| 1 | |
| 2 | * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter --
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| 3 | * Jitter RNG standalone code.
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| 4 | *
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| 5 | * Copyright Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>, 2015 - 2023
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| 6 | *
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| 7 | * Design
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| 8 | * ======
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| 9 | *
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| 10 | * See https://www.chronox.de/jent/
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| 11 | *
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| 12 | * License
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| 13 | * =======
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| 14 | *
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| 15 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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| 16 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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| 17 | * are met:
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| 18 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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| 19 | * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
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| 20 | * including the disclaimer of warranties.
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| 21 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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| 22 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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| 23 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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| 24 | * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
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| 25 | * products derived from this software without specific prior
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| 26 | * written permission.
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| 27 | *
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| 28 | * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
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| 29 | * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are
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| 30 | * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
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| 31 | * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
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| 32 | * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
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| 33 | *
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| 34 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
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| 35 | * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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| 36 | * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
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| 37 | * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
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| 38 | * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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| 39 | * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
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| 40 | * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
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| 41 | * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
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| 42 | * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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| 43 | * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
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| 44 | * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
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| 45 | * DAMAGE.
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| 46 |
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| 47 |
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| 48 | |
| 49 | * This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library
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| 50 | * version 3.4.0 provided at https://www.chronox.de/jent/
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| 51 |
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| 52 |
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| 53 | #ifdef __OPTIMIZE__
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| 54 | #error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy.c."
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| 55 | #endif
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| 56 |
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| 57 | typedef unsigned long long __u64;
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| 58 | typedef long long __s64;
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| 59 | typedef unsigned int __u32;
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| 60 | typedef unsigned char u8;
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| 61 | #define NULL ((void *) 0)
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| 62 |
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| 63 |
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| 64 | struct rand_data {
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| 65 |
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| 66 | #define DATA_SIZE_BITS 256
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| 67 | |
| 68 | * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not
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| 69 | * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to
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| 70 | * calculate the next random value.
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| 71 | struct sha3_ctx *hash_state;
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| 72 | __u64 prev_time;
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| 73 | __u64 last_delta;
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| 74 | __s64 last_delta2;
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| 75 |
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| 76 | unsigned int flags;
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| 77 | unsigned int osr;
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| 78 | #define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128
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| 79 | #define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE \
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| 80 | (CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKS * \
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| 81 | CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE)
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| 82 | unsigned char *mem; |
| 83 | * memblocks * memblocksize
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| 84 | unsigned int memlocation;
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| 85 | unsigned int memblocks;
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| 86 | unsigned int memblocksize;
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| 87 | unsigned int memaccessloops; |
| 88 | * bit generation
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| 89 |
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| 90 |
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| 91 | unsigned int rct_count;
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| 92 |
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| 93 |
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| 94 | unsigned int apt_cutoff;
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| 95 | unsigned int apt_cutoff_permanent;
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| 96 | #define JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE 512
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| 97 |
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| 98 | #define JENT_APT_LSB 16
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| 99 | #define JENT_APT_WORD_MASK (JENT_APT_LSB - 1)
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| 100 | unsigned int apt_observations;
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| 101 | unsigned int apt_count;
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| 102 | unsigned int apt_base;
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| 103 | unsigned int health_failure;
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| 104 |
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| 105 | unsigned int apt_base_set:1;
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| 106 | };
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| 107 |
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| 108 |
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| 109 | #define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) |
| 110 | * entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for
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| 111 | * entropy collector
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| 112 |
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| 113 |
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| 114 | #define JENT_ENOTIME 1
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| 115 | #define JENT_ECOARSETIME 2
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| 116 | #define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC 3
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| 117 | #define JENT_EVARVAR 5 |
| 118 | * variations (2nd derivation of time is
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| 119 | * zero).
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| 120 | #define JENT_ESTUCK 8
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| 121 | #define JENT_EHEALTH 9
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| 122 | #define JENT_ERCT 10
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| 123 | #define JENT_EHASH 11
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| 124 | #define JENT_EMEM 12
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| 125 |
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| 126 | #define JENT_RCT_FAILURE 1
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| 127 | #define JENT_APT_FAILURE 2
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| 128 | #define JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT 16
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| 129 | #define JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE(x) (x << JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT)
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| 130 | #define JENT_RCT_FAILURE_PERMANENT JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE(JENT_RCT_FAILURE)
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| 131 | #define JENT_APT_FAILURE_PERMANENT JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE(JENT_APT_FAILURE)
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| 132 |
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| 133 | |
| 134 | * The output n bits can receive more than n bits of min entropy, of course,
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| 135 | * but the fixed output of the conditioning function can only asymptotically
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| 136 | * approach the output size bits of min entropy, not attain that bound. Random
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| 137 | * maps will tend to have output collisions, which reduces the creditable
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| 138 | * output entropy (that is what SP 800-90B Section 3.1.5.1.2 attempts to bound).
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| 139 | *
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| 140 | * The value "64" is justified in Appendix A.4 of the current 90C draft,
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| 141 | * and aligns with NIST's in "epsilon" definition in this document, which is
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| 142 | * that a string can be considered "full entropy" if you can bound the min
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| 143 | * entropy in each bit of output to at least 1-epsilon, where epsilon is
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| 144 | * required to be <= 2^(-32).
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| 145 |
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| 146 | #define JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR 64
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| 147 |
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| 148 | #include <linux/array_size.h>
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| 149 | #include <linux/fips.h>
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| 150 | #include <linux/minmax.h>
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| 151 | #include "jitterentropy.h"
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| 152 |
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| 153 | |
| 154 | * Adaptive Proportion Test
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| 155 | *
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| 156 | * This test complies with SP800-90B section 4.4.2.
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| 157 | **************************************************************************
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| 158 |
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| 159 | |
| 160 | * See the SP 800-90B comment #10b for the corrected cutoff for the SP 800-90B
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| 161 | * APT.
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| 162 | * https://www.untruth.org/~josh/sp80090b/UL%20SP800-90B-final%20comments%20v1.9%2020191212.pdf
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| 163 | * In the syntax of R, this is C = 2 + qbinom(1 − 2^(−30), 511, 2^(-1/osr)).
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| 164 | * (The original formula wasn't correct because the first symbol must
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| 165 | * necessarily have been observed, so there is no chance of observing 0 of these
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| 166 | * symbols.)
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| 167 | *
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| 168 | * For the alpha < 2^-53, R cannot be used as it uses a float data type without
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| 169 | * arbitrary precision. A SageMath script is used to calculate those cutoff
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| 170 | * values.
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| 171 | *
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| 172 | * For any value above 14, this yields the maximal allowable value of 512
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| 173 | * (by FIPS 140-2 IG 7.19 Resolution # 16, we cannot choose a cutoff value that
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| 174 | * renders the test unable to fail).
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| 175 |
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| 176 | static const unsigned int jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[15] = {
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| 177 | 325, 422, 459, 477, 488, 494, 499, 502,
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| 178 | 505, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512 };
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| 179 | static const unsigned int jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[15] = {
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| 180 | 355, 447, 479, 494, 502, 507, 510, 512,
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| 181 | 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512 };
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| 182 |
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| 183 | static void jent_apt_init(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int osr)
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| 184 | {
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| 185 | |
| 186 | * Establish the apt_cutoff based on the presumed entropy rate of
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| 187 | * 1/osr.
