diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 55fc331..393d711 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ config ARM64 select HOTPLUG_SMT if HOTPLUG_CPU select IRQ_DOMAIN select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING + select JUMP_LABEL select KASAN_VMALLOC if KASAN select LOCK_MM_AND_FIND_VMA select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h index ba5df0d..9f38340 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h @@ -287,17 +287,6 @@ .Lskip_fgt2_\@: .endm -.macro __init_el2_gcs - mrs_s x1, SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 - ubfx x1, x1, #ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS_SHIFT, #4 - cbz x1, .Lskip_gcs_\@ - - /* Ensure GCS is not enabled when we start trying to do BLs */ - msr_s SYS_GCSCR_EL1, xzr - msr_s SYS_GCSCRE0_EL1, xzr -.Lskip_gcs_\@: -.endm - /** * Initialize EL2 registers to sane values. This should be called early on all * cores that were booted in EL2. Note that everything gets initialised as @@ -319,7 +308,6 @@ __init_el2_cptr __init_el2_fgt __init_el2_fgt2 - __init_el2_gcs .endm #ifndef __KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__ @@ -371,6 +359,13 @@ msr_s SYS_MPAMHCR_EL2, xzr // clear TRAP_MPAMIDR_EL1 -> EL2 .Lskip_mpam_\@: + check_override id_aa64pfr1, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS_SHIFT, .Linit_gcs_\@, .Lskip_gcs_\@, x1, x2 + +.Linit_gcs_\@: + msr_s SYS_GCSCR_EL1, xzr + msr_s SYS_GCSCRE0_EL1, xzr + +.Lskip_gcs_\@: check_override id_aa64pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SVE_SHIFT, .Linit_sve_\@, .Lskip_sve_\@, x1, x2 .Linit_sve_\@: /* SVE register access */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile index 2920b0a..a2faf00 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ obj-y := debug-monitors.o entry.o irq.o fpsimd.o \ cpufeature.o alternative.o cacheinfo.o \ smp.o smp_spin_table.o topology.o smccc-call.o \ syscall.o proton-pack.o idle.o patching.o pi/ \ - rsi.o + rsi.o jump_label.o obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += sys32.o signal32.o \ sys_compat.o @@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += perf_regs.o perf_callchain.o obj-$(CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF) += watchdog_hld.o obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT) += hw_breakpoint.o obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_PM) += sleep.o suspend.o -obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o obj-$(CONFIG_KGDB) += kgdb.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += efi.o efi-rt-wrapper.o obj-$(CONFIG_PCI) += pci.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index b34044e..e151585 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -3135,6 +3135,13 @@ static bool has_sve_feature(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SME +static bool has_sme_feature(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope) +{ + return system_supports_sme() && has_user_cpuid_feature(cap, scope); +} +#endif + static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = { HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, AES, PMULL, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_PMULL), HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, AES, AES, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_AES), @@ -3223,31 +3230,31 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = { HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, BC, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_HBC), #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SME HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SME, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, FA64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_FA64), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, LUTv2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_LUTV2), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P2), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p1, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P1), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I64), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F64F64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F64F64), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I32), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16B16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16B16), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F16), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F16), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F32), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I8I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I8I32), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F32), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16F32), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, BI32I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_BI32I32), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F32F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F32F32), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8FMA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8FMA), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP4), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP2), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SBitPerm, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SBITPERM), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, AES, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_AES), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SFEXPA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SFEXPA), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, STMOP, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_STMOP), - HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMOP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SMOP4), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, FA64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_FA64), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, LUTv2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_LUTV2), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P2), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p1, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P1), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I64), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F64F64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F64F64), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I32), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16B16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16B16), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F16), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F16), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F32), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I8I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I8I32), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F32), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16F32), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, BI32I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_BI32I32), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F32F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F32F32), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8FMA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8FMA), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP4), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP2), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SBitPerm, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SBITPERM), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, AES, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_AES), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SFEXPA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SFEXPA), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, STMOP, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_STMOP), + HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMOP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SMOP4), #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SME */ HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64FPFR0_EL1, F8CVT, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_F8CVT), HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64FPFR0_EL1, F8FMA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_F8FMA), diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c index 3857fd7..62230d6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include +#include static bool region_is_misaligned(const efi_memory_desc_t *md) { @@ -214,9 +215,13 @@ static int __init arm64_efi_rt_init(void) if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) return 0; - p = __vmalloc_node(THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL, - NUMA_NO_NODE, &&l); -l: if (!p) { + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { + clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + p = arch_alloc_vmap_stack(THREAD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE); + if (!p) { pr_warn("Failed to allocate EFI runtime stack\n"); clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags); return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index 5954cec..08b7042 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -673,6 +673,11 @@ static void permission_overlay_switch(struct task_struct *next) current->thread.por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0); if (current->thread.por_el0 != next->thread.por_el0) { write_sysreg_s(next->thread.por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0); + /* + * No ISB required as we can tolerate spurious Overlay faults - + * the fault handler will check again based on the new value + * of POR_EL0. + */ } } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c index 3b3f6b5..21a7953 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c @@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ static inline unsigned int num_other_online_cpus(void) void smp_send_stop(void) { static unsigned long stop_in_progress; - cpumask_t mask; + static cpumask_t mask; unsigned long timeout; /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index ec0a337..11eb8d1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -487,17 +487,29 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, } } -static bool fault_from_pkey(unsigned long esr, struct vm_area_struct *vma, - unsigned int mm_flags) +static bool fault_from_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int mm_flags) { - unsigned long iss2 = ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr); - if (!system_supports_poe()) return false; - if (esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr) && (iss2 & ESR_ELx_Overlay)) - return true; - + /* + * We do not check whether an Overlay fault has occurred because we + * cannot make a decision based solely on its value: + * + * - If Overlay is set, a fault did occur due to POE, but it may be + * spurious in those cases where we update POR_EL0 without ISB (e.g. + * on context-switch). We would then need to manually check POR_EL0 + * against vma_pkey(vma), which is exactly what + * arch_vma_access_permitted() does. + * + * - If Overlay is not set, we may still need to report a pkey fault. + * This is the case if an access was made within a mapping but with no + * page mapped, and POR_EL0 forbids the access (according to + * vma_pkey()). Such access will result in a SIGSEGV regardless + * because core code checks arch_vma_access_permitted(), but in order + * to report the correct error code - SEGV_PKUERR - we must handle + * that case here. + */ return !arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION, @@ -635,7 +647,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, goto bad_area; } - if (fault_from_pkey(esr, vma, mm_flags)) { + if (fault_from_pkey(vma, mm_flags)) { pkey = vma_pkey(vma); vma_end_read(vma); fault = 0; @@ -679,7 +691,7 @@ retry: goto bad_area; } - if (fault_from_pkey(esr, vma, mm_flags)) { + if (fault_from_pkey(vma, mm_flags)) { pkey = vma_pkey(vma); mmap_read_unlock(mm); fault = 0; diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S index 80d470a..54dccfd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S @@ -518,7 +518,6 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif msr REG_PIR_EL1, x0 orr tcr2, tcr2, TCR2_EL1_PIE - msr REG_TCR2_EL1, x0 .Lskip_indirection: