| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | * linux/kernel/sys.c
|
| 4 | *
|
| 5 | * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
|
| 6 |
|
| 7 |
|
| 8 | #include <linux/export.h>
|
| 9 | #include <linux/mm.h>
|
| 10 | #include <linux/mm_inline.h>
|
| 11 | #include <linux/utsname.h>
|
| 12 | #include <linux/mman.h>
|
| 13 | #include <linux/reboot.h>
|
| 14 | #include <linux/prctl.h>
|
| 15 | #include <linux/highuid.h>
|
| 16 | #include <linux/fs.h>
|
| 17 | #include <linux/kmod.h>
|
| 18 | #include <linux/perf_event.h>
|
| 19 | #include <linux/resource.h>
|
| 20 | #include <linux/kernel.h>
|
| 21 | #include <linux/workqueue.h>
|
| 22 | #include <linux/capability.h>
|
| 23 | #include <linux/device.h>
|
| 24 | #include <linux/key.h>
|
| 25 | #include <linux/times.h>
|
| 26 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
|
| 27 | #include <linux/security.h>
|
| 28 | #include <linux/random.h>
|
| 29 | #include <linux/suspend.h>
|
| 30 | #include <linux/tty.h>
|
| 31 | #include <linux/signal.h>
|
| 32 | #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
|
| 33 | #include <linux/getcpu.h>
|
| 34 | #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
|
| 35 | #include <linux/seccomp.h>
|
| 36 | #include <linux/cpu.h>
|
| 37 | #include <linux/personality.h>
|
| 38 | #include <linux/ptrace.h>
|
| 39 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
|
| 40 | #include <linux/file.h>
|
| 41 | #include <linux/mount.h>
|
| 42 | #include <linux/gfp.h>
|
| 43 | #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
|
| 44 | #include <linux/version.h>
|
| 45 | #include <linux/ctype.h>
|
| 46 | #include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h>
|
| 47 |
|
| 48 | #include <linux/compat.h>
|
| 49 | #include <linux/syscalls.h>
|
| 50 | #include <linux/kprobes.h>
|
| 51 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
|
| 52 | #include <linux/time_namespace.h>
|
| 53 | #include <linux/binfmts.h>
|
| 54 |
|
| 55 | #include <linux/sched.h>
|
| 56 | #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h>
|
| 57 | #include <linux/sched/loadavg.h>
|
| 58 | #include <linux/sched/stat.h>
|
| 59 | #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
|
| 60 | #include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
|
| 61 | #include <linux/sched/task.h>
|
| 62 | #include <linux/sched/cputime.h>
|
| 63 | #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
|
| 64 | #include <linux/uidgid.h>
|
| 65 | #include <linux/cred.h>
|
| 66 |
|
| 67 | #include <linux/nospec.h>
|
| 68 |
|
| 69 | #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
|
| 70 |
|
| 71 | #include <generated/utsrelease.h>
|
| 72 |
|
| 73 | #include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
| 74 | #include <asm/io.h>
|
| 75 | #include <asm/unistd.h>
|
| 76 |
|
| 77 | #include "uid16.h"
|
| 78 |
|
| 79 | #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
| 80 | # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 81 | #endif
|
| 82 | #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
| 83 | # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 84 | #endif
|
| 85 | #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL
|
| 86 | # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 87 | #endif
|
| 88 | #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL
|
| 89 | # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 90 | #endif
|
| 91 | #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL
|
| 92 | # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 93 | #endif
|
| 94 | #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL
|
| 95 | # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 96 | #endif
|
| 97 | #ifndef GET_ENDIAN
|
| 98 | # define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 99 | #endif
|
| 100 | #ifndef SET_ENDIAN
|
| 101 | # define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 102 | #endif
|
| 103 | #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL
|
| 104 | # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 105 | #endif
|
| 106 | #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL
|
| 107 | # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 108 | #endif
|
| 109 | #ifndef GET_FP_MODE
|
| 110 | # define GET_FP_MODE(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 111 | #endif
|
| 112 | #ifndef SET_FP_MODE
|
| 113 | # define SET_FP_MODE(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 114 | #endif
|
| 115 | #ifndef SVE_SET_VL
|
| 116 | # define SVE_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 117 | #endif
|
| 118 | #ifndef SVE_GET_VL
|
| 119 | # define SVE_GET_VL() (-EINVAL)
|
| 120 | #endif
|
| 121 | #ifndef SME_SET_VL
|
| 122 | # define SME_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 123 | #endif
|
| 124 | #ifndef SME_GET_VL
|
| 125 | # define SME_GET_VL() (-EINVAL)
|
| 126 | #endif
|
| 127 | #ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS
|
| 128 | # define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
| 129 | #endif
|
| 130 | #ifndef PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS
|
| 131 | # define PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(a, b, c) (-EINVAL)
|
| 132 | #endif
|
| 133 | #ifndef PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS
|
| 134 | # define PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 135 | #endif
|
| 136 | #ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
|
| 137 | # define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
| 138 | #endif
|
| 139 | #ifndef GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
|
| 140 | # define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() (-EINVAL)
|
| 141 | #endif
|
| 142 |
|
| 143 | |
| 144 | * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
|
| 145 | * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
|
| 146 |
|
| 147 |
|
| 148 | int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 149 | int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
|
| 150 |
|
| 151 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
|
| 152 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
|
| 153 |
|
| 154 | |
| 155 | * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
|
| 156 | * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
|
| 157 |
|
| 158 |
|
| 159 | int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
|
| 160 | int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWGID;
|
| 161 |
|
| 162 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
|
| 163 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
|
| 164 |
|
| 165 | |
| 166 | * Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid,
|
| 167 | * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns.
|
| 168 | *
|
| 169 | * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe
|
| 170 |
|
| 171 | static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p)
|
| 172 | {
|
| 173 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
|
| 174 |
|
| 175 | if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) ||
|
| 176 | uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid))
|
| 177 | return true;
|
| 178 | if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
|
| 179 | return true;
|
| 180 | return false;
|
| 181 | }
|
| 182 |
|
| 183 | |
| 184 | * set the priority of a task
|
| 185 | * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
|
| 186 |
|
| 187 | static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
|
| 188 | {
|
| 189 | int no_nice;
|
| 190 |
|
| 191 | if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) {
|
| 192 | error = -EPERM;
|
| 193 | goto out;
|
| 194 | }
|
| 195 | if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
|
| 196 | error = -EACCES;
|
| 197 | goto out;
|
| 198 | }
|
| 199 | no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
|
| 200 | if (no_nice) {
|
| 201 | error = no_nice;
|
| 202 | goto out;
|
| 203 | }
|
| 204 | if (error == -ESRCH)
|
| 205 | error = 0;
|
| 206 | set_user_nice(p, niceval);
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| 207 | out:
|
| 208 | return error;
|
| 209 | }
|
| 210 |
|
| 211 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval)
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| 212 | {
|
| 213 | struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
| 214 | struct user_struct *user;
|
| 215 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
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| 216 | int error = -EINVAL;
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| 217 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 218 | kuid_t uid;
|
| 219 |
|
| 220 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
| 221 | goto out;
|
| 222 |
|
| 223 |
|
| 224 | error = -ESRCH;
|
| 225 | if (niceval < MIN_NICE)
|
| 226 | niceval = MIN_NICE;
|
| 227 | if (niceval > MAX_NICE)
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| 228 | niceval = MAX_NICE;
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| 229 |
|
| 230 | rcu_read_lock();
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| 231 | switch (which) {
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| 232 | case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
| 233 | if (who)
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| 234 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
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| 235 | else
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| 236 | p = current;
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| 237 | if (p)
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| 238 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 239 | break;
|
| 240 | case PRIO_PGRP:
|
| 241 | if (who)
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| 242 | pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
| 243 | else
|
| 244 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 245 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 246 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
| 247 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 248 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
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| 249 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
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| 250 | break;
|
| 251 | case PRIO_USER:
|
| 252 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who);
|
| 253 | user = cred->user;
|
| 254 | if (!who)
|
| 255 | uid = cred->uid;
|
| 256 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) {
|
| 257 | user = find_user(uid);
|
| 258 | if (!user)
|
| 259 | goto out_unlock;
|
| 260 | }
|
| 261 | for_each_process_thread(g, p) {
|
| 262 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p))
|
| 263 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
| 264 | }
|
| 265 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid))
|
| 266 | free_uid(user);
|
| 267 | break;
|
| 268 | }
|
| 269 | out_unlock:
|
| 270 | rcu_read_unlock();
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| 271 | out:
|
| 272 | return error;
|
| 273 | }
|
| 274 |
|
| 275 | |
| 276 | * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
|
| 277 | * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
|
| 278 | * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
|
| 279 | * to stay compatible.
|
| 280 |
|
| 281 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who)
|
| 282 | {
|
| 283 | struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
| 284 | struct user_struct *user;
|
| 285 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 286 | long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 287 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 288 | kuid_t uid;
|
| 289 |
|
| 290 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
| 291 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 292 |
|
| 293 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 294 | switch (which) {
|
| 295 | case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
| 296 | if (who)
|
| 297 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
|
| 298 | else
|
| 299 | p = current;
|
| 300 | if (p) {
|
| 301 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p));
|
| 302 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 303 | retval = niceval;
|
| 304 | }
|
| 305 | break;
|
| 306 | case PRIO_PGRP:
|
| 307 | if (who)
|
| 308 | pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
| 309 | else
|
| 310 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 311 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 312 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
| 313 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p));
|
| 314 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 315 | retval = niceval;
|
| 316 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
| 317 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 318 | break;
|
| 319 | case PRIO_USER:
|
| 320 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who);
|
| 321 | user = cred->user;
|
| 322 | if (!who)
|
| 323 | uid = cred->uid;
|
| 324 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) {
|
| 325 | user = find_user(uid);
|
| 326 | if (!user)
|
| 327 | goto out_unlock;
|
| 328 | }
|
| 329 | for_each_process_thread(g, p) {
|
| 330 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p)) {
|
| 331 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p));
|
| 332 | if (niceval > retval)
|
| 333 | retval = niceval;
|
| 334 | }
|
| 335 | }
|
| 336 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid))
|
| 337 | free_uid(user);
|
| 338 | break;
|
| 339 | }
|
| 340 | out_unlock:
|
| 341 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 342 |
|
| 343 | return retval;
|
| 344 | }
|
| 345 |
|
| 346 | |
| 347 | * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
|
| 348 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
| 349 | *
|
| 350 | * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
|
| 351 | * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
|
| 352 | *
|
| 353 | * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
|
| 354 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
| 355 | * a security audit over a program.