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| 188 |
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| 189 | if (osr >= ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_lookup)) {
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| 190 | ec->apt_cutoff = jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[
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| 191 | ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_lookup) - 1];
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| 192 | ec->apt_cutoff_permanent = jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[
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| 193 | ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup) - 1];
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| 194 | } else {
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| 195 | ec->apt_cutoff = jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[osr - 1];
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| 196 | ec->apt_cutoff_permanent =
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| 197 | jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[osr - 1];
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| 198 | }
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| 199 | }
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| 200 | |
| 201 | * Reset the APT counter
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| 202 | *
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| 203 | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
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| 204 |
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| 205 | static void jent_apt_reset(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked)
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| 206 | {
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| 207 |
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| 208 | ec->apt_count = 0;
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| 209 | ec->apt_base = delta_masked;
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| 210 | ec->apt_observations = 0;
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| 211 | }
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| 212 |
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| 213 | |
| 214 | * Insert a new entropy event into APT
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| 215 | *
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| 216 | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
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| 217 | * @delta_masked [in] Masked time delta to process
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| 218 |
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| 219 | static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked)
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| 220 | {
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| 221 |
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| 222 | if (!ec->apt_base_set) {
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| 223 | ec->apt_base = delta_masked;
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| 224 | ec->apt_base_set = 1;
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| 225 | return;
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| 226 | }
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| 227 |
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| 228 | if (delta_masked == ec->apt_base) {
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| 229 | ec->apt_count++;
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| 230 |
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| 231 |
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| 232 | if (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff_permanent)
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| 233 | ec->health_failure |= JENT_APT_FAILURE_PERMANENT;
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| 234 | else if (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff)
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| 235 | ec->health_failure |= JENT_APT_FAILURE;
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| 236 | }
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| 237 |
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| 238 | ec->apt_observations++;
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| 239 |
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| 240 | if (ec->apt_observations >= JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE)
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| 241 | jent_apt_reset(ec, delta_masked);
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| 242 | }
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| 243 |
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| 244 | |
| 245 | * Stuck Test and its use as Repetition Count Test
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| 246 | *
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| 247 | * The Jitter RNG uses an enhanced version of the Repetition Count Test
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| 248 | * (RCT) specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.1. Instead of counting identical
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| 249 | * back-to-back values, the input to the RCT is the counting of the stuck
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| 250 | * values during the generation of one Jitter RNG output block.
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| 251 | *
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| 252 | * The RCT is applied with an alpha of 2^{-30} compliant to FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8.
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| 253 | *
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| 254 | * During the counting operation, the Jitter RNG always calculates the RCT
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| 255 | * cut-off value of C. If that value exceeds the allowed cut-off value,
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| 256 | * the Jitter RNG output block will be calculated completely but discarded at
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| 257 | * the end. The caller of the Jitter RNG is informed with an error code.
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| 258 | **************************************************************************
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| 259 |
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| 260 | |
| 261 | * Repetition Count Test as defined in SP800-90B section 4.4.1
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| 262 | *
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| 263 | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
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| 264 | * @stuck [in] Indicator whether the value is stuck
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| 265 |
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| 266 | static void jent_rct_insert(struct rand_data *ec, int stuck)
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| 267 | {
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| 268 | if (stuck) {
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| 269 | ec->rct_count++;
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| 270 |
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| 271 | |
| 272 | * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration:
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| 273 | * alpha = 2^-30 or 2^-60 as recommended in SP800-90B.
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| 274 | * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/osr as this
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| 275 | * is the minimum entropy required to provide full entropy.
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| 276 | * Note, we collect (DATA_SIZE_BITS + ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR)*osr
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| 277 | * deltas for inserting them into the entropy pool which should
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| 278 | * then have (close to) DATA_SIZE_BITS bits of entropy in the
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| 279 | * conditioned output.
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| 280 | *
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| 281 | * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo
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| 282 | * code of SP800-90B section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence
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| 283 | * we need to subtract one from the cutoff value as calculated
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| 284 | * following SP800-90B. Thus C = ceil(-log_2(alpha)/H) = 30*osr
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| 285 | * or 60*osr.
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| 286 |
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| 287 | if ((unsigned int)ec->rct_count >= (60 * ec->osr)) {
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| 288 | ec->rct_count = -1;
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| 289 | ec->health_failure |= JENT_RCT_FAILURE_PERMANENT;
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| 290 | } else if ((unsigned int)ec->rct_count >= (30 * ec->osr)) {
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| 291 | ec->rct_count = -1;
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| 292 | ec->health_failure |= JENT_RCT_FAILURE;
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| 293 | }
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| 294 | } else {
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| 295 |
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| 296 | ec->rct_count = 0;
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| 297 | }
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| 298 | }
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| 299 |
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| 300 | static inline __u64 jent_delta(__u64 prev, __u64 next)
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| 301 | {
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| 302 | #define JENT_UINT64_MAX (__u64)(~((__u64) 0))
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| 303 | return (prev < next) ? (next - prev) :
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| 304 | (JENT_UINT64_MAX - prev + 1 + next);
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| 305 | }
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| 306 |
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| 307 | |
| 308 | * Stuck test by checking the:
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| 309 | * 1st derivative of the jitter measurement (time delta)
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| 310 | * 2nd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas)
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| 311 | * 3rd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas)
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| 312 | *
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| 313 | * All values must always be non-zero.
