Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6

bb50cbbd · Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> · 2007-07-12 13:46:48 -07:00

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  security: unexport mmap_min_addr
  SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel
  security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap
  SELinux: Use %lu for inode->i_no when printing avc
  SELinux: allow preemption between transition permission checks
  selinux: introduce schedule points in policydb_destroy()
  selinux: add selinuxfs structure for object class discovery
  selinux: change sel_make_dir() to specify inode counter.
  selinux: rename sel_remove_bools() for more general usage.
  selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy

Commit: bb50cbbd4beacd5ceda76c32fcb116c67fe8c66c
Parents: 702ed6ef · d4cf2915

Merge commit. Changes below are compared with the first parent: 702ed6ef.

Changes

20 files changed · +504 −86

File	Status	Add	Del	Content
Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt	modified	+15	−0	View file
include/linux/security.h	modified	+12	−5	View file
kernel/sysctl.c	modified	+10	−0	View file
mm/mmap.c	modified	+2	−2	View file
mm/mremap.c	modified	+11	−2	View file
mm/nommu.c	modified	+1	−1	View file
security/dummy.c	modified	+5	−1	View file
security/security.c	modified	+1	−0	View file
security/selinux/avc.c	modified	+7	−5	View file
security/selinux/hooks.c	modified	+24	−18	View file
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h	modified	+1	−0	View file
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h	modified	+1	−0	View file
security/selinux/include/avc.h	modified	+4	−2	View file
security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h	modified	+1	−0	View file
security/selinux/include/flask.h	modified	+1	−0	View file
security/selinux/include/security.h	modified	+4	−0	View file
security/selinux/netlabel.c	modified	+13	−21	View file
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c	modified	+259	−10	View file
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c	modified	+7	−0	View file
security/selinux/ss/services.c	modified	+125	−19	View file

Only the first 600 diff lines are shown. Download the complete patch.

Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt

View file

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
index 1d19256..8cfca17 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/vm:
 - min_unmapped_ratio
 - min_slab_ratio
 - panic_on_oom
+- mmap_min_address
 
 ==============================================================
 
@@ -216,3 +217,17 @@ above-mentioned.
 The default value is 0.
 1 and 2 are for failover of clustering. Please select either
 according to your policy of failover.
+
+==============================================================
+
+mmap_min_addr
+
+This file indicates the amount of address space  which a user process will
+be restricted from mmaping.  Since kernel null dereference bugs could
+accidentally operate based on the information in the first couple of pages
+of memory userspace processes should not be allowed to write to them.  By
+default this value is set to 0 and no protections will be enforced by the
+security module.  Setting this value to something like 64k will allow the
+vast majority of applications to work correctly and provide defense in depth
+against future potential kernel bugs.
+

include/linux/security.h

View file

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9eb9e0f..c11dc8a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx;
 extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 
+extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
 /*
  * Values used in the task_security_ops calls
  */
@@ -1241,8 +1242,9 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*file_ioctl) (struct file * file, unsigned int cmd,
 			   unsigned long arg);
 	int (*file_mmap) (struct file * file,
-			  unsigned long reqprot,
-			  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
+			  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+			  unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
+			  unsigned long addr_only);
 	int (*file_mprotect) (struct vm_area_struct * vma,
 			      unsigned long reqprot,
 			      unsigned long prot);
@@ -1814,9 +1816,12 @@ static inline int security_file_ioctl (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
 static inline int security_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 				      unsigned long prot,
-				      unsigned long flags)
+				      unsigned long flags,
+				      unsigned long addr,
+				      unsigned long addr_only)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+	return security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr,
+					addr_only);
 }
 
 static inline int security_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -2489,7 +2494,9 @@ static inline int security_file_ioctl (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
 static inline int security_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 				      unsigned long prot,
-				      unsigned long flags)
+				      unsigned long flags,
+				      unsigned long addr,
+				      unsigned long addr_only)
 {
 	return 0;
 }

kernel/sysctl.c

View file

diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 51f5dac..d93e13d 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -949,6 +949,16 @@ static ctl_table vm_table[] = {
 		.strategy	= &sysctl_jiffies,
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+	{
+		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+		.procname	= "mmap_min_addr",
+		.data		= &mmap_min_addr,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(unsigned long),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= &proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+	},
+#endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) || \
    (defined(CONFIG_SUPERH) && defined(CONFIG_VSYSCALL))
 	{

mm/mmap.c

View file

diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 906ed40..9f70c8e 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file * file, unsigned long addr,
 		}
 	}
 
