
| 35 | #include <linux/seccomp.h>
|
| 36 | #include <linux/cpu.h>
|
| 37 | #include <linux/personality.h>
|
| 38 | #include <linux/ptrace.h>
|
| 39 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
|
| 40 | #include <linux/file.h>
|
| 41 | #include <linux/mount.h>
|
| 42 | #include <linux/gfp.h>
|
| 43 | #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
|
| 44 | #include <linux/version.h>
|
| 45 | #include <linux/ctype.h>
|
| 46 | #include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h>
|
| 47 |
|
| 48 | #include <linux/compat.h>
|
| 49 | #include <linux/syscalls.h>
|
| 50 | #include <linux/kprobes.h>
|
| 51 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
|
| 52 | #include <linux/time_namespace.h>
|
| 53 | #include <linux/binfmts.h>
|
| 54 |
|
| 55 | #include <linux/sched.h>
|
| 56 | #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h>
|
| 57 | #include <linux/sched/loadavg.h>
|
| 58 | #include <linux/sched/stat.h>
|
| 59 | #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
|
| 60 | #include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
|
| 61 | #include <linux/sched/task.h>
|
| 62 | #include <linux/sched/cputime.h>
|
| 63 | #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
|
| 64 | #include <linux/uidgid.h>
|
| 65 | #include <linux/cred.h>
|
| 66 |
|
| 67 | #include <linux/nospec.h>
|
| 68 |
|
| 69 | #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
|
| 70 |
|
| 71 | #include <generated/utsrelease.h>
|
| 72 |
|
| 73 | #include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
| 74 | #include <asm/io.h>
|
| 75 | #include <asm/unistd.h>
|
| 76 |
|
| 77 | #include "uid16.h"
|
| 78 |
|
| 79 | #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
| 80 | # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 81 | #endif
|
| 82 | #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
| 83 | # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 84 | #endif
|
| 85 | #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL
|
| 86 | # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 87 | #endif
|
| 88 | #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL
|
| 89 | # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 90 | #endif
|
| 91 | #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL
|
| 92 | # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 93 | #endif
|
| 94 | #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL
|
| 95 | # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 96 | #endif
|
| 97 | #ifndef GET_ENDIAN
|
| 98 | # define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 99 | #endif
|
| 100 | #ifndef SET_ENDIAN
|
| 101 | # define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 102 | #endif
|
| 103 | #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL
|
| 104 | # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 105 | #endif
|
| 106 | #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL
|
| 107 | # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 108 | #endif
|
| 109 | #ifndef GET_FP_MODE
|
| 110 | # define GET_FP_MODE(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 111 | #endif
|
| 112 | #ifndef SET_FP_MODE
|
| 113 | # define SET_FP_MODE(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 114 | #endif
|
| 115 | #ifndef SVE_SET_VL
|
| 116 | # define SVE_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 117 | #endif
|
| 118 | #ifndef SVE_GET_VL
|
| 119 | # define SVE_GET_VL() (-EINVAL)
|
| 120 | #endif
|
| 121 | #ifndef SME_SET_VL
|
| 122 | # define SME_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 123 | #endif
|
| 124 | #ifndef SME_GET_VL
|
| 125 | # define SME_GET_VL() (-EINVAL)
|
| 126 | #endif
|
| 127 | #ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS
|
| 128 | # define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 129 | #endif
|
| 130 | #ifndef PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS
|
| 131 | # define PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(a, b, c) (-EINVAL)
|
| 132 | #endif
|
| 133 | #ifndef PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS
|
| 134 | # define PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 135 | #endif
|
| 136 | #ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
|
| 137 | # define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 138 | #endif
|
| 139 | #ifndef GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
|
| 140 | # define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() (-EINVAL)
|
| 141 | #endif
|
| 142 |
|
| 143 | |
| 144 | * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
|
| 145 | * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
|
| 146 |
|
| 147 |
|
| 148 | int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 149 | int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
|
| 150 |
|
| 151 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
|
| 152 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
|
| 153 |
|
| 154 | |
| 155 | * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
|
| 156 | * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
|
| 157 |
|
| 158 |
|
| 159 | int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 160 | int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWGID;
|
| 161 |
|
| 162 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
|
| 163 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
|
| 164 |
|
| 165 | |
| 166 | * Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid,
|
| 167 | * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns.
|
| 168 | *
|
| 169 | * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe
|
| 170 |
|
| 171 | static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p)
|
| 172 | {
|
| 173 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
|
| 174 |
|
| 175 | if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) ||
|
| 176 | uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid))
|
| 177 | return true;
|
| 178 | if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
|
| 179 | return true;
|
| 180 | return false;
|
| 181 | }
|
| 182 |
|
| 183 | |
| 184 | * set the priority of a task
|
| 185 | * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
|
| 186 |
|
| 187 | static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
|
| 188 | {
|
| 189 | int no_nice;
|
| 190 |
|
| 191 | if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) {
|
| 192 | error = -EPERM;
|
| 193 | goto out;
|
| 194 | }
|
| 195 | if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
|
| 196 | error = -EACCES;
|
| 197 | goto out;
|
| 198 | }
|
| 199 | no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
|
| 200 | if (no_nice) {
|
| 201 | error = no_nice;
|
| 202 | goto out;
|
| 203 | }
|
| 204 | if (error == -ESRCH)
|
| 205 | error = 0;
|
| 206 | set_user_nice(p, niceval);
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| 207 | out:
|
| 208 | return error;
|
| 209 | }
|
| 210 |
|
| 211 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval)
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| 212 | {
|
| 213 | struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
| 214 | struct user_struct *user;
|
| 215 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
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| 216 | int error = -EINVAL;
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| 217 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 218 | kuid_t uid;
|
| 219 |
|
| 220 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
| 221 | goto out;
|
| 222 |
|
| 223 |
|
| 224 | error = -ESRCH;
|
| 225 | if (niceval < MIN_NICE)
|
| 226 | niceval = MIN_NICE;
|
| 227 | if (niceval > MAX_NICE)
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| 228 | niceval = MAX_NICE;
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| 229 |
|
| 230 | rcu_read_lock();
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| 231 | switch (which) {
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| 232 | case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
| 233 | if (who)
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| 234 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
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| 235 | else
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| 236 | p = current;
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| 237 | if (p)
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| 238 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 239 | break;
|
| 240 | case PRIO_PGRP:
|
| 241 | if (who)
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| 242 | pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
| 243 | else
|
| 244 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 245 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 246 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
| 247 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 248 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
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| 249 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
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| 250 | break;
|
| 251 | case PRIO_USER:
|
| 252 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who);
|
| 253 | user = cred->user;
|
| 254 | if (!who)
|
| 255 | uid = cred->uid;
|
| 256 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) {
|
| 257 | user = find_user(uid);
|
| 258 | if (!user)
|
| 259 | goto out_unlock;
|
| 260 | }
|
| 261 | for_each_process_thread(g, p) {
|
| 262 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p))
|
| 263 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 264 | }
|
| 265 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid))
|
| 266 | free_uid(user);
|
| 267 | break;
|
| 268 | }
|
| 269 | out_unlock:
|
| 270 | rcu_read_unlock();
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| 271 | out:
|
| 272 | return error;
|
| 273 | }
|
| 274 |
|
| 275 | |
| 276 | * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
|
| 277 | * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
|
| 278 | * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
|
| 279 | * to stay compatible.
|
| 280 |
|
| 281 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who)
|
| 282 | {
|
| 283 | struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
| 284 | struct user_struct *user;
|
| 285 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 286 | long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 287 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 288 | kuid_t uid;
|
| 289 |
|
| 290 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
| 291 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 292 |
|
| 293 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 294 | switch (which) {
|
| 295 | case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
| 296 | if (who)
|
| 297 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
|
| 298 | else
|
| 299 | p = current;
|
| 300 | if (p) {
|
| 301 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p));
|
| 302 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 303 | retval = niceval;
|
| 304 | }
|
| 305 | break;
|
| 306 | case PRIO_PGRP:
|
| 307 | if (who)
|
| 308 | pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
| 309 | else
|
| 310 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 311 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 312 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
| 313 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p));
|
| 314 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 315 | retval = niceval;
|
| 316 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
| 317 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 318 | break;
|
| 319 | case PRIO_USER:
|
| 320 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who);
|
| 321 | user = cred->user;
|
| 322 | if (!who)
|
| 323 | uid = cred->uid;
|
| 324 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) {
|
| 325 | user = find_user(uid);
|
| 326 | if (!user)
|
| 327 | goto out_unlock;
|
| 328 | }
|
| 329 | for_each_process_thread(g, p) {
|
| 330 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p)) {
|
| 331 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p));
|
| 332 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 333 | retval = niceval;
|
| 334 | }
|
| 335 | }
|
| 336 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid))
|
| 337 | free_uid(user);
|
| 338 | break;
|
| 339 | }
|
| 340 | out_unlock:
|
| 341 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 342 |
|
| 343 | return retval;
|
| 344 | }
|
| 345 |
|
| 346 | |
| 347 | * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
|
| 348 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
| 349 | *
|
| 350 | * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
|
| 351 | * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
|
| 352 | *
|
| 353 | * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
|
| 354 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
| 355 | * a security audit over a program.