|
| 356 | *
|
| 357 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
|
| 358 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
|
| 359 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
| 360 | *
|
| 361 | * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
|
| 362 | * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
|
| 363 |
|
| 364 | #ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
|
| 365 | long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
|
| 366 | {
|
| 367 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 368 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 369 | struct cred *new;
|
| 370 | int retval;
|
| 371 | kgid_t krgid, kegid;
|
| 372 |
|
| 373 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
|
| 374 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
|
| 375 |
|
| 376 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
|
| 377 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 378 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
|
| 379 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 380 |
|
| 381 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 382 | if (!new)
|
| 383 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 384 | old = current_cred();
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 387 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
| 388 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) ||
|
| 389 | gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) ||
|
| 390 | ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 391 | new->gid = krgid;
|
| 392 | else
|
| 393 | goto error;
|
| 394 | }
|
| 395 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
| 396 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) ||
|
| 397 | gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) ||
|
| 398 | gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) ||
|
| 399 | ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 400 | new->egid = kegid;
|
| 401 | else
|
| 402 | goto error;
|
| 403 | }
|
| 404 |
|
| 405 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
|
| 406 | (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid)))
|
| 407 | new->sgid = new->egid;
|
| 408 | new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
| 409 |
|
| 410 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
| 411 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 412 | goto error;
|
| 413 |
|
| 414 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 415 |
|
| 416 | error:
|
| 417 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 418 | return retval;
|
| 419 | }
|
| 420 |
|
| 421 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
|
| 422 | {
|
| 423 | return __sys_setregid(rgid, egid);
|
| 424 | }
|
| 425 |
|
| 426 | |
| 427 | * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
|
| 428 | *
|
| 429 | * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
|
| 430 |
|
| 431 | long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
|
| 432 | {
|
| 433 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 434 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 435 | struct cred *new;
|
| 436 | int retval;
|
| 437 | kgid_t kgid;
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 | kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid);
|
| 440 | if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
| 441 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 444 | if (!new)
|
| 445 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 446 | old = current_cred();
|
| 447 |
|
| 448 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 449 | if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 450 | new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid;
|
| 451 | else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid))
|
| 452 | new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid;
|
| 453 | else
|
| 454 | goto error;
|
| 455 |
|
| 456 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
| 457 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 458 | goto error;
|
| 459 |
|
| 460 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 461 |
|
| 462 | error:
|
| 463 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 464 | return retval;
|
| 465 | }
|
| 466 |
|
| 467 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
|
| 468 | {
|
| 469 | return __sys_setgid(gid);
|
| 470 | }
|
| 471 |
|
| 472 | |
| 473 | * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID
|
| 474 |
|
| 475 | static int set_user(struct cred *new)
|
| 476 | {
|
| 477 | struct user_struct *new_user;
|
| 478 |
|
| 479 | new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid);
|
| 480 | if (!new_user)
|
| 481 | return -EAGAIN;
|
| 482 |
|
| 483 | free_uid(new->user);
|
| 484 | new->user = new_user;
|
| 485 | return 0;
|
| 486 | }
|
| 487 |
|
| 488 | static void flag_nproc_exceeded(struct cred *new)
|
| 489 | {
|
| 490 | if (new->ucounts == current_ucounts())
|
| 491 | return;
|
| 492 |
|
| 493 | |
| 494 | * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many
|
| 495 | * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming
|
| 496 | * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit
|
| 497 | * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the
|
| 498 | * failure to the execve() stage.
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 | if (is_rlimit_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) &&
|
| 501 | new->user != INIT_USER)
|
| 502 | current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
|
| 503 | else
|
| 504 | current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
|
| 505 | }
|
| 506 |
|
| 507 | |
| 508 | * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
|
| 509 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
| 510 | *
|
| 511 | * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
|
| 512 | * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
|
| 513 | *
|
| 514 | * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
|
| 515 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
| 516 | * a security audit over a program.
|
| 517 | *
|
| 518 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
|
| 519 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
|
| 520 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
| 521 |
|
| 522 | long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
|
| 523 | {
|
| 524 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 525 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 526 | struct cred *new;
|
| 527 | int retval;
|
| 528 | kuid_t kruid, keuid;
|
| 529 |
|
| 530 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
|
| 531 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
|
| 532 |
|
| 533 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid))
|
| 534 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 535 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid))
|
| 536 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 537 |
|
| 538 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 539 | if (!new)
|
| 540 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 541 | old = current_cred();
|
| 542 |
|
| 543 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 544 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 545 | new->uid = kruid;
|
| 546 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) &&
|
| 547 | !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) &&
|
| 548 | !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
| 549 | goto error;
|
| 550 | }
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 553 | new->euid = keuid;
|
| 554 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) &&
|
| 555 | !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) &&
|
| 556 | !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) &&
|
| 557 | !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
| 558 | goto error;
|
| 559 | }
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 | if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) {
|
| 562 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 563 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 564 | goto error;
|
| 565 | }
|
| 566 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
|
| 567 | (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid)))
|
| 568 | new->suid = new->euid;
|
| 569 | new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
| 570 |
|
| 571 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
| 572 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 573 | goto error;
|
| 574 |
|
| 575 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new);
|
| 576 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 577 | goto error;
|
| 578 |
|
| 579 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
|
| 580 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 581 |
|
| 582 | error:
|
| 583 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 584 | return retval;
|
| 585 | }
|
| 586 |
|
| 587 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
|
| 588 | {
|
| 589 | return __sys_setreuid(ruid, euid);
|
| 590 | }
|
| 591 |
|
| 592 | |
| 593 | * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
|
| 594 | *
|
| 595 | * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
|
| 596 | * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
|
| 597 | * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
|
| 598 | * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
|
| 599 | * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
|
| 600 | * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
|
| 601 | * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
|
| 602 |
|
| 603 | long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
|
| 604 | {
|
| 605 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 606 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 607 | struct cred *new;
|
| 608 | int retval;
|
| 609 | kuid_t kuid;
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 | kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid);
|
| 612 | if (!uid_valid(kuid))
|
| 613 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 614 |
|
| 615 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 616 | if (!new)
|
| 617 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 618 | old = current_cred();
|
| 619 |
|
| 620 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 621 | if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 622 | new->suid = new->uid = kuid;
|
| 623 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) {
|
| 624 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 625 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 626 | goto error;
|
| 627 | }
|
| 628 | } else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) {
|
| 629 | goto error;
|
| 630 | }
|
| 631 |
|
| 632 | new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid;
|
| 633 |
|
| 634 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
| 635 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 636 | goto error;
|
| 637 |
|
| 638 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new);
|
| 639 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 640 | goto error;
|
| 641 |
|
| 642 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
|
| 643 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 644 |
|
| 645 | error:
|
| 646 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 647 | return retval;
|
| 648 | }
|
| 649 |
|
| 650 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
|
| 651 | {
|
| 652 | return __sys_setuid(uid);
|
| 653 | }
|
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
|
| 656 | |
| 657 | * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
|
| 658 | * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 | long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
|
| 661 | {
|
| 662 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 663 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 664 | struct cred *new;
|
| 665 | int retval;
|
| 666 | kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid;
|
| 667 | bool ruid_new, euid_new, suid_new;
|
| 668 |
|
| 669 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
|
| 670 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
|
| 671 | ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid);
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid))
|
| 674 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 675 |
|
| 676 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid))
|
| 677 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 678 |
|
| 679 | if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid))
|
| 680 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 681 |
|
| 682 | old = current_cred();
|
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
|
| 685 | if ((ruid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) &&
|
| 686 | (euid == (uid_t) -1 || (uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) &&
|
| 687 | uid_eq(keuid, old->fsuid))) &&
|
| 688 | (suid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)))
|
| 689 | return 0;
|
| 690 |
|
| 691 | ruid_new = ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
|
| 692 | !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid);
|
| 693 | euid_new = euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) &&
|
| 694 | !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid);
|
| 695 | suid_new = suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) &&
|
| 696 | !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid);
|
| 697 | if ((ruid_new || euid_new || suid_new) &&
|
| 698 | !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
| 699 | return -EPERM;
|
| 700 |
|
| 701 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 702 | if (!new)
|
| 703 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 704 |
|
| 705 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
| 706 | new->uid = kruid;
|
| 707 | if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) {
|
| 708 | retval = set_user(new);
|
| 709 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 710 | goto error;
|
| 711 | }
|
| 712 | }
|
| 713 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1)
|
| 714 | new->euid = keuid;
|
| 715 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
|
| 716 | new->suid = ksuid;
|
| 717 | new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
| 720 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 721 | goto error;
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new);
|
| 724 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 725 | goto error;
|
| 726 |
|
| 727 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
|
| 728 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 729 |
|
| 730 | error:
|
| 731 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 732 | return retval;
|
| 733 | }
|
| 734 |
|
| 735 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
|
| 736 | {
|
| 737 | return __sys_setresuid(ruid, euid, suid);
|
| 738 | }
|
| 739 |
|
| 740 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp)
|
| 741 | {
|
| 742 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 743 | int retval;
|
| 744 | uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
|
| 745 |
|
| 746 | ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid);
|
| 747 | euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid);
|
| 748 | suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid);
|
| 749 |
|
| 750 | retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp);
|
| 751 | if (!retval) {
|
| 752 | retval = put_user(euid, euidp);
|
| 753 | if (!retval)
|
| 754 | return put_user(suid, suidp);
|
| 755 | }
|
| 756 | return retval;
|
| 757 | }
|
| 758 |
|
| 759 | |
| 760 | * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
|
| 761 |
|
| 762 | long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
|
| 763 | {
|
| 764 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
| 765 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 766 | struct cred *new;
|
| 767 | int retval;
|
| 768 | kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid;
|
| 769 | bool rgid_new, egid_new, sgid_new;
|
| 770 |
|
| 771 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
|
| 772 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
|
| 773 | ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid);
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
|
| 776 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 777 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
|
| 778 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 779 | if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid))
|
| 780 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 781 |
|
| 782 | old = current_cred();
|
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 | if ((rgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(krgid, old->gid)) &&
|
| 786 | (egid == (gid_t) -1 || (gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) &&
|
| 787 | gid_eq(kegid, old->fsgid))) &&
|
| 788 | (sgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)))
|
| 789 | return 0;
|
| 790 |
|
| 791 | rgid_new = rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
|
| 792 | !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid);
|
| 793 | egid_new = egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
|
| 794 | !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid);
|
| 795 | sgid_new = sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
|
| 796 | !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid);
|
| 797 | if ((rgid_new || egid_new || sgid_new) &&
|
| 798 | !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
| 799 | return -EPERM;
|
| 800 |
|
| 801 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 802 | if (!new)
|
| 803 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 804 |
|
| 805 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 806 | new->gid = krgid;
|
| 807 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 808 | new->egid = kegid;
|
| 809 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
| 810 | new->sgid = ksgid;
|
| 811 | new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
| 812 |
|
| 813 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
| 814 | if (retval < 0)
|
| 815 | goto error;
|
| 816 |
|
| 817 | return commit_creds(new);
|
| 818 |
|
| 819 | error:
|
| 820 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 821 | return retval;
|
| 822 | }
|
| 823 |
|
| 824 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
|
| 825 | {
|
| 826 | return __sys_setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid);
|
| 827 | }
|
| 828 |
|
| 829 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp)
|
| 830 | {
|
| 831 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
| 832 | int retval;
|
| 833 | gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 | rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid);
|
| 836 | egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid);
|
| 837 | sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid);
|
| 838 |
|
| 839 | retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp);
|
| 840 | if (!retval) {
|
| 841 | retval = put_user(egid, egidp);
|
| 842 | if (!retval)
|
| 843 | retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp);
|
| 844 | }
|
| 845 |
|
| 846 | return retval;
|
| 847 | }
|
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
|
| 850 | |
| 851 | * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
|
| 852 | * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
|
| 853 | * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
|
| 854 | * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
|
| 855 |
|
| 856 | long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
|
| 857 | {
|
| 858 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 859 | struct cred *new;
|
| 860 | uid_t old_fsuid;
|
| 861 | kuid_t kuid;
|
| 862 |
|
| 863 | old = current_cred();
|
| 864 | old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid);
|
| 865 |
|
| 866 | kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid);
|
| 867 | if (!uid_valid(kuid))
|
| 868 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 869 |
|
| 870 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 871 | if (!new)
|
| 872 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 873 |
|
| 874 | if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
|
| 875 | uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
|
| 876 | ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
| 877 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
|
| 878 | new->fsuid = kuid;
|
| 879 | if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
|
| 880 | goto change_okay;
|
| 881 | }
|
| 882 | }
|
| 883 |
|
| 884 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 885 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 886 |
|
| 887 | change_okay:
|
| 888 | commit_creds(new);
|
| 889 | return old_fsuid;
|
| 890 | }
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
|
| 893 | {
|
| 894 | return __sys_setfsuid(uid);
|
| 895 | }
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 | |
| 898 | * Samma på svenska..