-	error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+	error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-		
+
 	/* Clear old maps */
 	error = -ENOMEM;
 munmap_back:

mm/mremap.c

View file

diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index 5d4bd4f..bc7c52e 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -291,6 +291,10 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long addr,
 		if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr)
 			goto out;
 
+		ret = security_file_mmap(0, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
 		ret = do_munmap(mm, new_addr, new_len);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
@@ -390,8 +394,13 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long addr,
 
 			new_addr = get_unmapped_area(vma->vm_file, 0, new_len,
 						vma->vm_pgoff, map_flags);
-			ret = new_addr;
-			if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+			if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
+				ret = new_addr;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			ret = security_file_mmap(0, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
+			if (ret)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);

mm/nommu.c

View file

diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
index 2b16b00..989e2e9 100644
--- a/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/mm/nommu.c
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file,
 	}
 
 	/* allow the security API to have its say */
-	ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+	ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 

security/dummy.c

View file

diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 8ffd764..d6a112c 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -420,8 +420,12 @@ static int dummy_file_ioctl (struct file *file, unsigned int command,
 
 static int dummy_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			    unsigned long prot,
-			    unsigned long flags)
+			    unsigned long flags,
+			    unsigned long addr,
+			    unsigned long addr_only)
 {
+	if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+		return -EACCES;
 	return 0;
 }
 

security/security.c

View file

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fc8601b..27e5863 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
 extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 struct security_operations *security_ops;	/* Initialized to NULL */
+unsigned long mmap_min_addr;		/* 0 means no protection */
 
 static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
 {

security/selinux/avc.c

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index e4396a8..78c408f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 				}
 			}
 			if (inode)
-				audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%ld",
+				audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
 						 inode->i_sb->s_id,
 						 inode->i_ino);
 			break;
@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @flags:  AVC_STRICT or 0
  * @avd: access vector decisions
  *
  * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
@@ -846,8 +847,9 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
  * should be released for the auditing.
  */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                         u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-                         struct av_decision *avd)
+			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			 unsigned flags,
+			 struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 	struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae;
@@ -874,7 +876,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
 
 	if (!requested || denied) {
-		if (selinux_enforcing)
+		if (selinux_enforcing || (flags & AVC_STRICT))
 			rc = -EACCES;
 		else
 			if (node)
@@ -909,7 +911,7 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
 	avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
 	return rc;
 }

security/selinux/hooks.c

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ad8dd4e..aff8f46 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1592,9 +1592,10 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
 	rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
-					SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
-					CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
-					NULL);
+					  SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
+					  CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
+					  0,
+					  NULL);
 
 	if (rc == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2568,12 +2569,16 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
 }
 
 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+			     unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
 {
-	int rc;
+	int rc = 0;
+	u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
-	if (rc)
+	if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+	if (rc || addr_only)
 		return rc;
 
 	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
@@ -3124,17 +3129,19 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 /**
  * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
  * @skb: the packet
- * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only external labels
  * @sid: the packet's SID
  *
  * Description:
  * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
- * the external SID for the packet.
+ * the external SID for the packet.  If only one form of external labeling is
+ * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
+ * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
+ * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
+ * security attributes.  This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
  *
  */
-static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
-				   u32 base_sid,
-				   u32 *sid)
+static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
 {
 	u32 xfrm_sid;
 	u32 nlbl_sid;
@@ -3142,10 +3149,9 @@ static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 	if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
 					 (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
-					  base_sid : xfrm_sid),
+					  SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
 					 &nlbl_sid) != 0)
 		nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
 	*sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
 }
 
@@ -3690,7 +3696,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 	if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
 		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
 	else if (skb)
-		selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peer_secid);
+		selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid);
 
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -3751,7 +3757,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	u32 newsid;
 	u32 peersid;
 
-	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
+	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid);
 	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
 		req->secid = sksec->sid;
 		req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -3789,7 +3795,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 {
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
+	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
 }
 
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -4626,7 +4632,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 		if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
 			error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
 						     SECCLASS_PROCESS,
-						     PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
+						     PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
 			if (!error)
 				tsec->sid = sid;
 			task_unlock(p);

security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index b83e740..049bf69 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -158,3 +158,4 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, "create")
    S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
    S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
+   S_(SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, "mmap_zero")

security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 5fee173..eda89a2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -823,3 +823,4 @@
 #define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                    0x00200000UL
 #define DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                    0x00400000UL
 #define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT                 0x00800000UL
+#define MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO                     0x00000001UL

security/selinux/include/avc.h

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 6ed10c3..e145f6e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                u16 tclass, u32 requested,
                struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
 