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| 314 | *
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| 315 | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
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| 316 | * @current_delta [in] Jitter time delta
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| 317 | *
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| 318 | * @return
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| 319 | * 0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit)
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| 320 | * 1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit)
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| 321 |
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| 322 | static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta)
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| 323 | {
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| 324 | __u64 delta2 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta, current_delta);
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| 325 | __u64 delta3 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta2, delta2);
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| 326 |
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| 327 | ec->last_delta = current_delta;
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| 328 | ec->last_delta2 = delta2;
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| 329 |
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| 330 | |
| 331 | * Insert the result of the comparison of two back-to-back time
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| 332 | * deltas.
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| 333 |
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| 334 | jent_apt_insert(ec, current_delta);
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| 335 |
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| 336 | if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3) {
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| 337 |
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| 338 | jent_rct_insert(ec, 1);
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| 339 | return 1;
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| 340 | }
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| 341 |
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| 342 |
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| 343 | jent_rct_insert(ec, 0);
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| 344 |
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| 345 | return 0;
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| 346 | }
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| 347 |
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| 348 | |
| 349 | * Report any health test failures
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| 350 | *
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| 351 | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
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| 352 | *
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| 353 | * @return a bitmask indicating which tests failed
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| 354 | * 0 No health test failure
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| 355 | * 1 RCT failure
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| 356 | * 2 APT failure
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| 357 | * 1<<JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT RCT permanent failure
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| 358 | * 2<<JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT APT permanent failure
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| 359 |
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| 360 | static unsigned int jent_health_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
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| 361 | {
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| 362 |
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| 363 | if (!fips_enabled)
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| 364 | return 0;
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| 365 |
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| 366 | return ec->health_failure;
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| 367 | }
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| 368 |
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| 369 | |
| 370 | * Noise sources
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| 371 | **************************************************************************
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| 372 |
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| 373 | |
| 374 | * Update of the loop count used for the next round of
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| 375 | * an entropy collection.
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| 376 | *
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| 377 | * Input:
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| 378 | * @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider
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| 379 | * @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at
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| 380 | * the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value
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| 381 | *
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| 382 | * @return Newly calculated loop counter
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| 383 |
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| 384 | static __u64 jent_loop_shuffle(unsigned int bits, unsigned int min)
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| 385 | {
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| 386 | __u64 time = 0;
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| 387 | __u64 shuffle = 0;
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| 388 | unsigned int i = 0;
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| 389 | unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1;
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| 390 |
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| 391 | jent_get_nstime(&time);
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| 392 |
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| 393 | |
| 394 | * We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many
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| 395 | * bits of the time stamp are included as possible.
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| 396 |
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| 397 | for (i = 0; ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + bits - 1) / bits) > i; i++) {
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| 398 | shuffle ^= time & mask;
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| 399 | time = time >> bits;
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| 400 | }
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| 401 |
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| 402 | |
| 403 | * We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum
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| 404 | * RNG loop count.
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| 405 |
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| 406 | return (shuffle + (1<<min));
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| 407 | }
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| 408 |
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| 409 | |
| 410 | * CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU
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| 411 | * execution time jitter
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| 412 | *
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| 413 | * This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the
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| 414 | * entropy pool using a hash.
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| 415 | *
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| 416 | * ec [in] entropy collector
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| 417 | * time [in] time stamp to be injected
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| 418 | * stuck [in] Is the time stamp identified as stuck?
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| 419 | *
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| 420 | * Output: updated hash context in the entropy collector
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| 421 |
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| 422 | static void jent_condition_data(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time, int stuck)
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| 423 | {
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| 424 | #define SHA3_HASH_LOOP (1<<3)
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| 425 | struct {
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| 426 | int rct_count;
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| 427 | unsigned int apt_observations;
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| 428 | unsigned int apt_count;
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| 429 | unsigned int apt_base;
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| 430 | } addtl = {
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| 431 | ec->rct_count,
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| 432 | ec->apt_observations,
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| 433 | ec->apt_count,
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| 434 | ec->apt_base
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| 435 | };
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| 436 |
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| 437 | jent_hash_time(ec->hash_state, time, (u8 *)&addtl, sizeof(addtl),
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| 438 | SHA3_HASH_LOOP, stuck);
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| 439 | }
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| 440 |
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| 441 | |
| 442 | * Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in
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| 443 | * memory access times
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| 444 | *
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| 445 | * This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing
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| 446 | * variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be
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| 447 | * added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1
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| 448 | * caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing.