|
| 899 |
|
| 900 | long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
|
| 901 | {
|
| 902 | const struct cred *old;
|
| 903 | struct cred *new;
|
| 904 | gid_t old_fsgid;
|
| 905 | kgid_t kgid;
|
| 906 |
|
| 907 | old = current_cred();
|
| 908 | old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid);
|
| 909 |
|
| 910 | kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid);
|
| 911 | if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
| 912 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 913 |
|
| 914 | new = prepare_creds();
|
| 915 | if (!new)
|
| 916 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 917 |
|
| 918 | if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) ||
|
| 919 | gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) ||
|
| 920 | ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
|
| 921 | if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) {
|
| 922 | new->fsgid = kgid;
|
| 923 | if (security_task_fix_setgid(new,old,LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
|
| 924 | goto change_okay;
|
| 925 | }
|
| 926 | }
|
| 927 |
|
| 928 | abort_creds(new);
|
| 929 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 930 |
|
| 931 | change_okay:
|
| 932 | commit_creds(new);
|
| 933 | return old_fsgid;
|
| 934 | }
|
| 935 |
|
| 936 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
|
| 937 | {
|
| 938 | return __sys_setfsgid(gid);
|
| 939 | }
|
| 940 | #endif
|
| 941 |
|
| 942 | |
| 943 | * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process
|
| 944 | *
|
| 945 | * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and
|
| 946 | * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in
|
| 947 | * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group.
|
| 948 | *
|
| 949 | * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change.
|
| 950 |
|
| 951 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid)
|
| 952 | {
|
| 953 | return task_tgid_vnr(current);
|
| 954 | }
|
| 955 |
|
| 956 |
|
| 957 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid)
|
| 958 | {
|
| 959 | return task_pid_vnr(current);
|
| 960 | }
|
| 961 |
|
| 962 | |
| 963 | * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could
|
| 964 | * change from under us. However, we can use a stale
|
| 965 | * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see
|
| 966 | * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct).
|
| 967 |
|
| 968 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid)
|
| 969 | {
|
| 970 | int pid;
|
| 971 |
|
| 972 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 973 | pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent));
|
| 974 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 975 |
|
| 976 | return pid;
|
| 977 | }
|
| 978 |
|
| 979 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid)
|
| 980 | {
|
| 981 |
|
| 982 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
|
| 983 | }
|
| 984 |
|
| 985 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid)
|
| 986 | {
|
| 987 |
|
| 988 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid());
|
| 989 | }
|
| 990 |
|
| 991 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid)
|
| 992 | {
|
| 993 |
|
| 994 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid());
|
| 995 | }
|
| 996 |
|
| 997 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid)
|
| 998 | {
|
| 999 |
|
| 1000 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid());
|
| 1001 | }
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 | static void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms)
|
| 1004 | {
|
| 1005 | u64 tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime;
|
| 1006 |
|
| 1007 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
| 1008 | cutime = current->signal->cutime;
|
| 1009 | cstime = current->signal->cstime;
|
| 1010 | tms->tms_utime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgutime);
|
| 1011 | tms->tms_stime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgstime);
|
| 1012 | tms->tms_cutime = nsec_to_clock_t(cutime);
|
| 1013 | tms->tms_cstime = nsec_to_clock_t(cstime);
|
| 1014 | }
|
| 1015 |
|
| 1016 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf)
|
| 1017 | {
|
| 1018 | if (tbuf) {
|
| 1019 | struct tms tmp;
|
| 1020 |
|
| 1021 | do_sys_times(&tmp);
|
| 1022 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
|
| 1023 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1024 | }
|
| 1025 | force_successful_syscall_return();
|
| 1026 | return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
|
| 1027 | }
|
| 1028 |
|
| 1029 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 1030 | static compat_clock_t clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(clock_t x)
|
| 1031 | {
|
| 1032 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(clock_t_to_jiffies(x));
|
| 1033 | }
|
| 1034 |
|
| 1035 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct compat_tms __user *, tbuf)
|
| 1036 | {
|
| 1037 | if (tbuf) {
|
| 1038 | struct tms tms;
|
| 1039 | struct compat_tms tmp;
|
| 1040 |
|
| 1041 | do_sys_times(&tms);
|
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 | tmp.tms_utime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_utime);
|
| 1044 | tmp.tms_stime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_stime);
|
| 1045 | tmp.tms_cutime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cutime);
|
| 1046 | tmp.tms_cstime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cstime);
|
| 1047 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
| 1048 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1049 | }
|
| 1050 | force_successful_syscall_return();
|
| 1051 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(jiffies);
|
| 1052 | }
|
| 1053 | #endif
|
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 | |
| 1056 | * This needs some heavy checking ...
|
| 1057 | * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
|
| 1058 | * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
|
| 1059 | *
|
| 1060 | * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
|
| 1061 | * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
|
| 1062 | * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
|
| 1063 | *
|
| 1064 | * !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX.
|
| 1065 |
|
| 1066 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid)
|
| 1067 | {
|
| 1068 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 1069 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
| 1070 | struct pid *pgrp;
|
| 1071 | int err;
|
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 | if (!pid)
|
| 1074 | pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader);
|
| 1075 | if (!pgid)
|
| 1076 | pgid = pid;
|
| 1077 | if (pgid < 0)
|
| 1078 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1079 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 | |
| 1082 | * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
|
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1085 |
|
| 1086 | err = -ESRCH;
|
| 1087 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 1088 | if (!p)
|
| 1089 | goto out;
|
| 1090 |
|
| 1091 | err = -EINVAL;
|
| 1092 | if (!thread_group_leader(p))
|
| 1093 | goto out;
|
| 1094 |
|
| 1095 | if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) {
|
| 1096 | err = -EPERM;
|
| 1097 | if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader))
|
| 1098 | goto out;
|
| 1099 | err = -EACCES;
|
| 1100 | if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC))
|
| 1101 | goto out;
|
| 1102 | } else {
|
| 1103 | err = -ESRCH;
|
| 1104 | if (p != group_leader)
|
| 1105 | goto out;
|
| 1106 | }
|
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 | err = -EPERM;
|
| 1109 | if (p->signal->leader)
|
| 1110 | goto out;
|
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 | pgrp = task_pid(p);
|
| 1113 | if (pgid != pid) {
|
| 1114 | struct task_struct *g;
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 | pgrp = find_vpid(pgid);
|
| 1117 | g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID);
|
| 1118 | if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader))
|
| 1119 | goto out;
|
| 1120 | }
|
| 1121 |
|
| 1122 | err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
|
| 1123 | if (err)
|
| 1124 | goto out;
|
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 | if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp)
|
| 1127 | change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp);
|
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 | err = 0;
|
| 1130 | out:
|
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1133 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1134 | return err;
|
| 1135 | }
|
| 1136 |
|
| 1137 | static int do_getpgid(pid_t pid)
|
| 1138 | {
|
| 1139 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 1140 | struct pid *grp;
|
| 1141 | int retval;
|
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1144 | if (!pid)
|
| 1145 | grp = task_pgrp(current);
|
| 1146 | else {
|
| 1147 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 1148 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 1149 | if (!p)
|
| 1150 | goto out;
|
| 1151 | grp = task_pgrp(p);
|
| 1152 | if (!grp)
|
| 1153 | goto out;
|
| 1154 |
|
| 1155 | retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
|
| 1156 | if (retval)
|
| 1157 | goto out;
|
| 1158 | }
|
| 1159 | retval = pid_vnr(grp);
|
| 1160 | out:
|
| 1161 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1162 | return retval;
|
| 1163 | }
|
| 1164 |
|
| 1165 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid)
|
| 1166 | {
|
| 1167 | return do_getpgid(pid);
|
| 1168 | }
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp)
|
| 1173 | {
|
| 1174 | return do_getpgid(0);
|
| 1175 | }
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 | #endif
|
| 1178 |
|
| 1179 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid)
|
| 1180 | {
|
| 1181 | struct task_struct *p;
|
| 1182 | struct pid *sid;
|
| 1183 | int retval;
|
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1186 | if (!pid)
|
| 1187 | sid = task_session(current);
|
| 1188 | else {
|
| 1189 | retval = -ESRCH;
|
| 1190 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
| 1191 | if (!p)
|
| 1192 | goto out;
|
| 1193 | sid = task_session(p);
|
| 1194 | if (!sid)
|
| 1195 | goto out;
|
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 | retval = security_task_getsid(p);
|
| 1198 | if (retval)
|
| 1199 | goto out;
|
| 1200 | }
|
| 1201 | retval = pid_vnr(sid);
|
| 1202 | out:
|
| 1203 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1204 | return retval;
|
| 1205 | }
|
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 | static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid)
|
| 1208 | {
|
| 1209 | struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader;
|
| 1210 |
|
| 1211 | if (task_session(curr) != pid)
|
| 1212 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid);
|
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 | if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid)
|
| 1215 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid);
|
| 1216 | }
|
| 1217 |
|
| 1218 | int ksys_setsid(void)
|
| 1219 | {
|
| 1220 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
| 1221 | struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader);
|
| 1222 | pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid);
|
| 1223 | int err = -EPERM;
|
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 | if (group_leader->signal->leader)
|
| 1228 | goto out;
|
| 1229 |
|
| 1230 | |
| 1231 | * proposed session id.
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 | if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID))
|
| 1234 | goto out;
|
| 1235 |
|
| 1236 | group_leader->signal->leader = 1;
|
| 1237 | set_special_pids(sid);
|
| 1238 |
|
| 1239 | proc_clear_tty(group_leader);
|
| 1240 |
|
| 1241 | err = session;
|
| 1242 | out:
|
| 1243 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
| 1244 | if (err > 0) {
|
| 1245 | proc_sid_connector(group_leader);
|
| 1246 | sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader);
|
| 1247 | }
|
| 1248 | return err;
|
| 1249 | }
|
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid)
|
| 1252 | {
|
| 1253 | return ksys_setsid();
|
| 1254 | }
|
| 1255 |
|
| 1256 | DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);
|
| 1257 |
|
| 1258 | #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE
|
| 1259 | #define override_architecture(name) \
|
| 1260 | (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \
|
| 1261 | copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \
|
| 1262 | sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE)))
|
| 1263 | #else
|
| 1264 | #define override_architecture(name) 0
|
| 1265 | #endif
|
| 1266 |
|
| 1267 | |
| 1268 | * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0".
|
| 1269 | * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40
|
| 1270 | * And we map 4.x and later versions to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0/5.0/6.0/... would be
|
| 1271 | * 2.6.60.
|
| 1272 |
|
| 1273 | static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len)
|
| 1274 | {
|
| 1275 | int ret = 0;
|
| 1276 |
|
| 1277 | if (current->personality & UNAME26) {
|
| 1278 | const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE;
|
| 1279 | char buf[65] = { 0 };
|
| 1280 | int ndots = 0;
|
| 1281 | unsigned v;
|
| 1282 | size_t copy;
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 | while (*rest) {
|
| 1285 | if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3)
|
| 1286 | break;
|
| 1287 | if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.')
|
| 1288 | break;
|
| 1289 | rest++;
|
| 1290 | }
|
| 1291 | v = LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL + 60;
|
| 1292 | copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf));
|
| 1293 | copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest);
|
| 1294 | ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1);
|
| 1295 | }
|
| 1296 | return ret;
|
| 1297 | }
|
| 1298 |
|
| 1299 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1300 | {
|
| 1301 | struct new_utsname tmp;
|
| 1302 |
|
| 1303 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1304 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp));
|
| 1305 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1306 | if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
| 1307 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1308 |
|
| 1309 | if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
| 1310 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1311 | if (override_architecture(name))
|
| 1312 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1313 | return 0;
|
| 1314 | }
|
| 1315 |
|
| 1316 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME
|
| 1317 | |
| 1318 | * Old cruft
|
| 1319 |
|
| 1320 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1321 | {
|
| 1322 | struct old_utsname tmp;
|
| 1323 |
|
| 1324 | if (!name)
|
| 1325 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1326 |
|
| 1327 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1328 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp));
|
| 1329 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1330 | if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
| 1331 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 | if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
| 1334 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1335 | if (override_architecture(name))
|
| 1336 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1337 | return 0;
|
| 1338 | }
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name)
|
| 1341 | {
|
| 1342 | struct oldold_utsname tmp;
|
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 | if (!name)
|
| 1345 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1346 |
|
| 1347 | memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
|
| 1348 |
|
| 1349 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1350 | memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1351 | memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1352 | memcpy(&tmp.release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1353 | memcpy(&tmp.version, &utsname()->version, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1354 | memcpy(&tmp.machine, &utsname()->machine, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
| 1355 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1356 | if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
| 1357 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1358 |
|
| 1359 | if (override_architecture(name))
|
| 1360 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1361 | if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
| 1362 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1363 | return 0;
|
| 1364 | }
|
| 1365 | #endif
|
| 1366 |
|
| 1367 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1368 | {
|
| 1369 | int errno;
|
| 1370 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
| 1371 |
|
| 1372 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
| 1373 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1374 |
|
| 1375 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
| 1376 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1377 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1378 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
| 1379 | struct new_utsname *u;
|
| 1380 |
|
| 1381 | add_device_randomness(tmp, len);
|
| 1382 | down_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1383 | u = utsname();
|
| 1384 | memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len);
|
| 1385 | memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len);
|
| 1386 | errno = 0;
|
| 1387 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME);
|
| 1388 | up_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1389 | }
|
| 1390 | return errno;
|
| 1391 | }
|
| 1392 |
|
| 1393 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1396 | {
|
| 1397 | int i;
|
| 1398 | struct new_utsname *u;
|
| 1399 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1];
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 | if (len < 0)
|
| 1402 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1403 | down_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1404 | u = utsname();
|
| 1405 | i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename);
|
| 1406 | if (i > len)
|
| 1407 | i = len;
|
| 1408 | memcpy(tmp, u->nodename, i);
|
| 1409 | up_read(&uts_sem);
|
| 1410 | if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, i))
|
| 1411 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1412 | return 0;
|
| 1413 | }
|
| 1414 |
|
| 1415 | #endif
|
| 1416 |
|
| 1417 | |
| 1418 | * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
|
| 1419 | * uname()
|
| 1420 |
|
| 1421 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
| 1422 | {
|
| 1423 | int errno;
|
| 1424 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
| 1425 |
|
| 1426 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
| 1427 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1428 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
| 1429 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1430 |
|
| 1431 | errno = -EFAULT;
|
| 1432 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
| 1433 | struct new_utsname *u;
|
| 1434 |
|
| 1435 | add_device_randomness(tmp, len);
|
| 1436 | down_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1437 | u = utsname();
|
| 1438 | memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len);
|
| 1439 | memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len);
|
| 1440 | errno = 0;
|
| 1441 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME);
|
| 1442 | up_write(&uts_sem);
|
| 1443 | }
|
| 1444 | return errno;
|
| 1445 | }
|
| 1446 |
|
| 1447 |
|
| 1448 | static int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
|
| 1449 | struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim)
|
| 1450 | {
|
| 1451 | struct rlimit *rlim;
|
| 1452 | int retval = 0;
|
| 1453 |
|
| 1454 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1455 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1456 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
|
| 1457 |
|
| 1458 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1459 | if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
|
| 1460 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1461 | if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE &&
|
| 1462 | new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open)
|
| 1463 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1464 | }
|
| 1465 |
|
| 1466 |
|
| 1467 | rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
|
| 1468 | task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
|
| 1469 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1470 | |
| 1471 | * Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until cgroups can
|
| 1472 | * contain all limits.
|
| 1473 |
|
| 1474 | if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max &&
|
| 1475 | !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 1476 | retval = -EPERM;
|
| 1477 | if (!retval)
|
| 1478 | retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim);
|
| 1479 | }
|
| 1480 | if (!retval) {
|
| 1481 | if (old_rlim)
|
| 1482 | *old_rlim = *rlim;
|
| 1483 | if (new_rlim)
|
| 1484 | *rlim = *new_rlim;
|
| 1485 | }
|
| 1486 | task_unlock(tsk->group_leader);
|
| 1487 |
|
| 1488 | |
| 1489 | * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Arm the posix CPU timer if the limit is not
|
| 1490 | * infinite. In case of RLIM_INFINITY the posix CPU timer code
|
| 1491 | * ignores the rlimit.
|
| 1492 |
|
| 1493 | if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU &&
|
| 1494 | new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY &&
|
| 1495 | IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
|
| 1496 | |
| 1497 | * update_rlimit_cpu can fail if the task is exiting, but there
|
| 1498 | * may be other tasks in the thread group that are not exiting,
|
| 1499 | * and they need their cpu timers adjusted.
|
| 1500 | *
|
| 1501 | * The group_leader is the last task to be released, so if we
|
| 1502 | * cannot update_rlimit_cpu on it, then the entire process is
|
| 1503 | * exiting and we do not need to update at all.