|
| 356 | *
|
| 357 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
|
| 358 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
|
| 359 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
| 360 | *
|
| 361 | * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
|
| 362 | * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
|
| 363 |
|
| 364 | #ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
|
| 365 | long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
|
| 366 | {
|
| 367 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 368 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 369 | struct cred *new;
|
| 370 | int retval;
|
| 371 | kgid_t krgid, kegid;
|
| 372 |
|
| 373 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
|
| 374 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
|
| 375 |
|
| 376 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
|
| 377 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 378 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
|
| 379 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 380 |
|
| 381 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 382 | if (!new)
|
| 383 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 384 | old = current_cred();
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 387 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
| 388 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) ||
|
| 389 | gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) ||
|
| 390 | ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 391 | new->gid = krgid;
|
| 392 | else
|
| 393 | goto error;
|
| 394 | }
|
| 395 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
| 396 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) ||
|
| 397 | gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) ||
|
| 398 | gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) ||
|
| 399 | ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 400 | new->egid = kegid;
|
| 401 | else
|
| 402 | goto error;
|
| 403 | }
|
| 404 |
|
| 405 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
|
| 406 | (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid)))
|
| 407 | new->sgid = new->egid;
|
| 408 | new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
| 409 |
|
| 410 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
| 411 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 412 | goto error;
|
| 413 |
|
| 414 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 415 |
|
| 416 | error:
|
| 417 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 418 | return retval;
|
| 419 | }
|
| 420 |
|
| 421 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
|
| 422 | {
|
| 423 | return __sys_setregid(rgid, egid);
|
| 424 | }
|
| 425 |
|
| 426 | |
| 427 | * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
|
| 428 | *
|
| 429 | * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
|
| 430 |
|
| 431 | long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
|
| 432 | {
|
| 433 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 434 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 435 | struct cred *new;
|
| 436 | int retval;
|
| 437 | kgid_t kgid;
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 | kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid);
|
| 440 | if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
| 441 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 444 | if (!new)
|
| 445 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 446 | old = current_cred();
|
| 447 |
|
| 448 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 449 | if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 450 | new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid;
|
| 451 | else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid))
|
| 452 | new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid;
|
| 453 | else
|
| 454 | goto error;
|
| 455 |
|
| 456 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
| 457 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 458 | goto error;
|
| 459 |
|
| 460 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 461 |
|
| 462 | error:
|
| 463 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 464 | return retval;
|
| 465 | }
|
| 466 |
|
| 467 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
|
| 468 | {
|
| 469 | return __sys_setgid(gid);
|
| 470 | }
|
| 471 |
|
| 472 | |
| 473 | * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID
|
| 474 |
|
| 475 | static int set_user(struct cred *new)
|
| 476 | {
|
| 477 | struct user_struct *new_user;
|
| 478 |
|
| 479 | new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid);
|
| 480 | if (!new_user)
|
| 481 | return -EAGAIN;
|
| 482 |
|
| 483 | free_uid(new->user);
|
| 484 | new->user = new_user;
|
| 485 | return 0;
|
| 486 | }
|
| 487 |
|
| 488 | static void flag_nproc_exceeded(struct cred *new)
|
| 489 | {
|
| 490 | if (new->ucounts == current_ucounts())
|
| 491 | return;
|
| 492 |
|
| 493 | |
| 494 | * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many
|
| 495 | * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming
|
| 496 | * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit
|
| 497 | * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the
|
| 498 | * failure to the execve() stage.
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 | if (is_rlimit_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) &&
|
| 501 | new->user != INIT_USER)
|
| 502 | current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
|
| 503 | else
|
| 504 | current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
|
| 505 | }
|
| 506 |
|
| 507 | |
| 508 | * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
|
| 509 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
| 510 | *
|
| 511 | * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
|
| 512 | * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
|
| 513 | *
|
| 514 | * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
|
| 515 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
| 516 | * a security audit over a program.
|
| 517 | *
|
| 518 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
|
| 519 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
|
| 520 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
| 521 |
|
| 522 | long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
|
| 523 | {
|
| 524 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 525 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 526 | struct cred *new;
|
| 527 | int retval;
|
| 528 | kuid_t kruid, keuid;
|
| 529 |
|
| 530 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
|
| 531 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
|
| 532 |
|
| 533 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid))
|
| 534 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 535 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid))
|
| 536 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 537 |
|
| 538 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 539 | if (!new)
|
| 540 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 541 | old = current_cred();
|
| 542 |
|
| 543 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 544 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 545 | new->uid = kruid;
|
| 546 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) &&
|
| 547 | !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) &&
|
| 548 | !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
| 549 | goto error;
|
| 550 | }
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 553 | new->euid = keuid;
|
| 554 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) &&
|
| 555 | !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) &&
|
| 556 | !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) &&
|
| 557 | !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
| 558 | goto error;
|
| 559 | }
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 | if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) {
|
| 562 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 563 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 564 | goto error;
|
| 565 | }
|
| 566 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
|
| 567 | (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid)))
|
| 568 | new->suid = new->euid;
|
| 569 | new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
| 570 |
|
| 571 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
| 572 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 573 | goto error;
|
| 574 |
|
| 575 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new);
|
| 576 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 577 | goto error;
|
| 578 |
|
| 579 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
|
| 580 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 581 |
|
| 582 | error:
|
| 583 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 584 | return retval;
|
| 585 | }
|
| 586 |
|
| 587 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
|
| 588 | {
|
| 589 | return __sys_setreuid(ruid, euid);
|
| 590 | }
|
| 591 |
|
| 592 | |
| 593 | * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
|
| 594 | *
|
| 595 | * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
|
| 596 | * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
|
| 597 | * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
|
| 598 | * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
|
| 599 | * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
|
| 600 | * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
|
| 601 | * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
|
| 602 |
|
| 603 | long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
|
| 604 | {
|
| 605 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 606 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 607 | struct cred *new;
|
| 608 | int retval;
|
| 609 | kuid_t kuid;
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 | kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid);
|
| 612 | if (!uid_valid(kuid))
|
| 613 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 614 |
|
| 615 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 616 | if (!new)
|
| 617 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 618 | old = current_cred();
|
| 619 |
|
| 620 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 621 | if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 622 | new->suid = new->uid = kuid;
|
| 623 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) {
|
| 624 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 625 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 626 | goto error;
|
| 627 | }
|
| 628 | } else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) {
|
| 629 | goto error;
|
| 630 | }
|
| 631 |
|
| 632 | new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid;
|
| 633 |
|
| 634 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
| 635 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 636 | goto error;
|
| 637 |
|
| 638 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new);
|
| 639 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 640 | goto error;
|
| 641 |
|
| 642 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
|
| 643 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 644 |
|
| 645 | error:
|
| 646 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 647 | return retval;
|
| 648 | }
|
| 649 |
|
| 650 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
|
| 651 | {
|
| 652 | return __sys_setuid(uid);
|
| 653 | }
|
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
|
| 656 | |
| 657 | * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
|
| 658 | * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 | long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
|
| 661 | {
|
| 662 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 663 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 664 | struct cred *new;
|
| 665 | int retval;
|
| 666 | kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid;
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
|
| 669 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
|
| 670 | ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid);
|
| 671 |
|
| 672 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid))
|
| 673 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 674 |
|
| 675 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid))
|
| 676 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 677 |
|
| 678 | if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid))
|
| 679 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 680 |
|
| 681 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 682 | if (!new)
|
| 683 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 684 |
|
| 685 | old = current_cred();
|
| 686 |
|
| 687 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 688 | if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 689 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
|
| 690 | !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid))
|
| 691 | goto error;
|
| 692 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) &&
|
| 693 | !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid))
|
| 694 | goto error;
|
| 695 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) &&
|
| 696 | !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid))
|
| 697 | goto error;
|
| 698 | }
|
| 699 |
|
| 700 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 701 | new->uid = kruid;
|
| 702 | if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) {
|
| 703 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 704 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 705 | goto error;
|
| 706 | }
|
| 707 | }
|
| 708 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1)
|
| 709 | new->euid = keuid;
|
| 710 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
|
| 711 | new->suid = ksuid;
|
| 712 | new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
| 713 |
|
| 714 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
| 715 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 716 | goto error;
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new);
|
| 719 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 720 | goto error;
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
|
| 723 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 724 |
|
| 725 | error:
|
| 726 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 727 | return retval;
|
| 728 | }
|
| 729 |
|
| 730 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
|
| 731 | {
|
| 732 | return __sys_setresuid(ruid, euid, suid);
|
| 733 | }
|
| 734 |
|
| 735 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp)
|
| 736 | {
|
| 737 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 738 | int retval;
|
| 739 | uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
|
| 740 |
|
| 741 | ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid);
|
| 742 | euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid);
|
| 743 | suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid);
|
| 744 |
|
| 745 | retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp);
|
| 746 | if (!retval) {
|
| 747 | retval = put_user(euid, euidp);
|
| 748 | if (!retval)
|
| 749 | return put_user(suid, suidp);
|
| 750 | }
|
| 751 | return retval;
|
| 752 | }
|
| 753 |
|
| 754 | |
| 755 | * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
|
| 756 |
|
| 757 | long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
|
| 758 | {
|
| 759 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 760 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 761 | struct cred *new;
|
| 762 | int retval;
|
| 763 | kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid;
|
| 764 |
|
| 765 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
|
| 766 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
|
| 767 | ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid);
|
| 768 |
|
| 769 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
|
| 770 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 771 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
|
| 772 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 773 | if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid))
|
| 774 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 777 | if (!new)
|
| 778 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 779 | old = current_cred();
|
| 780 |
|
| 781 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 782 | if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
|
| 783 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
|
| 784 | !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid))
|
| 785 | goto error;
|
| 786 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
|
| 787 | !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid))
|
| 788 | goto error;
|
| 789 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
|
| 790 | !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid))
|
| 791 | goto error;
|
| 792 | }
|
| 793 |
|
| 794 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 795 | new->gid = krgid;
|
| 796 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 797 | new->egid = kegid;
|
| 798 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 799 | new->sgid = ksgid;
|
| 800 | new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
| 801 |
|
| 802 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
| 803 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 804 | goto error;
|
| 805 |
|
| 806 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 807 |
|
| 808 | error:
|
| 809 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 810 | return retval;
|
| 811 | }
|
| 812 |
|
| 813 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
|
| 814 | {
|
| 815 | return __sys_setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid);
|
| 816 | }
|
| 817 |
|
| 818 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp)
|
| 819 | {
|
| 820 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 821 | int retval;
|
| 822 | gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
|
| 823 |
|
| 824 | rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid);
|
| 825 | egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid);
|
| 826 | sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid);
|
| 827 |
|
| 828 | retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp);
|
| 829 | if (!retval) {
|
| 830 | retval = put_user(egid, egidp);
|
| 831 | if (!retval)
|
| 832 | retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp);
|
| 833 | }
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 | return retval;
|
| 836 | }
|
| 837 |
|
| 838 |
|
| 839 | |
| 840 | * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
|
| 841 | * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
|
| 842 | * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
|
| 843 | * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
|
| 844 |
|
| 845 | long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
|
| 846 | {
|
| 847 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 848 | struct cred *new;
|
| 849 | uid_t old_fsuid;
|
| 850 | kuid_t kuid;
|
| 851 |
|
| 852 | old = current_cred();
|
| 853 | old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid);
|
| 854 |
|
| 855 | kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid);
|
| 856 | if (!uid_valid(kuid))
|
| 857 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 858 |
|
| 859 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 860 | if (!new)
|
| 861 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 862 |
|
| 863 | if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
|
| 864 | uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
|
| 865 | ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 866 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
|
| 867 | new->fsuid = kuid;
|
| 868 | if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
|
| 869 | goto change_okay;
|
| 870 | }
|
| 871 | }
|
| 872 |
|
| 873 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 874 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 875 |
|
| 876 | change_okay:
|
| 877 | commit_creds(new);
|
| 878 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 879 | }
|
| 880 |
|
| 881 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
|
| 882 | {
|
| 883 | return __sys_setfsuid(uid);
|
| 884 | }
|
| 885 |
|
| 886 | |
| 887 | * Samma på svenska..
