projects/linux·commit aa6fc3de

Merge tag 'for-next-keys-7.2-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

aa6fc3de · Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> · 2026-07-27 14:14:11 -07:00

Pull keys fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen:

 - An unprivileged keyring whose keys collide through the
   description-chunk path can drive assoc_array node splitting
   into an out-of-bounds slot write. Fix it.

 - Fix the DCP trusted keys backend

* tag 'for-next-keys-7.2-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  assoc_array: trim the final shortcut word using the current chunk end
  keys: make keyring key-chunk byte order agree with keyring_diff_objects()
  keys: fix out-of-bounds read in keyring_get_key_chunk()
  KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix key_len validation and calc_blob_len() return type
Commit
aa6fc3defb36b11eb82c4d1f4e95b5f6d8a0bca6
Parents
e895a6fc · a82c8a05

Merge commit. Changes below are compared with the first parent: e895a6fc.

Changes

3 files changed · +21 −11

lib/assoc_array.c

View file
diff --git a/lib/assoc_array.c b/lib/assoc_array.c
index bcc6e0a..b6c9723 100644
--- a/lib/assoc_array.c
+++ b/lib/assoc_array.c
@@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ follow_shortcut:
sc_segments = shortcut->index_key[sc_level >> ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT];
dissimilarity = segments ^ sc_segments;
- if (round_up(sc_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE) > shortcut->skip_to_level) {
+ if (shortcut->skip_to_level < round_down(sc_level,
+ ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE) + ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE) {
/* Trim segments that are beyond the shortcut */
int shift = shortcut->skip_to_level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
dissimilarity &= ~(ULONG_MAX << shift);

security/keys/keyring.c

View file
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 7a2ee0d..15bf4af 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chunk(const void *data, int level)
unsigned long chunk = 0;
const u8 *d;
int desc_len = index_key->desc_len, n = sizeof(chunk);
+ unsigned int offset;
level /= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE;
switch (level) {
@@ -284,17 +285,18 @@ static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chunk(const void *data, int level)
return (unsigned long)index_key->domain_tag;
default:
level -= 4;
- if (desc_len <= sizeof(index_key->desc))
+ offset = sizeof(index_key->desc) + level * sizeof(long);
+ if (desc_len <= offset)
return 0;
- d = index_key->description + sizeof(index_key->desc);
- d += level * sizeof(long);
- desc_len -= sizeof(index_key->desc);
+ d = index_key->description + offset;
+ desc_len -= offset;
if (desc_len > n)
desc_len = n;
+ d += desc_len;
do {
chunk <<= 8;
- chunk |= *d++;
+ chunk |= *--d;
} while (--desc_len > 0);
return chunk;
}
@@ -375,7 +377,7 @@ same:
return -1;
differ_plus_i:
- level += i;
+ level += i - (int)sizeof(a->desc);
differ:
i = level * 8 + __ffs(seg_a ^ seg_b);
return i;

security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c

View file
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
index 7b6eb65..c078ade 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static bool skip_zk_test;
module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are zero'ed");
-static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len)
+static size_t calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len)
{
return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN;
}
@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *plain_key, u8 *encrypted_key)
static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
- int blen, ret;
+ size_t blen;
+ int ret;
u8 *plain_blob_key;
blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
@@ -242,7 +243,8 @@ out:
static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
- int blen, ret;
+ size_t blen;
+ int ret;
u8 *plain_blob_key = NULL;
if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) {
@@ -253,9 +255,14 @@ static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
}
p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len);
+ if (p->key_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || p->key_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
if (blen != p->blob_len) {
- pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen,
+ pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %zu != %u\n", blen,
p->blob_len);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;