diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h index 35389b2..0216f63 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -81,22 +81,4 @@ do { \ #include -/* - * Make previous memory operations globally visible before - * a WRMSR. - * - * MFENCE makes writes visible, but only affects load/store - * instructions. WRMSR is unfortunately not a load/store - * instruction and is unaffected by MFENCE. The LFENCE ensures - * that the WRMSR is not reordered. - * - * Most WRMSRs are full serializing instructions themselves and - * do not require this barrier. This is only required for the - * IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and X2APIC MSRs. - */ -static inline void weak_wrmsr_fence(void) -{ - asm volatile("mfence; lfence" : : : "memory"); -} - #endif /* _ASM_X86_BARRIER_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 4af140c..632c26c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ -#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN (7*32+28) /* "" CPU based on Zen microarchitecture */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" Generic flag for all Zen and newer */ #define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */ #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL ( 7*32+31) /* "" MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL configured */ @@ -308,10 +308,14 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SMBA (11*32+21) /* "" Slow Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_BMEC (11*32+22) /* "" Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration */ #define X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK (11*32+23) /* Shadow stack support for user mode applications */ - #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO (11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */ #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS (11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */ #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT (11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */ +#define X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE (11*32+27) /* "" IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and X2APIC MSRs need fencing */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN2 (11*32+28) /* "" CPU based on Zen2 microarchitecture */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN3 (11*32+29) /* "" CPU based on Zen3 microarchitecture */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN4 (11*32+30) /* "" CPU based on Zen4 microarchitecture */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN1 (11*32+31) /* "" CPU based on Zen1 microarchitecture */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index ae81a71..26620d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -749,4 +749,22 @@ enum mds_mitigations { extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void); +/* + * Make previous memory operations globally visible before + * a WRMSR. + * + * MFENCE makes writes visible, but only affects load/store + * instructions. WRMSR is unfortunately not a load/store + * instruction and is unaffected by MFENCE. The LFENCE ensures + * that the WRMSR is not reordered. + * + * Most WRMSRs are full serializing instructions themselves and + * do not require this barrier. This is only required for the + * IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and X2APIC MSRs. + */ +static inline void weak_wrmsr_fence(void) +{ + alternative("mfence; lfence", "", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE)); +} + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index f322ebd..9f42d1c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -34,87 +34,6 @@ */ static u32 nodes_per_socket = 1; -/* - * AMD errata checking - * - * Errata are defined as arrays of ints using the AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM() or - * AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM() macros. The latter is intended for newer errata that - * have an OSVW id assigned, which it takes as first argument. Both take a - * variable number of family-specific model-stepping ranges created by - * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(). - * - * Example: - * - * const int amd_erratum_319[] = - * AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x2, 0x1, 0x4, 0x2), - * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x8, 0x0, 0x8, 0x0), - * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x9, 0x0, 0x9, 0x0)); - */ - -#define AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(...) { -1, __VA_ARGS__, 0 } -#define AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(osvw_id, ...) { osvw_id, __VA_ARGS__, 0 } -#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE(f, m_start, s_start, m_end, s_end) \ - ((f << 24) | (m_start << 16) | (s_start << 12) | (m_end << 4) | (s_end)) -#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range) (((range) >> 24) & 0xff) -#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range) (((range) >> 12) & 0xfff) -#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_END(range) ((range) & 0xfff) - -static const int amd_erratum_400[] = - AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(1, AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0xf, 0x41, 0x2, 0xff, 0xf), - AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x2, 0x1, 0xff, 0xf)); - -static const int amd_erratum_383[] = - AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(3, AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0, 0, 0xff, 0xf)); - -/* #1054: Instructions Retired Performance Counter May Be Inaccurate */ -static const int amd_erratum_1054[] = - AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0, 0, 0x2f, 0xf)); - -static const int amd_zenbleed[] = - AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x30, 0x0, 0x4f, 0xf), - AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x60, 0x0, 0x7f, 0xf), - AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x90, 0x0, 0x91, 0xf), - AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf)); - -static const int amd_div0[] = - AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x00, 0x0, 0x2f, 0xf), - AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x50, 