diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
index 10959e6..929f689 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
 	select ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
 	select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
 	select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
+	select ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION if TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
 	select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE	if ACPI
 	select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
 	select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if PERF_EVENTS
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
+	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
@@ -632,23 +634,6 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
 
 	  This is limited by the size of the lower address memory, 256MB.
 
-config SECCOMP
-	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
-	depends on PROC_FS
-	default y
-	help
-	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
-	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
-	  execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
-	  the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
-	  syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
-	  their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
-	  enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
-	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
-	  defined by each seccomp mode.
-
-	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
-
 endmenu
 
 config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL
@@ -667,10 +652,6 @@ config ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE
 	  or have huge holes in the physical address space for other reasons.
 	  See <file:Documentation/mm/numa.rst> for more.
 
-config ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION
-	def_bool y
-	depends on TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
-
 config ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE
 	def_bool y
 	depends on MEMORY_HOTPLUG
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h
index 8de6c4b..49e29b2 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ static inline bool acpi_has_cpu_in_madt(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
+#define MAX_CORE_PIC 256
+
 extern struct list_head acpi_wakeup_device_list;
-extern struct acpi_madt_core_pic acpi_core_pic[NR_CPUS];
+extern struct acpi_madt_core_pic acpi_core_pic[MAX_CORE_PIC];
 
 extern int __init parse_acpi_topology(void);
 
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c
index b6b097b..5cf59c6 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c
@@ -29,11 +29,9 @@ int disabled_cpus;
 
 u64 acpi_saved_sp;
 
-#define MAX_CORE_PIC 256
-
 #define PREFIX			"ACPI: "
 
-struct acpi_madt_core_pic acpi_core_pic[NR_CPUS];
+struct acpi_madt_core_pic acpi_core_pic[MAX_CORE_PIC];
 
 void __init __iomem * __acpi_map_table(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
 {
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c b/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c
index cc3e81f..c608adc 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)
 		unsigned long xrange = (maddr >> XRANGE_SHIFT) & 0xffff;
 		unsigned long offset = 0;
 
+		if (maddr >= FIXADDR_START)
+			return (void *)(kasan_early_shadow_page);
+
 		maddr &= XRANGE_SHADOW_MASK;
 		switch (xrange) {
 		case XKPRANGE_CC_SEG:
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile b/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile
index c74c992..f597cd0 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/loongarch/vdso/Makefile
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 # Objects to go into the VDSO.
 
 KASAN_SANITIZE := n
+UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
 
 # Include the generic Makefile to check the built vdso.