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 | long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
|
| 890 | {
|
| 891 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 892 | struct cred *new;
|
| 893 | gid_t old_fsgid;
|
| 894 | kgid_t kgid;
|
| 895 |
|
| 896 | old = current_cred();
|
| 897 | old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid);
|
| 898 |
|
| 899 | kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid);
|
| 900 | if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
| 901 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 902 |
|
| 903 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 904 | if (!new)
|
| 905 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 906 |
|
| 907 | if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) ||
|
| 908 | gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) ||
|
| 909 | ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
|
| 910 | if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) {
|
| 911 | new->fsgid = kgid;
|
| 912 | if (security_task_fix_setgid(new,old,LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
|
| 913 | goto change_okay;
|
| 914 | }
|
| 915 | }
|
| 916 |
|
| 917 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 918 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 919 |
|
| 920 | change_okay:
|
| 921 | commit_creds(new);
|
| 922 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 923 | }
|
| 924 |
|
| 925 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
|
| 926 | {
|
| 927 | return __sys_setfsgid(gid);
|
| 928 | }
|
| 929 | #endif
|
| 930 |
|
| 931 | |
| 932 | * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process
|
| 933 | *
|
| 934 | * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and
|
| 935 | * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in
|
| 936 | * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group.
|
| 937 | *
|
| 938 | * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change.
|
| 939 |
|
| 940 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid)
|
| 941 | {
|
| 942 | return task_tgid_vnr(current);
|
| 943 | }
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid)
|
| 947 | {
|
| 948 | return task_pid_vnr(current);
|
| 949 | }
|
| 950 |
|
| 951 | |
| 952 | * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could
|
| 953 | * change from under us. However, we can use a stale
|
| 954 | * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see
|
| 955 | * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct).
|
| 956 |
|
| 957 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid)
|
| 958 | {
|
| 959 | int pid;
|
| 960 |
|
| 961 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 962 | pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent));
|
| 963 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 964 |
|
| 965 | return pid;
|
| 966 | }
|
| 967 |
|
| 968 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid)
|
| 969 | {
|
| 970 |
|
| 971 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
|
| 972 | }
|
| 973 |
|
| 974 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid)
|
| 975 | {
|
| 976 |
|
| 977 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid());
|
| 978 | }
|
| 979 |
|
| 980 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid)
|
| 981 | {
|
| 982 |
|
| 983 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid());
|
| 984 | }
|
| 985 |
|
| 986 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid)
|
| 987 | {
|
| 988 |
|
| 989 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid());
|
| 990 | }
|
| 991 |
|
| 992 | static void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms)
|
| 993 | {
|
| 994 | u64 tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime;
|
| 995 |
|
| 996 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
| 997 | cutime = current->signal->cutime;
|
| 998 | cstime = current->signal->cstime;
|
| 999 | tms->tms_utime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgutime);
|
| 1000 | tms->tms_stime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgstime);
|
| 1001 | tms->tms_cutime = nsec_to_clock_t(cutime);
|
| 1002 | tms->tms_cstime = nsec_to_clock_t(cstime);
|
| 1003 | }
|
| 1004 |
|
| 1005 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf)
|
| 1006 | {
|
| 1007 | if (tbuf) {
|
| 1008 | struct tms tmp;
|
| 1009 |
|
| 1010 | do_sys_times(&tmp);
|
| 1011 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
|
| 1012 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1013 | }
|
| 1014 | force_successful_syscall_return();
|
| 1015 | return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
|
| 1016 | }
|
| 1017 |
|
| 1018 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 1019 | static compat_clock_t clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(clock_t x)
|
| 1020 | {
|
| 1021 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(clock_t_to_jiffies(x));
|
| 1022 | }
|
| 1023 |
|
| 1024 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct compat_tms __user *, tbuf)
|
| 1025 | {
|
| 1026 | if (tbuf) {
|
| 1027 | struct tms tms;
|
| 1028 | struct compat_tms tmp;
|
| 1029 |
|
| 1030 | do_sys_times(&tms);
|
| 1031 |
|
| 1032 | tmp.tms_utime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_utime);
|
| 1033 | tmp.tms_stime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_stime);
|
| 1034 | tmp.tms_cutime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cutime);
|
| 1035 | tmp.tms_cstime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cstime);
|
| 1036 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
| 1037 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1038 | }
|
| 1039 | force_successful_syscall_return();
|
| 1040 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(jiffies);
|
| 1041 | }
|
| 1042 | #endif
|
| 1043 |
|
| 1044 | |
| 1045 | * This needs some heavy checking ...
|
| 1046 | * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
|
| 1047 | * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
|
| 1048 | *
|
| 1049 | * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
|
| 1050 | * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
|
| 1051 | * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
|
| 1052 | *
|
| 1053 | * !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX.
|
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid)
|
| 1056 | {
|
| 1057 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 1058 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
| 1059 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 1060 | int err;
|
| 1061 |
|
| 1062 | if (!pid)
|
| 1063 | pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader);
|
| 1064 | if (!pgid)
|
| 1065 | pgid = pid;
|
| 1066 | if (pgid < 0)
|
| 1067 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1068 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1069 |
|
| 1070 | |
| 1071 | * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
|
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 | err = -ESRCH;
|
| 1076 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 1077 | if (!p)
|
| 1078 | goto out;
|
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 | err = -EINVAL;
|
| 1081 | if (!thread_group_leader(p))
|
| 1082 | goto out;
|
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 | if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) {
|
| 1085 | err = -EPERM;
|
| 1086 | if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader))
|
| 1087 | goto out;
|
| 1088 | err = -EACCES;
|
| 1089 | if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC))
|
| 1090 | goto out;
|
| 1091 | } else {
|
| 1092 | err = -ESRCH;
|
| 1093 | if (p != group_leader)
|
| 1094 | goto out;
|
| 1095 | }
|
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 | err = -EPERM;
|
| 1098 | if (p->signal->leader)
|
| 1099 | goto out;
|
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 | pgrp = task_pid(p);
|
| 1102 | if (pgid != pid) {
|
| 1103 | struct task_struct *g;
|
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 | pgrp = find_vpid(pgid);
|
| 1106 | g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID);
|
| 1107 | if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader))
|
| 1108 | goto out;
|
| 1109 | }
|
| 1110 |
|
| 1111 | err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
|
| 1112 | if (err)
|
| 1113 | goto out;
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 | if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp)
|
| 1116 | change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp);
|
| 1117 |
|
| 1118 | err = 0;
|
| 1119 | out:
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1122 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1123 | return err;
|
| 1124 | }
|
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 | static int do_getpgid(pid_t pid)
|
| 1127 | {
|
| 1128 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 1129 | struct pid *grp;
|
| 1130 | int retval;
|
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1133 | if (!pid)
|
| 1134 | grp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 1135 | else {
|
| 1136 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 1137 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 1138 | if (!p)
|
| 1139 | goto out;
|
| 1140 | grp = task_pgrp(p);
|
| 1141 | if (!grp)
|
| 1142 | goto out;
|
| 1143 |
|
| 1144 | retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
|
| 1145 | if (retval)
|
| 1146 | goto out;
|
| 1147 | }
|
| 1148 | retval = pid_vnr(grp);
|
| 1149 | out:
|
| 1150 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1151 | return retval;
|
| 1152 | }
|
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid)
|
| 1155 | {
|
| 1156 | return do_getpgid(pid);
|
| 1157 | }
|
| 1158 |
|
| 1159 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
|
| 1160 |
|
| 1161 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp)
|
| 1162 | {
|
| 1163 | return do_getpgid(0);
|
| 1164 | }
|
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 | #endif
|
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid)
|
| 1169 | {
|
| 1170 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 1171 | struct pid *sid;
|
| 1172 | int retval;
|
| 1173 |
|
| 1174 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1175 | if (!pid)
|
| 1176 | sid = task_session(current);
|
| 1177 | else {
|
| 1178 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 1179 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 1180 | if (!p)
|
| 1181 | goto out;
|
| 1182 | sid = task_session(p);
|
| 1183 | if (!sid)
|
| 1184 | goto out;
|
| 1185 |
|
| 1186 | retval = security_task_getsid(p);
|
| 1187 | if (retval)
|
| 1188 | goto out;
|
| 1189 | }
|
| 1190 | retval = pid_vnr(sid);
|
| 1191 | out:
|
| 1192 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1193 | return retval;
|
| 1194 | }
|
| 1195 |
|
| 1196 | static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid)
|
| 1197 | {
|
| 1198 | struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader;
|
| 1199 |
|
| 1200 | if (task_session(curr) != pid)
|
| 1201 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid);
|
| 1202 |
|
| 1203 | if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid)
|
| 1204 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid);
|
| 1205 | }
|
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 | int ksys_setsid(void)
|
| 1208 | {
|
| 1209 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
| 1210 | struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader);
|
| 1211 | pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid);
|
| 1212 | int err = -EPERM;
|
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1215 |
|
| 1216 | if (group_leader->signal->leader)
|
| 1217 | goto out;
|
| 1218 |
|
| 1219 | |
| 1220 | * proposed session id.
