projects/linux·commit 9cdca336

Merge tag 'integrity-v7.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

9cdca336 · Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> · 2026-04-17 15:42:01 -07:00

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "There are two main changes, one feature removal, some code cleanup,
  and a number of bug fixes.

  Main changes:
   - Detecting secure boot mode was limited to IMA. Make detecting
     secure boot mode accessible to EVM and other LSMs
   - IMA sigv3 support was limited to fsverity. Add IMA sigv3 support
     for IMA regular file hashes and EVM portable signatures

  Remove:
   - Remove IMA support for asychronous hash calculation originally
     added for hardware acceleration

  Cleanup:
   - Remove unnecessary Kconfig CONFIG_MODULE_SIG and CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
     tests
   - Add descriptions of the IMA atomic flags

  Bug fixes:
   - Like IMA, properly limit EVM "fix" mode
   - Define and call evm_fix_hmac() to update security.evm
   - Fallback to using i_version to detect file change for filesystems
     that do not support STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE
   - Address missing kernel support for configured (new) TPM hash
     algorithms
   - Add missing crypto_shash_final() return value"

* tag 'integrity-v7.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  evm: Enforce signatures version 3 with new EVM policy 'bit 3'
  integrity: Allow sigv3 verification on EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG
  ima: add support to require IMA sigv3 signatures
  ima: add regular file data hash signature version 3 support
  ima: Define asymmetric_verify_v3() to verify IMA sigv3 signatures
  ima: remove buggy support for asynchronous hashes
  integrity: Eliminate weak definition of arch_get_secureboot()
  ima: Add code comments to explain IMA iint cache atomic_flags
  ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos
  ima: check return value of crypto_shash_final() in boot aggregate
  ima: Define and use a digest_size field in the ima_algo_desc structure
  powerpc/ima: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
  ima: efi: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG/CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
  ima: fallback to using i_version to detect file change
  evm: fix security.evm for a file with IMA signature
  s390: Drop unnecessary CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
  evm: Don't enable fix mode when secure boot is enabled
  integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide
Commit
9cdca336677b4d15579ec462e33c8a330ab3a9de
Parents
ba314ed1 · 82bbd447

Merge commit. Changes below are compared with the first parent: ba314ed1.

Changes

33 files changed · +398 −586

FileStatusAddDelContent
Documentation/ABI/testing/evmmodified+1−0View file
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policymodified+6−4View file
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txtmodified+0−17View file
MAINTAINERSmodified+1−0View file
arch/Kconfigmodified+3−0View file
arch/powerpc/Kconfigmodified+1−0View file
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.cmodified+1−7View file
arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.cmodified+6−0View file
arch/s390/Kconfigmodified+1−1View file
arch/s390/kernel/Makefilemodified+0−1View file
arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.cdeleted+0−14View before deletion
arch/s390/kernel/ipl.cmodified+6−0View file
arch/x86/include/asm/efi.hmodified+2−2View file
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.cmodified+1−1View file
include/linux/evm.hmodified+8−0View file
include/linux/ima.hmodified+1−6View file
include/linux/secure_boot.hadded+23−0View file
security/integrity/Makefilemodified+1−0View file
security/integrity/digsig.cmodified+5−3View file
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.cmodified+59−0View file
security/integrity/efi_secureboot.cadded+56−0View file
security/integrity/evm/evm.hmodified+2−1View file
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.cmodified+61−8View file
security/integrity/ima/ima.hmodified+28−1View file
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.cmodified+9−4View file
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.cmodified+27−52View file
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.cmodified+16−374View file
security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.cmodified+4−49View file
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.cmodified+18−16View file
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.cmodified+27−10View file
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.cmodified+10−12View file
security/integrity/integrity.hmodified+13−2View file
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.cmodified+1−1View file

Only the first 600 diff lines are shown. Download the complete patch.

Documentation/ABI/testing/evm

View file
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
index 44750a9..db3007b 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Description:
2 Permit modification of EVM-protected metadata at
runtime. Not supported if HMAC validation and
creation is enabled (deprecated).
+ 3 Require asymmetric signatures to be version 3
31 Disable further runtime modification of EVM policy
=== ==================================================

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

View file
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index d4b3696..1925847 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -53,10 +53,7 @@ Description:
where 'imasig' is the original or the signature
format v2.
where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
- where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3. (Currently
- limited to fsverity digest based signatures
- stored in security.ima xattr. Requires
- specifying "digest_type=verity" first.)
+ where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3.
appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist] (deprecated)
Setting the check_blacklist flag is no longer necessary.
@@ -186,6 +183,11 @@ Description:
appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
appraise_type=sigv3
+ Example of a regular IMA file hash 'appraise' rule requiring
+ signature version 3 format stored in security.ima xattr.
+
+ appraise func=BPRM_CHECK appraise_type=sigv3
+
All of these policy rules could, for example, be constrained
either based on a filesystem's UUID (fsuuid) or based on LSM
labels.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

View file
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index ec1fdb4..cf38076 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2410,23 +2410,6 @@ Kernel parameters
[IMA] Define a custom template format.
Format: { "field1|...|fieldN" }
- ima.ahash_minsize= [IMA] Minimum file size for asynchronous hash usage
- Format: <min_file_size>
- Set the minimal file size for using asynchronous hash.
- If left unspecified, ahash usage is disabled.
-
- ahash performance varies for different data sizes on
- different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
- to achieve the best performance for a particular HW.
-
- ima.ahash_bufsize= [IMA] Asynchronous hash buffer size
- Format: <bufsize>
- Set hashing buffer size. Default: 4k.
-
- ahash performance varies for different chunk sizes on
- different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
- to achieve best performance for particular HW.
-
ima= [IMA] Enable or disable IMA
Format: { "off" | "on" }
Default: "on"

MAINTAINERS

View file
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 27e65f0..8562d24 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -12732,6 +12732,7 @@ R: Eric Snowberg <[email protected]>
S: Supported
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
+F: include/linux/secure_boot.h
F: security/integrity/
F: security/integrity/ima/

arch/Kconfig

View file
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 334b695..fa1d4bc 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -1839,4 +1839,7 @@ config ARCH_WANTS_PRE_LINK_VMLINUX
config ARCH_HAS_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS
bool
+config HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
+ def_bool EFI
+
endmenu

arch/powerpc/Kconfig

View file
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 1075d0a..e93df95 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
select PSERIES_PLPKS if PPC_PSERIES
+ select HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
help
Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security
policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user

arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c

View file
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
index b7029be..17f9304 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <asm/secure_boot.h>
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
- return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled();
-}
-
/*
* The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems.
* These rules verify the file signatures against known good values.
@@ -63,8 +58,7 @@ static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = {
const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
{
if (is_ppc_secureboot_enabled()) {
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
- set_module_sig_enforced();
+ set_module_sig_enforced();
if (is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled())
return secure_and_trusted_rules;

arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c

View file
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c
index 3a28795..28436c1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
#include <linux/string_choices.h>
#include <asm/secure_boot.h>
@@ -44,6 +45,11 @@ out:
return enabled;
}
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled();
+}
+
bool is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled(void)
{
struct device_node *node;

arch/s390/Kconfig

View file
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index d018009..1a555a4 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ config S390
#
# Note: keep this list sorted alphabetically
#
- imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
select ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE
select ARCH_32BIT_USTAT_F_TINODE
select ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE
@@ -181,6 +180,7 @@ config S390
select GENERIC_IOREMAP if PCI
select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN

arch/s390/kernel/Makefile

View file
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile b/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile
index b522c66..137e479 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) += stackprotector.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += machine_kexec_file.o kexec_image.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += kexec_elf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CERT_STORE) += cert_store.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_arch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += perf_event.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += perf_cpum_cf.o perf_cpum_sf.o

arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c

View before deletion
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
deleted file mode 100644
index f3c3e6e..0000000
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-
-#include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <asm/boot_data.h>
-
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
- return ipl_secure_flag;
-}
-
-const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
-{
- return NULL;
-}

arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c

View file
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c
index 049c557..3c346b0 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/debug_locks.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
#include <asm/asm-extable.h>
#include <asm/machine.h>
#include <asm/diag.h>
@@ -2387,6 +2388,11 @@ void __no_stack_protector s390_reset_system(void)
diag_amode31_ops.diag308_reset();
}
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ return ipl_secure_flag;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
int ipl_report_add_component(struct ipl_report *report, struct kexec_buf *kbuf,

arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h

View file
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index 51b4cdb..dc8fe13 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -401,9 +401,9 @@ extern int __init efi_memmap_split_count(efi_memory_desc_t *md,
extern void __init efi_memmap_insert(struct efi_memory_map *old_memmap,
void *buf, struct efi_mem_range *mem);
-extern enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode(void);
+enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_efi_boot_mode(void);
-#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode()
+#define arch_efi_boot_mode __x86_efi_boot_mode()
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RUNTIME_MAP
int efi_get_runtime_map_size(void);

arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c

View file
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index d84c602..0c39adb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ umode_t efi_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, int n)
return attr->mode;
}
-enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode(void)
+enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_efi_boot_mode(void)
{
return boot_params.secure_boot;
}

include/linux/evm.h

View file
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index ddece4a..913f457 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
void *xattr_value,
size_t xattr_value_len);
+int evm_fix_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+ const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
int *xattr_count);
@@ -51,6 +53,12 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
{
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
+
+static inline int evm_fix_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+ const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
#endif
static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,

include/linux/ima.h

View file
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index abf8923..8e08baf 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
struct linux_binprm;
@@ -73,14 +74,8 @@ int ima_validate_range(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
-extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
#else
-static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
- return false;
-}
-
static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
{
return NULL;