0x0, 0x5f, 0xf)); - -static const int amd_erratum_1485[] = - AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x10, 0x0, 0x1f, 0xf), - AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x60, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf)); - -static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum) -{ - int osvw_id = *erratum++; - u32 range; - u32 ms; - - if (osvw_id >= 0 && osvw_id < 65536 && - cpu_has(cpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) { - u64 osvw_len; - - rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH, osvw_len); - if (osvw_id < osvw_len) { - u64 osvw_bits; - - rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS + (osvw_id >> 6), - osvw_bits); - return osvw_bits & (1ULL << (osvw_id & 0x3f)); - } - } - - /* OSVW unavailable or ID unknown, match family-model-stepping range */ - ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_stepping; - while ((range = *erratum++)) - if ((cpu->x86 == AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range)) && - (ms >= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range)) && - (ms <= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_END(range))) - return true; - - return false; -} - static inline int rdmsrl_amd_safe(unsigned msr, unsigned long long *p) { u32 gprs[8] = { 0 }; @@ -616,6 +535,49 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } resctrl_cpu_detect(c); + + /* Figure out Zen generations: */ + switch (c->x86) { + case 0x17: { + switch (c->x86_model) { + case 0x00 ... 0x2f: + case 0x50 ... 0x5f: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN1); + break; + case 0x30 ... 0x4f: + case 0x60 ... 0x7f: + case 0x90 ... 0x91: + case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN2); + break; + default: + goto warn; + } + break; + } + case 0x19: { + switch (c->x86_model) { + case 0x00 ... 0x0f: + case 0x20 ... 0x5f: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN3); + break; + case 0x10 ... 0x1f: + case 0x60 ... 0xaf: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN4); + break; + default: + goto warn; + } + break; + } + default: + break; + } + + return; + +warn: + WARN_ONCE(1, "Family 0x%x, model: 0x%x??\n", c->x86, c->x86_model); } static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -739,15 +701,6 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->x86 == 0x16 && c->x86_model <= 0xf) msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, 15); - /* - * Check whether the machine is affected by erratum 400. This is - * used to select the proper idle routine and to enable the check - * whether the machine is affected in arch_post_acpi_init(), which - * sets the X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E bug depending on the MSR check. - */ - if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_400)) - set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400); - early_detect_mem_encrypt(c); /* Re-enable TopologyExtensions if switched off by BIOS */ @@ -814,6 +767,16 @@ static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, 6); #endif set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE); + + /* + * Check models and steppings affected by erratum 400. This is + * used to select the proper idle routine and to enable the + * check whether the machine is affected in arch_post_acpi_subsys_init() + * which sets the X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E bug depending on the MSR check. + */ + if (c->x86_model > 0x41 || + (c->x86_model == 0x41 && c->x86_stepping >= 0x2)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_AMD_E400); } static void init_amd_gh(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -847,8 +810,17 @@ static void init_amd_gh(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2, 24); - if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_383)) - set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH); + set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH); + + /* + * Check models and steppings affected by erratum 400. This is + * used to select the proper idle routine and to enable the + * check whether the machine is affected in arch_post_acpi_subsys_init() + * which sets the X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E bug depending on the MSR check. + */ + if (c->x86_model > 0x2 || + (c->x86_model == 0x2 && c->x86_stepping >= 0x1)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_AMD_E400); } static void init_amd_ln(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -941,6 +913,19 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c); } +static void fix_erratum_1386(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + /* + * Work around Erratum 1386. The XSAVES instruction malfunctions in + * certain circumstances on Zen1/2 uarch, and not all parts have had + * updated microcode at the time of writing (March 2023). + * + * Affected parts all have no supervisor XSAVE states, meaning that + * the XSAVEC instruction (which works fine) is equivalent. + */ + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); +} + void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY @@ -951,34 +936,28 @@ void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * * This suppresses speculation from the middle of a basic block, i.e. it * suppresses non-branch predictions. - * - * We use STIBP as a heuristic to filter out Zen2 from the rest of F17H */ - if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) { + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, &value)) { value |= MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT; wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value); } } #endif - /* - * Work around Erratum 1386. The XSAVES instruction malfunctions in - * certain circumstances on Zen1/2 uarch, and not all parts have had - * updated microcode at the time of writing (March 2023). - * - * Affected parts all have no supervisor XSAVE states, meaning that - * the XSAVEC instruction (which works fine) is equivalent. - */ - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); } -static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +static void init_amd_zen_common(void) { - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN); - + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN); #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA node_reclaim_distance = 32; #endif +} + +static void init_amd_zen1(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + init_amd_zen_common(); + fix_erratum_1386(c); /* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { @@ -986,15 +965,10 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB)) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); - - /* - * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to - * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the - * BTC_NO bit. - */ - if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO); } + + pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 DIV0 bug detected. Disable SMT for full protection.\n"); + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_DIV0); } static bool cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode(void) @@ -1018,11 +992,8 @@ static bool cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode(void) return true; } -static void zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +static void zen2_zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - if (!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_zenbleed)) - return; - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) return; @@ -1037,6 +1008,37 @@ static void zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static void init_amd_zen2(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + init_amd_zen_common(); + init_spectral_chicken(c); + fix_erratum_1386(c); + zen2_zenbleed_check(c); +} + +static void init_amd_zen3(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + init_amd_zen_common(); + + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { + /* + * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to + * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the + * BTC_NO bit. + */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO); + } +} + +static void init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + init_amd_zen_common(); + + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT); +} + static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 vm_cr; @@ -1072,11 +1074,17 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break; case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break; case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break; - case 0x17: init_spectral_chicken(c); - fallthrough; - case 0x19: init_amd_zn(c); break; } + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN1)) + init_amd_zen1(c); + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN2)) + init_amd_zen2(c); + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN3)) + init_amd_zen3(c); + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN4)) + init_amd_zen4(c); + /* * Enable workaround for FXSAVE leak on CPUs * without a XSaveErPtr feature @@ -1136,7 +1144,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * Counter May Be Inaccurate". */ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IRPERF) && - !cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1054)) + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN1) && c->x86_model > 0x2f)) msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT); check_null_seg_clears_base(c); @@ -1152,16 +1160,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) WARN_ON_ONCE(msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS)); - zenbleed_check(c); - - if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_div0)) { - pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 DIV0 bug detected. Disable SMT for full protection.\n"); - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_DIV0); - } - - if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && - cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1485)) - msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT); + /* AMD CPUs don't need fencing after x2APIC/TSC_DEADLINE MSR writes. */ + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE); } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 @@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused) { struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id()); - zenbleed_check(c); + zen2_zenbleed_check(c); } void amd_check_microcode(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index b14fc8c..98f7ea6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1856,6 +1856,13 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->topo.apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->topo.initial_apicid, 0); #endif + + /* + * Set default APIC and TSC_DEADLINE MSR fencing flag. AMD and + * Hygon will clear it in ->c_init() below. + */ + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE); + /* * Vendor-specific initialization. In this section we * canonicalize the feature flags, meaning if there are diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c index 6f247d6..f0cd955 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c @@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS); check_null_seg_clears_base(c); + + /* Hygon CPUs don't need fencing after x2APIC/TSC_DEADLINE MSR writes. */ + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE); } static void cpu_detect_tlb_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_epb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_epb.c index e4c3ba9..f18d35f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_epb.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_epb.c @@ -237,4 +237,4 @@ err_out_online: cpuhp_remove_state(CPUHP_AP_X86_INTEL_EPB_ONLINE); return ret; } -subsys_initcall(intel_epb_init); +late_initcall(intel_epb_init); diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 4af140c..f4542d2 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ -#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN (7*32+28) /* "" CPU based on Zen microarchitecture */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" Generic flag for all Zen and newer */ #define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */ #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL ( 7*32+31) /* "" MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL configured */