|
| 1221 |
|
| 1222 | if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID))
|
| 1223 | goto out;
|
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 | group_leader->signal->leader = 1;
|
| 1226 | set_special_pids(sid);
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 | proc_clear_tty(group_leader);
|
| 1229 |
|
| 1230 | err = session;
|
| 1231 | out:
|
| 1232 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1233 | if (err > 0) {
|
| 1234 | proc_sid_connector(group_leader);
|
| 1235 | sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader);
|
| 1236 | }
|
| 1237 | return err;
|
| 1238 | }
|
| 1239 |
|
| 1240 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid)
|
| 1241 | {
|
| 1242 | return ksys_setsid();
|
| 1243 | }
|
| 1244 |
|
| 1245 | DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);
|
| 1246 |
|
| 1247 | #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE
|
| 1248 | #define override_architecture(name) \
|
| 1249 | (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \
|
| 1250 | copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \
|
| 1251 | sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE)))
|
| 1252 | #else
|
| 1253 | #define override_architecture(name) 0
|
| 1254 | #endif
|
| 1255 |
|
| 1256 | |
| 1257 | * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0".
|
| 1258 | * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40
|
| 1259 | * And we map 4.x and later versions to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0/5.0/6.0/... would be
|
| 1260 | * 2.6.60.
|
| 1261 |
|
| 1262 | static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len)
|
| 1263 | {
|
| 1264 | int ret = 0;
|
| 1265 |
|
| 1266 | if (current->personality & UNAME26) {
|
| 1267 | const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE;
|
| 1268 | char buf[65] = { 0 };
|
| 1269 | int ndots = 0;
|
| 1270 | unsigned v;
|
| 1271 | size_t copy;
|
| 1272 |
|
| 1273 | while (*rest) {
|
| 1274 | if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3)
|
| 1275 | break;
|
| 1276 | if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.')
|
| 1277 | break;
|
| 1278 | rest++;
|
| 1279 | }
|
| 1280 | v = LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL + 60;
|
| 1281 | copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf));
|
| 1282 | copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest);
|
| 1283 | ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1);
|
| 1284 | }
|
| 1285 | return ret;
|
| 1286 | }
|
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1289 | {
|
| 1290 | struct new_utsname tmp;
|
| 1291 |
|
| 1292 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1293 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp));
|
| 1294 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1295 | if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
| 1296 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1297 |
|
| 1298 | if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
| 1299 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1300 | if (override_architecture(name))
|
| 1301 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1302 | return 0;
|
| 1303 | }
|
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME
|
| 1306 | |
| 1307 | * Old cruft
|
| 1308 |
|
| 1309 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1310 | {
|
| 1311 | struct old_utsname tmp;
|
| 1312 |
|
| 1313 | if (!name)
|
| 1314 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1315 |
|
| 1316 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1317 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp));
|
| 1318 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1319 | if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
| 1320 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1321 |
|
| 1322 | if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
| 1323 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1324 | if (override_architecture(name))
|
| 1325 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1326 | return 0;
|
| 1327 | }
|
| 1328 |
|
| 1329 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1330 | {
|
| 1331 | struct oldold_utsname tmp;
|
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 | if (!name)
|
| 1334 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 | memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1339 | memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1340 | memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1341 | memcpy(&tmp.release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1342 | memcpy(&tmp.version, &utsname()->version, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1343 | memcpy(&tmp.machine, &utsname()->machine, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1344 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1345 | if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
| 1346 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1347 |
|
| 1348 | if (override_architecture(name))
|
| 1349 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1350 | if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
| 1351 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1352 | return 0;
|
| 1353 | }
|
| 1354 | #endif
|
| 1355 |
|
| 1356 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1357 | {
|
| 1358 | int errno;
|
| 1359 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
| 1360 |
|
| 1361 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
| 1362 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1363 |
|
| 1364 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
| 1365 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1366 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1367 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
| 1368 | struct new_utsname *u;
|
| 1369 |
|
| 1370 | add_device_randomness(tmp, len);
|
| 1371 | down_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1372 | u = utsname();
|
| 1373 | memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len);
|
| 1374 | memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len);
|
| 1375 | errno = 0;
|
| 1376 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME);
|
| 1377 | up_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1378 | }
|
| 1379 | return errno;
|
| 1380 | }
|
| 1381 |
|
| 1382 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
|
| 1383 |
|
| 1384 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1385 | {
|
| 1386 | int i;
|
| 1387 | struct new_utsname *u;
|
| 1388 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1];
|
| 1389 |
|
| 1390 | if (len < 0)
|
| 1391 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1392 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1393 | u = utsname();
|
| 1394 | i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename);
|
| 1395 | if (i > len)
|
| 1396 | i = len;
|
| 1397 | memcpy(tmp, u->nodename, i);
|
| 1398 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1399 | if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, i))
|
| 1400 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1401 | return 0;
|
| 1402 | }
|
| 1403 |
|
| 1404 | #endif
|
| 1405 |
|
| 1406 | |
| 1407 | * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
|
| 1408 | * uname()
|
| 1409 |
|
| 1410 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1411 | {
|
| 1412 | int errno;
|
| 1413 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
| 1414 |
|
| 1415 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
| 1416 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1417 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
| 1418 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1419 |
|
| 1420 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1421 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
| 1422 | struct new_utsname *u;
|
| 1423 |
|
| 1424 | add_device_randomness(tmp, len);
|
| 1425 | down_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1426 | u = utsname();
|
| 1427 | memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len);
|
| 1428 | memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len);
|
| 1429 | errno = 0;
|
| 1430 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME);
|
| 1431 | up_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1432 | }
|
| 1433 | return errno;
|
| 1434 | }
|
| 1435 |
|
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 | static int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
|
| 1438 | struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim)
|
| 1439 | {
|
| 1440 | struct rlimit *rlim;
|
| 1441 | int retval = 0;
|
| 1442 |
|
| 1443 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1444 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1445 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
|
| 1446 |
|
| 1447 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1448 | if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
|
| 1449 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1450 | if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE &&
|
| 1451 | new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open)
|
| 1452 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1453 | }
|
| 1454 |
|
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 | rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
|
| 1457 | task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
|
| 1458 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1459 | |
| 1460 | * Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until cgroups can
|
| 1461 | * contain all limits.
|
| 1462 |
|
| 1463 | if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max &&
|
| 1464 | !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 1465 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 1466 | if (!retval)
|
| 1467 | retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim);
|
| 1468 | }
|
| 1469 | if (!retval) {
|
| 1470 | if (old_rlim)
|
| 1471 | *old_rlim = *rlim;
|
| 1472 | if (new_rlim)
|
| 1473 | *rlim = *new_rlim;
|
| 1474 | }
|
| 1475 | task_unlock(tsk->group_leader);
|
| 1476 |
|
| 1477 | |
| 1478 | * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Arm the posix CPU timer if the limit is not
|
| 1479 | * infinite. In case of RLIM_INFINITY the posix CPU timer code
|
| 1480 | * ignores the rlimit.
|
| 1481 |
|
| 1482 | if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU &&
|
| 1483 | new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY &&
|
| 1484 | IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
|
| 1485 | |
| 1486 | * update_rlimit_cpu can fail if the task is exiting, but there
|
| 1487 | * may be other tasks in the thread group that are not exiting,
|
| 1488 | * and they need their cpu timers adjusted.
|
| 1489 | *
|
| 1490 | * The group_leader is the last task to be released, so if we
|
| 1491 | * cannot update_rlimit_cpu on it, then the entire process is
|
| 1492 | * exiting and we do not need to update at all.