|
| 1504 |
|
| 1505 | update_rlimit_cpu(tsk->group_leader, new_rlim->rlim_cur);
|
| 1506 | }
|
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 | return retval;
|
| 1509 | }
|
| 1510 |
|
| 1511 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1512 | {
|
| 1513 | struct rlimit value;
|
| 1514 | int ret;
|
| 1515 |
|
| 1516 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value);
|
| 1517 | if (!ret)
|
| 1518 | ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1519 |
|
| 1520 | return ret;
|
| 1521 | }
|
| 1522 |
|
| 1523 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 1524 |
|
| 1525 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1526 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1527 | {
|
| 1528 | struct rlimit r;
|
| 1529 | struct compat_rlimit r32;
|
| 1530 |
|
| 1531 | if (copy_from_user(&r32, rlim, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit)))
|
| 1532 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1533 |
|
| 1534 | if (r32.rlim_cur == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1535 | r.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1536 | else
|
| 1537 | r.rlim_cur = r32.rlim_cur;
|
| 1538 | if (r32.rlim_max == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1539 | r.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1540 | else
|
| 1541 | r.rlim_max = r32.rlim_max;
|
| 1542 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, &r, NULL);
|
| 1543 | }
|
| 1544 |
|
| 1545 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1546 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1547 | {
|
| 1548 | struct rlimit r;
|
| 1549 | int ret;
|
| 1550 |
|
| 1551 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &r);
|
| 1552 | if (!ret) {
|
| 1553 | struct compat_rlimit r32;
|
| 1554 | if (r.rlim_cur > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1555 | r32.rlim_cur = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1556 | else
|
| 1557 | r32.rlim_cur = r.rlim_cur;
|
| 1558 | if (r.rlim_max > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1559 | r32.rlim_max = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1560 | else
|
| 1561 | r32.rlim_max = r.rlim_max;
|
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 | if (copy_to_user(rlim, &r32, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit)))
|
| 1564 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1565 | }
|
| 1566 | return ret;
|
| 1567 | }
|
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 | #endif
|
| 1570 |
|
| 1571 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
|
| 1572 |
|
| 1573 | |
| 1574 | * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
|
| 1575 |
|
| 1576 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1577 | struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1578 | {
|
| 1579 | struct rlimit x;
|
| 1580 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1581 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1582 |
|
| 1583 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
|
| 1584 | task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1585 | x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
| 1586 | task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1587 | if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1588 | x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1589 | if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1590 | x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1591 | return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1592 | }
|
| 1593 |
|
| 1594 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 1595 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1596 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1597 | {
|
| 1598 | struct rlimit r;
|
| 1599 |
|
| 1600 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
| 1601 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1602 |
|
| 1603 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
|
| 1604 | task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1605 | r = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
| 1606 | task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
| 1607 | if (r.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1608 | r.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1609 | if (r.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
| 1610 | r.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
| 1611 |
|
| 1612 | if (put_user(r.rlim_cur, &rlim->rlim_cur) ||
|
| 1613 | put_user(r.rlim_max, &rlim->rlim_max))
|
| 1614 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1615 | return 0;
|
| 1616 | }
|
| 1617 | #endif
|
| 1618 |
|
| 1619 | #endif
|
| 1620 |
|
| 1621 | static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64)
|
| 1622 | {
|
| 1623 | #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64
|
| 1624 | return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX;
|
| 1625 | #else
|
| 1626 | return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1627 | #endif
|
| 1628 | }
|
| 1629 |
|
| 1630 | static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64)
|
| 1631 | {
|
| 1632 | if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1633 | rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1634 | else
|
| 1635 | rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur;
|
| 1636 | if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
| 1637 | rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
| 1638 | else
|
| 1639 | rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max;
|
| 1640 | }
|
| 1641 |
|
| 1642 | static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim)
|
| 1643 | {
|
| 1644 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur))
|
| 1645 | rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1646 | else
|
| 1647 | rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur;
|
| 1648 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max))
|
| 1649 | rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
| 1650 | else
|
| 1651 | rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max;
|
| 1652 | }
|
| 1653 |
|
| 1654 |
|
| 1655 | static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task,
|
| 1656 | unsigned int flags)
|
| 1657 | {
|
| 1658 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
|
| 1659 | bool id_match;
|
| 1660 |
|
| 1661 | if (current == task)
|
| 1662 | return 0;
|
| 1663 |
|
| 1664 | tcred = __task_cred(task);
|
| 1665 | id_match = (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
|
| 1666 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
|
| 1667 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
|
| 1668 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
|
| 1669 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
|
| 1670 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid));
|
| 1671 | if (!id_match && !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 1672 | return -EPERM;
|
| 1673 |
|
| 1674 | return security_task_prlimit(cred, tcred, flags);
|
| 1675 | }
|
| 1676 |
|
| 1677 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,
|
| 1678 | const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim,
|
| 1679 | struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim)
|
| 1680 | {
|
| 1681 | struct rlimit64 old64, new64;
|
| 1682 | struct rlimit old, new;
|
| 1683 | struct task_struct *tsk;
|
| 1684 | unsigned int checkflags = 0;
|
| 1685 | int ret;
|
| 1686 |
|
| 1687 | if (old_rlim)
|
| 1688 | checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_READ;
|
| 1689 |
|
| 1690 | if (new_rlim) {
|
| 1691 | if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64)))
|
| 1692 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1693 | rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new);
|
| 1694 | checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE;
|
| 1695 | }
|
| 1696 |
|
| 1697 | rcu_read_lock();
|
| 1698 | tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current;
|
| 1699 | if (!tsk) {
|
| 1700 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1701 | return -ESRCH;
|
| 1702 | }
|
| 1703 | ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk, checkflags);
|
| 1704 | if (ret) {
|
| 1705 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1706 | return ret;
|
| 1707 | }
|
| 1708 | get_task_struct(tsk);
|
| 1709 | rcu_read_unlock();
|
| 1710 |
|
| 1711 | ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL,
|
| 1712 | old_rlim ? &old : NULL);
|
| 1713 |
|
| 1714 | if (!ret && old_rlim) {
|
| 1715 | rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64);
|
| 1716 | if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64)))
|
| 1717 | ret = -EFAULT;
|
| 1718 | }
|
| 1719 |
|
| 1720 | put_task_struct(tsk);
|
| 1721 | return ret;
|
| 1722 | }
|
| 1723 |
|
| 1724 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
| 1725 | {
|
| 1726 | struct rlimit new_rlim;
|
| 1727 |
|
| 1728 | if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
|
| 1729 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 1730 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL);
|
| 1731 | }
|
| 1732 |
|
| 1733 | |
| 1734 | * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
|
| 1735 | * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
|
| 1736 | * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
|
| 1737 | * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
|
| 1738 | * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
|
| 1739 | * measuring them yet).
|
| 1740 | *
|
| 1741 | * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
|
| 1742 | * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
|
| 1743 | * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
|
| 1744 | * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
|
| 1745 | * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
|
| 1746 | * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
|
| 1747 | * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
|
| 1748 | *
|
| 1749 | * Locking:
|
| 1750 | * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH
|
| 1751 | * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded
|
| 1752 | * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with
|
| 1753 | * the siglock held.
|
| 1754 | * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and
|
| 1755 | * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one
|
| 1756 | * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else
|
| 1757 | * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the
|
| 1758 | * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just
|
| 1759 | * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock.
|
| 1760 | * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal
|
| 1761 | * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal->
|
| 1762 | * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple.
|
| 1763 | *
|
| 1764 |
|
| 1765 |
|
| 1766 | static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r)
|
| 1767 | {
|
| 1768 | r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw;
|
| 1769 | r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw;
|
| 1770 | r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt;
|
| 1771 | r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt;
|
| 1772 | r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t);
|
| 1773 | r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t);
|
| 1774 | }
|
| 1775 |
|
| 1776 | void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
|
| 1777 | {
|
| 1778 | struct task_struct *t;
|
| 1779 | unsigned long flags;
|
| 1780 | u64 tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime;
|
| 1781 | unsigned long maxrss = 0;
|
| 1782 |
|
| 1783 | memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r));
|
| 1784 | utime = stime = 0;
|
| 1785 |
|
| 1786 | if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) {
|
| 1787 | task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime);
|
| 1788 | accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r);
|
| 1789 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
|
| 1790 | goto out;
|
| 1791 | }
|
| 1792 |
|
| 1793 | if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags))
|
| 1794 | return;
|
| 1795 |
|
| 1796 | switch (who) {
|
| 1797 | case RUSAGE_BOTH:
|
| 1798 | case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
|
| 1799 | utime = p->signal->cutime;
|
| 1800 | stime = p->signal->cstime;
|
| 1801 | r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw;
|
| 1802 | r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw;
|
| 1803 | r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt;
|
| 1804 | r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt;
|
| 1805 | r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock;
|
| 1806 | r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock;
|
| 1807 | maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss;
|
| 1808 |
|
| 1809 | if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
|
| 1810 | break;
|
| 1811 | fallthrough;
|
| 1812 |
|
| 1813 | case RUSAGE_SELF:
|
| 1814 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
| 1815 | utime += tgutime;
|
| 1816 | stime += tgstime;
|
| 1817 | r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw;
|
| 1818 | r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw;
|
| 1819 | r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt;
|
| 1820 | r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt;
|
| 1821 | r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock;
|
| 1822 | r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock;
|
| 1823 | if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss)
|
| 1824 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
|
| 1825 | t = p;
|
| 1826 | do {
|
| 1827 | accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r);
|
| 1828 | } while_each_thread(p, t);
|
| 1829 | break;
|
| 1830 |
|
| 1831 | default:
|
| 1832 | BUG();
|
| 1833 | }
|
| 1834 | unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
|
| 1835 |
|
| 1836 | out:
|
| 1837 | r->ru_utime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(utime);
|
| 1838 | r->ru_stime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(stime);
|
| 1839 |
|
| 1840 | if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) {
|
| 1841 | struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p);
|
| 1842 |
|
| 1843 | if (mm) {
|
| 1844 | setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm);
|
| 1845 | mmput(mm);
|
| 1846 | }
|
| 1847 | }
|
| 1848 | r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024);
|
| 1849 | }
|
| 1850 |
|
| 1851 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru)
|
| 1852 | {
|
| 1853 | struct rusage r;
|
| 1854 |
|
| 1855 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
|
| 1856 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
|
| 1857 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1858 |
|
| 1859 | getrusage(current, who, &r);
|
| 1860 | return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 1861 | }
|
| 1862 |
|
| 1863 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 1864 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru)
|
| 1865 | {
|
| 1866 | struct rusage r;
|
| 1867 |
|
| 1868 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
|
| 1869 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
|
| 1870 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1871 |
|
| 1872 | getrusage(current, who, &r);
|
| 1873 | return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru);
|
| 1874 | }
|
| 1875 | #endif
|
| 1876 |
|
| 1877 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask)
|
| 1878 | {
|
| 1879 | mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
|
| 1880 | return mask;
|
| 1881 | }
|
| 1882 |
|
| 1883 | static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
|
| 1884 | {
|
| 1885 | struct fd exe;
|
| 1886 | struct inode *inode;
|
| 1887 | int err;
|
| 1888 |
|
| 1889 | exe = fdget(fd);
|
| 1890 | if (!exe.file)
|
| 1891 | return -EBADF;
|
| 1892 |
|
| 1893 | inode = file_inode(exe.file);
|
| 1894 |
|
| 1895 | |
| 1896 | * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make
|
| 1897 | * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an
|
| 1898 | * overall picture.
|
| 1899 |
|
| 1900 | err = -EACCES;
|
| 1901 | if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
|
| 1902 | goto exit;
|
| 1903 |
|
| 1904 | err = file_permission(exe.file, MAY_EXEC);
|
| 1905 | if (err)
|
| 1906 | goto exit;
|
| 1907 |
|
| 1908 | err = replace_mm_exe_file(mm, exe.file);
|
| 1909 | exit:
|
| 1910 | fdput(exe);
|
| 1911 | return err;
|
| 1912 | }
|
| 1913 |
|
| 1914 | |
| 1915 | * Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses.