include/linux/secure_boot.h

View file
diff --git a/include/linux/secure_boot.h b/include/linux/secure_boot.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d17e923
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/secure_boot.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2026 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Author: Coiby Xu <[email protected]>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_SECURE_BOOT_H
+#define _LINUX_SECURE_BOOT_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
+/*
+ * Returns true if the platform secure boot is enabled.
+ * Returns false if disabled or not supported.
+ */
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void);
+#else
+static inline bool arch_get_secureboot(void) { return false; }
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SECURE_BOOT_H */

security/integrity/Makefile

View file
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index 92b6303..45dfded 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_EFI) += efi_secureboot.o
# The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below.
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/
obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/

security/integrity/digsig.c

View file
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 75c684c..1ed6861 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
}
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
- const char *digest, int digestlen)
+ const char *digest, int digestlen, u8 algo)
{
struct key *keyring;
@@ -76,9 +76,11 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
digestlen);
case 2: /* regular file data hash based signature */
- case 3: /* struct ima_file_id data based signature */
return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
- digestlen);
+ digestlen);
+ case 3: /* struct ima_file_id data based signature */
+ return asymmetric_verify_v3(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
+ digestlen, algo);
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;

security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c

View file
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 87be85f..6e68ec3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -131,3 +131,62 @@ out:
pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
+
+/*
+ * calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data
+ * @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type]
+ * @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo]
+ * @digest: pointer to the digest to be hashed
+ * @hash: (out) pointer to the hash
+ *
+ * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed by
+ * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
+ enum hash_algo algo, const u8 *digest,
+ struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ struct ima_file_id file_id = {.hash_type = type, .hash_algorithm = algo};
+ size_t digest_size = hash_digest_size[algo];
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ size_t file_id_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+ type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ memcpy(file_id.hash, digest, digest_size);
+
+ /* Calculate the ima_file_id struct hash on the portion used. */
+ file_id_size = sizeof(file_id) - (HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - digest_size);
+
+ hash->hdr.algo = algo;
+ hash->hdr.length = digest_size;
+ rc = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, (const u8 *)&file_id, file_id_size,
+ hash->digest);
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int asymmetric_verify_v3(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen,
+ const char *data, int datalen, u8 algo)
+{
+ struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
+ struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = calc_file_id_hash(hdr->type, algo, data, &hash);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, hash.digest,
+ hash.hdr.length);
+}

security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c

View file
diff --git a/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfd4260
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-1.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+#ifndef arch_efi_boot_mode
+#define arch_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset
+#endif
+
+static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
+{
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
+
+ if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+ }
+
+ mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+ if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled)
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode disabled\n");
+ else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown)
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode enabled\n");
+ return mode;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Query secure boot status
+ *
+ * Note don't call this function too early e.g. in __setup hook otherwise the
+ * kernel may hang when calling efi_get_secureboot_mode.
+ *
+ */
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
+ static bool initialized;
+
+ if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ sb_mode = arch_efi_boot_mode;
+
+ if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+ sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
+ initialized = true;
+ }
+
+ if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+ return true;
+ else
+ return false;
+}

security/integrity/evm/evm.h

View file
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 51aba5a..694552a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -20,11 +20,12 @@
#define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001
#define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002
#define EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES 0x0004
+#define EVM_SIGV3_REQUIRED 0x0008
#define EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */
#define EVM_KEY_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509)
#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE | \
- EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+ EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES | EVM_SIGV3_REQUIRED)
struct xattr_list {
struct list_head list;

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c

View file
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 41b053c..b59e3f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -72,17 +72,25 @@ static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = {
LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames);
+static char *evm_cmdline __initdata;
+core_param(evm, evm_cmdline, charp, 0);
+
static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init;
-static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
+static void __init evm_set_fixmode(void)
{
- if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
- evm_fixmode = 1;
- else
- pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str);
+ if (!evm_cmdline)
+ return;
- return 1;
+ if (strncmp(evm_cmdline, "fix", 3) == 0) {
+ if (arch_get_secureboot()) {
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring evm=fix");
+ return;
+ }
+ evm_fixmode = 1;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", evm_cmdline);
+ }
}
-__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
static void __init evm_init_config(void)
{
@@ -128,6 +136,14 @@ static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void)
return true;
}
+static bool evm_sigv3_required(void)
+{
+ if (evm_initialized & EVM_SIGV3_REQUIRED)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -250,6 +266,12 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
}
hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data;
+
+ if (evm_sigv3_required() && hdr->version != 3) {
+ evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo;
rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest,
@@ -258,7 +280,8 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
break;
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
- digest.digest, digest.hdr.length);
+ digest.digest, digest.hdr.length,
+ digest.hdr.algo);
if (!rc) {

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security/integrity/ima/ima.h

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security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c

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security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c

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security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c

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security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c

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security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c

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security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

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security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

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security/integrity/integrity.h

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security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c

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