|
| 1493 |
|
| 1494 | update_rlimit_cpu(tsk->group_leader, new_rlim->rlim_cur);
|
| 1495 | }
|
| 1496 |
|
| 1497 | return retval;
|
| 1498 | }
|
| 1499 |
|
| 1500 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1501 | {
|
| 1502 | struct rlimit value;
|
| 1503 | int ret;
|
| 1504 |
|
| 1505 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value);
|
| 1506 | if (!ret)
|
| 1507 | ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1508 |
|
| 1509 | return ret;
|
| 1510 | }
|
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 1513 |
|
| 1514 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1515 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1516 | {
|
| 1517 | struct rlimit r;
|
| 1518 | struct compat_rlimit r32;
|
| 1519 |
|
| 1520 | if (copy_from_user(&r32, rlim, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit)))
|
| 1521 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1522 |
|
| 1523 | if (r32.rlim_cur == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1524 | r.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1525 | else
|
| 1526 | r.rlim_cur = r32.rlim_cur;
|
| 1527 | if (r32.rlim_max == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1528 | r.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1529 | else
|
| 1530 | r.rlim_max = r32.rlim_max;
|
| 1531 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, &r, NULL);
|
| 1532 | }
|
| 1533 |
|
| 1534 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1535 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1536 | {
|
| 1537 | struct rlimit r;
|
| 1538 | int ret;
|
| 1539 |
|
| 1540 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &r);
|
| 1541 | if (!ret) {
|
| 1542 | struct compat_rlimit r32;
|
| 1543 | if (r.rlim_cur > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1544 | r32.rlim_cur = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1545 | else
|
| 1546 | r32.rlim_cur = r.rlim_cur;
|
| 1547 | if (r.rlim_max > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1548 | r32.rlim_max = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1549 | else
|
| 1550 | r32.rlim_max = r.rlim_max;
|
| 1551 |
|
| 1552 | if (copy_to_user(rlim, &r32, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit)))
|
| 1553 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1554 | }
|
| 1555 | return ret;
|
| 1556 | }
|
| 1557 |
|
| 1558 | #endif
|
| 1559 |
|
| 1560 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
|
| 1561 |
|
| 1562 | |
| 1563 | * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
|
| 1564 |
|
| 1565 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1566 | struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1567 | {
|
| 1568 | struct rlimit x;
|
| 1569 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1570 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1571 |
|
| 1572 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
|
| 1573 | task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1574 | x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
| 1575 | task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1576 | if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1577 | x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1578 | if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1579 | x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1580 | return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1581 | }
|
| 1582 |
|
| 1583 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 1584 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1585 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1586 | {
|
| 1587 | struct rlimit r;
|
| 1588 |
|
| 1589 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1590 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1591 |
|
| 1592 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
|
| 1593 | task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1594 | r = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
| 1595 | task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1596 | if (r.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1597 | r.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1598 | if (r.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1599 | r.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1600 |
|
| 1601 | if (put_user(r.rlim_cur, &rlim->rlim_cur) ||
|
| 1602 | put_user(r.rlim_max, &rlim->rlim_max))
|
| 1603 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1604 | return 0;
|
| 1605 | }
|
| 1606 | #endif
|
| 1607 |
|
| 1608 | #endif
|
| 1609 |
|
| 1610 | static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64)
|
| 1611 | {
|
| 1612 | #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64
|
| 1613 | return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX;
|
| 1614 | #else
|
| 1615 | return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1616 | #endif
|
| 1617 | }
|
| 1618 |
|
| 1619 | static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64)
|
| 1620 | {
|
| 1621 | if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1622 | rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1623 | else
|
| 1624 | rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur;
|
| 1625 | if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1626 | rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1627 | else
|
| 1628 | rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max;
|
| 1629 | }
|
| 1630 |
|
| 1631 | static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim)
|
| 1632 | {
|
| 1633 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur))
|
| 1634 | rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1635 | else
|
| 1636 | rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur;
|
| 1637 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max))
|
| 1638 | rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1639 | else
|
| 1640 | rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max;
|
| 1641 | }
|
| 1642 |
|
| 1643 |
|
| 1644 | static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task,
|
| 1645 | unsigned int flags)
|
| 1646 | {
|
| 1647 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
|
| 1648 | bool id_match;
|
| 1649 |
|
| 1650 | if (current == task)
|
| 1651 | return 0;
|
| 1652 |
|
| 1653 | tcred = __task_cred(task);
|
| 1654 | id_match = (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
|
| 1655 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
|
| 1656 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
|
| 1657 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
|
| 1658 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
|
| 1659 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid));
|
| 1660 | if (!id_match && !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 1661 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1662 |
|
| 1663 | return security_task_prlimit(cred, tcred, flags);
|
| 1664 | }
|
| 1665 |
|
| 1666 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1667 | const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim,
|
| 1668 | struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim)
|
| 1669 | {
|
| 1670 | struct rlimit64 old64, new64;
|
| 1671 | struct rlimit old, new;
|
| 1672 | struct task_struct *tsk;
|
| 1673 | unsigned int checkflags = 0;
|
| 1674 | int ret;
|
| 1675 |
|
| 1676 | if (old_rlim)
|
| 1677 | checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_READ;
|
| 1678 |
|
| 1679 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1680 | if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64)))
|
| 1681 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1682 | rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new);
|
| 1683 | checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE;
|
| 1684 | }
|
| 1685 |
|
| 1686 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1687 | tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current;
|
| 1688 | if (!tsk) {
|
| 1689 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1690 | return -ESRCH;
|
| 1691 | }
|
| 1692 | ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk, checkflags);
|
| 1693 | if (ret) {
|
| 1694 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1695 | return ret;
|
| 1696 | }
|
| 1697 | get_task_struct(tsk);
|
| 1698 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1699 |
|
| 1700 | ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL,
|
| 1701 | old_rlim ? &old : NULL);
|
| 1702 |
|
| 1703 | if (!ret && old_rlim) {
|
| 1704 | rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64);
|
| 1705 | if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64)))
|
| 1706 | ret = -EFAULT;
|
| 1707 | }
|
| 1708 |
|
| 1709 | put_task_struct(tsk);
|
| 1710 | return ret;
|
| 1711 | }
|
| 1712 |
|
| 1713 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1714 | {
|
| 1715 | struct rlimit new_rlim;
|
| 1716 |
|
| 1717 | if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
|
| 1718 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1719 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL);
|
| 1720 | }
|
| 1721 |
|
| 1722 | |
| 1723 | * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
|
| 1724 | * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
|
| 1725 | * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
|
| 1726 | * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
|
| 1727 | * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
|
| 1728 | * measuring them yet).
|
| 1729 | *
|
| 1730 | * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
|
| 1731 | * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
|
| 1732 | * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
|
| 1733 | * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
|
| 1734 | * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
|
| 1735 | * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
|
| 1736 | * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
|
| 1737 | *
|
| 1738 | * Locking:
|
| 1739 | * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH
|
| 1740 | * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded
|
| 1741 | * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with
|
| 1742 | * the siglock held.
|
| 1743 | * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and
|
| 1744 | * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one
|
| 1745 | * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else
|
| 1746 | * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the
|
| 1747 | * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just
|
| 1748 | * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock.
|
| 1749 | * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal
|
| 1750 | * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal->
|
| 1751 | * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple.
|
| 1752 | *
|
| 1753 |
|
| 1754 |
|
| 1755 | static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r)
|
| 1756 | {
|
| 1757 | r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw;
|
| 1758 | r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw;
|
| 1759 | r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt;
|
| 1760 | r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt;
|
| 1761 | r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t);
|
| 1762 | r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t);
|
| 1763 | }
|
| 1764 |
|
| 1765 | void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
|
| 1766 | {
|
| 1767 | struct task_struct *t;
|
| 1768 | unsigned long flags;
|
| 1769 | u64 tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime;
|
| 1770 | unsigned long maxrss = 0;
|
| 1771 |
|
| 1772 | memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r));
|
| 1773 | utime = stime = 0;
|
| 1774 |
|
| 1775 | if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) {
|
| 1776 | task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime);
|
| 1777 | accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r);
|
| 1778 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
|
| 1779 | goto out;
|
| 1780 | }
|
| 1781 |
|
| 1782 | if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags))
|
| 1783 | return;
|
| 1784 |
|
| 1785 | switch (who) {
|
| 1786 | case RUSAGE_BOTH:
|
| 1787 | case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
|
| 1788 | utime = p->signal->cutime;
|
| 1789 | stime = p->signal->cstime;
|
| 1790 | r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw;
|
| 1791 | r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw;
|
| 1792 | r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt;
|
| 1793 | r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt;
|
| 1794 | r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock;
|
| 1795 | r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock;
|
| 1796 | maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss;
|
| 1797 |
|
| 1798 | if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
|
| 1799 | break;
|
| 1800 | fallthrough;
|
| 1801 |
|
| 1802 | case RUSAGE_SELF:
|
| 1803 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
| 1804 | utime += tgutime;
|
| 1805 | stime += tgstime;
|
| 1806 | r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw;
|
| 1807 | r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw;
|
| 1808 | r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt;
|
| 1809 | r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt;
|
| 1810 | r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock;
|
| 1811 | r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock;
|
| 1812 | if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss)
|
| 1813 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
|
| 1814 | t = p;
|
| 1815 | do {
|
| 1816 | accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r);
|
| 1817 | } while_each_thread(p, t);
|
| 1818 | break;
|
| 1819 |
|
| 1820 | default:
|
| 1821 | BUG();
|
| 1822 | }
|
| 1823 | unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
|
| 1824 |
|
| 1825 | out:
|
| 1826 | r->ru_utime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(utime);
|
| 1827 | r->ru_stime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(stime);
|
| 1828 |
|
| 1829 | if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) {
|
| 1830 | struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p);
|
| 1831 |
|
| 1832 | if (mm) {
|
| 1833 | setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm);
|
| 1834 | mmput(mm);
|
| 1835 | }
|
| 1836 | }
|
| 1837 | r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024);
|
| 1838 | }
|
| 1839 |
|
| 1840 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru)
|
| 1841 | {
|
| 1842 | struct rusage r;
|
| 1843 |
|
| 1844 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
|
| 1845 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
|
| 1846 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 | getrusage(current, who, &r);
|
| 1849 | return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1850 | }
|
| 1851 |
|
| 1852 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 1853 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru)
|
| 1854 | {
|
| 1855 | struct rusage r;
|
| 1856 |
|
| 1857 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
|
| 1858 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
|
| 1859 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1860 |
|
| 1861 | getrusage(current, who, &r);
|
| 1862 | return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru);
|
| 1863 | }
|
| 1864 | #endif
|
| 1865 |
|
| 1866 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask)
|
| 1867 | {
|
| 1868 | mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
|
| 1869 | return mask;
|
| 1870 | }
|
| 1871 |
|
| 1872 | static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
|
| 1873 | {
|
| 1874 | struct fd exe;
|
| 1875 | struct inode *inode;
|
| 1876 | int err;
|
| 1877 |
|
| 1878 | exe = fdget(fd);
|
| 1879 | if (!exe.file)
|
| 1880 | return -EBADF;
|
| 1881 |
|
| 1882 | inode = file_inode(exe.file);
|
| 1883 |
|
| 1884 | |
| 1885 | * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make
|
| 1886 | * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an
|
| 1887 | * overall picture.
|
| 1888 |
|
| 1889 | err = -EACCES;
|
| 1890 | if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
|
| 1891 | goto exit;
|
| 1892 |
|
| 1893 | err = file_permission(exe.file, MAY_EXEC);
|
| 1894 | if (err)
|
| 1895 | goto exit;
|
| 1896 |
|
| 1897 | err = replace_mm_exe_file(mm, exe.file);
|
| 1898 | exit:
|
| 1899 | fdput(exe);
|
| 1900 | return err;
|
| 1901 | }
|
| 1902 |
|
| 1903 | |
| 1904 | * Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses.
|
| 1905 | *
|
| 1906 | * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful
|
| 1907 | * in what is allowed for modification from userspace.
|
| 1908 |
|
| 1909 | static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
|
| 1910 | {
|
| 1911 | unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE;
|
| 1912 | int error = -EINVAL, i;
|
| 1913 |
|
| 1914 | static const unsigned char offsets[] = {
|
| 1915 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code),
|
| 1916 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_code),
|
| 1917 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_data),
|
| 1918 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_data),
|
| 1919 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_brk),
|
| 1920 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, brk),
|
| 1921 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_stack),
|
| 1922 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_start),
|
| 1923 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_end),
|
| 1924 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_start),
|
| 1925 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end),
|
| 1926 | };
|
| 1927 |
|
| 1928 | |
| 1929 | * Make sure the members are not somewhere outside
|
| 1930 | * of allowed address space.