|
| 1916 | *
|
| 1917 | * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful
|
| 1918 | * in what is allowed for modification from userspace.
|
| 1919 |
|
| 1920 | static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
|
| 1921 | {
|
| 1922 | unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE;
|
| 1923 | int error = -EINVAL, i;
|
| 1924 |
|
| 1925 | static const unsigned char offsets[] = {
|
| 1926 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code),
|
| 1927 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_code),
|
| 1928 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_data),
|
| 1929 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_data),
|
| 1930 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_brk),
|
| 1931 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, brk),
|
| 1932 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_stack),
|
| 1933 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_start),
|
| 1934 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_end),
|
| 1935 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_start),
|
| 1936 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end),
|
| 1937 | };
|
| 1938 |
|
| 1939 | |
| 1940 | * Make sure the members are not somewhere outside
|
| 1941 | * of allowed address space.
|
| 1942 |
|
| 1943 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) {
|
| 1944 | u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]);
|
| 1945 |
|
| 1946 | if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr ||
|
| 1947 | (unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr)
|
| 1948 | goto out;
|
| 1949 | }
|
| 1950 |
|
| 1951 | |
| 1952 | * Make sure the pairs are ordered.
|
| 1953 |
|
| 1954 | #define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \
|
| 1955 | ((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \
|
| 1956 | (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL
|
| 1957 | error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code);
|
| 1958 | error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data,<=, end_data);
|
| 1959 | error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk);
|
| 1960 | error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end);
|
| 1961 | error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end);
|
| 1962 | if (error)
|
| 1963 | goto out;
|
| 1964 | #undef __prctl_check_order
|
| 1965 |
|
| 1966 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 1967 |
|
| 1968 | |
| 1969 | * Neither we should allow to override limits if they set.
|
| 1970 |
|
| 1971 | if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk,
|
| 1972 | prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data,
|
| 1973 | prctl_map->start_data))
|
| 1974 | goto out;
|
| 1975 |
|
| 1976 | error = 0;
|
| 1977 | out:
|
| 1978 | return error;
|
| 1979 | }
|
| 1980 |
|
| 1981 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
| 1982 | static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size)
|
| 1983 | {
|
| 1984 | struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, };
|
| 1985 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE];
|
| 1986 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
| 1987 | int error;
|
| 1988 |
|
| 1989 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv));
|
| 1990 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct prctl_mm_map) > 256);
|
| 1991 |
|
| 1992 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)
|
| 1993 | return put_user((unsigned int)sizeof(prctl_map),
|
| 1994 | (unsigned int __user *)addr);
|
| 1995 |
|
| 1996 | if (data_size != sizeof(prctl_map))
|
| 1997 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 1998 |
|
| 1999 | if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map)))
|
| 2000 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2001 |
|
| 2002 | error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
|
| 2003 | if (error)
|
| 2004 | return error;
|
| 2005 |
|
| 2006 | if (prctl_map.auxv_size) {
|
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector.
|
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 | if (!prctl_map.auxv ||
|
| 2011 | prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv))
|
| 2012 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2013 |
|
| 2014 | memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv));
|
| 2015 | if (copy_from_user(user_auxv,
|
| 2016 | (const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv,
|
| 2017 | prctl_map.auxv_size))
|
| 2018 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2019 |
|
| 2020 |
|
| 2021 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = AT_NULL;
|
| 2022 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL;
|
| 2023 | }
|
| 2024 |
|
| 2025 | if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
|
| 2026 | |
| 2027 | * Check if the current user is checkpoint/restore capable.
|
| 2028 | * At the time of this writing, it checks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
|
| 2029 | * or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
|
| 2030 | * Note that a user with access to ptrace can masquerade an
|
| 2031 | * arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones.
|
| 2032 | * This may have implications in the tomoyo subsystem.
|
| 2033 |
|
| 2034 | if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(current_user_ns()))
|
| 2035 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2036 |
|
| 2037 | error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd);
|
| 2038 | if (error)
|
| 2039 | return error;
|
| 2040 | }
|
| 2041 |
|
| 2042 | |
| 2043 | * arg_lock protects concurrent updates but we still need mmap_lock for
|
| 2044 | * read to exclude races with sys_brk.
|
| 2045 |
|
| 2046 | mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
| 2047 |
|
| 2048 | |
| 2049 | * We don't validate if these members are pointing to
|
| 2050 | * real present VMAs because application may have correspond
|
| 2051 | * VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics
|
| 2052 | * output in procfs mostly, except
|
| 2053 | *
|
| 2054 | * - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk_flags but kernel lookups
|
| 2055 | * for VMAs when updating these members so anything wrong written
|
| 2056 | * here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead
|
| 2057 | * to any problem in kernel itself
|
| 2058 |
|
| 2059 |
|
| 2060 | spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
| 2061 | mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code;
|
| 2062 | mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code;
|
| 2063 | mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data;
|
| 2064 | mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data;
|
| 2065 | mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk;
|
| 2066 | mm->brk = prctl_map.brk;
|
| 2067 | mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack;
|
| 2068 | mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start;
|
| 2069 | mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end;
|
| 2070 | mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start;
|
| 2071 | mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end;
|
| 2072 | spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
| 2073 |
|
| 2074 | |
| 2075 | * Note this update of @saved_auxv is lockless thus
|
| 2076 | * if someone reads this member in procfs while we're
|
| 2077 | * updating -- it may get partly updated results. It's
|
| 2078 | * known and acceptable trade off: we leave it as is to
|
| 2079 | * not introduce additional locks here making the kernel
|
| 2080 | * more complex.
|
| 2081 |
|
| 2082 | if (prctl_map.auxv_size)
|
| 2083 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv));
|
| 2084 |
|
| 2085 | mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
| 2086 | return 0;
|
| 2087 | }
|
| 2088 | #endif
|
| 2089 |
|
| 2090 | static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
|
| 2091 | unsigned long len)
|
| 2092 | {
|
| 2093 | |
| 2094 | * This doesn't move the auxiliary vector itself since it's pinned to
|
| 2095 | * mm_struct, but it permits filling the vector with new values. It's
|
| 2096 | * up to the caller to provide sane values here, otherwise userspace
|
| 2097 | * tools which use this vector might be unhappy.
|
| 2098 |
|
| 2099 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE] = {};
|
| 2100 |
|
| 2101 | if (len > sizeof(user_auxv))
|
| 2102 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2103 |
|
| 2104 | if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, len))
|
| 2105 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2106 |
|
| 2107 |
|
| 2108 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0;
|
| 2109 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0;
|
| 2110 |
|
| 2111 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv));
|
| 2112 |
|
| 2113 | task_lock(current);
|
| 2114 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len);
|
| 2115 | task_unlock(current);
|
| 2116 |
|
| 2117 | return 0;
|
| 2118 | }
|
| 2119 |
|
| 2120 | static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
|
| 2121 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
| 2122 | {
|
| 2123 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
| 2124 | struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = {
|
| 2125 | .auxv = NULL,
|
| 2126 | .auxv_size = 0,
|
| 2127 | .exe_fd = -1,
|
| 2128 | };
|
| 2129 | struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
| 2130 | int error;
|
| 2131 |
|
| 2132 | if (arg5 || (arg4 && (opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV &&
|
| 2133 | opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP &&
|
| 2134 | opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)))
|
| 2135 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2136 |
|
| 2137 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
| 2138 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)
|
| 2139 | return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4);
|
| 2140 | #endif
|
| 2141 |
|
| 2142 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 2143 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2144 |
|
| 2145 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE)
|
| 2146 | return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr);
|
| 2147 |
|
| 2148 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV)
|
| 2149 | return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4);
|
| 2150 |
|
| 2151 | if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr)
|
| 2152 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2153 |
|
| 2154 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2155 |
|
| 2156 | |
| 2157 | * arg_lock protects concurrent updates of arg boundaries, we need
|
| 2158 | * mmap_lock for a) concurrent sys_brk, b) finding VMA for addr
|
| 2159 | * validation.
|
| 2160 |
|
| 2161 | mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
| 2162 | vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
|
| 2163 |
|
| 2164 | spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
| 2165 | prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code;
|
| 2166 | prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code;
|
| 2167 | prctl_map.start_data = mm->start_data;
|
| 2168 | prctl_map.end_data = mm->end_data;
|
| 2169 | prctl_map.start_brk = mm->start_brk;
|
| 2170 | prctl_map.brk = mm->brk;
|
| 2171 | prctl_map.start_stack = mm->start_stack;
|
| 2172 | prctl_map.arg_start = mm->arg_start;
|
| 2173 | prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end;
|
| 2174 | prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start;
|
| 2175 | prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end;
|
| 2176 |
|
| 2177 | switch (opt) {
|
| 2178 | case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE:
|
| 2179 | prctl_map.start_code = addr;
|
| 2180 | break;
|
| 2181 | case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE:
|
| 2182 | prctl_map.end_code = addr;
|
| 2183 | break;
|
| 2184 | case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA:
|
| 2185 | prctl_map.start_data = addr;
|
| 2186 | break;
|
| 2187 | case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA:
|
| 2188 | prctl_map.end_data = addr;
|
| 2189 | break;
|
| 2190 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK:
|
| 2191 | prctl_map.start_stack = addr;
|
| 2192 | break;
|
| 2193 | case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK:
|
| 2194 | prctl_map.start_brk = addr;
|
| 2195 | break;
|
| 2196 | case PR_SET_MM_BRK:
|
| 2197 | prctl_map.brk = addr;
|
| 2198 | break;
|
| 2199 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START:
|
| 2200 | prctl_map.arg_start = addr;
|
| 2201 | break;
|
| 2202 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END:
|
| 2203 | prctl_map.arg_end = addr;
|
| 2204 | break;
|
| 2205 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START:
|
| 2206 | prctl_map.env_start = addr;
|
| 2207 | break;
|
| 2208 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END:
|
| 2209 | prctl_map.env_end = addr;
|
| 2210 | break;
|
| 2211 | default:
|
| 2212 | goto out;
|
| 2213 | }
|
| 2214 |
|
| 2215 | error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
|
| 2216 | if (error)
|
| 2217 | goto out;
|
| 2218 |
|
| 2219 | switch (opt) {
|
| 2220 | |
| 2221 | * If command line arguments and environment
|
| 2222 | * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can
|
| 2223 | * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup
|
| 2224 | * command line arguments and ENV_START/END
|
| 2225 | * for environment.
