diff --git a/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h b/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h index 01e42ee..4646362 100644 --- a/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h +++ b/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct request_key_auth { const struct cred *cred; void *callout_info; size_t callout_len; - pid_t pid; + struct pid *pid; char op[8]; } __randomize_layout; diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 59cb77b..e07092e 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -579,6 +580,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key, { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL; unsigned short datablob_len; + unsigned short payload_totallen; unsigned short decrypted_datalen; unsigned short payload_datalen; unsigned int encrypted_datalen; @@ -632,16 +634,22 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key, encrypted_datalen = roundup(decrypted_datalen, blksize); - datablob_len = format_len + 1 + strlen(master_desc) + 1 - + strlen(datalen) + 1 + ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen; + if (check_add_overflow(format_len + 1 + strlen(master_desc) + 1 + + strlen(datalen) + 1 + ivsize + 1, + encrypted_datalen, &datablob_len)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (check_add_overflow(datablob_len, + payload_datalen + HASH_SIZE + 1, + &payload_totallen)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, payload_datalen + datablob_len - + HASH_SIZE + 1); + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, payload_totallen); if (ret < 0) return ERR_PTR(ret); - epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + payload_datalen + - datablob_len + HASH_SIZE + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + epayload = kzalloc_flex(*epayload, payload_data, payload_totallen, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!epayload) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c index 748e838..eda445f 100644 --- a/security/keys/gc.c +++ b/security/keys/gc.c @@ -318,9 +318,7 @@ maybe_resched: if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_3)) { kdebug("dead wake"); - smp_mb(); - clear_bit(KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags); - wake_up_bit(&key_gc_flags, KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE); + clear_and_wake_up_bit(KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags); } if (gc_state & KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN) diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 282e09d..ed6f55b 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include #include +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -73,7 +75,10 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); if (key_is_positive(key)) - seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len); + seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", + pid_nr_ns(rka->pid, + proc_pid_ns(file_inode(m->file)->i_sb)), + rka->callout_len); } /* @@ -113,6 +118,7 @@ static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka) if (rka->cred) put_cred(rka->cred); kfree(rka->callout_info); + put_pid(rka->pid); kfree(rka); } @@ -226,14 +232,14 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op, irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred); - rka->pid = irka->pid; + rka->pid = get_pid(irka->pid); up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); } else { /* it isn't - use this process as the context */ rka->cred = get_cred(cred); - rka->pid = current->pid; + rka->pid = get_pid(task_pid(current)); } rka->target_key = key_get(target); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 67225dd..01f18bb 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct tpm2_key_context { static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options, - u8 **buf) + u8 **buf, unsigned int *blob_len) { int ret; struct tpm2_key_context ctx; @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return -ENOMEM; *buf = blob; + *blob_len = ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len; options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); @@ -384,10 +385,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, int rc; u32 attrs; - rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob, &blob_len); if (rc) { /* old form */ blob = payload->blob; + blob_len = payload->blob_len; payload->old_format = 1; } else { /* Bind for cleanup: */ @@ -399,17 +401,17 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return -EINVAL; /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ - if (payload->blob_len < 4) + if (blob_len < 4) return -EINVAL; private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob); /* must be big enough for following public_len */ - if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len)) + if (private_len + 2 + 2 > blob_len) return -E2BIG; public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len); - if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) + if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > blob_len) return -E2BIG; pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;