|
| 1931 |
|
| 1932 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) {
|
| 1933 | u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]);
|
| 1934 |
|
| 1935 | if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr ||
|
| 1936 | (unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr)
|
| 1937 | goto out;
|
| 1938 | }
|
| 1939 |
|
| 1940 | |
| 1941 | * Make sure the pairs are ordered.
|
| 1942 |
|
| 1943 | #define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \
|
| 1944 | ((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \
|
| 1945 | (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL
|
| 1946 | error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code);
|
| 1947 | error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data,<=, end_data);
|
| 1948 | error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk);
|
| 1949 | error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end);
|
| 1950 | error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end);
|
| 1951 | if (error)
|
| 1952 | goto out;
|
| 1953 | #undef __prctl_check_order
|
| 1954 |
|
| 1955 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1956 |
|
| 1957 | |
| 1958 | * Neither we should allow to override limits if they set.
|
| 1959 |
|
| 1960 | if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk,
|
| 1961 | prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data,
|
| 1962 | prctl_map->start_data))
|
| 1963 | goto out;
|
| 1964 |
|
| 1965 | error = 0;
|
| 1966 | out:
|
| 1967 | return error;
|
| 1968 | }
|
| 1969 |
|
| 1970 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
| 1971 | static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size)
|
| 1972 | {
|
| 1973 | struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, };
|
| 1974 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE];
|
| 1975 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
| 1976 | int error;
|
| 1977 |
|
| 1978 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv));
|
| 1979 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct prctl_mm_map) > 256);
|
| 1980 |
|
| 1981 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)
|
| 1982 | return put_user((unsigned int)sizeof(prctl_map),
|
| 1983 | (unsigned int __user *)addr);
|
| 1984 |
|
| 1985 | if (data_size != sizeof(prctl_map))
|
| 1986 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1987 |
|
| 1988 | if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map)))
|
| 1989 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1990 |
|
| 1991 | error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
|
| 1992 | if (error)
|
| 1993 | return error;
|
| 1994 |
|
| 1995 | if (prctl_map.auxv_size) {
|
| 1996 | |
| 1997 | * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector.
|
| 1998 |
|
| 1999 | if (!prctl_map.auxv ||
|
| 2000 | prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv))
|
| 2001 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2002 |
|
| 2003 | memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv));
|
| 2004 | if (copy_from_user(user_auxv,
|
| 2005 | (const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv,
|
| 2006 | prctl_map.auxv_size))
|
| 2007 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2008 |
|
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = AT_NULL;
|
| 2011 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL;
|
| 2012 | }
|
| 2013 |
|
| 2014 | if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
|
| 2015 | |
| 2016 | * Check if the current user is checkpoint/restore capable.
|
| 2017 | * At the time of this writing, it checks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
|
| 2018 | * or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
|
| 2019 | * Note that a user with access to ptrace can masquerade an
|
| 2020 | * arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones.
|
| 2021 | * This may have implications in the tomoyo subsystem.
|
| 2022 |
|
| 2023 | if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(current_user_ns()))
|
| 2024 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2025 |
|
| 2026 | error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd);
|
| 2027 | if (error)
|
| 2028 | return error;
|
| 2029 | }
|
| 2030 |
|
| 2031 | |
| 2032 | * arg_lock protects concurrent updates but we still need mmap_lock for
|
| 2033 | * read to exclude races with sys_brk.
|
| 2034 |
|
| 2035 | mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
| 2036 |
|
| 2037 | |
| 2038 | * We don't validate if these members are pointing to
|
| 2039 | * real present VMAs because application may have correspond
|
| 2040 | * VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics
|
| 2041 | * output in procfs mostly, except
|
| 2042 | *
|
| 2043 | * - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk_flags but kernel lookups
|
| 2044 | * for VMAs when updating these members so anything wrong written
|
| 2045 | * here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead
|
| 2046 | * to any problem in kernel itself
|
| 2047 |
|
| 2048 |
|
| 2049 | spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
| 2050 | mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code;
|
| 2051 | mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code;
|
| 2052 | mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data;
|
| 2053 | mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data;
|
| 2054 | mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk;
|
| 2055 | mm->brk = prctl_map.brk;
|
| 2056 | mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack;
|
| 2057 | mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start;
|
| 2058 | mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end;
|
| 2059 | mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start;
|
| 2060 | mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end;
|
| 2061 | spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
| 2062 |
|
| 2063 | |
| 2064 | * Note this update of @saved_auxv is lockless thus
|
| 2065 | * if someone reads this member in procfs while we're
|
| 2066 | * updating -- it may get partly updated results. It's
|
| 2067 | * known and acceptable trade off: we leave it as is to
|
| 2068 | * not introduce additional locks here making the kernel
|
| 2069 | * more complex.
|
| 2070 |
|
| 2071 | if (prctl_map.auxv_size)
|
| 2072 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv));
|
| 2073 |
|
| 2074 | mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
| 2075 | return 0;
|
| 2076 | }
|
| 2077 | #endif
|
| 2078 |
|
| 2079 | static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
|
| 2080 | unsigned long len)
|
| 2081 | {
|
| 2082 | |
| 2083 | * This doesn't move the auxiliary vector itself since it's pinned to
|
| 2084 | * mm_struct, but it permits filling the vector with new values. It's
|
| 2085 | * up to the caller to provide sane values here, otherwise userspace
|
| 2086 | * tools which use this vector might be unhappy.
|
| 2087 |
|
| 2088 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE] = {};
|
| 2089 |
|
| 2090 | if (len > sizeof(user_auxv))
|
| 2091 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2092 |
|
| 2093 | if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, len))
|
| 2094 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2095 |
|
| 2096 |
|
| 2097 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0;
|
| 2098 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0;
|
| 2099 |
|
| 2100 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv));
|
| 2101 |
|
| 2102 | task_lock(current);
|
| 2103 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len);
|
| 2104 | task_unlock(current);
|
| 2105 |
|
| 2106 | return 0;
|
| 2107 | }
|
| 2108 |
|
| 2109 | static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
|
| 2110 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
| 2111 | {
|
| 2112 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
| 2113 | struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = {
|
| 2114 | .auxv = NULL,
|
| 2115 | .auxv_size = 0,
|
| 2116 | .exe_fd = -1,
|
| 2117 | };
|
| 2118 | struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
| 2119 | int error;
|
| 2120 |
|
| 2121 | if (arg5 || (arg4 && (opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV &&
|
| 2122 | opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP &&
|
| 2123 | opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)))
|
| 2124 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2125 |
|
| 2126 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
| 2127 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)
|
| 2128 | return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4);
|
| 2129 | #endif
|
| 2130 |
|
| 2131 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 2132 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2133 |
|
| 2134 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE)
|
| 2135 | return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr);
|
| 2136 |
|
| 2137 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV)
|
| 2138 | return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4);
|
| 2139 |
|
| 2140 | if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr)
|
| 2141 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2142 |
|
| 2143 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2144 |
|
| 2145 | |
| 2146 | * arg_lock protects concurrent updates of arg boundaries, we need
|
| 2147 | * mmap_lock for a) concurrent sys_brk, b) finding VMA for addr
|
| 2148 | * validation.
|
| 2149 |
|
| 2150 | mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
| 2151 | vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
|
| 2152 |
|
| 2153 | spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
| 2154 | prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code;
|
| 2155 | prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code;
|
| 2156 | prctl_map.start_data = mm->start_data;
|
| 2157 | prctl_map.end_data = mm->end_data;
|
| 2158 | prctl_map.start_brk = mm->start_brk;
|
| 2159 | prctl_map.brk = mm->brk;
|
| 2160 | prctl_map.start_stack = mm->start_stack;
|
| 2161 | prctl_map.arg_start = mm->arg_start;
|
| 2162 | prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end;
|
| 2163 | prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start;
|
| 2164 | prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end;
|
| 2165 |
|
| 2166 | switch (opt) {
|
| 2167 | case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE:
|
| 2168 | prctl_map.start_code = addr;
|
| 2169 | break;
|
| 2170 | case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE:
|
| 2171 | prctl_map.end_code = addr;
|
| 2172 | break;
|
| 2173 | case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA:
|
| 2174 | prctl_map.start_data = addr;
|
| 2175 | break;
|
| 2176 | case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA:
|
| 2177 | prctl_map.end_data = addr;
|
| 2178 | break;
|
| 2179 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK:
|
| 2180 | prctl_map.start_stack = addr;
|
| 2181 | break;
|
| 2182 | case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK:
|
| 2183 | prctl_map.start_brk = addr;
|
| 2184 | break;
|
| 2185 | case PR_SET_MM_BRK:
|
| 2186 | prctl_map.brk = addr;
|
| 2187 | break;
|
| 2188 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START:
|
| 2189 | prctl_map.arg_start = addr;
|
| 2190 | break;
|
| 2191 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END:
|
| 2192 | prctl_map.arg_end = addr;
|
| 2193 | break;
|
| 2194 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START:
|
| 2195 | prctl_map.env_start = addr;
|
| 2196 | break;
|
| 2197 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END:
|
| 2198 | prctl_map.env_end = addr;
|
| 2199 | break;
|
| 2200 | default:
|
| 2201 | goto out;
|
| 2202 | }
|
| 2203 |
|
| 2204 | error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
|
| 2205 | if (error)
|
| 2206 | goto out;
|
| 2207 |
|
| 2208 | switch (opt) {
|
| 2209 | |
| 2210 | * If command line arguments and environment
|
| 2211 | * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can
|
| 2212 | * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup
|
| 2213 | * command line arguments and ENV_START/END
|
| 2214 | * for environment.