|
| 2226 |
|
| 2227 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK:
|
| 2228 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START:
|
| 2229 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END:
|
| 2230 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START:
|
| 2231 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END:
|
| 2232 | if (!vma) {
|
| 2233 | error = -EFAULT;
|
| 2234 | goto out;
|
| 2235 | }
|
| 2236 | }
|
| 2237 |
|
| 2238 | mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code;
|
| 2239 | mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code;
|
| 2240 | mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data;
|
| 2241 | mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data;
|
| 2242 | mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk;
|
| 2243 | mm->brk = prctl_map.brk;
|
| 2244 | mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack;
|
| 2245 | mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start;
|
| 2246 | mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end;
|
| 2247 | mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start;
|
| 2248 | mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end;
|
| 2249 |
|
| 2250 | error = 0;
|
| 2251 | out:
|
| 2252 | spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
| 2253 | mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
| 2254 | return error;
|
| 2255 | }
|
| 2256 |
|
| 2257 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
| 2258 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr)
|
| 2259 | {
|
| 2260 | return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr);
|
| 2261 | }
|
| 2262 | #else
|
| 2263 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr)
|
| 2264 | {
|
| 2265 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2266 | }
|
| 2267 | #endif
|
| 2268 |
|
| 2269 | static int propagate_has_child_subreaper(struct task_struct *p, void *data)
|
| 2270 | {
|
| 2271 | |
| 2272 | * If task has has_child_subreaper - all its descendants
|
| 2273 | * already have these flag too and new descendants will
|
| 2274 | * inherit it on fork, skip them.
|
| 2275 | *
|
| 2276 | * If we've found child_reaper - skip descendants in
|
| 2277 | * it's subtree as they will never get out pidns.
|
| 2278 |
|
| 2279 | if (p->signal->has_child_subreaper ||
|
| 2280 | is_child_reaper(task_pid(p)))
|
| 2281 | return 0;
|
| 2282 |
|
| 2283 | p->signal->has_child_subreaper = 1;
|
| 2284 | return 1;
|
| 2285 | }
|
| 2286 |
|
| 2287 | int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which)
|
| 2288 | {
|
| 2289 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2290 | }
|
| 2291 |
|
| 2292 | int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which,
|
| 2293 | unsigned long ctrl)
|
| 2294 | {
|
| 2295 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2296 | }
|
| 2297 |
|
| 2298 | #define PR_IO_FLUSHER (PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO | PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE)
|
| 2299 |
|
| 2300 | #ifdef CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME
|
| 2301 |
|
| 2302 | #define ANON_VMA_NAME_MAX_LEN 80
|
| 2303 | #define ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS "\\`$[]"
|
| 2304 |
|
| 2305 | static inline bool is_valid_name_char(char ch)
|
| 2306 | {
|
| 2307 |
|
| 2308 | return ch > 0x1f && ch < 0x7f &&
|
| 2309 | !strchr(ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS, ch);
|
| 2310 | }
|
| 2311 |
|
| 2312 | static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long addr,
|
| 2313 | unsigned long size, unsigned long arg)
|
| 2314 | {
|
| 2315 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
| 2316 | const char __user *uname;
|
| 2317 | struct anon_vma_name *anon_name = NULL;
|
| 2318 | int error;
|
| 2319 |
|
| 2320 | switch (opt) {
|
| 2321 | case PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME:
|
| 2322 | uname = (const char __user *)arg;
|
| 2323 | if (uname) {
|
| 2324 | char *name, *pch;
|
| 2325 |
|
| 2326 | name = strndup_user(uname, ANON_VMA_NAME_MAX_LEN);
|
| 2327 | if (IS_ERR(name))
|
| 2328 | return PTR_ERR(name);
|
| 2329 |
|
| 2330 | for (pch = name; *pch != '\0'; pch++) {
|
| 2331 | if (!is_valid_name_char(*pch)) {
|
| 2332 | kfree(name);
|
| 2333 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2334 | }
|
| 2335 | }
|
| 2336 |
|
| 2337 | anon_name = anon_vma_name_alloc(name);
|
| 2338 | kfree(name);
|
| 2339 | if (!anon_name)
|
| 2340 | return -ENOMEM;
|
| 2341 |
|
| 2342 | }
|
| 2343 |
|
| 2344 | mmap_write_lock(mm);
|
| 2345 | error = madvise_set_anon_name(mm, addr, size, anon_name);
|
| 2346 | mmap_write_unlock(mm);
|
| 2347 | anon_vma_name_put(anon_name);
|
| 2348 | break;
|
| 2349 | default:
|
| 2350 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2351 | }
|
| 2352 |
|
| 2353 | return error;
|
| 2354 | }
|
| 2355 |
|
| 2356 | #else
|
| 2357 | static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start,
|
| 2358 | unsigned long size, unsigned long arg)
|
| 2359 | {
|
| 2360 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2361 | }
|
| 2362 | #endif
|
| 2363 |
|
| 2364 | static inline int prctl_set_mdwe(unsigned long bits, unsigned long arg3,
|
| 2365 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
| 2366 | {
|
| 2367 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2368 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2369 |
|
| 2370 | if (bits & ~(PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN))
|
| 2371 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2372 |
|
| 2373 | if (bits & PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN)
|
| 2374 | set_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags);
|
| 2375 | else if (test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags))
|
| 2376 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2377 |
|
| 2378 | return 0;
|
| 2379 | }
|
| 2380 |
|
| 2381 | static inline int prctl_get_mdwe(unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|
| 2382 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
| 2383 | {
|
| 2384 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2385 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2386 |
|
| 2387 | return test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags) ?
|
| 2388 | PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN : 0;
|
| 2389 | }
|
| 2390 |
|
| 2391 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
|
| 2392 | unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
|
| 2393 | {
|
| 2394 | struct task_struct *me = current;
|
| 2395 | unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
|
| 2396 | long error;
|
| 2397 |
|
| 2398 | error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2399 | if (error != -ENOSYS)
|
| 2400 | return error;
|
| 2401 |
|
| 2402 | error = 0;
|
| 2403 | switch (option) {
|
| 2404 | case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
|
| 2405 | if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
|
| 2406 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2407 | break;
|
| 2408 | }
|
| 2409 | me->pdeath_signal = arg2;
|
| 2410 | break;
|
| 2411 | case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
|
| 2412 | error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
|
| 2413 | break;
|
| 2414 | case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
|
| 2415 | error = get_dumpable(me->mm);
|
| 2416 | break;
|
| 2417 | case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
|
| 2418 | if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) {
|
| 2419 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2420 | break;
|
| 2421 | }
|
| 2422 | set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
|
| 2423 | break;
|
| 2424 |
|
| 2425 | case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
|
| 2426 | error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2427 | break;
|
| 2428 | case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
|
| 2429 | error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2430 | break;
|
| 2431 | case PR_SET_FPEMU:
|
| 2432 | error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2433 | break;
|
| 2434 | case PR_GET_FPEMU:
|
| 2435 | error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2436 | break;
|
| 2437 | case PR_SET_FPEXC:
|
| 2438 | error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2439 | break;
|
| 2440 | case PR_GET_FPEXC:
|
| 2441 | error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
| 2442 | break;
|
| 2443 | case PR_GET_TIMING:
|
| 2444 | error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
|
| 2445 | break;
|
| 2446 | case PR_SET_TIMING:
|
| 2447 | if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
|
| 2448 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2449 | break;
|
| 2450 | case PR_SET_NAME:
|
| 2451 | comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0;
|
| 2452 | if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2,
|
| 2453 | sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0)
|
| 2454 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2455 | set_task_comm(me, comm);
|
| 2456 | proc_comm_connector(me);
|
| 2457 | break;
|
| 2458 | case PR_GET_NAME:
|
| 2459 | get_task_comm(comm, me);
|
| 2460 | if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm)))
|
| 2461 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2462 | break;
|
| 2463 | case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
|
| 2464 | error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
| 2465 | break;
|
| 2466 | case PR_SET_ENDIAN:
|
| 2467 | error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
| 2468 | break;
|
| 2469 | case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
|
| 2470 | error = prctl_get_seccomp();
|
| 2471 | break;
|
| 2472 | case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
|
| 2473 | error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3);
|
| 2474 | break;
|
| 2475 | case PR_GET_TSC:
|
| 2476 | error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
| 2477 | break;
|
| 2478 | case PR_SET_TSC:
|
| 2479 | error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
| 2480 | break;
|
| 2481 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE:
|
| 2482 | error = perf_event_task_disable();
|
| 2483 | break;
|
| 2484 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE:
|
| 2485 | error = perf_event_task_enable();
|
| 2486 | break;
|
| 2487 | case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK:
|
| 2488 | if (current->timer_slack_ns > ULONG_MAX)
|
| 2489 | error = ULONG_MAX;
|
| 2490 | else
|
| 2491 | error = current->timer_slack_ns;
|
| 2492 | break;
|
| 2493 | case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK:
|
| 2494 | if (arg2 <= 0)
|
| 2495 | current->timer_slack_ns =
|
| 2496 | current->default_timer_slack_ns;
|
| 2497 | else
|
| 2498 | current->timer_slack_ns = arg2;
|
| 2499 | break;
|
| 2500 | case PR_MCE_KILL:
|
| 2501 | if (arg4 | arg5)
|
| 2502 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2503 | switch (arg2) {
|
| 2504 | case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR:
|
| 2505 | if (arg3 != 0)
|
| 2506 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2507 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
| 2508 | break;
|
| 2509 | case PR_MCE_KILL_SET:
|
| 2510 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
| 2511 | if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY)
|
| 2512 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
| 2513 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE)
|
| 2514 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
| 2515 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT)
|
| 2516 | current->flags &=
|
| 2517 | ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS);
|
| 2518 | else
|
| 2519 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2520 | break;
|
| 2521 | default:
|
| 2522 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2523 | }
|
| 2524 | break;
|
| 2525 | case PR_MCE_KILL_GET:
|
| 2526 | if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
|
| 2527 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2528 | if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS)
|
| 2529 | error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ?
