projects/linux·commit bfb819ea

proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener

bfb819ea · Kees Cook <[email protected]> · 2021-05-25 12:37:35 -07:00

Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/
files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not
transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to
trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write
to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly
exploitable behaviors.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Commit
bfb819ea20ce8bbeeba17e1a6418bf8bda91fc28
Parents
ad9f25d3

Changes

1 files changed · +4 −0

FileStatusAddDelContent
fs/proc/base.cmodified+4−0View file

fs/proc/base.c

View file
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 3851bfc..58bbf33 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2703,6 +2703,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
void *page;
int rv;
+ /* A task may only write when it was the opener. */
+ if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred())
+ return -EPERM;
+
rcu_read_lock();
task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!task) {