|
| 2215 |
|
| 2216 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK:
|
| 2217 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START:
|
| 2218 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END:
|
| 2219 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START:
|
| 2220 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END:
|
| 2221 | if (!vma) {
|
| 2222 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 2223 | goto out;
|
| 2224 | }
|
| 2225 | }
|
| 2226 |
|
| 2227 | mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code;
|
| 2228 | mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code;
|
| 2229 | mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data;
|
| 2230 | mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data;
|
| 2231 | mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk;
|
| 2232 | mm->brk = prctl_map.brk;
|
| 2233 | mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack;
|
| 2234 | mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start;
|
| 2235 | mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end;
|
| 2236 | mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start;
|
| 2237 | mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end;
|
| 2238 |
|
| 2239 | error = 0;
|
| 2240 | out:
|
| 2241 | spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
| 2242 | mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
| 2243 | return error;
|
| 2244 | }
|
| 2245 |
|
| 2246 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
| 2247 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr)
|
| 2248 | {
|
| 2249 | return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr);
|
| 2250 | }
|
| 2251 | #else
|
| 2252 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr)
|
| 2253 | {
|
| 2254 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2255 | }
|
| 2256 | #endif
|
| 2257 |
|
| 2258 | static int propagate_has_child_subreaper(struct task_struct *p, void *data)
|
| 2259 | {
|
| 2260 | |
| 2261 | * If task has has_child_subreaper - all its descendants
|
| 2262 | * already have these flag too and new descendants will
|
| 2263 | * inherit it on fork, skip them.
|
| 2264 | *
|
| 2265 | * If we've found child_reaper - skip descendants in
|
| 2266 | * it's subtree as they will never get out pidns.
|
| 2267 |
|
| 2268 | if (p->signal->has_child_subreaper ||
|
| 2269 | is_child_reaper(task_pid(p)))
|
| 2270 | return 0;
|
| 2271 |
|
| 2272 | p->signal->has_child_subreaper = 1;
|
| 2273 | return 1;
|
| 2274 | }
|
| 2275 |
|
| 2276 | int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which)
|
| 2277 | {
|
| 2278 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2279 | }
|
| 2280 |
|
| 2281 | int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which,
|
| 2282 | unsigned long ctrl)
|
| 2283 | {
|
| 2284 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2285 | }
|
| 2286 |
|
| 2287 | #define PR_IO_FLUSHER (PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO | PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE)
|
| 2288 |
|
| 2289 | #ifdef CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME
|
| 2290 |
|
| 2291 | #define ANON_VMA_NAME_MAX_LEN 80
|
| 2292 | #define ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS "\\`$[]"
|
| 2293 |
|
| 2294 | static inline bool is_valid_name_char(char ch)
|
| 2295 | {
|
| 2296 |
|
| 2297 | return ch > 0x1f && ch < 0x7f &&
|
| 2298 | !strchr(ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS, ch);
|
| 2299 | }
|
| 2300 |
|
| 2301 | static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long addr,
|
| 2302 | unsigned long size, unsigned long arg)
|
| 2303 | {
|
| 2304 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
| 2305 | const char __user *uname;
|
| 2306 | struct anon_vma_name *anon_name = NULL;
|
| 2307 | int error;
|
| 2308 |
|
| 2309 | switch (opt) {
|
| 2310 | case PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME:
|
| 2311 | uname = (const char __user *)arg;
|
| 2312 | if (uname) {
|
| 2313 | char *name, *pch;
|
| 2314 |
|
| 2315 | name = strndup_user(uname, ANON_VMA_NAME_MAX_LEN);
|
| 2316 | if (IS_ERR(name))
|
| 2317 | return PTR_ERR(name);
|
| 2318 |
|
| 2319 | for (pch = name; *pch != '\0'; pch++) {
|
| 2320 | if (!is_valid_name_char(*pch)) {
|
| 2321 | kfree(name);
|
| 2322 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2323 | }
|
| 2324 | }
|
| 2325 |
|
| 2326 | anon_name = anon_vma_name_alloc(name);
|
| 2327 | kfree(name);
|
| 2328 | if (!anon_name)
|
| 2329 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 2330 |
|
| 2331 | }
|
| 2332 |
|
| 2333 | mmap_write_lock(mm);
|
| 2334 | error = madvise_set_anon_name(mm, addr, size, anon_name);
|
| 2335 | mmap_write_unlock(mm);
|
| 2336 | anon_vma_name_put(anon_name);
|
| 2337 | break;
|
| 2338 | default:
|
| 2339 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2340 | }
|
| 2341 |
|
| 2342 | return error;
|
| 2343 | }
|
| 2344 |
|
| 2345 | #else
|
| 2346 | static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start,
|
| 2347 | unsigned long size, unsigned long arg)
|
| 2348 | {
|
| 2349 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2350 | }
|
| 2351 | #endif
|
| 2352 |
|
| 2353 | static inline int prctl_set_mdwe(unsigned long bits, unsigned long arg3,
|
| 2354 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
| 2355 | {
|
| 2356 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2357 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2358 |
|
| 2359 | if (bits & ~(PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN))
|
| 2360 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2361 |
|
| 2362 | if (bits & PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN)
|
| 2363 | set_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags);
|
| 2364 | else if (test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags))
|
| 2365 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2366 |
|
| 2367 | return 0;
|
| 2368 | }
|
| 2369 |
|
| 2370 | static inline int prctl_get_mdwe(unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|
| 2371 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
| 2372 | {
|
| 2373 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2374 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2375 |
|
| 2376 | return test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags) ?
|
| 2377 | PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN : 0;
|
| 2378 | }
|
| 2379 |
|
| 2380 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
|
| 2381 | unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
|
| 2382 | {
|
| 2383 | struct task_struct *me = current;
|
| 2384 | unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
|
| 2385 | long error;
|
| 2386 |
|
| 2387 | error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2388 | if (error != -ENOSYS)
|
| 2389 | return error;
|
| 2390 |
|
| 2391 | error = 0;
|
| 2392 | switch (option) {
|
| 2393 | case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
|
| 2394 | if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
|
| 2395 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2396 | break;
|
| 2397 | }
|
| 2398 | me->pdeath_signal = arg2;
|
| 2399 | break;
|
| 2400 | case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
|
| 2401 | error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
|
| 2402 | break;
|
| 2403 | case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
|
| 2404 | error = get_dumpable(me->mm);
|
| 2405 | break;
|
| 2406 | case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
|
| 2407 | if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) {
|
| 2408 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2409 | break;
|
| 2410 | }
|
| 2411 | set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
|
| 2412 | break;
|
| 2413 |
|
| 2414 | case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
|
| 2415 | error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2416 | break;
|
| 2417 | case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
|
| 2418 | error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2419 | break;
|
| 2420 | case PR_SET_FPEMU:
|
| 2421 | error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2422 | break;
|
| 2423 | case PR_GET_FPEMU:
|
| 2424 | error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2425 | break;
|
| 2426 | case PR_SET_FPEXC:
|
| 2427 | error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2428 | break;
|
| 2429 | case PR_GET_FPEXC:
|
| 2430 | error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2431 | break;
|
| 2432 | case PR_GET_TIMING:
|
| 2433 | error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
|
| 2434 | break;
|
| 2435 | case PR_SET_TIMING:
|
| 2436 | if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
|
| 2437 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2438 | break;
|
| 2439 | case PR_SET_NAME:
|
| 2440 | comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0;
|
| 2441 | if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2,
|
| 2442 | sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0)
|
| 2443 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2444 | set_task_comm(me, comm);
|
| 2445 | proc_comm_connector(me);
|
| 2446 | break;
|
| 2447 | case PR_GET_NAME:
|
| 2448 | get_task_comm(comm, me);
|
| 2449 | if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm)))
|
| 2450 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2451 | break;
|
| 2452 | case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
|
| 2453 | error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
| 2454 | break;
|
| 2455 | case PR_SET_ENDIAN:
|
| 2456 | error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
| 2457 | break;
|
| 2458 | case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
|
| 2459 | error = prctl_get_seccomp();
|
| 2460 | break;
|
| 2461 | case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
|
| 2462 | error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3);
|
| 2463 | break;
|
| 2464 | case PR_GET_TSC:
|
| 2465 | error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
| 2466 | break;
|
| 2467 | case PR_SET_TSC:
|
| 2468 | error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
| 2469 | break;
|
| 2470 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE:
|
| 2471 | error = perf_event_task_disable();
|
| 2472 | break;
|
| 2473 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE:
|
| 2474 | error = perf_event_task_enable();
|
| 2475 | break;
|
| 2476 | case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK:
|
| 2477 | if (current->timer_slack_ns > ULONG_MAX)
|
| 2478 | error = ULONG_MAX;
|
| 2479 | else
|
| 2480 | error = current->timer_slack_ns;
|
| 2481 | break;
|
| 2482 | case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK:
|
| 2483 | if (arg2 <= 0)
|
| 2484 | current->timer_slack_ns =
|
| 2485 | current->default_timer_slack_ns;
|
| 2486 | else
|
| 2487 | current->timer_slack_ns = arg2;
|
| 2488 | break;
|
| 2489 | case PR_MCE_KILL:
|
| 2490 | if (arg4 | arg5)
|
| 2491 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2492 | switch (arg2) {
|
| 2493 | case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR:
|
| 2494 | if (arg3 != 0)
|
| 2495 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2496 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
| 2497 | break;
|
| 2498 | case PR_MCE_KILL_SET:
|
| 2499 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
| 2500 | if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY)
|
| 2501 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
| 2502 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE)
|
| 2503 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
| 2504 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT)
|
| 2505 | current->flags &=
|
| 2506 | ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS);
|
| 2507 | else
|
| 2508 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2509 | break;
|
| 2510 | default:
|
| 2511 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2512 | }
|
| 2513 | break;
|
| 2514 | case PR_MCE_KILL_GET:
|
| 2515 | if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
|
| 2516 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2517 | if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS)
|
| 2518 | error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ?