|
| 2530 | PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE;
|
| 2531 | else
|
| 2532 | error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT;
|
| 2533 | break;
|
| 2534 | case PR_SET_MM:
|
| 2535 | error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2536 | break;
|
| 2537 | case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS:
|
| 2538 | error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user * __user *)arg2);
|
| 2539 | break;
|
| 2540 | case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
|
| 2541 | me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2;
|
| 2542 | if (!arg2)
|
| 2543 | break;
|
| 2544 |
|
| 2545 | walk_process_tree(me, propagate_has_child_subreaper, NULL);
|
| 2546 | break;
|
| 2547 | case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
|
| 2548 | error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper,
|
| 2549 | (int __user *)arg2);
|
| 2550 | break;
|
| 2551 | case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
|
| 2552 | if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2553 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2554 |
|
| 2555 | task_set_no_new_privs(current);
|
| 2556 | break;
|
| 2557 | case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
|
| 2558 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2559 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2560 | return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0;
|
| 2561 | case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE:
|
| 2562 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2563 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2564 | error = !!test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
|
| 2565 | break;
|
| 2566 | case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE:
|
| 2567 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2568 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2569 | if (mmap_write_lock_killable(me->mm))
|
| 2570 | return -EINTR;
|
| 2571 | if (arg2)
|
| 2572 | set_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
|
| 2573 | else
|
| 2574 | clear_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
|
| 2575 | mmap_write_unlock(me->mm);
|
| 2576 | break;
|
| 2577 | case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT:
|
| 2578 | case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT:
|
| 2579 |
|
| 2580 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2581 | case PR_SET_FP_MODE:
|
| 2582 | error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2);
|
| 2583 | break;
|
| 2584 | case PR_GET_FP_MODE:
|
| 2585 | error = GET_FP_MODE(me);
|
| 2586 | break;
|
| 2587 | case PR_SVE_SET_VL:
|
| 2588 | error = SVE_SET_VL(arg2);
|
| 2589 | break;
|
| 2590 | case PR_SVE_GET_VL:
|
| 2591 | error = SVE_GET_VL();
|
| 2592 | break;
|
| 2593 | case PR_SME_SET_VL:
|
| 2594 | error = SME_SET_VL(arg2);
|
| 2595 | break;
|
| 2596 | case PR_SME_GET_VL:
|
| 2597 | error = SME_GET_VL();
|
| 2598 | break;
|
| 2599 | case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
|
| 2600 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2601 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2602 | error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(me, arg2);
|
| 2603 | break;
|
| 2604 | case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
|
| 2605 | if (arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2606 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2607 | error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(me, arg2, arg3);
|
| 2608 | break;
|
| 2609 | case PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS:
|
| 2610 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2611 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2612 | error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2);
|
| 2613 | break;
|
| 2614 | case PR_PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS:
|
| 2615 | if (arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2616 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2617 | error = PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(me, arg2, arg3);
|
| 2618 | break;
|
| 2619 | case PR_PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS:
|
| 2620 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2621 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2622 | error = PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(me);
|
| 2623 | break;
|
| 2624 | case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL:
|
| 2625 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2626 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2627 | error = SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg2);
|
| 2628 | break;
|
| 2629 | case PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL:
|
| 2630 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2631 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2632 | error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL();
|
| 2633 | break;
|
| 2634 | case PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER:
|
| 2635 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 2636 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2637 |
|
| 2638 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2639 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2640 |
|
| 2641 | if (arg2 == 1)
|
| 2642 | current->flags |= PR_IO_FLUSHER;
|
| 2643 | else if (!arg2)
|
| 2644 | current->flags &= ~PR_IO_FLUSHER;
|
| 2645 | else
|
| 2646 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2647 | break;
|
| 2648 | case PR_GET_IO_FLUSHER:
|
| 2649 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
| 2650 | return -EPERM;
|
| 2651 |
|
| 2652 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
| 2653 | return -EINVAL;
|
| 2654 |
|
| 2655 | error = (current->flags & PR_IO_FLUSHER) == PR_IO_FLUSHER;
|
| 2656 | break;
|
| 2657 | case PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH:
|
| 2658 | error = set_syscall_user_dispatch(arg2, arg3, arg4,
|
| 2659 | (char __user *) arg5);
|
| 2660 | break;
|
| 2661 | #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE
|
| 2662 | case PR_SCHED_CORE:
|
| 2663 | error = sched_core_share_pid(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2664 | break;
|
| 2665 | #endif
|
| 2666 | case PR_SET_MDWE:
|
| 2667 | error = prctl_set_mdwe(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2668 | break;
|
| 2669 | case PR_GET_MDWE:
|
| 2670 | error = prctl_get_mdwe(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2671 | break;
|
| 2672 | case PR_SET_VMA:
|
| 2673 | error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
| 2674 | break;
|
| 2675 | default:
|
| 2676 | error = -EINVAL;
|
| 2677 | break;
|
| 2678 | }
|
| 2679 | return error;
|
| 2680 | }
|
| 2681 |
|
| 2682 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep,
|
| 2683 | struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused)
|
| 2684 | {
|
| 2685 | int err = 0;
|
| 2686 | int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
|
| 2687 |
|
| 2688 | if (cpup)
|
| 2689 | err |= put_user(cpu, cpup);
|
| 2690 | if (nodep)
|
| 2691 | err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep);
|
| 2692 | return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
| 2693 | }
|
| 2694 |
|
| 2695 | |
| 2696 | * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct
|
| 2697 | * @info: pointer to buffer to fill
|
| 2698 |
|
| 2699 | static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info)
|
| 2700 | {
|
| 2701 | unsigned long mem_total, sav_total;
|
| 2702 | unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount;
|
| 2703 | struct timespec64 tp;
|
| 2704 |
|
| 2705 | memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo));
|
| 2706 |
|
| 2707 | ktime_get_boottime_ts64(&tp);
|
| 2708 | timens_add_boottime(&tp);
|
| 2709 | info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0);
|
| 2710 |
|
| 2711 | get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT);
|
| 2712 |
|
| 2713 | info->procs = nr_threads;
|
| 2714 |
|
| 2715 | si_meminfo(info);
|
| 2716 | si_swapinfo(info);
|
| 2717 |
|
| 2718 | |
| 2719 | * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap)
|
| 2720 | * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then
|
| 2721 | * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not,
|
| 2722 | * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways...
|
| 2723 | *
|
| 2724 | * -Erik Andersen <[email protected]>
|
| 2725 |
|
| 2726 |
|
| 2727 | mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap;
|
| 2728 | if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap)
|
| 2729 | goto out;
|
| 2730 | bitcount = 0;
|
| 2731 | mem_unit = info->mem_unit;
|
| 2732 | while (mem_unit > 1) {
|
| 2733 | bitcount++;
|
| 2734 | mem_unit >>= 1;
|
| 2735 | sav_total = mem_total;
|
| 2736 | mem_total <<= 1;
|
| 2737 | if (mem_total < sav_total)
|
| 2738 | goto out;
|
| 2739 | }
|
| 2740 |
|
| 2741 | |
| 2742 | * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by
|
| 2743 | * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible
|
| 2744 | * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x
|
| 2745 | * kernels...
|
| 2746 |
|
| 2747 |
|
| 2748 | info->mem_unit = 1;
|
| 2749 | info->totalram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2750 | info->freeram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2751 | info->sharedram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2752 | info->bufferram <<= bitcount;
|
| 2753 | info->totalswap <<= bitcount;
|
| 2754 | info->freeswap <<= bitcount;
|
| 2755 | info->totalhigh <<= bitcount;
|
| 2756 | info->freehigh <<= bitcount;
|
| 2757 |
|
| 2758 | out:
|
| 2759 | return 0;
|
| 2760 | }
|
| 2761 |
|
| 2762 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info)
|
| 2763 | {
|
| 2764 | struct sysinfo val;
|
| 2765 |
|
| 2766 | do_sysinfo(&val);
|
| 2767 |
|
| 2768 | if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo)))
|
| 2769 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2770 |
|
| 2771 | return 0;
|
| 2772 | }
|
| 2773 |
|
| 2774 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
| 2775 | struct compat_sysinfo {
|
| 2776 | s32 uptime;
|
| 2777 | u32 loads[3];
|
| 2778 | u32 totalram;
|
| 2779 | u32 freeram;
|
| 2780 | u32 sharedram;
|
| 2781 | u32 bufferram;
|
| 2782 | u32 totalswap;
|
| 2783 | u32 freeswap;
|
| 2784 | u16 procs;
|
| 2785 | u16 pad;
|
| 2786 | u32 totalhigh;
|
| 2787 | u32 freehigh;
|
| 2788 | u32 mem_unit;
|
| 2789 | char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)];
|
| 2790 | };
|
| 2791 |
|
| 2792 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
|
| 2793 | {
|
| 2794 | struct sysinfo s;
|
| 2795 | struct compat_sysinfo s_32;
|
| 2796 |
|
| 2797 | do_sysinfo(&s);
|
| 2798 |
|
| 2799 | |
| 2800 | * down if needed
|
| 2801 |
|
| 2802 | if (upper_32_bits(s.totalram) || upper_32_bits(s.totalswap)) {
|
| 2803 | int bitcount = 0;
|
| 2804 |
|
| 2805 | while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) {
|
| 2806 | s.mem_unit <<= 1;
|
| 2807 | bitcount++;
|
| 2808 | }
|
| 2809 |
|
| 2810 | s.totalram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2811 | s.freeram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2812 | s.sharedram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2813 | s.bufferram >>= bitcount;
|
| 2814 | s.totalswap >>= bitcount;
|
| 2815 | s.freeswap >>= bitcount;
|
| 2816 | s.totalhigh >>= bitcount;
|
| 2817 | s.freehigh >>= bitcount;
|
| 2818 | }
|
| 2819 |
|
| 2820 | memset(&s_32, 0, sizeof(s_32));
|
| 2821 | s_32.uptime = s.uptime;
|
| 2822 | s_32.loads[0] = s.loads[0];
|
| 2823 | s_32.loads[1] = s.loads[1];
|
| 2824 | s_32.loads[2] = s.loads[2];
|
| 2825 | s_32.totalram = s.totalram;
|
| 2826 | s_32.freeram = s.freeram;
|
| 2827 | s_32.sharedram = s.sharedram;
|
| 2828 | s_32.bufferram = s.bufferram;
|
| 2829 | s_32.totalswap = s.totalswap;
|
| 2830 | s_32.freeswap = s.freeswap;
|
| 2831 | s_32.procs = s.procs;
|
| 2832 | s_32.totalhigh = s.totalhigh;
|
| 2833 | s_32.freehigh = s.freehigh;
|
| 2834 | s_32.mem_unit = s.mem_unit;
|
| 2835 | if (copy_to_user(info, &s_32, sizeof(s_32)))
|
| 2836 | return -EFAULT;
|
| 2837 | return 0;
|
| 2838 | }
|
| 2839 | #endif
|