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| 449 | *
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| 450 | * The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is usually
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| 451 | * slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal
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| 452 | * variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant
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| 453 | * variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more
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| 454 | * and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses.
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| 455 | * L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However,
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| 456 | * to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite
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| 457 | * large which is usually not desirable.
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| 458 | *
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| 459 | * @ec [in] Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if
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| 460 | * the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise
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| 461 | * source is disabled
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| 462 | * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value
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| 463 | * number of loops to perform the LFSR
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| 464 |
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| 465 | static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt)
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| 466 | {
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| 467 | unsigned int wrap = 0;
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| 468 | __u64 i = 0;
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| 469 | #define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7
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| 470 | #define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0
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| 471 | __u64 acc_loop_cnt =
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| 472 | jent_loop_shuffle(MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT);
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| 473 |
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| 474 | if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem)
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| 475 | return;
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| 476 | wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks;
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| 477 |
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| 478 | |
| 479 | * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
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| 480 | * needed during runtime
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| 481 |
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| 482 | if (loop_cnt)
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| 483 | acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;
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| 484 |
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| 485 | for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) {
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| 486 | unsigned char *tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation;
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| 487 | |
| 488 | * memory access: just add 1 to one byte,
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| 489 | * wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read
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| 490 | * from and write to memory location
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| 491 |
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| 492 | *tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff;
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| 493 | |
| 494 | * Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer
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| 495 | * with wrap around logic to ensure that every
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| 496 | * memory location is hit evenly
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| 497 |
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| 498 | ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1;
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| 499 | ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap;
|
| 500 | }
|
| 501 | }
|
| 502 |
|
| 503 | |
| 504 | * Start of entropy processing logic
|
| 505 | **************************************************************************
|
| 506 | |
| 507 | * This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and
|
| 508 | * use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is injected into the
|
| 509 | * entropy pool.
|
| 510 | *
|
| 511 | * WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output
|
| 512 | * of this function! This can be done by calling this function
|
| 513 | * and not using its result.
|
| 514 | *
|
| 515 | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
|
| 516 | *
|
| 517 | * @return result of stuck test
|
| 518 |
|
| 519 | static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 *ret_current_delta)
|
| 520 | {
|
| 521 | __u64 time = 0;
|
| 522 | __u64 current_delta = 0;
|
| 523 | int stuck;
|
| 524 |
|
| 525 |
|
| 526 | jent_memaccess(ec, 0);
|
| 527 |
|
| 528 | |
| 529 | * Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous
|
| 530 | * invocation to measure the timing variations
|
| 531 |
|
| 532 | jent_get_nstime(&time);
|
| 533 | current_delta = jent_delta(ec->prev_time, time);
|
| 534 | ec->prev_time = time;
|
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
|
| 537 | stuck = jent_stuck(ec, current_delta);
|
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
|
| 540 | jent_condition_data(ec, current_delta, stuck);
|
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
|
| 543 | if (ret_current_delta)
|
| 544 | *ret_current_delta = current_delta;
|
| 545 |
|
| 546 | return stuck;
|
| 547 | }
|
| 548 |
|
| 549 | |
| 550 | * Generator of one 64 bit random number
|
| 551 | * Function fills rand_data->hash_state
|
| 552 | *
|
| 553 | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 | static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec)
|
| 556 | {
|
| 557 | unsigned int k = 0, safety_factor = 0;
|
| 558 |
|
| 559 | if (fips_enabled)
|
| 560 | safety_factor = JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR;
|
| 561 |
|
| 562 |
|
| 563 | jent_measure_jitter(ec, NULL);
|
| 564 |
|
| 565 | while (!jent_health_failure(ec)) {
|
| 566 |
|
| 567 | if (jent_measure_jitter(ec, NULL))
|
| 568 | continue;
|
| 569 |
|
| 570 | |
| 571 | * We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the
|
| 572 | * oversampling rate requested by the caller
|
| 573 |
|
| 574 | if (++k >= ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + safety_factor) * ec->osr))
|
| 575 | break;
|
| 576 | }
|
| 577 | }
|
| 578 |
|
| 579 | |
| 580 | * Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller.