|
| 2519 | PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE;
|
| 2520 | else
|
| 2521 | error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT;
|
| 2522 | break;
|
| 2523 | case PR_SET_MM:
|
| 2524 | error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2525 | break;
|
| 2526 | case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS:
|
| 2527 | error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user * __user *)arg2);
|
| 2528 | break;
|
| 2529 | case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
|
| 2530 | me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2;
|
| 2531 | if (!arg2)
|
| 2532 | break;
|
| 2533 |
|
| 2534 | walk_process_tree(me, propagate_has_child_subreaper, NULL);
|
| 2535 | break;
|
| 2536 | case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
|
| 2537 | error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper,
|
| 2538 | (int __user *)arg2);
|
| 2539 | break;
|
| 2540 | case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
|
| 2541 | if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2542 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2543 |
|
| 2544 | task_set_no_new_privs(current);
|
| 2545 | break;
|
| 2546 | case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
|
| 2547 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2548 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2549 | return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0;
|
| 2550 | case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE:
|
| 2551 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2552 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2553 | error = !!test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
|
| 2554 | break;
|
| 2555 | case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE:
|
| 2556 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2557 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2558 | if (mmap_write_lock_killable(me->mm))
|
| 2559 | return -EINTR;
|
| 2560 | if (arg2)
|
| 2561 | set_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
|
| 2562 | else
|
| 2563 | clear_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
|
| 2564 | mmap_write_unlock(me->mm);
|
| 2565 | break;
|
| 2566 | case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT:
|
| 2567 | case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT:
|
| 2568 |
|
| 2569 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2570 | case PR_SET_FP_MODE:
|
| 2571 | error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2);
|
| 2572 | break;
|
| 2573 | case PR_GET_FP_MODE:
|
| 2574 | error = GET_FP_MODE(me);
|
| 2575 | break;
|
| 2576 | case PR_SVE_SET_VL:
|
| 2577 | error = SVE_SET_VL(arg2);
|
| 2578 | break;
|
| 2579 | case PR_SVE_GET_VL:
|
| 2580 | error = SVE_GET_VL();
|
| 2581 | break;
|
| 2582 | case PR_SME_SET_VL:
|
| 2583 | error = SME_SET_VL(arg2);
|
| 2584 | break;
|
| 2585 | case PR_SME_GET_VL:
|
| 2586 | error = SME_GET_VL();
|
| 2587 | break;
|
| 2588 | case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
|
| 2589 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2590 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2591 | error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(me, arg2);
|
| 2592 | break;
|
| 2593 | case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
|
| 2594 | if (arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2595 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2596 | error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(me, arg2, arg3);
|
| 2597 | break;
|
| 2598 | case PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS:
|
| 2599 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2600 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2601 | error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2);
|
| 2602 | break;
|
| 2603 | case PR_PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS:
|
| 2604 | if (arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2605 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2606 | error = PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(me, arg2, arg3);
|
| 2607 | break;
|
| 2608 | case PR_PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS:
|
| 2609 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2610 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2611 | error = PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(me);
|
| 2612 | break;
|
| 2613 | case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL:
|
| 2614 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2615 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2616 | error = SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg2);
|
| 2617 | break;
|
| 2618 | case PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL:
|
| 2619 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2620 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2621 | error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL();
|
| 2622 | break;
|
| 2623 | case PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER:
|
| 2624 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 2625 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2626 |
|
| 2627 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2628 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2629 |
|
| 2630 | if (arg2 == 1)
|
| 2631 | current->flags |= PR_IO_FLUSHER;
|
| 2632 | else if (!arg2)
|
| 2633 | current->flags &= ~PR_IO_FLUSHER;
|
| 2634 | else
|
| 2635 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2636 | break;
|
| 2637 | case PR_GET_IO_FLUSHER:
|
| 2638 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 2639 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2640 |
|
| 2641 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2642 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2643 |
|
| 2644 | error = (current->flags & PR_IO_FLUSHER) == PR_IO_FLUSHER;
|
| 2645 | break;
|
| 2646 | case PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH:
|
| 2647 | error = set_syscall_user_dispatch(arg2, arg3, arg4,
|
| 2648 | (char __user *) arg5);
|
| 2649 | break;
|
| 2650 | #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE
|
| 2651 | case PR_SCHED_CORE:
|
| 2652 | error = sched_core_share_pid(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2653 | break;
|
| 2654 | #endif
|
| 2655 | case PR_SET_MDWE:
|
| 2656 | error = prctl_set_mdwe(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2657 | break;
|
| 2658 | case PR_GET_MDWE:
|
| 2659 | error = prctl_get_mdwe(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2660 | break;
|
| 2661 | case PR_SET_VMA:
|
| 2662 | error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2663 | break;
|
| 2664 | default:
|
| 2665 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2666 | break;
|
| 2667 | }
|
| 2668 | return error;
|
| 2669 | }
|
| 2670 |
|
| 2671 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep,
|
| 2672 | struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused)
|
| 2673 | {
|
| 2674 | int err = 0;
|
| 2675 | int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
|
| 2676 |
|
| 2677 | if (cpup)
|
| 2678 | err |= put_user(cpu, cpup);
|
| 2679 | if (nodep)
|
| 2680 | err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep);
|
| 2681 | return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 2682 | }
|
| 2683 |
|
| 2684 | |
| 2685 | * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct
|
| 2686 | * @info: pointer to buffer to fill
|
| 2687 |
|
| 2688 | static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info)
|
| 2689 | {
|
| 2690 | unsigned long mem_total, sav_total;
|
| 2691 | unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount;
|
| 2692 | struct timespec64 tp;
|
| 2693 |
|
| 2694 | memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo));
|
| 2695 |
|
| 2696 | ktime_get_boottime_ts64(&tp);
|
| 2697 | timens_add_boottime(&tp);
|
| 2698 | info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0);
|
| 2699 |
|
| 2700 | get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT);
|
| 2701 |
|
| 2702 | info->procs = nr_threads;
|
| 2703 |
|
| 2704 | si_meminfo(info);
|
| 2705 | si_swapinfo(info);
|
| 2706 |
|
| 2707 | |
| 2708 | * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap)
|
| 2709 | * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then
|
| 2710 | * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not,
|
| 2711 | * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways...
|
| 2712 | *
|
| 2713 | * -Erik Andersen <[email protected]>
|
| 2714 |
|
| 2715 |
|
| 2716 | mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap;
|
| 2717 | if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap)
|
| 2718 | goto out;
|
| 2719 | bitcount = 0;
|
| 2720 | mem_unit = info->mem_unit;
|
| 2721 | while (mem_unit > 1) {
|
| 2722 | bitcount++;
|
| 2723 | mem_unit >>= 1;
|
| 2724 | sav_total = mem_total;
|
| 2725 | mem_total <<= 1;
|
| 2726 | if (mem_total < sav_total)
|
| 2727 | goto out;
|
| 2728 | }
|
| 2729 |
|
| 2730 | |
| 2731 | * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by
|
| 2732 | * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible
|
| 2733 | * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x
|
| 2734 | * kernels...
|
| 2735 |
|
| 2736 |
|
| 2737 | info->mem_unit = 1;
|
| 2738 | info->totalram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2739 | info->freeram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2740 | info->sharedram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2741 | info->bufferram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2742 | info->totalswap <<= bitcount;
|
| 2743 | info->freeswap <<= bitcount;
|
| 2744 | info->totalhigh <<= bitcount;
|
| 2745 | info->freehigh <<= bitcount;
|
| 2746 |
|
| 2747 | out:
|
| 2748 | return 0;
|
| 2749 | }
|
| 2750 |
|
| 2751 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info)
|
| 2752 | {
|
| 2753 | struct sysinfo val;
|
| 2754 |
|
| 2755 | do_sysinfo(&val);
|
| 2756 |
|
| 2757 | if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo)))
|
| 2758 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2759 |
|
| 2760 | return 0;
|
| 2761 | }
|
| 2762 |
|
| 2763 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 2764 | struct compat_sysinfo {
|
| 2765 | s32 uptime;
|
| 2766 | u32 loads[3];
|
| 2767 | u32 totalram;
|
| 2768 | u32 freeram;
|
| 2769 | u32 sharedram;
|
| 2770 | u32 bufferram;
|
| 2771 | u32 totalswap;
|
| 2772 | u32 freeswap;
|
| 2773 | u16 procs;
|
| 2774 | u16 pad;
|
| 2775 | u32 totalhigh;
|
| 2776 | u32 freehigh;
|
| 2777 | u32 mem_unit;
|
| 2778 | char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)];
|
| 2779 | };
|
| 2780 |
|
| 2781 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
|
| 2782 | {
|
| 2783 | struct sysinfo s;
|
| 2784 | struct compat_sysinfo s_32;
|
| 2785 |
|
| 2786 | do_sysinfo(&s);
|
| 2787 |
|
| 2788 | |
| 2789 | * down if needed
|
| 2790 |
|
| 2791 | if (upper_32_bits(s.totalram) || upper_32_bits(s.totalswap)) {
|
| 2792 | int bitcount = 0;
|
| 2793 |
|
| 2794 | while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) {
|
| 2795 | s.mem_unit <<= 1;
|
| 2796 | bitcount++;
|
| 2797 | }
|
| 2798 |
|
| 2799 | s.totalram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2800 | s.freeram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2801 | s.sharedram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2802 | s.bufferram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2803 | s.totalswap >>= bitcount;
|
| 2804 | s.freeswap >>= bitcount;
|
| 2805 | s.totalhigh >>= bitcount;
|
| 2806 | s.freehigh >>= bitcount;
|
| 2807 | }
|
| 2808 |
|
| 2809 | memset(&s_32, 0, sizeof(s_32));
|
| 2810 | s_32.uptime = s.uptime;
|
| 2811 | s_32.loads[0] = s.loads[0];
|
| 2812 | s_32.loads[1] = s.loads[1];
|
| 2813 | s_32.loads[2] = s.loads[2];
|
| 2814 | s_32.totalram = s.totalram;
|
| 2815 | s_32.freeram = s.freeram;
|
| 2816 | s_32.sharedram = s.sharedram;
|
| 2817 | s_32.bufferram = s.bufferram;
|
| 2818 | s_32.totalswap = s.totalswap;
|
| 2819 | s_32.freeswap = s.freeswap;
|
| 2820 | s_32.procs = s.procs;
|
| 2821 | s_32.totalhigh = s.totalhigh;
|
| 2822 | s_32.freehigh = s.freehigh;
|
| 2823 | s_32.mem_unit = s.mem_unit;
|
| 2824 | if (copy_to_user(info, &s_32, sizeof(s_32)))
|
| 2825 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2826 | return 0;
|
| 2827 | }
|
| 2828 | #endif
|