projects/linux·commit d80825ee

Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.14_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

d80825ee · Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> · 2025-01-21 08:22:40 -08:00

Pull x86 CPU speculation update from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add support for AMD hardware which is not affected by SRSO on the
   user/kernel attack vector and advertise it to guest userspace

* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.14_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  KVM: x86: Advertise SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO to userspace
  x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support
Commit
d80825ee4a34a1b108aee51cd0302be0ab7943fa
Parents
0763dd89 · 716f86b5

Merge commit. Changes below are compared with the first parent: 0763dd89.

Changes

4 files changed · +7 −1

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

View file
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 645aa36..0e2d817 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -465,6 +465,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB (20*32+27) /* Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (20*32+28) /* MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */
#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (20*32+29) /* CPU is not affected by SRSO */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO (20*32+30) /* CPU is not affected by SRSO across user/kernel boundaries */
/*
* Extended auxiliary flags: Linux defined - for features scattered in various

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

View file
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 47a01d4..5a505aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2615,6 +2615,9 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
break;
case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO))
+ goto ibpb_on_vmexit;
+
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
/*
* Enable the return thunk for generated code
@@ -2658,6 +2661,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
}
break;
+ibpb_on_vmexit:
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c

View file
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 3e90376..7e8d811 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1270,6 +1270,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x1a, SRSO),
{}
};

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c

View file
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index ae0b438..f7e2229 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX,
F(NO_NESTED_DATA_BP) | F(LFENCE_RDTSC) | 0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |
F(NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE) | F(AUTOIBRS) | 0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ |
- F(WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS)
+ F(WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS) | F(SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO)
);
kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);