|
| 581 | *
|
| 582 | * This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate
|
| 583 | * as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic
|
| 584 | * creates 64 bit per invocation.
|
| 585 | *
|
| 586 | * This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact
|
| 587 | * size specified by the caller.
|
| 588 | *
|
| 589 | * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
|
| 590 | * @data [in] pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already
|
| 591 | * exist
|
| 592 | * @len [in] size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random
|
| 593 | * in bytes
|
| 594 | *
|
| 595 | * @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error
|
| 596 | *
|
| 597 | * The following error codes can occur:
|
| 598 | * -1 entropy_collector is NULL
|
| 599 | * -2 Intermittent health failure
|
| 600 | * -3 Permanent health failure
|
| 601 |
|
| 602 | int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data,
|
| 603 | unsigned int len)
|
| 604 | {
|
| 605 | unsigned char *p = data;
|
| 606 |
|
| 607 | if (!ec)
|
| 608 | return -1;
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 | while (len > 0) {
|
| 611 | unsigned int tocopy, health_test_result;
|
| 612 |
|
| 613 | jent_gen_entropy(ec);
|
| 614 |
|
| 615 | health_test_result = jent_health_failure(ec);
|
| 616 | if (health_test_result > JENT_PERMANENT_FAILURE_SHIFT) {
|
| 617 | |
| 618 | * At this point, the Jitter RNG instance is considered
|
| 619 | * as a failed instance. There is no rerun of the
|
| 620 | * startup test any more, because the caller
|
| 621 | * is assumed to not further use this instance.
|
| 622 |
|
| 623 | return -3;
|
| 624 | } else if (health_test_result) {
|
| 625 | |
| 626 | * Perform startup health tests and return permanent
|
| 627 | * error if it fails.
|
| 628 |
|
| 629 | if (jent_entropy_init(0, 0, NULL, ec)) {
|
| 630 |
|
| 631 | ec->health_failure &=
|
| 632 | JENT_RCT_FAILURE_PERMANENT |
|
| 633 | JENT_APT_FAILURE_PERMANENT;
|
| 634 | return -3;
|
| 635 | }
|
| 636 |
|
| 637 | return -2;
|
| 638 | }
|
| 639 |
|
| 640 | tocopy = min(DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8, len);
|
| 641 | jent_read_random_block(ec->hash_state, p, tocopy);
|
| 642 |
|
| 643 | len -= tocopy;
|
| 644 | p += tocopy;
|
| 645 | }
|
| 646 |
|
| 647 | return 0;
|
| 648 | }
|
| 649 |
|
| 650 | |
| 651 | * Initialization logic
|
| 652 | **************************************************************************
|
| 653 |
|
| 654 | struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,
|
| 655 | unsigned int flags,
|
| 656 | struct sha3_ctx *hash_state)
|
| 657 | {
|
| 658 | struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 | entropy_collector = jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data));
|
| 661 | if (!entropy_collector)
|
| 662 | return NULL;
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 | if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) {
|
| 665 | |
| 666 | * access
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 | entropy_collector->mem = jent_kvzalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE);
|
| 669 | if (!entropy_collector->mem) {
|
| 670 | jent_zfree(entropy_collector);
|
| 671 | return NULL;
|
| 672 | }
|
| 673 | entropy_collector->memblocksize =
|
| 674 | CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE;
|
| 675 | entropy_collector->memblocks =
|
| 676 | CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_MEMORY_BLOCKS;
|
| 677 | entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS;
|
| 678 | }
|
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
|
| 681 | if (osr == 0)
|
| 682 | osr = 1;
|
| 683 | entropy_collector->osr = osr;
|
| 684 | entropy_collector->flags = flags;
|
| 685 |
|
| 686 | entropy_collector->hash_state = hash_state;
|
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
|
| 689 | jent_apt_init(entropy_collector, osr);
|
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
|
| 692 | jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector);
|
| 693 |
|
| 694 | return entropy_collector;
|
| 695 | }
|
| 696 |
|
| 697 | void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
|
| 698 | {
|
| 699 | jent_kvzfree(entropy_collector->mem, JENT_MEMORY_SIZE);
|
| 700 | entropy_collector->mem = NULL;
|
| 701 | jent_zfree(entropy_collector);
|
| 702 | }
|
| 703 |
|
| 704 | int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags,
|
| 705 | struct sha3_ctx *hash_state, struct rand_data *p_ec)
|
| 706 | {
|
| 707 | |
| 708 | * If caller provides an allocated ec, reuse it which implies that the
|
| 709 | * health test entropy data is used to further still the available
|
| 710 | * entropy pool.
