projects/linux·commit 160da84d

userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.

160da84d · Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> · 2013-07-02 10:04:54 -07:00

As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace
properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP
permission in the user namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Commit
160da84dbb39443fdade7151bc63a88f8e953077
Parents
dbef0c1c

Changes

1 files changed · +1 −1

FileStatusAddDelContent
security/commoncap.cmodified+1−1View file

security/commoncap.c

View file
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c44b6fe..9fccf71 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
*/
static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;