+#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                         u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-                         struct av_decision *avd);
+			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			 unsigned flags,
+			 struct av_decision *avd);
 
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                  u16 tclass, u32 requested,

security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 3787990..e77de0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -63,3 +63,4 @@
     S_("key")
     S_(NULL)
     S_("dccp_socket")
+    S_("memprotect")

security/selinux/include/flask.h

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index 35f309f..a9c2b20 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 #define SECCLASS_PACKET                                  57
 #define SECCLASS_KEY                                     58
 #define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET                             60
+#define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT                              61
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities

security/selinux/include/security.h

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index b94378a..83bdd4d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ extern int selinux_mls_enabled;
 
 int security_load_policy(void * data, size_t len);
 
+#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
 	u32 allowed;
 	u32 decided;
@@ -87,6 +88,9 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 
 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
 
+int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
+int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR		1 /* use xattr */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS		2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK		3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs */

security/selinux/netlabel.c

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index e64eca2..8192e8b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -158,9 +158,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
 	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
-		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
-						    base_sid,
-						    sid);
+		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid);
 	else
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -198,7 +196,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 	if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
 	    secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
 	    security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
-					   SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+					   SECINITSID_NETMSG,
 					   &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
 		sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -295,38 +293,32 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int rc;
-	u32 netlbl_sid;
-	u32 recv_perm;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
+	u32 perm;
 
-	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
-					  SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
-					  &netlbl_sid);
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, SECINITSID_NETMSG, &nlbl_sid);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
-
-	if (netlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
-		return 0;
+	if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 	switch (sksec->sclass) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
-		recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 		break;
 	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
-		recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 		break;
 	default:
-		recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
-			  netlbl_sid,
-			  sksec->sclass,
-			  recv_perm,
-			  ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
+	if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+		netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
 

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

View file

diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index aca099a..c9e92da 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ static struct dentry *bool_dir = NULL;
 static int bool_num = 0;
 static int *bool_pending_values = NULL;
 
+/* global data for classes */
+static struct dentry *class_dir = NULL;
+static unsigned long last_class_ino;
+
 extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */
@@ -106,6 +110,7 @@ static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
 
 #define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET 	0x01000000
 #define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET	0x02000000
+#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET	0x04000000
 #define SEL_INO_MASK		0x00ffffff
 
 #define TMPBUFLEN	12
@@ -237,6 +242,11 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
 
 /* declaration for sel_write_load */
 static int sel_make_bools(void);
+static int sel_make_classes(void);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
+static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			unsigned long *ino);
 
 static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -287,10 +297,18 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = sel_make_bools();
+	if (ret) {
+		length = ret;
+		goto out1;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_classes();
 	if (ret)
 		length = ret;
 	else
 		length = count;
+
+out1:
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
 		"policy loaded auid=%u",
 		audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
@@ -940,9 +958,8 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
 	.write          = sel_commit_bools_write,
 };
 
-/* delete booleans - partial revoke() from
- * fs/proc/generic.c proc_kill_inodes */
-static void sel_remove_bools(struct dentry *de)
+/* partial revoke() from fs/proc/generic.c proc_kill_inodes */
+static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
 {
 	struct list_head *p, *node;
 	struct super_block *sb = de->d_sb;
@@ -998,7 +1015,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 	kfree(bool_pending_values);
 	bool_pending_values = NULL;
 
-	sel_remove_bools(dir);
+	sel_remove_entries(dir);
 
 	if (!(page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL)))
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1048,7 +1065,7 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 err:
 	kfree(values);
-	sel_remove_bools(dir);
+	sel_remove_entries(dir);
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	goto out;
 }
@@ -1294,7 +1311,227 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+static inline unsigned int sel_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
+{
+	return a / b - (a % b < 0);

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6

Changes

Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt

include/linux/security.h

kernel/sysctl.c

mm/mmap.c

mm/mremap.c

mm/nommu.c

security/dummy.c

security/security.c

security/selinux/avc.c

security/selinux/hooks.c

security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h

security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h

security/selinux/include/avc.h

security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h

security/selinux/include/flask.h

security/selinux/include/security.h

security/selinux/netlabel.c

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

security/selinux/ss/policydb.c

security/selinux/ss/services.c