|
| 711 |
|
| 712 | struct rand_data *ec = p_ec;
|
| 713 | int i, time_backwards = 0, ret = 0, ec_free = 0;
|
| 714 | unsigned int health_test_result;
|
| 715 |
|
| 716 | if (!ec) {
|
| 717 | ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(osr, flags, hash_state);
|
| 718 | if (!ec)
|
| 719 | return JENT_EMEM;
|
| 720 | ec_free = 1;
|
| 721 | } else {
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 | jent_apt_reset(ec, 0);
|
| 724 |
|
| 725 | ec->apt_base_set = 0;
|
| 726 |
|
| 727 | ec->rct_count = 0;
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 | ec->health_failure &= (~JENT_RCT_FAILURE);
|
| 730 | ec->health_failure &= (~JENT_APT_FAILURE);
|
| 731 | }
|
| 732 |
|
| 733 | |
| 734 | * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
|
| 735 | * loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce
|
| 736 | * false positives.
|
| 737 | *
|
| 738 | * Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic
|
| 739 | * jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But
|
| 740 | * the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely
|
| 741 | * used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus,
|
| 742 | * no statistical tests.
|
| 743 |
|
| 744 |
|
| 745 | |
| 746 | * We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or
|
| 747 | * check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the
|
| 748 | * following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution
|
| 749 | * timer.
|
| 750 |
|
| 751 | |
| 752 | * TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is
|
| 753 | * definitely too little.
|
| 754 | *
|
| 755 | * SP800-90B requires at least 1024 initial test cycles.
|
| 756 |
|
| 757 | #define TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024
|
| 758 | #define CLEARCACHE 100
|
| 759 | for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) {
|
| 760 | __u64 start_time = 0, end_time = 0, delta = 0;
|
| 761 |
|
| 762 |
|
| 763 | jent_measure_jitter(ec, &delta);
|
| 764 | end_time = ec->prev_time;
|
| 765 | start_time = ec->prev_time - delta;
|
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
|
| 768 | if (!start_time || !end_time) {
|
| 769 | ret = JENT_ENOTIME;
|
| 770 | goto out;
|
| 771 | }
|
| 772 |
|
| 773 | |
| 774 | * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
|
| 775 | * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
|
| 776 | * implies that we also have a high resolution timer
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 | if (!delta) {
|
| 779 | ret = JENT_ECOARSETIME;
|
| 780 | goto out;
|
| 781 | }
|
| 782 |
|
| 783 | |
| 784 | * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
|
| 785 | * evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we
|
| 786 | * already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction,
|
| 787 | * etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case
|
| 788 | * measurements.
|
| 789 |
|
| 790 | if (i < CLEARCACHE)
|
| 791 | continue;
|
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
|
| 794 | if (!(end_time > start_time))
|
| 795 | time_backwards++;
|
| 796 | }
|
| 797 |
|
| 798 | |
| 799 | * we allow up to three times the time running backwards.
|
| 800 | * CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus,
|
| 801 | * if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it
|
| 802 | * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
|
| 803 | * performed during our test run.
|
| 804 |
|
| 805 | if (time_backwards > 3) {
|
| 806 | ret = JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;
|
| 807 | goto out;
|
| 808 | }
|
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
|
| 811 | health_test_result = jent_health_failure(ec);
|
| 812 | if (health_test_result) {
|
| 813 | ret = (health_test_result & JENT_RCT_FAILURE) ? JENT_ERCT :
|
| 814 | JENT_EHEALTH;
|
| 815 | goto out;
|
| 816 | }
|
| 817 |
|
| 818 | out:
|
| 819 | if (ec_free)
|
| 820 | jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);
|
| 821 |
|
| 822 | return ret;
|
| 823 | }
|